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Summary  
This thesis explores the ways in which professionals (in particular, social work 
professionals) define, produce, transfer, use, develop and disseminate knowledge 
of and for their profession and their practice. The thesis considers the issue(s) of 
professional knowledge from three related but distinct perspectives: philosophical, 
methodological and professional.  
From a philosophical perspective, the thesis articulates and examines the 
underpinning principles of epistemology and considers to what extent the 
professional social work knowledge debate has been informed by reference to 
these, and whether the application of appropriate epistemic principles has anything 
to offer the professions(s) in terms of its knowledge requirements.   
Methodologically, the thesis is informed by the history of the philosophy of science 
regarding the nature of inquiry. These considerations provide a clear paradigmatic 
rationale and context for the utilisation of a mixed-methods approach to the 
empirical content, with Q-Factor analysis being the quantitative method of choice, 
supported by semi-structured interviews.  
From a professional perspective, the thesis explores the views of those 
professionals actively engaged in those processes of defining, producing, 
transferring, using, developing and disseminating knowledge of and for social work. 
These three perspectives are here combined to provide a means by which the views 
and understandings of professionals can be articulated in meaningful ways and 
used to inform future discussion and practice regarding professional knowledge 
forms.   
The findings within this thesis reveal the differing ways professional social workers 
both theorise about and engage with knowledge in its many and varied forms. The 
findings also highlight the ways in which influences external to the individual affect 
how knowledge is, or is not used, and how some forms of knowledge appear to 
have preferential status. The conclusions suggest ways of responding to and 
addressing these issues by reference to a new pragmatic epistemology for the 
profession(s), which takes cognisance of the contemporary professional zeitgeist.    
 
 
x 
  
 
 
1 
Chapter 1: Context, Overview and Structure of the Thesis 
 
“Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science 
without philosophy of science is blind” (Lakatos 1971:91). 
 
1.0 Context and Overview 
This thesis aims to explore the ways in which professionals (in particular, social 
work professionals) define, produce, transfer, use, develop and disseminate 
knowledge of and for their profession and their practice. The thesis will initially 
examine the philosophical/theoretical issues regarding (professional) knowledge in 
order to provide a background and context for the empirical elements that follow, 
which themselves aim to investigate and explore contemporary approaches to 
knowledge definition, production, transfer, use, development and dissemination by 
reference to the practitioner’s own voice. In undertaking such inquiry, recourse to 
general philosophy, the philosophy of science and that of epistemology in particular 
is essential in order to provide a basis from which to explore the functional relevance 
of epistemological principles in contemporary social work (and professional) 
practice. In addition, cognisance is required of the central role of language in such 
discourse in terms of how it functions in relation to account(s) of ontology and, ergo, 
the particular epistemologies emerging from and relating to this.  
 
This orients us towards the role of language in depicting the two major ‘worldviews’ 
(‘weltanschauung’) extant (broadly) in relation to the philosophy of science and 
epistemology – realist and constructivist (Aerts et al 1994; Vidal 2012). It is these 
(somewhat dichotomous) positions revolving around the objective and the 
subjective that this thesis attempts to engage with and to consider by reference to 
a third, more inclusive, pluralistic or intersubjective worldview; that of pragmatism. 
Within this, the issue of the constitutive nature of language must be acknowledged 
and its potential implications considered, irrespective of the nature, integrative or 
otherwise, of any particular worldview. Vidal (2012:1) refers to these three 
worldviews and outlines their respective metaphilosophical attributes as a means 
2 
of aiding an understanding of how analysis of philosophical theory might proceed 
under the aegis of each: Objective: objective consistency, scientificity, scope; 
subjective: subjective consistency, personal utility, emotionality; intersubjective: 
intersubjective consistency, collective utility, narrativity. Axiomatically, the presence 
of differing worldviews presupposes a particular function for language in their very 
constitution.  
 
Thus, the theoretical and (meta-) philosophical components (Rescher 1994) seek 
to provide both an account of the extant debate within social work/professional 
practice regarding knowledge, whilst the (specifically) philosophical component 
seeks to clearly articulate the myriad discussions and debates within and across 
philosophy, an understanding of which represents a possible route out of the many 
(mis)representations regarding the structure, function(s) and role of knowledge in 
contemporary professional practice. Having provided the background to the current 
terrain, the thesis then seeks to explore empirically the ways in which practitioners 
currently define, produce, transfer, use, develop and disseminate knowledge.  
 
On the basis of this, the thesis aims to articulate a credible and functional 
epistemology for the profession(s), which avoids the many circuitous and rhetorical 
arguments about knowledge of and for the professions that exist today. In essence, 
the profession of social work and many other cognate disciplines are themselves 
engaged in the business of knowledge use to further and better our understanding 
of the world and ourselves, and to improve the human condition. So to explore and 
add to the extant corpus of knowledge about knowledge in a way that those using 
such knowledge (in all ways) find meaningful, practical and productive has huge 
potential and both professional and academic merit. Inquiry of the sort undertaken 
here, and in this particular form utilising philosophical argument and empirical 
research via the use of mixed-methods, allows a picture to emerge of the 
contemporary professional knowledge terrain through the perspectives of 
practitioners which can then be considered by reference to philosophical argument: 
‘Philosophy seeks to bring rational order, system, and intelligibility to the 
confusing diversity of our cognitive affairs. It strives for orderly arrangements 
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in the cognitive sphere that will enable us to find our way about in the world 
in an effective and satisfying way. Philosophy is indeed a venture in 
theorising, but one whose rationale is entirely practical.’ (Rescher 1994 p5).  
Thus, there is a symbiosis evident in terms of both theory and praxis: each is 
necessary for the other. The philosophical argument provides the basis for the 
empirical exploration of its functional relevance to contemporary professional 
(social work) practice as seen through the eyes of practitioners which, reflexively, 
permits philosophical, statistical and interpretative analysis of empirical findings to 
inform the professional knowledge debate in a structured way. In its current state, 
the debate continues to present as both confused and confusing. The theoretical 
components enable analysis to proceed in a robust way by reference to relevant, 
underpinning and explanatory concepts, informed by empirical findings. Thereafter, 
such analysis may be translated and transposed back into the ‘lifeworld’ 
(Lebenswelt) (Husserl 1936) of the practitioner and the professional terrain. Thus, 
empirical work is essential to breath life into the theoretical constructs that offer 
shape to the notion of professional knowledge.  
 
These accounts regarding professional knowledge, obtained via both quantitative 
and qualitative means offers the potential for significant insight into the ways in 
which professional social workers define, produce, transfer, use, develop and 
disseminate knowledge, and on this basis, provide a functionally relevant analysis 
and a practice framework to enhance the value afforded to all relevant knowledge 
forms extant within the professional domain. Thus, the use of philosophical inquiry 
to explore the functional relevance (practical uses) of epistemological principles 
underpinning (professional) knowledge use as illustrated by reference to empirical 
inquiry realigns and integrates the practical and conceptual in ways that resonate 
with the underlying purposes of ‘practical philosophy’ (Heller 1984; Toulmin 1990).  
It is therefore essential (if not entirely axiomatic) that inquiry into the nature of 
knowledge itself should include empirically-based explorations regarding both the 
contemporary context for knowledge use and the ways in which epistemological 
and other philosophical concepts and constructs are (or are not) understood, 
discussed and used. Thus, the thesis generates and engages with an essentially 
4 
reflexive epistemology, recognising the symbiosis between theory and practice and 
the the central importance of the role of language therein, the issue of which is 
particularly apposite in this inquiry because much of the debate around professional 
and other forms of knowledge is predicated upon assumptions regarding how the 
world is represented and subsequently described. Simply put – those approaches 
that sit within the positivist/realist tradition see language as a simple 
‘correspondence’ tool between what is and how it is described/represented. The 
statement is simply a description of the (known) fact. Conversely, those who lean 
towards the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm would see language itself as a 
construction, sufficiently fluid to represent the same thing in many different ways 
dependent on a number of factors, not the least of which might be the interests of 
those doing the describing. In this, the role of power and dominant ideologies have 
the potential for great potency – things may not actually be as we may (like to) think 
they are, and given that social work practice is focused on engagement with those 
for whom interpretation and definition might mean the difference between 
oppression and empowerment, language has a central role to play. These issues 
are central to our appreciation of the nature of ontology and the underlying 
epistemologies used as the basis for description, explanation and understanding 
(Bunge 1974, 1974a, 1977). As such, consideration needs to be given to the role 
of both realist and constructivist approaches to knowledge and the mediating role 
of language in order to provide a broad context for the discussions that follow.   
 
1.1 Representing the World? 
It is therefore not surprising that humankind’s quest to understand and take control 
of the environment so as to minimise risk and danger and maximise the chances of 
survival is able to provide us with a strong rationale for the utility of inquiry and the 
application of findings. The Ancient Greeks are perhaps renowned for their 
endeavours in this regard, and much theorising and philosophising regarding the 
best way to achieve this has taken place. As a result, systematic inquiry of various 
sorts in various domains has grown and evolved, allowing us to achieve great 
things. These achievements rest on the acquisition of knowledge, and our present 
term for the study of this, epistemology – episteme [knowledge] and logos [theory] 
5 
refers to a fundamental branch of philosophy that investigates the possibility, 
origins, limits, structures, methods and validity [truth] of our knowledge and the way 
it is represented to us and by us.  
 
Epistemology therefore embraces a number of issues: the very possibility of 
knowledge itself – what is it? (Gettier 1963), what are the limits of knowledge – are 
some things unknowable? Where does knowledge come from – the senses, 
experience or both? Is it a priori and therefore innate? How best to obtain 
knowledge – by deduction, induction, abduction or intuition? And what is the 
relationship, if any, between the subjective and objective components of 
knowledge, and what forms of truth exist – is it intrinsic? Is truth that which 
corresponds to reality, or is it that which is coherent with our understanding of reality 
or is there some consensual position to be achieved? (Blackburn 2006). These 
issues have evolved and we now have a much more differentiated view of 
knowledge as taking distinct forms: self-knowledge; common sense or tacit 
knowledge; everyday knowledge; wisdom and scientific knowledge. In relation to 
the latter, scientific knowledge is invariably (and narrowly) categorised as 
comprising deductive and inductive knowledge forms.  
 
All of these considerations relate to ontology – the theory of being and the nature 
of reality itself. Any knowledge that we have is knowledge of or about reality; thus, 
the ontological dimension is that which is explored and articulated via the processes 
of inquiry. Inquiry into both the natural and the social worlds has evolved into distinct 
approaches with distinct methodologies and underpinning ideologies. To some 
extent this divergence has been necessary and wholly appropriate. The exploration 
of the physical world has necessitated strict observations, measurement, 
calculation and description in order that predictions can be made, and on the basis 
of these, inferences regarding causality inferred with (often) an impressive degree 
of precision. These developments, ideological or paradigmatic subtleties aside, 
have led to huge benefits. Science (in the positivistic tradition) has done us proud 
and the benefits of the application of the ‘scientific method’ and its deductive logic 
are to be celebrated. The nature of the natural and physical world is better 
6 
understood than ever before and all of us benefit from this. In that regard, criticism 
of the positivistic, hypothetico-deductive approach (Bayes and Price 1763; Popper 
1935/2002a; Hempel 1945a: 1945b; Popper 1963/2002b; Godfrey-Smith 2003) 
need to be tempered and located correctly in relation to its stated purpose and 
context.  The ‘science wars’ to which reference has already been alluded arose as 
it became more and more apparent that the methodologies of the natural and 
physical sciences were less and less applicable to the study of the social world. 
Thus, whilst criticisms are justified in this context, they should in no way be taken 
to imply a disregard of the importance of these approaches in other respects – 
hence criticism needs to be situated in the relevant socio-historical context (see 
Nietzsche 1913/1996).  
 
Here of course we do need to recognise and consider the above comments in light 
of the means by which such processes and methods of inquiry are themselves 
represented and how the findings, and ergo the substantive nature of reality itself 
are themselves articulated and how they are then represented (i.e: as knowledge 
of and about the world). One of the reasons for such an inquiry as this relates to the 
confusion that appears to exist regarding what knowledge is, the forms it takes and 
how we use it. The manner in which the terrain is described is replete with differing 
interpretations, definitions and applications, many of which are used both loosely 
and interchangeably. As a result, there is considerable confusion regarding the 
terms of reference for philosophical analysis (Adler 1965, 1993) such that it is at 
times difficult to steer a clear path through the terminology – a clear example (if not 
an exemplar) of the role and (dys)function of language and its descriptive and 
explanatory use. Thus, what inquiry reveals is, depending upon your view, either a 
direct representation of the world – ‘the word represents the world’, or an 
interpretation thereof – ‘the word reflects the world’. Thus, some form of explication 
is required that provides both a conceptual and a contextual basis for an 
appreciation of the role and function of language within epistemology such that it 
can serve as a reference point for all future comment regarding language within this 
inquiry: that of the (essentially) dichotomous relationship between realism and 
constructionism as broad categorisations relating to how the world is (re)presented 
to us.  
7 
 
Realism1, in its ‘strong’ version, generally posits a metaphysical view that the world 
exists independently of our minds – ontology is mind-independent. Semantically, 
scientific realism is committed to a literal interpretation of scientific claims about the 
world and that such descriptions refer to the world as it is and that these correspond 
with what actually is and what actually exists, whether we can actually see them or 
not – the doctrine applies itself to unobservable entities too e.g: electrons; gravity 
and relies upon inference to the best explanation (Lipton 2004, Laudan 1984). It is 
in this degree of correspondence that the predictive claims of science exist. 
Epistemologically, realism would endorse the literal interpretation of scientific 
claims and argue that these constitute our knowledge of the world. There is 
therefore only one reality according to (scientific) realism – an objective one (Harker 
2010; Psillos 2009; Leeds 2007; Lewens 2005). Conversely, constructionism, as a 
form of cognitive relativism, argues (in its ‘strong’ form) that there are in fact many 
versions of reality – ‘The way things appear to me, in that way they exist for me: 
and the way things appear to you, in that way they exist for you.’ (Protagoras quoted 
by Plato – Theaetetus 152a (1987)). As a doctrine however, strict relativism has a 
number of inconsistencies, not the least of which is that it cannot deny the truth of 
its own contradiction – it cannot deny that anything is not true (or false). This self-
referential inconsistency leaves it open to criticism, particularly if applied 
vociferously and applied in a doctrinaire fashion, leading ultimately to absolute 
scepticism (Grayling 2009; Lange 2008; Hume 1748/2008) if taken to extremes. 
These of course would (as depicted here) represent ‘strong’ versions; more 
moderate and pluralistic approaches exist where a more functional relationship 
between nature and culture is envisioned. Nonetheless, the debate regarding how 
reality is represented ultimately rests on some form of ‘construction’, with language 
playing an important role; the issue then is the extent to which and the way in which 
                                                 
1The terms ‘realism’ and ‘relativism’ like many others within philosophy, have various forms or types, 
best represented as sitting along a continuum from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’. It is not the intention here to 
delinetate each of these in detail, as this would necessitate (and perhaps constitute) a critique of  
such positions. Rather, the intention is simply to illustrate the differences between them and other 
broad positions (in this case, constructivist/constructionist approaches as an example of relativism) 
for the purposes of locating these in broad context. See Shaffer (2012); Bhaskar (2008); Brock and 
Mares (2007); Smart (1963) for reviews and critiques of realism and its variants and Hales (2011), 
Phillps (2011) and Recanati (2007) on relativism. 
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linguistic constructs are able to accurately represent the world – both natural and 
social, and the extent to which each impinges (or not) on the other (Roversi 2015).  
 
However, in discussions regarding relativist notions of ontology, we first need to 
distinguish between constructivism and constructionism in order to ensure linguistic 
accuracy. Constructivism is often used synonomously with the assertion that the 
perceptions, experiences and views of an individual are best understood as ‘an 
elaboration or construction based on hypothesized cognitive and affective 
operations’ (Reber 1985 p151 in Watts and Stenner 2012 p41). Thus, we do not 
passively see the world as it is; rather, we are selective in what we perceive and 
attend to. This notion of a ‘percepual set’ has its roots in Piagetian psychology under 
the rubric of ‘schematas’ (Piaget 1953) and also finds traction in Kelly’s personal 
construct theory (Kelly 1955) as well as Vygotskyian accounts of the personal 
meaning-making processes within human cognition (Vygotsky 1978; Wertsch 1985) 
and the broader sociological issues implicit within this from the perspective of 
analysis and interpretation (Daniels 2012). Thus, although such accounts are 
essentially individualistic, they assist us in understanding how, at an individual level, 
the world is interpreted and how such interpretation may be altered in light of 
experience and/or receipt of new/different information, which may arise from the 
confluence of these and broader collective influences. Constructionism is the more 
collectively-oriented viewpoint on the constructionist theme, and is generally 
understood to refer to the social or sociological aspects of these meaning-making 
operations and processes. In this way, the focus moves from the centrality of 
personal meaning-making to the role of shared/communal/collective viewpoints and 
other extant discourses (Foucault 1974), or, as Dewey (1931/1985) referred to 
them, ‘social facts’ (pre-dating Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) reference by some 
three decades) and their influence on perception and, ultimately, action.  
 
The social constructionist view is well represented by writers such as Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), Bloor (1976/1991); Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986); Collins 
(1985/1992); Latour (1992, 1999); Hacking (2000); Searle (1995: 2010); Elder-Vass 
(2012); Burr (2015); Gergen (2015) and others, all of whom consider that social 
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reality is negotiated and mediated by reference to, amongst other things, language 
(Dewey 1929a; Wittgenstein 1953) and the semiotic function of signs within this 
(Saussure 1916/1983; Hodge and Kress 1988; Chandler 2007). Searle (op cit) is 
perhaps one of the most vocal exponents of the role of language in the creation of 
social ontology. He would argue that social facts are ontologically subjective but 
epistemologically objective and that the existence and use of language is 
constitutive of such ‘facts’ (Searle 1998, 2006, 2008). Using the (now common) 
example of money, Searle differentiates between ‘brute’ facts and ‘social’ facts; the 
former (in this example) would refer to paper, ink and the process of making paper 
money or nowadays, magnetic and digital traces representing financial 
transactions; the ‘social’ fact of money operates symbolically and becomes ‘money’ 
because we call it this and use it in certain ways, imbuing it with certain 
characteristics, shared between us all, based on the constitutive (and collective) 
rule that “X counts as Y in C”. In contrast, a mountain is a mountain – it is a ‘brute’ 
fact, having no existence other than as a mountain – it has no generally accepted 
symbolic function in the way that money has. Similarly, there are states that are pre-
linguistic – they are unaffected in terms of their impact or felt presence irrespective 
of what they might be called – thirst, hunger, surprise, anxiety, anger – all generate 
similar (visceral) responses and so are language-independent. In contrast, the law, 
money, rights, property, democracy, are all language-dependent for their very 
existence. Searle insists that: 
"…it could not be the case, as some have maintained, that all facts are 
institutional [i.e., social] facts; that there are no brute facts, because the 
structure of institutional facts reveals that they are logically dependent on 
brute facts. To suppose that all facts are institutional [i.e., social] would 
produce an infinite regress or circularity in the account of institutional facts. 
In order that some facts are institutional, there must be other facts that are 
brute [i.e., physical, biological, natural]. This is the consequence of the 
logical structure of institutional facts." (Searle 1995 p62.)  
 
Based on the above, it could be surmised that the intellectual foundations of social 
constructionism span phenomenology, hermeneutics, poststructuralism, symbolic 
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interactionism and strands of literary criticism and social psychology. Hacking 
(2000) would hold the (moderate) view that there need not be a conflict between 
regarding something as being ‘socially constructed’ or as being ‘real’. Similarly, and 
importantly, Blumer (1969) reminds us that a sense of perspective regarding the 
social constructionist view is important, because a view that holds that knowledge 
(or any aspect of the social world) is socially constructed: 
“…does not shift ‘reality’, as so many conclude, from the empirical world to 
the realm of imagery and conception…[The] empirical world can ‘talk back’ 
to our picture of it or assertions about it – talk back in the sense of challenging 
and resisting, or not bending to, our images or conceptions of it. This 
resistance gives the empirical world an obdurate character that is the mark 
of reality.” (p22).  
 
The example of gender is perhaps illustrative – there are ‘real’ and objective 
differences between genders (the biological basis), but societal perceptions of what 
gender means in terms of role, status and function may be socially constructed and 
in turn affect how people interact in relation to gender differences and how social 
structures may come to treat males/females/transgender in different ways that 
themselves bear no resemblance to biological functionalism. It is these latter 
constructions that essentially infer that biology equates with difference, above and 
beyond the normative biological differences. And it is these inferences that can be 
conflated and regarded as being equivalent to what Searle (1995) would see as a 
‘brute fact’ rather than a social (or an ‘institutional’) fact. This is the essence of the 
social constructionist thesis: that ‘common knowledge’, once reinforced and 
typified, takes on the staus of a social fact that may then become articulated and 
acted upon as if it were something else – a ‘brute’ or objective fact independent of 
its social context and origins. According to this view, human social existence and 
activity gradually coheres, via repetition and then habit, into social institutions/facts 
which are then legitimised by language conventions, mythology, religion and 
philosophy, maintained by therapies and reinforced through socialization until they 
are subjectively internalised by upbringing and education to become an ‘objective’ 
part of the identity of each of us. Thus, the accretion of interactions can eventually 
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serve to legitimise the perception of reality as an independent one, even though the 
phenomena under question is very much a socially constructed entity – or was. 
Socially-constructed phenomena then become ‘real’ in the objective sense.  
 
The above notwithstanding, social constructionism does accept that there is an 
objective reality. It is however concerned with how knowledge is constructed and 
understood and the role this plays in how we come to understand the world, rather 
than whether or not reality actually exists unless we ‘create’ it through our use of 
language. It has therefore an epistemological, and not necessarily a strict 
ontological perspective; criticisms and misunderstanding arise when this central 
fact is mis-or over-interpreted. This is most evident in the debates and criticisms 
surrounding the ‘strong’ versions of realism and relativism referred to above. Social 
constructionism places great emphasis on everyday interactions between people 
and how they use language to construct their reality. As a result, there is an 
appreciation that language and the meanings derived from and through it are best 
seen as being contextual such that: 
‘…meanings are as stable as the background consensus that sustains them. 
So, given the constant reconstruction and re-articulation of the consensus of 
action of language users, the meanings emerging from this consensus 
always point to new contexts, that is, they are “self-moving to new cases.” 
On this contextualist view, meanings are durable but they do not remain the 
same; they are in a constant process of transformation, no matter how 
minute and unnoticeable these transformations may be. Absolute sameness 
is impossible and unnecessary for the continuity of semantic contents. The 
contexts of use in which a term finds application can be expanded and 
diversified; or they can be narrowed down and homogenized; and, 
accordingly, meaning can grow or shrink, become enriched or impoverished. 
But what a meaning cannot do is to become absolutely static, frozen in time.’ 
(Medina 2004 p358). 
 
Assigning such a contextual role to and for language allows us to avoid the descent 
into linguistic scepticism (Unger 1975; Kempson 1975). This is possible by 
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reference to the principle of underdetermination as a counter against radical 
indeterminacy (Lauden 1990; Lauden and Leplin 1991). Underdetermination, in 
terms of scientific theory justification and, ergo, the development of knowledge as 
well as in relation to the philosophy of language 
‘is simply one aspect of the limited and fallible nature of our epistemic 
practices, but it doesn’t constitute an insurmountable obstacle to scientific 
researchor to the various investigative activities of ordinary life, as the 
skeptic would have us believe. Underdetermination can only be inflated into 
radical indeterminacy if we buy in to the mistaken assumption that what is 
logically possible and what is reasonable are coextensive.’ (Medina op cit 
p342). 
Semantic scepticism is what realists see as being the outcome of a constructivist 
approach to language and meaning-making – it becomes indeterminate. This 
though is based on the assumption that meaning is fixed, and that there is some 
form of semantic foundationalism in operation. However, more moderate but 
oppositional positions would argue that semantic anti-foundationalism does not 
equate with indeterminancy of meaning. Medina (op cit p343) refers to “contextual 
determinacy” which ‘accepts and integrates the thesis of underdetermination whilst 
rejecting the thesis of indeterminacy’ (Ibid). Thus, meanings are not absolute or 
foundational, but neither are they indeterminate (sceptical) because of this. Rather, 
the context within which language is used and meaning is intended provides a 
transitory and relativised form of determinacy that matches the purpose of the 
communicative exchange that is consistent with the general background conditions, 
generally accepted practices and the knowledge and perspective(s) of the 
participant(s).  
 
We thus have an essentially non-foundationalist view of meaning that draws from 
both Dewey (1929a) and Wittgenstein (1953) that offers a constraining role on 
interpretation by contextual factors. Wittgenstein refers to our linguistic practices as 
being supported by regularities in the environment and that these provide a 
structure within which language is used effectively. These regularities are not fixed 
nor foundational but stress the action-oriented relationship between words and 
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deeds. If these ‘regularities’ in our linguistic environment were to change – then our 
linguistic practices would change. Wittgenstein refers to these as representing a 
‘language-game’ (Wittgenstein Ibid §7). In a similar vein, Dewey refers to language 
use as a form of agency, with speakers being regarded as agents. Language 
therefore is seen as a form of action (Dewey 1929a p137; p139).  This provides the 
rationale for the claim that whilst all statements and knowledge claims may well 
have a right to enter the public discourse with the possibility of representing a viable 
alternative (the principle of nonuniqueness), not all have legitimacy and credibility 
– simply put – some may be silly and therefore not gain any traction whatsoever 
(the principle of cognitive egalitarianism) (Laudan 1990), whereas those that 
conform to the ‘rules’ – or the context of use, will at least be considered relevant, 
even though they may not ultimately be accepted. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey 
argue that ‘the meaning of words and sentences becomes contextually determinate 
through the tacit agreement in action of the participants in communicative 
practices.’ (Medina op cit p345 – emphasis in original) rather than being derived 
from the mechanically enumerable features of the words themselves (Fish 1989 
p4).  These features of context and their normative use therefore provide a ‘barrier’ 
behind which linguistic and other forms of scepticism must sit and offer a counter (if 
not reassurance) to the view of the realists (eg: Langdon 1975; Unger 1975) that 
social constructivist perspectives serve only to fuel the worst features of relativism 
by opening up the floodgates for radical indeterminacy and a chaotic scepticism:  
‘…all meaning is ultimately rooted in the consensus of action of our practices: 
meanings become contextually determinate through the practical consensus 
achieved by participants in situated linguistic interactions. Radical 
indeterminacy arises when we detach language from its techniques of use 
and the background agreement in action of language users. But, on this 
view, indeterminacy is not a final and inescapable feature of language; it is 
the artifact of philosophical theories that lose sight of the contextual 
character of language. There is no radical indeterminacy when the use of a 
term is contextualized and considered against the background of the tacit 
agreement in action of its users.’ (Medina op cit p 364). 
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Thus, in general terms, our usage of terms such as ‘research’ equates with an 
acknowledgement of the existence of a systematic approach to inquiry, embracing 
various rational and procedural principles. Those principles regulating the search 
for and acquisition of knowledge about various forms of reality proceed through a 
series of accessible and justifiable steps. These steps we refer to as ‘methodology’ 
[German form = Wissenschaftstheorie] and in English-speaking communities is 
referred to as the ‘theory of science’ or, as a result of the influence of positivism, 
and ergo somewhat reductively, as the ‘scientific method’. However, as we shall 
see in chapter two, these issues have caused significant debate in relation to how 
we come to know the world and as a result, discussion and debate regarding what 
methodology or approach to follow has gone on for a long time, and is still for some, 
unresolved. However, it is my hope that within this thesis, I can establish a credible 
case for the utilisation of a pluralistic methodology that not only allows for the 
adoption of a range of methods in the research process, but that also provides a 
logical and proportionate philosophy within which such endeavours can be safely 
and usefully located, taking full account of the respective roles of ideology, power 
and language in shaping the different ways we come to know and understand the 
world around us, particularly the professional world of front-line social work.   
 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter two provides an overview of the current debate regarding knowledge – 
philosophically and epistemologically as well as that regarding knowledge of and 
for social work. Commentary is provided regarding the various (philosophical) 
definitions of knowledge and the chapter provides an account of how some of these 
epistemological principles have particular relevance to the professional knowledge 
debate. The chapter therefore adopts an explicitly philosophical attitude in its 
discussion of the extant professional social work literature on the topic.  
Chapter three continues to expand on the philosophical elements by providing an 
account of the philosophy of methodology. The chapter considers the relevance of 
philosophical positions, paradigms of inquiry to the nature, and our appreciation of 
ontology, epistemology, methodology and associated methods. It focuses on the 
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use of a mixed-methods approach to inquiry, arguing that this is particularly relevant 
in this thesis. The chapter elaborates on the mixed-method paradigm and illustrates 
how such an approach has consonance with pragmatism, arguing that utilising a 
mixed-methods approach is both consistent and congruent with the broader 
epistemological principles extant within this paradigm. The chapter provides an 
account of the history of the philosophy of science to illustrate how the ‘science 
wars’ are essentially at the root of many of the difficulties today regarding 
professional knowledge and provides commentary on the role and function of 
language therein. In addition, there is an account of different forms of reasoning 
and these are related to the nature of this particular thesis.    
   
Chapter four provides an account of the methods used in the study. There is 
discussion on factor analysis and its sub-types, including Q-methodology, which is 
used specifically in the empirical aspects of this thesis. Q-methodology is a less 
well-known approach to research generally, and certainly it is not highly visible 
within the domain of social work research. However, there are many examples of 
Q in the literature, and a range of these is presented to illustrate its breadth and 
utility. The chapter also provides a detailed account of the methods, procedures 
and process associated with the implementation of the empirical elements of the 
thesis, with due reference to data outputs, ethical approval and other matters, 
including how the constitutive aspects of language are considered in relation to Q-
methodology.  
 
Chapter five presents the results of the Q-method approach and the post-Q sort 
interviews along with the descriptive factor narratives produced from the factor 
arrays. A number of figures and tables are presented, drawn from the raw output 
data files contained in the appendices. Relevant and appropriate signposting is 
provided.  
 
Chapter six provides a discussion of the results/findings with particular emphasis 
on the interpretation of the descriptive narrative findings, which are the product of 
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the interpretation of the factor analytic data. The discussion utilises differences and 
similarities of opinion from within the data as a starting point for a discussion of the 
meanings inherent within the data, making creative use of a unique nomenclature. 
These interpretations are discussed within the broad context of contemporary social 
work practice with children and adults with due reference being had to current and 
relevant literature in an attempt to explain the findings in a meaningful way that 
coheres with contemporary practice. The discussion is focused on the knowledge 
processes referred to in chapter two: knowledge definition, production (or creation), 
transfer, use, development and dissemination and the emergent (and interpretative 
themes) are aligned to these in a functional way. Each of these thematic elements 
can be seen to have relevance to the experiences of front-line practitioners.  
 
Chapter seven discusses the conclusions from the study and reiterates the case for 
the development of a ‘new’ and functional pragmatic epistemology for the 
profession of social work. A proposed ‘model’ is articulated and its core features 
discussed. These features are described and their practical relevance to social work 
highlighted. There is an emphasis on the functionality of the model, both in terms 
of its ability to address the many and varied complexities surrounding contemporary 
professional (social work) knowledge and also in terms of its capacity to function as 
a critical framework to evaluate knowledge processes. The chapter (and the thesis) 
concludes by making reference to some of the implications for individuals, for 
organisations and for practice, before highlighting some of the limitations of the 
study as well as some of its innovations.   
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Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 
 
2.0 Introduction: The Scope of the Inquiry 
In this thesis I intend to outline the case for an exploration and analysis regarding 
the broad issue of knowledge of and for social work and the case for the 
development of a new pragmatic epistemology for the profession. For many years 
now the status of social work as a profession has been the subject of some debate 
(Rogowski 2010) based largely upon what I see as assumptions concerning 
perceived frailties in its epistemology. More specifically, because one of the traits 
of a ‘true’ profession is seen by some to be the presence or possession of a clear 
and discernible knowledge base, social work apparently ‘fails’ this test because it 
appears to lack this particular trait. Such claims and assumptions have taken on a 
diachronic status and are themselves I believe based on erroneous (‘foundational’) 
assumptions that at best misrepresent and/or misunderstand, and at worst ignore, 
the essence of epistemic belief and practice and the contemporary and changing 
nature of social work and those practices associated with it.  
 
2.1 The State of the Art? 
It was Flexner (1915/2001) who can perhaps be ‘credited’ with damaging social 
work’s reputation as a profession because of his claim that it did not/could not 
evidence a clear and credible knowledge base, citing medicine in particular as being 
the ‘standard bearer’ for credibility, thereby configuring it as social work’s nemesis 
(Gilgun and Adams 2002). This view is still espoused by some in the contemporary 
literature, who suggest that “Social work tends to be an incoherent set of theories 
and techniques without a systematic structure” (Göppner & Hämäläinen 2007 p280) 
although their argument in favour of the development of a scientific basis for social 
work notes that “[…] in terms of theories and knowledge [it] leads to unsystematic 
pluralism of mutually exclusive models, and in the final instance to dogmatism.” 
(p282). Largely as a result of such comments and the writings of Etzioni (1969) for 
example, social work (and teaching and nursing) has spent the last few decades 
trying to justify its existence, not just in terms of professional identity and 
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epistemological status, but also in terms of its efficacy within a post-modern new-
world order where conceptions of welfare within democratic societies are 
increasingly open to revisionist ideas and policies (Leonard 1997; Rodger 2000) 
and where ‘bad press’ continues to vilify it (Reder, Duncan and Gray 1993; Reder 
and Duncan 1999: 2004; Valentine 1994; Ayre 2001; Hammond 2001; O’Brien, 
Hammond and McKinnon 2003; Rogowski 2010; Brandon et al 2012; Butler and 
Drakeford 2012). There are however those who would disagree with such views 
and actively support a claim for social work to be seen as a profession as much as 
any other. Reamer, in an influential piece states “From its roots in the charity 
organisation society and settlement house movements, social work has evolved 
into a full-fledged profession with a distinctive value base, body of knowledge, and 
method of training.” (Reamer 1994 p2 cited in Payne 2001 p135).  
 
There are then clear divisions within the wider academic community as well as 
within social work itself regarding the status of social work as a profession, but this 
is not the only issue relating to knowledge and social work, although this does 
present itself as the prima facie reason for the disputes. The appellation ‘profession’ 
may well be something to aspire to, but when all is said and done, social work as 
an activity is something that affects people’s lives on a daily basis, so what to use 
to inform those activities is a germane question, and one that requires an answer 
of some description. Thus we move into the arena concerning the most appropriate 
type(s) of knowledge for social work, the best way to generate and disseminate 
knowledge and the most effective way of applying knowledge in practice. These 
debates and the differences they exemplify have existed for many years and have 
centred on issues of approach (positivism or interpretivism), methodology 
(quantitative or qualitative), method (for example, Random Controlled Trials or 
interviews) and application (for example, intervention manuals or situation-specific) 
amongst other issues and take contemporary shape in what we might refer to as 
the ‘evidence-based practice’/’what works?’ debate (Sackett et al 1996; Macdonald 
and Sheldon 1998). I would contend that these (somewhat circular) arguments have 
at their core fundamental issues appertaining to the philosophy of science and 
epistemology, and it will therefore be necessary to consider these as many of the 
arguments referred to in relation to knowledge of and for social work are but a 
19 
subset of those wider, philosophical issues (Boyd, Gaspar and Trout 1991; Benton 
and Craib 2011).  
 
Given these factors and the apparent longevity of this particular debate, it is entirely 
appropriate and necessary to locate the discussion and analysis of professional 
knowledge within a clearly defined and articulated framework that refers to basic 
principles as well as broader processes and ideologies. Thus, we need to be clear 
that any activity like social work, or medicine for that matter, does in fact require 
adherence to basic epistemic principles for any sense of credibility. In this paper 
therefore I intend to address a number of ‘claims’ regarding underlying structures, 
types and forms of professional knowledge that I believe cannot be sustained once 
we understand the nature of epistemology, epistemic practice and, of particular 
relevance to the professions (however defined) and this particular thesis, the 
importance of pragmatism in relation to knowledge generally and professional 
knowledge in particular (Peirce 1905; James 1907; Schön 1983; Almeder 2007). I 
will show how this approach can clarify the current debate and give substance to 
the issue of knowledge of and for professional practice, and professional social 
work practice in particular.  
 
2.2 A Philosophical Approach to Empirical Inquiry 
I shall begin by exploring the nature of knowledge itself and what epistemology 
(Pritchard 2009; Audi 2011) can offer to the debate concerning social work 
knowledge: what it is thought to be and how it is created/produced, transferred into 
practice, used, developed and disseminated with particular emphasis on these 
processes as they might relate to social work practitioners (although these matters 
relate to any professional). What ‘counts’ as knowledge from an epistemological 
perspective must be taken as being fundamental to the whole discussion regarding 
knowledge generally, and that of and for social work in particular. Insofar as 
epistemology is concerned and its traditional view regarding knowledge as being a 
proposition that functions as a belief deemed to be true and justified, we need to 
think in terms of what I will refer to as its two epochs: pre- and post-Gettier (Ayer 
1963; Chisholm 1966). This refers to the impact of Gettier’s short paper that asked 
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the (deceptively simple) question “Is justified true belief (JTB) knowledge?” (Gettier 
1963). This was a challenge to the extant and ‘classic’ account of what could 
(‘legitimately’) be regarded as knowledge. Gettier problems refer to situations where 
a proposition, functioning as a belief thought to be true and justified, does not 
function as knowledge because it is not true, although the individual concerned is 
unaware of this. Such situations are commonplace in day-to-day life and 
professional practice, and are likely to remain so. The impact of Gettier’s claims 
were profound and has split epistemology into a ‘before’ and ‘after’ discipline 
(Hetherington 2005; Lycan 2006) because it provided a more accessible account of 
what knowledge might be, thereby recognising the realities of day-to-day 
knowledge definition and use. Gettier problems have the potential to create huge 
difficulties if the traditional account of knowledge is that to which we refer, as under 
this rubric, much everyday knowledge, and knowledge regarding practice-based 
situations would not be seen as knowledge. Ergo, the implications of this on and for 
professional activity would be significant as such activity is seen, necessarily so, as 
being underpinned by reference to knowledge rather than (say) just feelings or 
hunches. I believe that practice (and everyday life) are replete with what would be 
referred to as Gettier-problems under the tradional JTB model, and as such have 
day-to-day implications for service users. Therefore they must be acknowledged 
and addressed pragmatically by reference to more functional accounts and 
mechanisms.   
 
The issue here, given the potential seriousness of decisions based on Gettier-type 
reasoning (if framed in terms of the ‘classic’ account) – that we do have beliefs 
(knowledge) that we are prepared to act upon that are not justified nor indeed true, 
and that we are unaware of this - is to ensure that, insofar as it is possible, epistemic 
mechanisms are available that function in such a way as to minimise the possible 
effects of Gettier-type situations on people’s lives. For example, where a social work 
practitioner believes that a child has been harmed by its parent and takes action on 
this basis (removal), there may be no justification for the belief under the ‘classic’ 
account of knowledge as its truth-value may not have been verified, and yet action 
is still taken. Technically, the actions of the practitioner are, under the ‘classic’ 
account, based on something other than knowledge, and yet this is understandable 
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as a response to a situation as Gettier’s account is more pragmatic and 
accommodating to what actually happens in real life. We all operate on the basis of 
what we think or regard as knowledge, ceteris paribus. I am of the opinion that by 
responding to Gettier’s objections regarding JTB pragmatically, we can 
accommodate them effectively, even though we cannot solve them.  Gettier 
problems are only problematic in relation to the ‘classic’ JTB account of knowledge, 
which has framed the prevailing discourse regarding epistemology prior to Getter’s 
paper. These and a number of other epistemological issues must be addressed in 
order to avoid the risk of the ongoing debate regarding social work and other forms 
of professional knowledge descending into further obfuscation, mindless repetition 
and unnecessary circularity.  
 
Within the extant literature regarding knowledge and social work, there is little 
evidence to suggest that epistemological principles per se are seen as being of any 
real importance at a practical level, although latterly some writers have to their credit 
attempted to introduce some limited considerations of such matters into their 
writings (Le Croy, Ashford and Macht 1989; White 1997; Sheppard 1995: 1998; 
Gould 2004), although for the most part the focus is upon the ‘correct’ 
methodological approach and associated philosophical rationales (Reid 2001; 
Taylor and White 2001). In this regard I would have to voice a contrary view and 
assert that such principles are actually central to the practice of social work itself 
and so need to be clearly articulated and ‘put to work’ so to speak (Fantl and 
McGrath 2009).  
 
The discussion concerning the nature of knowledge itself will be followed by 
commentary on how professional knowledge is generally and quite specifically 
conceptualised, acquired and utilised (Olsson and Ljunghill 1997) by providing a 
representative overview of the extant literature in this area. This account will draw 
on material from social work and a range of other disciplines, mostly related, but 
some very clearly unrelated to social work and its particular subject matter - people 
(Hoffmann, Probst and Christinck 2007; Schneider et al 2009; Baars 2010), 
although what is evident in relation to such cross-disciplinary accounts of 
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knowledge processes (definition, production, transfer, use, development and 
dissemination) is the role and importance of human agency and action (Fuller 
2015). Necessarily, this will be followed by an account of the current debate 
concerning the nature of evidence or, from a more philosophical standpoint, 
justification (Wittgenstein 1969) in relation to what constitutes knowledge of and for 
social work. Within this I shall attempt to delimit the claim that it is the status of 
medicine and other ‘true’ professions to which social work should aspire in relation 
to its particular epistemology, largely because of the claim that (bio-) medicine 
(Saks 2003) is more ‘scientific’ (Ackerknecht 1955; Berliner 1984; Rosenberg and 
Donald 1995; Lane 2001; Porter 2003; Timmermans and Kolker 2004) even though 
there are detractors from this position (Vogel and Rosenberg 1979; Warner and 
Tighe 2001; Goldenberg 2009).  
 
The relevance of the current ‘trend’ within the human services towards evidence-
based practice (EBP) (Sackett et al 1996; Macdonald and Sheldon 1998) will also 
be considered because it is seen by some to provide a vocabulary where ‘the 
language of goals, objectives, outcomes and effectiveness challenges the reliance 
on sentimentality, opinion-based practice, intuition or lay-knowledge.’ (Shaw 1992: 
42).  It could be argued that this trend is but one recent manifestation of the 
continuation of what Hughes and Sharrock (1997) refer to as the ‘positivist project’ 
whereby approaches to the creation of knowledge via such means and the results 
are taken to have greater validity than knowledge produced via other means (Smith 
1987; Goldenberg 2009). Some authors would argue that this is in fact the essential 
role of science in relation to social work and all other professions: “With its claims 
to validity, science supplies assured factual and explanatory knowledge for the 
substantiation or guidance of professional action.” (Gredig and Sommerfeld 2008 
p292), a view reflecting one expressed earlier by Reid (2001), an avowed positivist 
who does however make the valid claim (and concession) that the perceived 
‘encroachment’ of such methodological approaches may in fact be as much to do 
with the wider influences of government funding for intervention programmes and 
the need for agencies to justify their successes as it might be to do with the personal 
or professional preferences of academics.  
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The issues regarding the structure of knowledge are mirrored in their urgency by 
those regarding the type of knowledge preferred in relation to social work practice 
along with issues appertaining to its application (Trevillion 1998; Payne 2001; Reid 
2001). Some of these manifest as a counter against ‘pragmatic’ uses of theory 
(knowledge) where this term is used in a very generalised way with no specificity 
attached to it concerning the application of Peirce’s pragmatic principle (Almeder 
2007 p172). Trevillion (1998) cited in Göppner and Hämäläinen (2007) comments 
that an essentially ‘competency-based’ approach to practice has resulted in a 
situation where ‘Theory becomes anything which apparently works’ (p277), 
seemingly missing the fact that this is a partially correct interpretation of the 
pragmatic principle itself, although referred to somewhat scathingly and in a 
somewhat decontextualised fashion that seems to miss the importance of issues 
appertaining to meaning-making and the context-specificity of theoretical 
applications (Healy 2005).  
 
This perhaps illustrates the manner in which a range and variety of philosophical 
concepts are often used quite ‘loosely’ and somewhat randomly within the debate 
over social work and knowledge, with the result that imprecision leads to an 
inevitable sense of confusion about the very subject matter itself. This is perhaps 
well illustrated by White (1997) who states that ‘Social Work is often a pragmatic 
and reactive activity; as such it has not traditionally concerned itself with philosophy’ 
(p40). Thus, the relevance of philosophical pragmatism (or to some, American 
Pragmatism) will be considered in the context of its role and function as a viable 
epistemological mechanism in relation to social work knowledge, both in terms of 
its explanatory power regarding the processes of knowledge definition and creation 
(Goldenstein 2011) as well as its pragmatic function in relation to knowledge use, 
dissemination and development (Goldenberg 2009). Almeder (2007) not only 
provides a clear and succinct definition of the pragmatic principle [PP] but also 
accounts for the presence of tacit knowledge under this principle when he states 
that “…[induction] generally tends also to produce beliefs that allow us to predict 
precisely our sensory experiences and thereby permits the production of other 
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beliefs whose adoption and applications allow us to navigate more successfully 
under the principle of homeostasis.” [p173]. Aligned to this is the recognition that 
what constitutes knowledge may well be a relative thing and therefore some 
consideration of the nature of social constructionism will be necessary (Berger 
1972; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Searle 1995; Hacking 2000). 
 
In relation to the empirical aspects of this thesis, my aim is to consider how social 
work professionals construct, perceive, source and use knowledge, in order to 
consider how using pragmatism as a ‘filter’, with and through which knowledge 
construction per se could be made intelligible (irrespective of the particular area of 
professional knowledge, for example, medicine, law, nursing, engineering, physics, 
agriculture, teaching, surveying, accountancy), applicable, relevant and functional. 
More specifically, I shall argue that pragmatism can be seen to be an integral 
component not only of epistemic activity in relation to professional knowledge 
development and use, but also in terms of knowledge application and action from 
the perspective of the private individual in situ. Here I refer to how an individuals 
‘knowledge’ of their (metaphysical) situation can be illustrated by their particular 
response in the form of attachment strategies (Cassidy and Shaver 2008; 
Crittenden 2008). These are a manifestation of knowledge ‘structures’ and perhaps 
illustrate what Argyris and Schön refer to as knowledge in action (Argyris and Schön 
1974). This has the potential of offering a wider consideration of how knowledge 
ought to be conceived of and suggests that there is in fact a range of different ‘ways 
of knowing’.  
 
There is however a palpable degree of irony to be noted in relation to this aspect of 
the thesis. Given that this whole endeavour is concerned with knowledge and how 
we come to know things, my own approach must evidence fidelity to the issues 
under consideration in relation to my general orientation, my methods and my 
treatment of the ‘knowledge’ I refer to and generate. This is very much therefore a 
‘live’ project having some sense of methodological ethnography. If in fact we can 
ever come to know anything (Grayling 2009) I shall, through the processes of this 
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project, have to evidence how doubt (scepticism) is a necessary part of knowing 
(Peirce 1877; Menary 2003).  
 
2.3 The Nature of Knowledge 
Epistemology is driven by a number of basic but highly significant questions and is 
primarily concerned with evaluating claims about the way in which the world can be 
known to us: What is knowledge; what can we know (scepticism) and how do we 
know that we know something?  In addition to this, we may ask whether that if we 
think we do in fact know something, how sure can we be that what we know is 
actually worth knowing? These fundamental epistemological questions are highly 
relevant to the discussions concerning professional knowledge of and for social 
work, so a foray into epistemology and the philosophy of science is essential in 
order that we are clear as to what it is we are talking about. I would contend that 
much of the literature regarding knowledge of and for social work tends to avoid 
any critical discussion about epistemology and important epistemic principles and 
mechanisms with the result that there is actually very little agreement or clarity 
about the actual topic under discussion. Rather, writers tend to get into discussions 
about what, in their opinion, is the best type of knowledge for social work and what 
its content should be without offering a clear, logical account of the mechanisms 
and processes underpinning its creation and use per se, before applying these to 
an analysis or account of social work (or any other profession) and its professed 
claims to knowledge.  
 
There is an assumption that social work, like most professions, requires to have 
some form of palpable corpus of extant knowledge to which people can refer to at 
will. This need for a knowledge base appears as a fairly robust feature within this 
general debate, generated perhaps by an implicit acceptance of ‘trait’ theories 
regarding the nature of the professions and because of social work’s apparent 
‘desperation’ (Gammack 1982) and ‘yearnings’ (Howe 1980) for credibility as a ‘full’ 
profession, a status to be conferred upon it once this knowledge base had passed 
some kind of test. Thus, the debate within social work can be seen to have 
historically had a strong focus on issues of content with less concern regarding its 
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structure and form or the means by which it was generated and validated. It is 
assumed that we know what knowing is and knowledge is generally treated as a 
taken-for-granted entity. This is a fundamental error that has, I believe, led to 
obfuscation and confusion within the professional literature and the profession(s) 
as a whole, and it is therefore necessary to explicate the range of basic 
epistemological concepts and epistemic mechanisms in order to appreciate and 
understand the structure of knowledge as this will provide a benchmark for the 
discussions to follow.   
 
2.4 The Structure and Principles of Knowledge 
Broadly speaking, ‘classic’ accounts of knowledge tend to see it as being of two 
broad forms: knowing that [KT] and knowing how [KH]. The former relates to what 
might be referred to as propositional knowledge: a collection of ‘facts’ about 
something. Generally it is taken that such knowledge is based on propositions 
[‘facts’] about the world or some entity that are regarded as being true and justified 
i.e. there is some evidence to support the belief, and they usually take the form of 
‘knowledge that p’, where p is an indicative sentence (for example ‘Elephants do 
not fly’) (Zagzebski 1999; Cole 2002; Pritchard 2009; Martin 2010; Audi 2011). The 
latter form of knowledge is variously described as practice knowledge, tacit 
knowledge or craft knowledge, knowing both what to do and how to do it, and is 
therefore very much about knowledge in action or skill (Ryle 1949, 1971; Schön 
1983). These general statements are very much that: general, because as we shall 
see, what is taken to be a fact or the truth for example is a rather complex matter 
and one not just of philosophical concern, but one having huge practical 
consequences for social work and other professions.  
 
As a means of facilitating a more rigorous analysis of knowledge in all its forms, it 
is important that we recognise the presence of a rather condensed and composite 
view of professional knowledge. Such a view does not allow any opportunity for a 
detailed consideration of the various elements of knowledge, and here I shall seek 
to explore some of its components in more detail.  
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In considering the structure of knowledge we must make reference to a number of 
basic epistemic principles including belief, truth, justification (internal and external), 
sensitivity, safety (Pritchard 2009) and underlying mechanisms including Gettier 
counter-examples (Gettier 1963), epistemic norms and epistemic performance. If 
the underlying structures of knowledge and its creation are not considered then, a 
priori so to speak, social work cannot defend its knowledge claims because it cannot 
say whether or not its knowledge is knowledge, or whether it is something else 
entirely. The significance and relevance of Gettier-type problems appears never to 
have been raised as an issue within the social work literature, so I shall address 
this oversight and provide an explanation of their general form and an explication 
of their relevance to social work knowledge, highlighting what I see to be their day-
to-day impact within social work practice.  
 
By effectively ignoring Gettier’s assertions, all professionals are theoretically 
operating ‘in the dark’ with regards to their knowledge claims, although this does 
not imply that an explicit and active awareness of such matters is required at a 
practical level. Rather, these factors need to be an integral part of reflective practice 
per se. I shall argue therefore that not only are such Gettier-type problems 
commonplace and significant contributors to practice decisions that are in fact 
based on false knowledge (using the ‘classic’ account of knowledge referred to 
above), but that Gettier’s objections are in fact entirely understandable if we account 
for them by reference to Peirce’s pragmatic principle (Peirce 1877; 1905) and take 
full account of Hume’s objections to induction (Hume 1748/2008) and Hempel’s 
contemporary reframing of this (Hempel 1965), thereby reviewing our ‘classic’ 
conception of knowledge which, I will argue, cannot be sustained in its current form.  
By approaching the topic of knowledge in such a fashion and addressing these 
problems by reference to pragmatism, it is I believe entirely possible to reframe the 
whole landscape of professional knowledge in a manner that is epistemologically, 
professionally and ethically credible.  
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Whether we can be said to have knowledge relates to the issue of justification; if 
knowledge is justified true belief, we need to understand how this JTB arises. This 
requires that we understand the processes of external and internal justification 
attributions. Such attributions are the essential processes via which knowledge can 
be seen as being valid or not. An external justification attribution addresses whether 
the evidence for a particular claim [belief] when objectively viewed, supports the 
claim or not. Internal justification attributions are those that relate to the agent’s own 
belief in a certain theory or proposition. Audi (2003) writes “I distinguish between 
personal justification – that of a person’s belief that p – from impersonal justification 
– that of the proposition that p, or of ‘the belief that p’ in the abstract” (p18 in Koons 
2009 p191), whereas Goldman (1988 in Koons 2009 p274) refers to these types of 
justification as being ‘strong’ (objective or impersonal) or ‘weak’ (subjective or 
personal). External justifications regarding knowledge claims can be seen to have 
parallels to the role currently played by EBP, so in this regard the EBP ‘movement’ 
has a clear role in the area of the justification of knowledge claims, but one not 
without its limitations, particularly in relation to how EBP views such claims 
hierarchically (Goldenberg 2009; Skaerbaek 2010).  
 
Internal justification relates to the evaluation by the particular individual as to 
whether or not their knowledge is valid i.e. is based on a rational belief. Such 
evaluation depends on a number of things including the particular frame of 
reference of the individual, individual circumstances and, importantly, what can 
reasonably be expected of that person i.e. what is regarded as normative for a 
social worker, an engineer etc, and has taken on a new guise as ‘reflection’ (Schön 
1983). This frame of reference is aligned to the notion of the particular epistemic 
community that one inhabits (Kakavelakis 2010), whereas the issue of normativity 
concerning expectations refers to one’s epistemic performance. These issues are 
inextricably bound to the manifestation of Gettier-type problems referred to earlier.  
 
With regards to subjective justifications, the notion of underpinning beliefs has an 
important role to play. Wittgenstein (1969) in ‘On Certainty’ [OC] claims that we 
have a number of ‘background’ beliefs that are so fundamental that we are unable 
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to question them. These essentially provide us with a point of reference to a series 
of propositions about the world and our place in it that we must accept so that we 
can begin to evaluate the world and thereby function within it. For example, he 
states: “I have a world picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all 
my enquiring and asserting” (OC: para 162) and “The questions that we raise and 
our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, 
are as it were like hinges upon which those turn” (OC: para 341). Hume (1748/2008 
§5.1) phrases it somewhat differently but refers to the same necessity when he 
says, "…without the influence of custom we would be entirely ignorant of every 
matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses."   
 
This apparent ‘foundationalism’ is I believe a necessary part of the discussion 
concerning the types and forms of professional knowledge and represents an 
important aspect of the empirical element of this thesis regarding the manner in 
which people (agents) from different epistemic communities (professional 
groupings) and with different epistemological beliefs (claims to possessing 
knowledge) act (Karseth and Nerland 2007; Auyang 2009; Baars 2010; Kakavelakis 
2010) as well as reflecting, somewhat prospectively in the hands of Hume, the 
emergence of the contemporary view that we all develop and use ‘schemas’ (Piaget 
1953) heuristically. However, as we have seen earlier, the way in which ideas and 
concepts are represented through language can lead to mis-interpretation and 
misunderstandings. The notion of foundationalism within the philosophical canon 
refers to and represents a degree of fixity and infallibility regarding (in this case) our 
beliefs, which neither Wittgenstein, Hume, nor Dewey (1929a) for that matter, 
intended. They do not support a strict foundationalist doctrine; rather, they assert 
that  in order to prevent the dissolution of all our beliefs (and therefore our actions 
in and upon the world) into complete scepticism and doubt, we rely on a series of 
background assumptions that provide us with a fallible and therefore a revisable 
frame of reference based on our enagement with the world and that which we 
already know of it. Thus, given the ‘revisability thesis’, foundationalism does not 
present itself as a credible epistemic position.  
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There are however other issues to consider. If we know anything, how do we come 
to know it? Is there some knowledge that we possess inherently and which therefore 
arises independent of our experiences in and of the world (a priori knowledge) 
(Wittgenstein 1969), as opposed to that knowledge we acquire because of our 
experiences (a posteriori knowledge)? This debate within epistemology refers to 
the presence or otherwise of so-called foundational beliefs and what role they have 
in underpinning broader epistemic principles. Within the realm of professional 
knowledge, there are I believe similar ‘foundational’ (but not necessarily ‘fixed’) 
beliefs and these have an important role in helping us to understand how 
professional knowledge is constructed and how it may (or may not) operate. Such 
a view regarding the existence of such ‘foundational’ beliefs presents itself as a 
refutation of scepticism (Grayling 2009), the doctrine of which posits that ‘real’ 
knowledge is in fact not possible. The issue of scepticism has been made ‘famous’ 
by Hume’s argument concerning induction, whose essence is that our beliefs 
regarding what we have not observed have no justification – induction takes us 
beyond our observations and into the ‘unknown’ and as such our claims to 
knowledge lack full epistemic cerdibility. Hempel (1981) states this well: 
‘Many, [….] of the statements asserted by empirical science at a given time 
are accepted on the basis of previously established evidence sentences. 
Hume’s sceptical doubt reflects the realisation that most of those indirectly, 
or inferentially, accepted assertions rest on evidence that gives them no 
complete, no logically conclusive support. This is of course the point of 
Hume’s observation that even if we have examined many occurrences of A 
and found them all to be accompanied by B, it is quite conceivable, or 
logically possible, that some future occurrence of A might not be 
accompanied by B.’ (Hempel 1981 p389). 
 
In this, Humean scepticism can be seen to have great destructive potential if 
considered in extremis. However: 
‘That inductive arguments are not deductive - that they are not logically 
guaranteed to be truth-preserving – plays an important part in Hume’s 
argument. But the fact that the premises of a good inductive argument 
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cannot give the same maximal guarantee to its conclusion as the premises 
of a deductive argument give to its conclusion should not by itself be enough 
to cast doubt on the cogency of inductive reasoning.’ (Lange 2008 p46 – 
emphasis added).  
Thus, what the sceptic might consider to be ‘real’ knowledge lacks cogency when 
considered against the background of our experiences. In a somewhat veiled 
sense, arguments around the lack of a ‘real and discernible’ knowledge base for 
social work, and the rise of evidence-based approaches, ostensibly to counter the 
limitations of inductive, non-demonstrative evidence, suggests the presence of an 
inherent ‘scepticism’ being applied to the profession because of this focus on the 
existential aspects of people’s lives and ‘[T]he pervasiveness of non-demonstrative 
inferences in identifying and making use of knowledge in social work [that] makes 
practice more demanding.’ (Shaw 2012: 56) and the unwillingness (or inability) to 
take account of a ‘lesser’ standard of ‘proof’ regarding what might (reasonably) 
constitute a claim to knowledge.  
 
The epistemic principles referred to above are obviously applicable to the issue of 
knowledge within any form and context, although as we shall see, when we speak 
of knowledge within particular professional or similarly bounded contexts 
(contextualism), we begin to see nuanced distinctions in relation to how such 
principles should be applied and how these particular knowledge ‘fields’ (Moi 2001; 
Houston 2002; Bourdieu 2003) or forms depend upon the application of epistemic 
principles in order to ensure consistency, coherency and therefore, validity, seen 
here as a form of justification.  All of this of course is necessary to ensure that the 
issue of knowledge of and for social work continues to be in keeping with the 
broader epistemological project which if maintained can, I would argue, refute 
Flexner’s (Ibid) claim and those of others that social work is not a profession 
because it cannot lay claim to a clear and credible knowledge base, although the 
notion of a knowledge ‘base’ is itself something I will take issue with later, taking 
into account some, but not all, of Payne’s comments on these matters (Payne 
2001).  
 
32 
2.5 Forms of Knowledge 
Having taken account of the structural elements of knowledge, we can then think 
about the particular form of knowledge we are dealing with.  By form I refer to 
whether it is propositional knowledge [Knowing that] or practice, tacit or craft 
knowledge [Knowing how]. In epistemology it is generally the case that 
propositional knowledge is the main object of concern, and to be sure this has 
provided grist for many a philosopher’s mill. However, the nature of human activity 
appears, a priori, to lend itself to the need for the use of knowledge derived from 
many sources that would appear, on the basis of the ‘classic’ account of knowledge, 
to lack clear (in the philosophical sense) justificatory means. If this were in fact the 
case that all knowledge should be capable of being turned into a propositional state, 
then much practical activity would immediately have to cease. In practical, day-to-
day activity, knowledge appears to be derived from many sources and used in many 
ways. The ‘classic’ account appears therefore to be rather too rigid to explain such 
commonplace activity, and as much professional activity is of this commonplace 
sort, so we have to account for it and apply a sufficiently robust epistemic framework 
to it so that it ‘counts’ as knowledge. Gettier’s counter to the ‘classic’ account of 
knowledge has in my view provided an opening for the acceptance of the role, 
function and significance of other forms of knowing, and it may be that the 
epistemological debacle that has followed is somewhat misplaced (Lycan 2006) in 
that it tries to deal with Gettier’s objections rather than dealing with what might be 
identified as real flaws in the ‘classic’ account of knowledge.  
 
I contend that this is in fact the case and seek to evidence this by reference to a 
pragmatic epistemology (Comesaña 2008) that can effectively accommodate 
Gettier’s objections and normalise them. Rescher (2009) provides a helpful means 
of addressing the Gettier conundrum when he refers to knowledge being predicated 
upon presumptively justified beliefs (PJB). The role of presumption is seen as a 
pragmatically justified tool that enables us act on the basis of our beliefs (and 
therefore upon the world) without worrying about or being affected by the regress 
problem as considered by Hume in his framing of the problem of induction (Hume 
1748/2008; Smith 1941; Lange 2008).  
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In relation to Gettier problems, a PJB allows us to act with reasonable confidence 
that our belief is true (with a small ‘t’) unless and until information to the contrary 
becomes available, assuming that we act in what I shall refer to as an epistemically 
ethical way i.e: ceterus paribus, we have approached the situation as openly and 
as honestly as we feel is possible and are open to the revisionary principles implied 
by epistemic fallibilism. Such an approach is borne of an acceptance of Peirce’s 
pragmatic principle and recognises that the Humean principle relating to the 
problem of induction and the nature (and necessity?) of infinite regress are matters 
with which we need to engage.  
 
Regarding types of knowledge, this refers to whether it is knowledge for social work, 
nursing, engineering etc. and therefore possessed of a particular context for its use, 
and is it therefore unique to one profession or is it interdisciplinary? It is now quite 
commonplace for discussion regarding the ‘knowledge base’ of a particular 
profession to consider whether what is known is applicable to a range of 
professional activity. Many recent developments in interprofessional education are 
predicated on the assumption that there are in fact forms of knowledge readily 
applicable to different professions (Barr 1998; Reynolds 2007; Reeves et al 2010), 
content considerations being relevant here too, not simply issues of form. 
 
These issues of what a particular form and type of knowledge might ‘look like’ refers 
us to a consideration of its substantive content, and it is this aspect that has largely 
been the focus of academic debate regarding knowledge of and for social work for 
many years. Argument continues over the ‘best’ bits of knowledge, often referred to 
as theories, that should be included within a substantive framework that provides 
the basis for social work as an activity (Trevillion 1998; Reid 2001; Payne 2001; 
Healy 2005: 2014), although some authors have taken issue with the notion of a 
‘framework’ because that implies rigidity and some degree of fixedness (Stevenson 
1971; Howe 1980; Payne 2001). This also goes deeper than one theory being 
‘better’ than any other because fundamental to the acceptance or otherwise of any 
theory is the issue of how that theory came to be. This insinuates something more 
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than an iterative process involving fundamental structural issues as referred to 
above: it begs questions regarding the very genesis of the theory and the underlying 
assumptions of the methodology utilised to produce it in the first place. The methods 
of the natural sciences, inherently positivistic as they are, would posit that such 
methods are the only way to reach the ‘truth’; those of a more interpretivist bent 
would certainly disagree. This schism is perhaps well articulated by Hughes and 
Sharrock who contend that: “The possibility of empirical knowledge needs to be 
secured against persistent sceptical doubt, the kind of doubt which raises 
arguments to the effect that we can never truly know anything about the real, 
external world, can never legitimately, and with full confidence, claim to know 
anything. To protect against this kind of scepticism it is argued that the possibility 
and the actuality of knowledge need to be conclusively demonstrated by identifying 
sound, unchallengeable means, or methods, of acquiring knowledge. If we are to 
be assured of our entitlement to the confidence that, for example, we often feel 
about our scientific knowledge, then we need to be able to demonstrate that our 
system of knowledge is built upon sound foundations.” (Hughes and Sharrock 1997 
p4: emphasis mine.) 
 
What is therefore to be regarded as valuable must in the first instance be 
epistemologically viable, but it also has to be relevant, applicable, meaningful and 
of some use. Thus, according to Chambers (1975), “…scientific knowledge is a 
necessary but not sufficient knowledge base for deriving practice behaviour. 
Science is incomplete and practitioners will be without a guide to action in many 
cases.” (Chambers 1975 p38), whilst Howe believes that “To look for skills in human 
behaviour and relationships and build them on the unsettled foundations of social 
science theory is a precarious business. The occupation's lack of effectiveness in 
changing individual attitudes and behaviour, the failure of the social sciences to 
predict human conduct, the fundamental disagreements about the nature of human 
beings and their actions, and finally the possibility that few social workers make use 
of such theoretically informed skills in practice, all serve to cast doubts on the 
wisdom and pertinence of continuing this style of thought and practice.” [Howe 1980 
pp332-3]. Content is clearly seen as being much more than a simple ‘shopping list’ 
of items and in fact represents a core feature of the diachronistic debate regarding 
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knowledge of and for social work, and is perhaps an exemplar of the symbiosis that 
exists regarding its various components (i.e. structure, type, form, content etc).  
 
Other considerations would need to focus upon knowledge transfer, use, 
development and dissemination, these all possessing an iterative quality, so that 
the ‘elements’ of knowledge outlined above can be seen to be representative of a 
dynamic process concerning knowledge in all its component parts. Such an 
approach seeks to avoid confusion around the range of differing definitions and 
distinctions within the literature concerning knowledge types, forms and contexts by 
establishing a clear process of differentiation and definition based upon extant 
epistemic principles within a clear typology. In this regard I intend to adopt and 
adapt what I consider to be a seminal work by Le Croy, Ashford and Macht (1989) 
whose paper provides a useful analytical framework that sets out to address their 
concern that: 
“Methodological and conceptual limitations have resulted in knowledge 
being defined so narrowly that we accept the inaccurate conclusion that 
social workers fail to utilise knowledge…[so]…a framework is proposed that 
makes explicit the philosophy of science and practice assumptions germane 
to the use of knowledge in practice.” (Le Croy, Ashford and Macht 1989 
Abstract p3).  
 
Thus, approaching critically the issue of knowledge qua knowledge, we can then 
proceed to analyse the elements of the debate regarding professional/social work 
knowledge with the benefit of a clear underpinning epistemological typology to act 
as the basis for analysis.  
 
2.6 The Professional Knowledge Debate 
In this section I shall provide a brief account of the main themes and issues relevant 
to the debate concerning professional/social work knowledge as represented within 
the extant literature and locate this within the broad knowledge ‘elements’ I outlined 
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above: definition, production, transfer, use, development and dissemination. It is 
not my intention at this point however to be either comprehensive or definitive; 
rather my aim is to highlight the range of issues to which the body of this inquiry will 
address itself later, both theoretically and empirically.  
 
2.6.1 Knowledge for Social Work? 
Debate concerning professional knowledge is clearly bound up with that particular 
appellation: professional, with one of its perceived and necessary characteristics or 
traits being the possession of specialist knowledge providing a particular 
occupational group with the basis upon which to claim expertise (Johnson 1972).  
From a functionalist perspective, “It seems evident that many of the most important 
features of our society are to a considerable extent dependent on the smooth 
functioning of the professions.” (Parsons 1939 p457). Thus, knowledge is not only 
necessary, but it is power. Such a deceptively simple ‘fact’ offers one reason why 
the whole debate concerning knowledge of and for social work has been, and 
continues to be, so lively. However, this is but one reason for that debate. Others 
include the need to be able to ‘do’ the task of social work (or whatever: nursing, 
teaching) more effectively, efficiently and ethically, and as such the possession of 
‘expertise’ is seen as a very important occupational characteristic, often bounded 
to those attributes of individuals possessing highly sophisticated abilities, including 
the possession of high-level knowledge (Fook, Ryan and Hawkins 2000). This is 
particularly so as social work and other human services deal with many of society’s 
most vulnerable and most dangerous individuals.  
For some however, the existence of human expertise is taken to be but one 
exemplar of the very reason why the human sciences per se are found wanting in 
terms of theory development. This is given support by reference to the failure of 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence to replicate such a phenomena 
(expertise), it being based it would appear on the use of intuition or ‘tacit’ knowledge 
forms (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Wolfe 1991), a very human capacity. This point 
however hides what I feel is a critical issue in this debate; there is still a lack of 
clarity about what social work is and ergo, what it should do. For some, social work 
can be seen as a ‘repressive’ force within society particularly for those with ‘radical’ 
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or Marxist positions (Bailey and Brake 1975; Rojek, Peacock and Collins 1998; 
Ferguson and Woodward 2009), and even though there have been recent attempts 
to clarify its remit (Grayson 2003; Pawson et al 2003; Scottish Executive 2006; 
GSCC 2008) in addition to the existence of a formal ‘definition’ (IFSW 2014) to 
which most of the profession appears to subscribe, there is still confusion over its 
purposes.   
 
Loewenberg (1984) claims that there is an “urgent need to clarify once again the 
basis, content, function and domain of our profession” (p309). Thus, the issue of 
knowledge of and for social work appears to be intimately connected to its raison 
d’être and to its context, thus implying that to some extent a more pluralistic attitude 
might in fact be helpful. Reid (2001), acknowledging others and perhaps shying 
away from an explicit behaviourist position notes:  
“In methodological pluralism the type of method one uses depends entirely 
on the questions and contexts of enquiry and not on one’s epistemological 
position. Methods are evaluated pragmatically in terms of how well they do 
the job; they are not seen as being undergirded by foundational philosophies 
(Seale [2002]).” (Reid 2001 pp286-7).  
 
Regarding the structure of professional knowledge, the literature tends to see this 
as being somewhat synonymous with concerns regarding underpinning 
methodological assumptions and for the most part structural issues are implicit 
within the debate. For many in social work, the potential impacts of human science 
methodologies, approaches and findings leave much to be desired. For example, 
Downie and Loudfoot contend “. . . that the possibility of a science of human 
relationships with the certainty of the natural sciences does not exist, and hence 
that there is serious doubt about the reality of a social work expertise based 
exclusively on it.” (Downie and Loudfoot 1978 p119 cited in Howe 1980 p333). 
Taylor and White argue that for social workers, “An unquestioning dependence on 
external, pre-existing knowledge will not be sufficient…” (Taylor and White 2001 
p47) thus implying that KT is simply not enough. They do however “…agree that 
evidence from research and so forth can assist workers in analysing risk and harm 
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but this still leaves the social worker with the task of deciding which evidence is 
relevant to the case, and crucially of categorising people as blameworthy or morally 
adequate and situations as harmful and risky or otherwise.” (Ibid p47). Attention is 
here drawn to the connection between the (unarticulated) mechanisms operating 
within particular methodologies and the use to which such knowledge as is 
generated is subsequently put.  
 
The need for social work to utilise and refer to relevant knowledge is arguably 
unquestionable, all the more so when the activities of a particular occupational 
group may be such as to involve life and death decisions in cases of serious child 
abuse for example (Laming 2003: 2009; Pritchard and Williams 2010; Devaney, 
Lazenblatt and Bunting 2011), decisions to detain people against their wishes as in 
the case of the care and treatment of those individuals with a mental disorder 
(Hothersall and Maas-Lowit 2008) or those affected by a range of disabling 
conditions making them vulnerable to harm and exploitation (Hothersall and Maas-
Lowit (2010: 2011). Howe (1980) notes that with its ‘…yearnings which it has for 
professional recognition, social work has found itself looking for a distinctive and 
convincing body of knowledge’ (p319) to the extent that it appears to hang on to 
everything it develops, thereby presenting with a rather ‘swollen’ and ‘congested’ 
knowledge base, perhaps representing nothing more than ‘…the steady 
accumulation of unrelated relics’ (Ibid) for which he suggests there may be three 
possible explanations. Following Kant, ‘…if it is impossible to produce unanimity 
among those engaged in the same work, as to the manner in which their common 
objective should be accomplished, then we may be convinced that such a study is 
far from having attained the secure course of a science, but is merely a groping in 
the dark.’ (Kant 1787/2007 in Howe 1980 p13). Thus, being unable to agree on 
what to do does little to clarify how it should be done. Howe then refers to Kuhn 
(1970 p91) as a means of suggesting that the range of theory within social work’s 
purview might represent ‘…symptoms of transition from normal to revolutionary 
research’ (Kuhn 1970 p91 in Howe 1980 p319), in short, the beginnings of a 
paradigm shift, although this is perhaps overstating the case. Thirdly, he suggests 
that all the variations and disagreements about knowledge of and for social work 
and how this should be formulated and utilised could actually imply ‘…that social 
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work will never actually establish a uniform body of knowledge as it is not a uniform 
phenomenon. Rather, it is a compendium of different theories and practices 
employed to help those who find difficulties in social living or those who present 
problems for the smooth conduct of social life.’ (pp319-320).   
 
These apparent ‘failures’ of social work in terms of behavioural and social change 
and the use of codified propositional knowledge (KT) to the apparent exclusion or 
derogation of other forms of knowing perhaps supports what Grace and Wilkinson 
(1978) claim, namely that ‘The nature of social work knowledge is not to be found 
in the literature, but “in situ”’ (p322). This clearly refers to the use of knowledge 
derived in and from practice (Curnock and Hardiker 1979) emphasising the 
importance of how social worker’s do what they do, an additional type of knowledge: 
knowing how (KH). Howe suggests that “…social work is an occupational 
description given to a number of disparate activities” (p320) and that the knowledge 
components required “…grow in proportion to the number of activities identified or 
proposed as examples of social work.’ (Ibid). As a result ‘…social work theories as 
well as social science theories in general have been disappointingly unsuccessful.” 
(p321). Some writers note however that the apparent lack of theory use by social 
workers in situ (Carew 1979) may well have something to do with the perceived 
‘inadequacies’ of the theories themselves. Rosen (1994) in his study begins by 
stating that, “…effective and accountable practice will be enhanced through focused 
efforts to develop scientifically valid and practice-relevant knowledge and through 
appropriate use of such knowledge in making practice decisions.” (p561). His 
findings (Rosen 1983; 1992; 1994) suggest that social workers are poor at being 
able to identify and articulate the knowledge they actually use in practice (which is 
distinct from them not actually using any), and he suggests that the structure of 
knowledge itself may be an impediment to its effective use in practice:  
“To be useful professionally, theoretical or empirical generalisations need to 
be applicable beyond the specific instances (cases or study samples) on 
which they are based...Thus, the very feature that renders knowledge 
statements professionally worthy (their generalisability) may be an obstacle 
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to their use by practitioners in a specific practice situation.” (Rosen 1994 
pp562-3).  
This is a fairly clear statement to the effect that attempts to apply knowledge 
generated through the methodologies of the natural and human sciences end up 
losing their relevance in the very act of application, the dilemma of the 
“…idiographic application of normative generalisations”. (p562). This is, in essence, 
a restatement of Hume’s paradox concerning induction. 
 
These concerns regarding the type of knowledge of and for social work are also to 
be considered by reference to the issue of how knowledge becomes accepted and 
articulated in the first place. Particular types of knowledge have historically been 
more privileged over others, their underlying methodological structures generating 
what Foucault (1974) refers to as ‘regimes of truth’. These are located within the 
broad ‘episteme’, which itself comprises (amongst other things) of “…the totality of 
relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when 
one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities.” (Philp 1979 p191), a 
contemporary example of this being evidence-based practice. And although Philp 
makes particular reference to Marxist forms of knowledge, he makes the more 
general point that these various forms tend to suffer from epistemological idealism 
that fail to take account of the influence of broader issues regarding what social 
work is and what social work does: in effect, the relevance of the specific 
(existential) context. This he says is important because it is this that predefines the 
content of knowledge as well as influencing its construction from the perspective of 
how underpinning epistemic principles are utilised i.e. are they free of bias 
generated by the influence of overarching structural (situational) influences, 
Foucault’s point exactly: “Knowledge can be seen to be related to economic, social 
and political forms. In this way also knowledge can be seen as subject to ruptures 
and discontinuities…” (p85).  
 
This particular approach perhaps emphasises what Rosen and others have argued, 
that with governments now seemingly requiring greater ‘proof’ of the efficacy of 
interventions to justify funding and to maintain political credibility, especially 
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regarding those interventions designed to enhance public safety, the search for the 
‘Truth’ (with a capital ‘T’) could be seen to be obscuring the need for epistemological 
clarity and functional relevance, thereby continuing to privilege certain types of 
knowledge over others. This apparent focus on the use of propositional knowledge 
(KT), for example through the evidence-based practice discourse, could minimise 
the role of other forms of knowing, undermining the agency of the possessor of that 
knowledge, particularly in terms of what type of knowledge is applied when and 
under what circumstances. Philp (1979) suggests “…it is essential to see that if a 
form of knowledge exists which we can call ‘social work knowledge’ it does so 
because it is the product of a specific historical, social and economic situation and 
that it will be related, in the form it takes, to that situation.” (p87), a sentiment highly 
relevant to the evidence-based practice movement.  
 
2.7 Accounts of Professional Knowledge 
Eraut (1994) provides perhaps one of the earliest comprehensive accounts of 
professional knowledge considering the different kinds (types) that exist and how 
these are used in a particular context (Gammack 1982) and located within the broad 
frame of reference of professionalisation. Whilst there is some discussion of 
epistemology in the sense of knowledge equating with justified true belief (p16) 
there is little discussion of epistemic principles and this perhaps reflects its rather 
generalised approach, albeit for a professional but generally non-philosophical 
audience, which I acknowledge.  The commentary offers a useful overview of 
knowledge in a general sense in that his focus is on knowledge as a taken-for-
granted entity without specific reference to underlying epistemological structures, 
and there is a somewhat bewildering array of labels used to refer to different types, 
forms and functions of knowledge (procedural, propositional, practical, technical, 
tacit, action, public, private etc) which it is difficult to disentangle, largely because 
these are often used interchangeably and therefore synonymously. Eraut does 
acknowledge this however when he says that:  
“For the purposes of this book, which is concerned with developing 
professional knowledge in its fullest possible sense, I intend to use the term 
‘knowledge’ to refer to the whole domain in which more specifically defined 
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clusters of meaning reside.” (p16).  
He also provides what he refers to as a ‘map of professional knowledge’, essentially 
a four-fold typology comprised of propositional, personal, process and ‘other’ types 
of knowledge. These four types are seen to be the constituent elements of a 
professional knowledge base and his task is then stated as being that of 
‘…considering how they are acquired and discussing their role in professional 
action’ (p103). Thus, his focus is more about knowledge use, as his discussions 
concerning knowledge acquisition at no point appear to take account of relevant 
epistemological principles or processes in any depth, such that what Eraut refers to 
as knowledge is essentially taken-for-granted as knowledge. However, one of its 
strengths is that the issues he raises are easily generalisable to knowledge issues 
in other professions, acknowledging the increasing awareness that knowledge 
forms and related content should increasingly be seen as being inter-disciplinary 
(Skaerbaek 2010).  
 
For the most part discussion and debate within the literature relating to knowledge 
of and for social work tends to centre on the type of knowledge deemed most 
appropriate. Aligned to this is the question as to whether or not social work needs 
to be seen to be the possessor of a credible base of knowledge to which people 
can refer and what the content of this perceived corpus ought to look like. This 
notion of a base of knowledge is but one identifiable feature posited within the whole 
functionalist ideology of professionalism (Etzioni 1969; Goode 1969; Parsons 
1968), although some see this approach as akin to creating a ‘caste-system’ of 
knowledge (Katz 1969), a view not dissimilar to criticisms aimed at the hierarchical 
positioning of evidence-based practice knowledge forms at the present time 
(Goldenberg 2009). Within the social work literature however, Stevenson (1971) 
warns against the idea of a specifiable knowledge base for a number of reasons, 
preferring instead to use the analogy of a ‘frame’: “…you can put what you like in a 
frame.” (p227). She argues that because of the shifting nature of this entity referred 
to as ‘social work’, to have a definable knowledge base is unworkable, as she 
believes that “we should not be talking at this stage in our development as if the 
knowledge upon which we can draw had a shape and clear-cut boundaries…” 
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(p226), largely because what social is itself is not clear-cut, an issue no less 
important today as it was over three decades ago.  
 
Payne (2001) provides a similar perspective when he suggests that the notion of a 
knowledge base is unhelpful and argues for the notion of a knowledge bias. This 
he suggests would more accurately reflect the idea that knowledge is constructed 
and re-constructed as required dependent on circumstances, context and a range 
of other factors. The notion of a knowledge base presupposes that there is some 
knowledge social work cannot do without. A knowledge bias is rather a leaning 
towards some particular theoretical construction: “…the role of knowledge within 
social sciences is more of a process of social construction than the establishment 
of irrefutable and universal laws of social behaviour.” (p145). This view provides 
some measure of support to the view that eclecticism could be a valuable 
mechanism in practice (Siporin 1979), having parallels to the pragmatic principle, 
although it is important to avoid conflating basic occupational activities (e.g. the 
giving of advice) to the status of what Timms and Timms (1977) refer to as 
‘treatment tools’ and assuming that such is done by reference to claims to particular, 
specialist forms of knowledge.  
 
Drury-Hudson (1997) aims to ‘…provide a model of professional knowledge and 
argue that social workers should become more proficient in incorporating theoretical 
and empirical knowledge in their practice in order to improve accuracy and 
consistency in decision-making so as to provide a better standard of accountable 
practice.’ [p35]. In relation to this particular model she states that ‘It is considered 
that such a model is needed because often professional knowledge is discussed 
without any attempt being made to define what is meant by this term.’ [p37]. Drury-
Hudson identifies from the literature ‘Five principal knowledge forms…and together 
these form the basis of professional knowledge’ [Ibid], which is defined as ‘the 
cumulated information or understanding derived from theory, research practice or 
experience considered to contribute to the profession’s understanding of its work 
and that serves as a guide to its practice’ [Ibid]. These categories of knowledge are 
labelled theoretical, empirical, personal, practice and procedural. Each of these is 
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described in an attempt to differentiate their constituent elements whilst trying to 
illustrate their interconnectedness. These differing types of knowledge all have their 
own sources and Drury-Hudson suggests that each of these has in its own way a 
degree of merit dependent on the nature of the situation knowledge. She refers to 
such eclecticism as being an important element in terms of knowledge utilisation 
and acknowledges that there are critics of this approach who would argue that the 
‘…indiscriminate importation of ideas has not resulted in the formation of a coherent 
knowledge base that supports the professions objectives, but has resulted in the 
fragmentation and incoherence of ideas and the mixing of concepts.’ (p38). Her 
contention that eclecticism itself has validity as a practice has more than a passing 
resemblance to the utilisation of the pragmatic principle and she cites Simons and 
Aigner (1979) who suggest that many people misunderstand the notion of 
eclecticism. Drury-Hudson suggests ‘True eclecticism requires the ability to be fully 
informed in relation to a variety of theories and to be able to switch from one practice 
theory to another in an effort to meet the particular demands of each unique 
problem, situation or client.’ (pp38-9). 
 
I would go further than this and suggest that true eclecticism is in fact nothing more 
or less than the application of the Pragmatic Principle that allows for the justified 
use of elements of relevant and appropriate theory and facts as required, providing 
such use is guided by having due regard for epistemic competence set within the 
functional boundaries of post-Gettier epistemological principles (Chisholm 1966). 
By adopting such an approach we can perhaps counter Rosen’s (1994) claim that:  
“Through artful epistemological mystification, the process and substance of 
direct practice are claimed by such proponents to be impervious to real 
comprehension and evaluation by anyone except the participating clinician. 
Although their view may be ideologically appealing, it discredits a priori any 
attempt to subject clinical practice to systematic inquiry or criticism.” (p563).  
 
What Rosen suggests however does have some validity: indiscriminate 
generalisations that have no credible means of support, epistemological or 
otherwise, understandably lead to worries regarding ‘theory-less practice’, (Paley 
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1987), the abandonment of the relevance of research and a tendency towards 
“…justifying an extra-scientific status to practice knowledge.” (Ibid). This should not 
however be taken to mean however that scientific knowledge is at the zenith of 
credibility; it is rather to acknowledge his general point and argue that for any form 
of knowledge to have status, it has to be credible, based on clear criteria which may 
or may not be those of the natural sciences in contradistinction to those derived 
from more interpretive approaches (Lobkowicz 1967; Rotenstreich 1977). 
 
Saleeby (1989) claims that social work is “…beguiled by the notion of professional 
practice as a kind of scientifically based applied technology.” (p556) that has arisen 
because of what might be perceived as an institutional and conceptual dichotomy 
between theory and practice that serves to separate ‘knowing’ from ‘doing’. The 
effect of this has been to remove the responsibility of knowing from the act of doing. 
One contemporary example might be the practice of using unqualified Family 
Support Workers to supervise contact visits between parents and their children 
where there is a ‘context for concern’ (Samuel 2011). In these situations, the 
information gleaned from such events is often used as ‘evidence’ of parenting 
capacity and subsequently used to inform future decision-making concerning the 
welfare of the child. Personnel who have not been trained to a particular level may 
have less knowledge regarding what to observe and, importantly, how to 
subsequently interpret this in the context of broader child welfare issues. 
 
This is not to suggest that such practices are fundamentally about the use of 
propositional knowledge, knowing that, to the exclusion of anything else, but a 
certain awareness of the range of knowledge propositions concerning say, child 
development would be necessary in order that meaning can be applied to the 
situation. This begs the question as to what extent knowing how or forms of tacit 
knowledge are underpinned by reference to knowing that? One (implicit) 
explanation for this approach might be the assumption that ‘common sense’ or 
particular value positions are in the fact used as the basis for knowledge (Rosen 
1994). Where value positions are seen as being universal, they are easy to apply. 
For example, it is generally felt to be the case that adoption for young children is 
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preferable than long-term foster care. Whilst this may generally be true, it is not true 
for all children and all situations, but practices that pursue such outcomes may be 
justified by reference to this general value position without recourse to the evidence 
of practice or research. In these situations, the use of value positions could be seen 
to have a heuristic function.   
 
Emmert (1985) draws attention to a distinction between two kinds of knowledge: 
‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘policy-science knowledge’. This dichotomy is used to 
illustrate the relevancy of both knowing that (policy-science) and knowing how 
(ordinary knowing) within practice. ‘Ordinary knowing’ is that which ‘does not owe 
its origin, testing, degree of verification, truth status, or currency to distinctive 
[professional social inquiry] techniques but rather to common sense, casual 
empiricism, or thoughtful speculation and analysis’ (Lindblom and Cohen 1979 p12, 
in Emmert 1985 p99).  
 
By contrast, ‘[P]olicy-science-based knowledge is grounded in theories and 
empirical evidence that are subjected to systematic and rigorous efforts at 
falsification.’ (p99). An important element within this paper is the discussion 
regarding causality. In many practice situations, causality is a key factor for 
practitioners to consider and forms the basis for any form of risk assessment, a 
central preoccupation of social work and other human services at this time 
underpinning many aspects of practice (Hothersall and Maas-Lowitt 2010; Webb 
2006). Emmert (1985) suggests that as these knowledge forms arise from differing 
sources, ‘ordinary knowing’ may be more amenable to being used to understand 
apparent causality (my emphasis).  Evolutionary epistemology would support a neo-
Darwinian perspective on how we use past experience as a heuristic device (Cook 
and Campbell 1979) and even Popper would appear to agree as to the potential 
value of such an approach:  
‘Without waiting, passively, for repetitions to impress or impose regularity 
upon us, we actively try to impose regularities upon the world. We try to 
discover similarities in it, and to interpret it in terms of laws invented by us. 
Without waiting for premises we jump to conclusions. These may have to be 
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discarded later, should observation show that they are wrong. The method 
of trial and error is not of course identical with the scientific or critical 
approach-with the method of conjecture and refutation. […] The difference 
lies not so much in the trials as in a critical and constructive attitude towards 
errors; errors which the scientist consciously and cautiously tries to uncover 
in order to refute his theories with searching arguments.’ (Popper 1963 p52 
in Emmert 1985 p102).  
 
The tendency to search for meaning (perhaps with some psychological parallels to 
the notion of the Gestalt) and impose such ‘regularities’ is in my view entirely 
consistent with the principles underpinning pragmatism: trial and error learning has 
as its focus the generation of knowledge in order to maximise homeostasis as do 
actions underpinned by reference to the philosophical principles of pragmatism. The 
aim of both is to generate knowledge that is functional and in this regard the 
example of attachment theory is well placed to illustrate these very processes of 
knowledge generation, use and functional significance, not just in terms of the 
relevance of these features for practitioners, but for all of us.  
Attachment theory offers an account of how individuals construct knowledge of their 
world (KT) and act on the basis of it (KH) to maximise their safety (physical, 
psychological and emotional), entirely consistent with the maintenance of 
homeostasis as implied by the principles of pragmatism. Attachment theory can 
therefore be seen to exemplify pragmatism and the interface of KT and KH, both 
forms of knowing (Crittenden 2000a: 2000b: 2008; Howe 2011). I would contend 
that the manifestation of particular attachment strategies, particularly those 
regarded as being of the insecure/anxious type and therefore dysfunctional relative 
to the more ‘privileged’ secure types of attachment could, through the lens of 
pragmatism be seen as entirely congruent with an individual’s unique situation 
where so-called insecure attachment patterns are entirely functional for that person 
by reference to the principle of homeostasis. We therefore have the phenomena of 
what I shall refer to as functional dysfunctionality: functional for the individual 
concerned because it maximises safety and therefore maintains homeostasis, but 
perceived as dysfunctional by the professional and therefore in need of rectification 
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(Houston 2001). This is in my view a classic example of the manifestation of Gettier-
type problems within social work practice.  
 
It is important however to maintain a level of critical awareness regarding the current 
state of available knowledge and understanding concerning any issue, including 
that of attachment. The Duhem/Quine thesis (Duhem 1954; Quine 1960) states that 
the evidence will always underdetermine theoretical formulations as, following 
Hume (again), there is no amount of data that can ever constitute a theoretical 
conclusion: all findings and subsequent theoretical constructs are, by definition, 
ambiguous and fallible (Yalcin 1992; Vahid 2005). However, there are examples of 
many theories being fully accepted by the scientific/practice/community because of 
the closure of scientific debate when people argue that such and such a theory is 
definitive, when in reality it can never be so. If we accept the incommensurability 
thesis derived from both Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975) in this regard as the 
operationalisation of the Duhem/Quine hypothesis, then the apparent domination 
and persistence of some theories (the Ptolemaic view of the solar system or 
Becher’s Phlogiston theory) must be attributable to social factors rather than any 
extant objective criteria. In this we must consider Laudan (1990) who differentiates 
between underdetermination and radical indeterminacy. In the former, there is 
acknowledgement that there is no infinite (or indefinite) number of equally plausible 
interpretations that we can rely upon that are reasonable and logically compatible 
with the body of knowledge on a subject – the thesis of nonuniqueness. Thus, by 
accepting this view, we simultaneously reject the thesis of cognitive egalitarianism 
and stop short of radical indeterminacy where all rival theories and interpretations 
thereof are seen to have equal worth or are equally rational to accept. Contextual 
factors therefore have a constraining influence on the interpretation of theories and 
the extent to which claims have credibility. This serves to return us to the discussion 
of issues central to the whole philosophy of science and the apparent pre-eminence 
of the positivistic tradition, one that has clear relevance to the issue of knowledge 
of and knowledge for social work, the whole basis of this thesis.  
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At this point I would contend that one of the main issues confronting social work is 
not so much that relating to what type or form of knowledge is best, or whether one 
methodological approach per se is more or less appropriate than any other in terms 
of the means by which to produce such knowledge. Rather, it is perhaps about the 
status we accord knowledge, how we use it and how we come to define it as 
knowledge worth having in the first place. Different methodologies and approaches 
to knowledge creation, use and dissemination should not necessarily be seen as 
‘good’ or ‘bad’; rather, they and the knowledge they engender should be tested by 
reference to the pragmatic principle in order to determine their functionality in 
relation to the particular context such knowledge aims to address itself to.  
 
For example, a very good exemplar of highly important propositional knowledge 
represented by a ‘checklist’, anathema to some, would be Sheridan’s 
developmental milestones (Sheridan 1997). Functionality therefore is key to this 
whole debate and this concept needs to be elaborated within a pragmatic 
framework, as it may be the case that it is only really through the application of a 
pragmatic epistemology that ‘true’ (with a small ‘t’) and arguably useful knowledge 
of humans and society can be generated, particularly if, as it seems, Hume’s 
objections to induction pertain. If this is the case, then we have to review our 
conception of knowledge and situate it within a functional (pragmatic) framework 
and acknowledge that perhaps ‘inference to the best explanation’ is the best we are 
ever likely to get (Goldstein 2011), and that Hume was right after all.  
 
Finally, in relation to the interface between knowledge of and for social work and 
the role of social work education, Downie and Loudfoot (1978) suggest that ‘No 
amount of knowledge of what is the case can ever establish for us what we ought 
to do about it. The need for practical judgment of what we ought to do, granted our 
knowledge, is inescapable; and therefore there are radical limits to the possibility of 
expertise. It is on the connection between his own everyday problems and those of 
his client, rather than on any doubtful connection between the natural and social 
sciences, that social work education should concentrate.’ (p122). Thus, the claims 
and assertions made within this paper have implications for a whole range of 
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applications and represent the main areas for a useful inquiry into the development 
and substantiation of a viable and coherent (pragmatic) epistemology of and for 
social work. 
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Chapter 3: The Philosophy of Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I shall explain, discuss and critically analyse issues appertaining to 
philosophical positions, paradigms of inquiry, ontology, epistemology, methodology 
and associated methods of data collection relevant to this thesis. As noted in 
chapter two, it is important to evidence coherence and consistency across the 
philosophical, theoretical and methodological domains, and as such I am utilising 
an essentially pragmatic methodology by adopting a mixed-methods approach 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 2006; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007; 
Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009) in relation to both the empirical and the theoretical 
elements of this work. As will be seen, this philosophical approach permeates the 
methodological position adopted and, in terms of the methods used (Q-
methodology), allows us to take account of the importance of both statistical 
significance and the importance of meaning in terms of empirical findings, and as 
such reflects the view that: 
“A major reason that pragmatism is the philosophical partner for MM [mixed 
methods] is that it rejects the either-or choices from the constructivism-
positivism debate. Pragmatism offers a third choice that embraces 
superordinate ideas gleaned through consideration of perspectives from 
both sides of the paradigms debate in interaction with the research question 
and real-world circumstances.” (Teddlie and Johnson 2009: 73).  
 
It is also important to acknowledge and thereafter articulate an ongoing awareness 
of the myriad relationships that potentially exist between philosophical positions and 
methodological approaches and how these are impacted upon by reference to our 
understanding of the nature of reality, or our definition of truth and what may or may 
not be regarded as knowledge (Howell 2013). In this regard, and drawing upon the 
ideas regarding the acquisition and use of differing forms of belief qua knowledge, 
a mixed-methods approach allows us to acknowledge that “…all research involves 
induction and deduction in the broad sense of those terms; in all research we move 
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from ideas to data as well as from data to ideas.” (Hammersley 1992:168). 
Furthermore, in adopting such a position it is possible to reject what Bernstein 
(1983) refers to as the ‘tyranny of method’ whereby the epistemological 
(conceptual) is allowed dominance over the practical (empirical) whilst also allowing 
that which is purely conceptual (epistemological) to determine the nature of the 
empirical (practical). Following an essentially pragmatic approach is supported by 
Howe (1988) who states “…paradigms must demonstrate their worth in terms of 
how they inform, and are informed by, research methods that are successfully 
employed. Given such a two-way relationship between methods and paradigms, 
paradigms are evaluated in terms of how well they square with the demands of 
research practice…” (p10) and not the other way round. Thus:  
“[T]he paradigms debate is an oversimplification that ignores, on the one 
hand, the thought processes involved in sustained enquiry where deduction 
and induction advance in an iterative process; and on the other hand the 
range of traditions within social science enquiry, many of which make use of 
both modes of analysis.” (Gilbert 2006:207).  
 
Both historically and (still) contemporaneously, the availability of different methods 
and the perceived degree of alignment between these and the topic(s) under 
scrutiny often continue to determine the approach to reasoning one should take (or 
vice-versa) – essentially deductive or inductive. In the context of using a mixed-
methods approach, whether one ought to follow an essentially deductive or 
inductive approach is rendered moot and seen not as an ‘either/or’ dilemma but 
rather as a ‘whether or not’ choice determined by the question(s) being addressed. 
The methodological dilemma is essentially resolved by reference to the principles 
of abduction (Shank 1998; Haig 2005: 2008: 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014), 
themselves a corollary of pragmatism. Abduction proceeds on the basis of reflection 
on a particular situation (a set of outcomes, a possible solution to a problem) and 
then speculating on a possible course of action – an ‘if-then’ formulation that if you 
act in a particular way, then you are likely to produce a specific outcome(s).  
As such, a clear articulation of the importance of the history and developments of 
and within the philosophy of science represents a useful means of locating my 
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particular approach within the broader context of knowledge creation, use and 
development. Included in this is the need to acknowledge and take account of the 
role of language. In relation to the philosophy of science and the emergence of 
particular ideologies, paradigms and dominant methodologies, language has 
played a significant role. For science, the need for a strong (some would say, strict) 
correspondence between the word and reality is essential as this is the predicate 
upon which its predictive power is seen to rest. Where the degree of 
correspondence is weak, or is challenged, questions emerge regarding the 
determinate relationship presumed to exist. As Gergen (1998) notes: 
“…it is primarily in the degree to which there is correspondence between 
theoretical language and real-world events that scientific theory acquires 
value in the marketplace of prediction. If scientific language bears no 
determinate relationship to events external to the language itself, not only 
does its contribution to prediction become problematic, but hope that 
knowledge may be advanced through continued, systematic observation 
proves futile.” (p34). 
 
Epistemology, like other things is represented and made dynamic by reference to 
language – there is here a symbiosis that requires explication, so to pass over the 
role played by language in the history of the development of approaches to the 
creation of knowledge (Hempel 1966; Chalmers 1999; Okasha 2002; Delanty and 
Strydom 2003; Dicken 2010; Benton and Craib 2011; Brown 2012) is to ignore the 
importance of how differing ideologies and a range of other factors are themselves 
shaped, and subsequently define and craft how we come to know the world and 
achieve understanding and impose meaning on it (Brier 2000).   
 
This is an important issue: as this thesis represents an exploration of the ways in 
which professional social workers define, produce, transfer, use, develop and 
disseminate knowledge within contemporary practice, consideration has to be given 
to the way language shapes the nature of the research question(s) by reference to 
the concourse of statements. As is made clear in chapter 4, the concourse is a 
‘thematic’ representation of the current zeitgeist regarding professional knowledge 
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in social work, derived from conversations with professionals in the field as well as 
themes extracted from published literature and other sources. The issue here, given 
the constitutive nature of language, is how representative is the concourse of the 
professional debate? Does the nature of the language used potentially compromise 
the nature of the findings because it generates an inherent bias in terms of how 
statements are represented? Is their representation an accurate one, or (merely) a 
representation – in this case, mine?  
 
If we return to the issue of contextual determinacy, we can argue that if the 
statements were not deemed by the participants to be relevant and to have general 
‘sense’, then they would challenge them as being either irrelevant or, at the 
extremes, nonsensical. As Margolis (1999) reminds us, ‘…general predicates [. . .] 
cannot be extended to new instances, except informally, in terms of what, 
consensually, may be tolerated as effective or incremental extensions from 
acknowledged exemplars.” (p63). The concourse of statements are the 
‘acknowledged exemplars’ to which Margolis refers. Any ‘stretching’ of these 
beyond the realms of what would fall within the Wittgensteinian ‘rules of the game’ 
would likely result in challenge or an inability to undertake the study because it was 
meaningless to the participants. The piloting of the statements with a small group 
of social workers beforehand represented the means by which the legitimacy of the 
statements could be tested. In addition, Margolis goes further when he says that 
‘our aptitude for discerning relevant similarities in a run of would-be cases—any 
cases—signifies our mastery of the same sittlich practices within whose bounds 
such similarities obtain or are reasonably extended’ (Ibid p64-emphasis in original). 
Thus, when presented with the concourse of statements, they are similar to that 
which would ordinarily sit within the realm of what is accepted and understood. 
There is therefore a clear and explicit acknowledgement of the potential for bias 
and distortion, but this is controlled for by reference to the linguistic exemplars 
regarding this topic that both are extant and contemporaneous.  
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3.2 History and the Philosophy of Science  
The popular conception of the distinctive features of what is referred to as ‘scientific 
knowledge’, as opposed to other forms of knowledge (Barnes, Bloor and Henry 
1996) is that it is derived from the ‘facts’, and as such can be given preferential 
status. It is this view that has led to many of the disputes regarding the credibility 
and ergo, the importance of differing forms of knowledge, a core feature addressed 
within this thesis. Widely held conceptions of the relative merits of differing forms of 
knowledge are reduced to a somewhat atomistic perspective by reference to the 
perceived pre-eminence of the ‘scientific method’ (Gauch 2012; Carey 2011), and 
by implication, the superiority of what I will refer to as ‘positivistic’ methodologies 
(experimentation and the like). These claims appear to rest on a number of 
assumptions – that science simply describes what we see and is based on our 
observations, which are tested in a systematic and value-free way. Or so the 
argument might go.   
 
The history of the philosophy of science and this denouement regarding scientific 
knowledge represents a central issue in relation to social work and many other 
professions. As we saw in chapter one, Flexner (op cit) made the claim that social 
work was not a profession (largely) because it did not possess a distinct body of 
knowledge it could call its own. In large measure this is a nod towards the 
possession of ‘scientific knowledge’ as Flexner cited medicine as the standard 
bearer for all professions and referenced its possession of large tracts of 
(scientifically-generated) knowledge to its credit. The possession of knowledge 
based on the ‘facts’ has a long history, and an overview of some of the key themes, 
issues and debates will serve to contextualise what follows. It is this, and the 
emergence of differing conceptions of what knowledge is and ergo what methods 
are best applied to its appropriation that requires a historiography so that the 
present thesis and its contentions can be seen in both historical and contemporary 
perspective.  
 
The history of science and philosophising about it, can be traced to antiquity – 
moving from the Ancient Greeks - Parmenides, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
56 
Theophrastus, Socrates et al (Lloyd 1970), through the Romans - Pliny the Elder, 
Ptolemy, Marcus Aurelius et al (Stahl 1962) to the great figures of the Enlightenment 
and the so-called ‘Scientific Revolution’ - Copernicus, Newton, Kepler, Galileo, 
Bacon, Descartes (Henry 2008; Hannam 2011), leading to the emergence and 
persistence of what was to become known as the ‘scientific method’. With its basis 
(at least initially) on the importance of observations as being the prima facia, taking 
the facts of observations seriously was seen as the foundation for knowledge. This 
view of the facts of observation being the basis for science and scientific endeavour 
(as opposed to everyday facts) rests on three issues: that the facts are directly 
available to an unbiased observer; that facts are prior to experience (a priori) and 
independent of theory and finally, that the facts constitute a firm and reliable 
foundation for scientific knowledge. These presuppositions formed the basis for the 
development of scientific method and the various approaches and ideologies 
underpinning it and persist in various forms to the present day. 
 
Implicit within these three ‘conditions’ is the view that ‘seeing is believing’, that visual 
experience is simply based on the object viewed and that a ‘fact’ is an unambiguous 
statement. All of these assumptions are today readily dismissed as being naive. 
Visual experience is readily influenced and at times distorted by the environment 
(visual illusions – Muller-Lyer; the ‘Moon illusion’ etc), and what is viewed is now 
known to be distinct from what is perceived. All forms of perception are influenced 
by our previous experiences, expectations and pre-existing knowledge, thus 
seriously damaging the claim that facts are not influenced by theory. Furthermore, 
how a ‘fact’ is presented rests not so much on the fact itself (whatever that may be), 
but more on who is doing the presenting and the way in which the fact is conveyed, 
which itself rests on issues relating to the presenter’s motives, their social position 
and a host of other features and factors (Chalmers 1990), leading the way 
(ultimately) for the emergence of a whole branch of research ethics (c/f Milgram 
1963).  
 
As the scientific method achieved what can only be described as remarkable 
successes, its pre-eminence began to be seen as axiomatic. Many of these were 
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based largely upon the approach to experimentation – the systematic gathering of 
facts and their testing and manipulation. This was and is important in relation not 
only to experimentation, but also to the process of systematic inquiry more 
generally. Those facts that are of benefit to the broad scientific endeavour are those 
that are the product of systematic inquiry – be that experimentation or any other 
sort, rather than everyday facts. Thus, there are it would seem ‘relevant’ facts and 
‘irrelevant’ facts to be seen as appropriately aligned with the proper pursuit of 
science. This is not to say that there were not some spectacular ‘own goals’ along 
the way when viewed with the benefits of hindsight. Some of the ‘facts’ that 
constituted evidence upon which theories appertaining to the physical world were 
based were clearly incorrect. This notwithstanding, it soon became apparent that 
not only did the facts of observation allow for testing, but also that the results led to 
the development in theory which in turn allowed for the interpretation of the 
observed facts.  
 
These developments foreshadowed the role of philosophical debate in relation to 
scientific endeavour: an understanding of what one is actually observing is 
beneficial to the whole process of scientific endeavour. If I don’t know anything 
about the patho-physiology of the circulatory system, how am I able to recognise 
when a heart is malfunctioning? Previous experimentation and exploration 
regarding the circulatory system will inform my observations – will guide what I look 
for, so the relevance of the facts is important. Thus, the results of the scientific 
method are not only theory-dependent, but they are also revisable in light of new 
information and understandings. This gives credence to the view that the results of 
the application of the scientific method can be and are, fallible – the ‘facts’ so 
produced are open to revision based on the emergence of other facts that may 
contradict that which has gone before. This introduces the philosophical issue of 
fallibilism into the proceedings and will be considered later, but it is an issue of some 
significance for and within this thesis, particularly as it relates to pragmatism and 
the creation and use of different forms of knowledge and the distinctions between 
fallibilism and scepticism (Cooke 2006; Fantl and McGrath 2009; Gava 2014).  In 
addition, the emergence of the critique of the scientific method and the realisation 
that outcomes are revisable (and ergo, fallible) leads inexorably to the conclusion 
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that the process is circular. If the findings of my work revised earlier findings, then 
this process must be circular. The processes of deductive logic, emanating from 
Aristotle’s syllogistic reasoning in his Prior Analytics (Ross 2000), utilised as the 
cornerstone of the scientific method in its early days, suddenly becomes 
questionable. In deductive logic, the conclusion of any statement is assured by 
reference to the truth or otherwise of its premises. If the premise is true, then the 
conclusion must be true also:  
Premise: All humans are mortal:  
I am a human:  
Conclusion: I am mortal.  
However, all that this means is that the (deductive) argument is valid, not that it is 
necessarily true.  
Premise: All cats have four legs: 
Bella is my cat: 
Conclusion: Bella has four legs. 
This is a valid argument from a logical perspective, but it is not necessarily true. All 
cats (insofar as we know and ceteris paribus) do have four legs, but some do not 
because of accidents or even because of birth defects. Therefore, we should be 
wary of accepting conclusions from valid premises as if they were true without 
thinking them through and taking account of the problem of induction.  
 
It is the logic of induction that generates serious problems not only for the status of 
the scientific method as the approach to inquiry, but also for epistemology per se in 
the context of the pursuit of knowledge and of certainty. The basis of an inductive 
argument is that it involves generalisations from observable facts and goes beyond 
what is contained in the premises. An inductive argument allows for the possibility 
that the conclusion is false even if the premises are true and as such we refer to 
inductive arguments as being strong or weak. In inductive reasoning, we see that 
we (necessarily must) draw uncertain conclusions from experiences, which, by 
definition, cannot be finite. The classic example of this is the claim that ‘All Swans 
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are White’. The problem of induction is whether or not such reasoning can lead to 
knowledge? It is based on the claim that all futures will be like all pasts – even 
where regular occurrences have been noted, to claim definitively that this will 
always be the case is just not possible – a universal rule or claim cannot be made 
on the basis of a necessarily incomplete set of particular instances (Hume 1748; 
Howson 2000). Induction is capable only of asserting that a conclusion from a valid 
premise is probably true. In order therefore to minimise the potentially disastrous 
effects of the limitations inherent within inductive reasoning from the perspective of 
establishing absolute claims regarding the truth of something, we need to modify 
our demands that scientific knowledge must be seen to represent the truth. We 
need to acknowledge that any claim, based on induction, is probably true and recall 
that induction is not deduction. 
 
One interesting feature of this discussion regarding the respective roles of 
deductive and inductive logic in relation to the pursuit of knowledge is that it soon 
becomes apparent that both types of logic are inherent in the fuller processes and 
implementation of the ‘scientific method’. In undertaking any type of scientific 
endeavour in either the natural or the social world, we take our theories to test and 
on the basis of our (necessarily) limited observations, we draw 
conclusions/inferences. Deductive logic falls prey to inductive logic. These 
necessary truths (something of an irony in this context) lead us to recognise that 
the scientific method, as the panacea for the production of the truth, necessarily 
falls short. In this regard, all attempts in the history and philosophy of science 
subsequently have in effect tried to ‘square the circle’.  
 
The extent to which the scientific method aimed to establish truths was 
subsequently reframed by philosophers such as Karl Popper (1935/2002a: 
1963/2002b) by reference to the principle of falsification (Kapsner 2015). Some 
assertions/claims are falsifiable, whereas others are not. For example, ‘all points on 
a Euclidean circle are equidistant from its centre’ is not falsifiable based upon the 
definition of such a circle, whereas ‘all swans are white’ has the potential to be 
falsified. It may take many observations of white swans to establish this point, but 
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it only takes one sighting of a non-white swan to falsify it. Thus, Popper’s account 
of falsification helped to strengthen claims for the veracity of the scientific method 
by seeking to rationalise and make more modest its claims. However, such a view 
is not without its own limitations (Lakatos 1970), largely because the criterion 
utilised would have rejected many theories initially rather ‘frail’, but later consistent 
with theory and observations. Classic examples would be Newton’s theory of 
gravitation and the theory that the ‘wobble’ in the orbit of Uranus was due to another 
planet (Neptune).  Both Kuhn’s (1970: 1996: 2000) arguments regarding paradigms 
and Lakatos’s research programmes (1968: 1970: 1971; Worral and Currie 1978a: 
1978b) attempted to locate scientific endeavour within frameworks designed to set 
parameters around the activities of scientists by providing rationales for the 
methodological approaches adopted and the ways in which findings could and 
should be utilised. This focus on attempting to clarify methodologies within certain 
frameworks and attempts to test these both retrospectively (by reference to the 
history of science) and contemporaneously by the use of the methodology of the 
frameworks led to criticisms that neither approach was sufficiently ‘objective’ 
enough. Both saw the role of the scientist/researcher as being central to decisions 
regarding the importance of findings and what was to be regarded as characteristic 
of science and ergo, true, even though neither explicitly acknowledged this 
‘subjective’ flaw in their methodologies.  
 
Partly as a result of these efforts, Feyerabend (1975) produced his anarchistic 
account of science, challenging all attempts to support the scientific method and 
offering a very individualistic account of portraying scientific method as little more 
than an accumulation of approaches where ‘anything goes’. Feyerabend (1978) 
argues for the importance of freeing all scientists and researchers from the 
constraints of methodology and encourages people to be free to choose which 
types of knowledge they see as being of value to them. His thesis is that the 
institutionalisation of scientific method has served not to advance science in the 
way it ought to have done by reference to the realities of science itself, but rather 
to uncritically reify the scientific method and create a hierarchy where knowledge 
derived from the scientific method is regarded as more valuable and useful than 
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knowledge derived from other sources and by other means (Feyerabend 1981a: 
1981b).  
 
All of these accounts, save for Feyerabend’s, amount to attempts to salvage the 
scientific method and its claims to being the ‘universal’ method for the development 
of knowledge in contradistinction to any other approach. Scientific knowledge seeks 
to describe and to predict, so robust and reliable methodologies are essential. The 
predictive nature of the scientific method as discussed above, can be seen to be 
found wanting when set against the need for absolute certainty in an uncertain world 
(Fantl and McGrath 2009), in spite of the myriad successes the scientific method 
can justifiably claim. A further development and response to issues regarding the 
probabilities of certainty derived from research and scientific activity is that of Bayes’ 
theorem (Bayes and Price 1763) which focuses on conditional probabilities. This 
refers to the likelihood of a proposition being true relative to the strength of the 
evidence bearing upon it. The theorem describes how propositions are to be 
changed in the light of new evidence and currently has wide usage and applicability 
in the realm of gambling as well as other fields. It essentially informs decision 
analysis and has applicability in a range of domains, including social work (Webb 
2002), risk assessment (Fenton and Neil 2013), research methodology (Fraser 
2004), legal precedent (Walker and Monahan 1988) and many forms of statistical 
research (Lee 2012), the physical (Linden et al 2014) and the social (Kaplan 2014) 
sciences.  
 
The issue is how to ascribe probabilities to theories or hypotheses in the light of 
available evidence. P(h/e) refers to the probability of the hypothesis/theory (h) in 
the light of the evidence (e). P(e/h) refers to the probability to be given to the 
evidence (e) if the hypothesis (h) is correct whereas P(h) the level of probability 
given to the hypothesis (h) in the absence of evidence/knowledge of it (e) and P(e) 
the probability ascribed to the evidence (e) in the absence of any assumption of the 
truth regarding the hypothesis (h). Thus: 
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P(h/e) = P(h). P(e/h) 
                   P(e) 
As a theorem it provides opportunities to determine both prior (P(h)) and posterior 
(P(h/e)) probabilities, the former being amended to produce the latter in the light of 
the evidence. Such calculations always take place in the context of some level of 
background knowledge. Hence, there is a context of subjectivity (induction) 
apparent that manifests itself in subjective degrees of belief regarding the 
strength/relevance of evidence, so it is not ‘objective’ even though it does subscribe 
to the rules of probability. That said these particularities do pose some problems for 
its application as a methodology if we are to take Bayes’ theorem as a possible 
route out of the realm of subjectivism and, by extension, interpretivism. One of the 
main difficulties relates to the nature of ‘evidence’ within the application of the 
theorem. According to Howson and Urbach (1989), what data a researcher accepts 
to use in a Bayesian manner, whether it is accurate or a true reflection of something 
is wholly a matter for the researcher. In this way, such an approach is seen to be a 
mere tool for people to use in any way they choose and affords no surety regarding 
the ‘scientific’ nature of the outcome. As an application of scientific method, this falls 
far short of acceptable. The issue then refers itself back to one of the moral standing 
of the researcher and the extent of his/her belief in the data being used and the 
need therefore to think more closely about how what is evidence comes to be 
regarded as such. In this light, Bayes’ theorem is open to misuse and would lead to 
no advancement in terms of the perceived rigour of the scientific method.  
 
These developments subsequently led to (renewed) discussions regarding the 
relative merits of realism and anti-realism as ways of seeing and responding to the 
world (both natural and social) and to rather ‘extreme’ views regarding the uses of 
experimentalism (Mayo 1996; Hacking 1983). According to the realists (Dummett 
1963; Bhaskar 1978: 2008; Leplin 1984) and those variants within Scottish 
Common Sense Realism (Reid 1818), aspects of our reality are ontologically 
independent of our ideas, theories and beliefs. Its claim for science is that it tells us 
about the nature of the world, both that which can and cannot be observed. Such 
claims regarding unobservable entities say the anti-realists (Tennant 1987; Rees 
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2012) cannot be supported, for how can we make claims regarding things we 
cannot see or evidence? Extreme forms of anti-realism argue that nothing can be 
objectively and definitively asserted because not only does the possibility exist, 
however small, of some fact being overturned or questioned by some as-yet-
undetermined piece of evidence, but that the way we describe our findings is biased 
by reference to language and what underpins it in terms of researcher bias, social 
conventions and so on. These are to some extent valid claims against realism, but 
taken to extremes would simply serve to stifle any form of progress and push it into 
the position where scepticism is the norm. These views refer to various theories of 
truth to which philosophers subscribe: the correspondence theory (Russell 1912; 
Kirkham 1992; Hanna and Bernard 2004) and the coherence theory (Joachim 1906; 
Alcoff 1996), the latter of which is supported by the Duhem-Quine hypothesis 
referred to in chapter two: that the evidence will always underdetermine the facts 
(Duhem 1954; Quine 1960). Anti-realists would argue that the truth or otherwise of 
a theory is in fact not the issue – rather, the merit of a theory is to be judged on the 
basis of its generality and applicability or correspondence. This ‘constructive 
empiricism’ (van Fraassen 1980: 1989: 2008; Dicken 2010) argues that ‘…the 
inference from scientific success to scientific truth is a problematic one. There is 
certainly no logical connection between the two, since it is perfectly possible for a 
predictively successful scientific theory to be false.’ (Dicken 2010:1).  
 
Much of the discussion above has been leading to this conclusion. As a result, what 
all of the above appear to have trying to achieve is to justify the scientific method 
even in the face of what appear to be fundamental problems with it at a number of 
levels. There is a strong sense within the history and philosophy of science that the 
merits of the hypothetico-deductive model must be supported at all costs. However, 
as each of these responses has emerged, refinements not only to this particular 
model, but also to others and to the processes of scientific endeavour and 
methodology in general have been apparent, so there is much that has been 
gained. Clarification of some of the omnipresent challenges has clearly been 
apparent and a more reasoned and proportionate view is emerging, aided by these 
various debates and the strengths emanating from each, including a more pluralist 
view of truth (Lynch 2009) as well as that regarding methodology and what could 
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be regarded as knowledge in terms of its form and the sources from which it might 
legitimately be derived. In this light, I now turn to a consideration of the relevance 
of what can be regarded as a pluralistic framework within which one might 
conceivably encompass and effectively address a range of issues referred to 
above: pragmatism. 
 
3.3 The Relevance of Pragmatism 
“Pragmatism is principally a theory of knowledge with distinct views about 
the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge.” (Almeder 1986: 79).  
Pragmatism, as an overarching and an underpinning philosophy (as opposed to 
simple notions about what is “pragmatic”), provides us with a framework and ergo 
the means by which we can develop and regard our belief systems/what we know 
as tools to assist us in meaningful and functional engagement with the world at 
large. It is fundamentally a philosophy of experience. In this, knowledge is regarded 
simply as a belief in something. If we believe that the sun will rise in the morning 
and that a cat is sitting on the sofa, then we have knowledge of something – the 
behaviour of the sun and the presence of a cat. Beliefs then are regarded as forms 
of knowledge, and these may be propositional or based entirely on our own 
experience, or both.  
 
In the context of everyday life, any belief we hold is a means by which we may 
inform and understand both the world at large, natural and social, our own 
behaviour and that of others, such that these beliefs enable us to make meaningful 
sense of what is going on around us. Pragmatism relies upon the principle of 
fallibilism to act as a self-correcting strategy so that beliefs/knowledge currently 
informing our understanding of the world may be revised in the light of experience.  
In the contexts of everyday living, professional practice and research, pragmatism 
acts as a mechanism to help us develop, revise and refine the epistemological 
veracity of our knowledge (our beliefs) about the world based on our experience so 
as to potentially maximise our capacity to function and adapt under the broad 
principle of homeostasis. It is therefore a functional philosophy that sees thinking 
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and doing as being intricately connected, avoiding Cartesian and other forms of 
dualism; it is an integrative philosophy. There are three elements of pragmatism 
then that we must be mindful of: firstly, that actions cannot be separated from the 
contexts within which they occur – they are situational; secondly, that actions are 
linked to consequences in ways that are open to change – the meaning of an 
act(ion) can be very different in different situations and thirdly, actions are built on 
the basis of socially shared sets of beliefs (Morgan 2014a: 26-27).  
 
Within the context of research therefore, pragmatism can be used as an organising 
framework within which a range of different approaches to inquiry can be situated 
(Dewey 1933/2013), exploiting the fact that research proceeds on the basis of 
‘warrantable beliefs’ about the likely consequences of using one research design 
rather than, or in tandem with, others. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue for 
a ‘contingency theory’ approach to research design, claiming that: 
“…quantitative, qualitative and mixed research are all superior under different 
circumstances and it is the researcher’s task to examine the specific 
contingencies and make the decisions about which research approach, or which 
combination of approaches, should be used in a specific study.” (pp22-23). 
Thus, both deductive and inductive approaches to the creation of knowledge (the 
formulation of beliefs) can be adopted, but importantly, pragmatism goes beyond 
these strictures, taking the view that: 
“…under certain conditions, there are some proposed beliefs that we can 
neither establish nor refute under the deductive or inductive methods of 
testing and confirmation in the natural sciences. Such beliefs are, 
nevertheless, epistemologically justified and hence rationally acceptable 
because when adopted as true they directly or indirectly produce behavioural 
or epistemological consequences that provide for suitable adaptation under 
homeostasis…” (Almeder 2007: 172. Emphasis in original).  
 
This may appear to be a convenient route to the truth, effectively eschewing the 
principles of good science and robust methodologies – an almost irreverent 
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approach with shades of Feyeraband’s anarchy. However, this is too simplistic. In 
order to adopt the beliefs in the manner referred to, there are a number of conditions 
that need to be met. These comprise the pragmatic principle (PP). Utilising the 
approach of logic, we can state that: 
Pragmatic Principle > A Person will be rationally justified in accepting a 
proposed proposition [P] as true if: 
i): there is at that time no currently available conscious inference, 
inductive or deductive, from any other previously known or justified 
beliefs that would either confirm or disconfirm P;  and 
ii): there is a distinct possibility that by accepting P as being true or 
likely to be so, it will produce consequences more likely to contribute 
to the enhancement of cognitive and/or moral utility than would be the 
case if we did not accept P as being true, or likely to be so.  
In terms of adopting the pragmatic principle, most pragmatists can appreciate and 
would acknowledge the centrality of the inductive method in terms of belief 
formation. Hume’s ‘problem of induction’ and infinite regress support the view that 
there can be no absolute certainties. Rather, we have differing degrees of 
justification in terms of our claims to knowledge/beliefs. Many of these claims are 
fairly robust, based on the available evidence.  
 
The extent to which such beliefs are verifiable sits in a functional relationship with 
the PP itself. Verificationism, like most positions, has both strong and weak forms, 
although the general view would be that we cannot know the meaning of a 
proposition if we have no conception of what it would take to provide sufficient 
evidence to confirm it, i.e. previous/background knowledge. The world would be 
very different place if we did not believe/know that bacteria can cause illness and 
kill us, but that penicillin and other substances can kill bacteria. Whether these 
beliefs are absolute is not an issue from a practical perspective. Penicillin works (or 
at least for most people). From a philosophical perspective, a lack of absolutes in 
terms of verification may well be a problem, particularly if we want to try and avoid 
the ‘tyranny’ of (absolute) scepticism. However, pragmatism’s primary concern is to 
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maintain the connection between thinking and doing – the two are inseparable 
(Dewey 1929: 1933; James 1968; Bernstein 1983; Morgan 2014b).  
 
Many pragmatists would assert that the (ultimate) goal of science is not to provide 
‘True’ statements about the world as it is to provide systems of belief/knowing that 
help us to understand the world as far as we need to in order to be able to adapt 
and function successfully. If, over time, those ‘Truths’ become more ‘True’ or 
predictive (Reichenbach 1938) and in their way enhance cognitive (understanding) 
(Putnam 1978; Rescher 2001) or moral (adaptive) utility (van Fraasen 1980), then 
so much the better. The issue in the here and now is that they allow things to work 
(Carnap 1950; Rescher 2003). As James (1907) remarked, it is in the ‘fruits’ of our 
beliefs that any ‘truth’ resides, not in their ‘roots’, clearly emphasising that the 
epistemic value of a belief/knowledge lies in its functional utility rather than any 
justification being predicated on its origins.  
 
The issue of ‘truth’ is considered to be one area where critics of the PP have some 
leverage, arguing that for something to be labelled ‘knowledge’, it requires to be 
true. This however misrepresents the nature of ‘truth’, at least insofar as the 
pragmatists are concerned. The ‘Truth’ is an absolute standard and one that, 
following Hume’s discourse on induction, can never be inductively established, and 
as there are similarly no deductive means of establishing the truth of induction 
either, we have infinite regression and no means of establishing the ‘Truth’. If we 
require knowledge to be predicated on ‘Truth’, then we can only abandon the notion 
and settle for a ‘lower’ epistemological standard. This radical pragmatism (Brandom 
2000: pp4-14) is often referred to as cultural relativism in epistemological terms. 
However, the pragmatists can to some extent side-step such criticisms as they 
believe that the fundamental concern is not about truth, but about experience and 
the relevance of the fact/observation to practical ends.  
 
In the context of research activity, different modes of reasoning are often aligned to 
particular methodological paradigms. Deduction (objectivity/generality) and 
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induction (subjectivity/context), too often seen as discrete and isolated entities, are 
in fact circular and reciprocal. Adopting a broadly deductive approach, based on the 
principles of scientific method, would lead one to try to establish the ‘Truth’ of a 
hypothesis or to test a particular theory. If one were attempting to develop a new 
theory, an inductive approach would be adopted. However, it is perhaps axiomatic 
in the twenty-first century to accept that, ultimately, both lead to the other at some 
point. The distinction has been, and continues to be artificial, dualistic and atomistic. 
Pragmatism asserts that either method of reasoning is applicable depending on 
what it is you want to find out about – the ultimate test of the approach lies in its 
functionality. If deduction gets us to where we need to be in terms of functioning or 
adaptability, then this is fine; similarly with inductive approaches. The reciprocal 
nature of these processes is encapsulated well in the notion of abduction (Peirce 
1867: 1905; Shank 1998; Haig 2008) where either process, in leading to a situation 
where something is unexplained or apparently inexplicable, allows the researcher 
to adapt and adopt new and different methods according to the criterion 
underpinning the PP. As we will see, MMR uses both sets of reasoning (Krathwohl 
2004), moving from grounded results (observations/facts), through inductive 
inference to general inference, through to deductive inference to predictions to the 
particular. This explicitly cyclical process represents the MMR response to the 
inductive/deductive dichotomy and renders it sterile.  
 
If we accept Hume’s assertion that there is no way that induction can provide us 
with absolute justification for our beliefs (that all futures will be like all pasts or, more 
contemporarily, that all swans are white (Taleb 2007) which restates Hempel’s 
famous ‘Raven Paradox’ (Hempel 1945a: 1945b), the implication is not that we 
should not continue to reason under such terms, nor that we should not accept the 
beliefs derived from such processes. Rather, that we should be prepared to accept 
that those beliefs do not amount to us knowing something about the world, but that 
they are useful beliefs and that they are subject to change in light of new evidence, 
particularly apposite in the context of the application of theory to practice (Wiley 
2012). In this light, pragmatism offers the research process and scientific method 
new freedoms. In the context of mixed-methods research, the PP can be seen to 
have functional applicability.  
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The pragmatic paradigm is seen as “…a deconstructive paradigm that debunks 
concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and focuses instead on ‘what works’ as the 
truth regarding the research questions under investigation. Pragmatism rejects the 
either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed 
methods in research, and acknowledges that the values of the researcher play a 
large role in interpretation of results.” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 713). In this 
regard, James (1968) argued that even if there were no compelling evidence to 
support a belief (a claim to the truth of something), we have every right to accept it 
as being true, if to do so were more likely to produce some moral value than not to 
do so (p54). Simply because the current ‘state of the art’ in relation to science and 
its methods cannot provide us with definitive answers in relation to unobservable 
entities does not negate the value or the utility in accepting that they do exist, 
particularly when accepting such propositions as true helps us to understand 
something and to adapt more successfully. Dewey (1938) took a different view, 
arguing that unobservable entities should not be countenanced in this way, 
although many classical and contemporary pragmatists would concede, “…that 
those things must be thought to exist when the theory asserting their existence is 
workable.” (Almeder 1986: 82). Hacking (1983) supports the view (against the anti-
realists) that where an unobserved entity can be manipulated in a controlled way 
and used to bring about effects in other things, they must be real.  
 
There are however three major (and recurrent) objections to pragmatism that some 
argue render its position untenable as a philosophy of and for science. Firstly, 
pragmatism has a clear commitment to support the evolutionary and changeable 
nature of ontology. This engenders an inevitable form of scepticism in relation to 
the scientific method and implies that there will never be any theory that is complete 
nor entirely predictive or that has absolute explanatory power, such that it could 
claim to be the Truth (Grayling 2009). If we accept this (and pragmatists do), then 
“…the most we can know is what is best for us to believe in the light of our best 
current theory; but there is no guarantee that what is best for us to believe under 
current theory reflects in any enduring way the way the real world is.” (Almeder 
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1986: 83). Scepticism will therefore be inevitable and indefinite, raising once again 
the ‘spectre’ of the effects of induction, so effectively and powerfully articulated by 
Hume. James (1907) emphasised that the issue for pragmatism was not whether a 
thing was true or not, but what difference it would make if we were to believe it to 
be true, and to act accordingly? 
 
A second objection relates to the view that pragmatism is merely an instrumentalist 
philosophy in that its primary and stated aims relate to the desire to exert control 
over the forces of nature, physical objects and human beings. All pragmatism can 
achieve it is claimed, is an instrumental rather than an inherent knowledge of such 
things. Human beings though are not merely physical objects – they are much more 
complex than this and therefore the methods of science cannot provide us with the 
necessary knowledge of them, particularly within the context of social systems 
(Bhaskar 1978). In defence, pragmatists would argue that if we approach the 
development of knowledge in such a way as to make ‘warrantable assertions’ rather 
than absolute claims to truth, then this could enable us to adapt and function more 
effectively. This being so, then we cannot but assume that the approach and the 
method is successful at least insofar as any current theory appears to explain that 
which would otherwise be inexplicable. If pragmatism achieves this, then it can be 
argued that the ‘scientific method’ of pragmatism does tell us something about the 
nature of the world and those things in it. Pragmatism is able to address the 
‘incommensurability thesis’ – that realist and constructivist approaches are 
incompatible (Kuhn 1972).  
 
A final major objection rests on a claim that some propositions about the world may 
in fact be false, but under the pragmatic maxim, it becomes best/easier for us to 
believe that they are in fact true even if these beliefs do not actually represent the 
real world in its True form. However, there is a counter from the pragmatist that 
contends that we can never actually know what the real world is, simply because of 
the problem of induction and the nature of infinite regress.  Pragmatism does not 
(generally) claim that a theory is the theory; rather, its claims are more modest – 
that the way something is and the way it is described or explained – if this allows 
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us to understand something more effectively or promotes explanation that is 
superior to that which has gone before - then its moral and epistemological utility 
cannot be questioned, especially if other options leave us with unworkable 
solutions. In this regard, this final objection hints very strongly at a plea for certainty; 
that theoretical explanations must provide certainty, whereas approaching 
knowledge creation from a pragmatic perspective only claims to provide 
‘warrantable assertions’ which are openly noted to be fallible. Pragmatism then 
situates itself in the realms of fallibilism and aligns itself to the ‘correspondence’ 
theory of truth. It also bases its position on the view that knowledge of the world is 
both real and independent of us, but that it is also socially constructed in that we 
come to know the world by virtue of our experiences of it. It thus avoids the extremes 
of both realism and anti-realism.  
 
This approach to knowledge does however have the possibility to open the way for 
a rather sceptical worldview and one where there is little or no certainty evident. 
This runs counter to the claims of the positivists who argue that their (deductive) 
scientific method provides necessary certainties. Pragmatism also raises the issue 
of the foundations of our knowledge and beliefs. A core feature of much 
epistemology is that some knowledge is both a priori and essential. As noted in 
chapter one, a significant issue for many in social work is Flexner’s claim that social 
work is not a profession (simply) because it does not have a discernible 
(‘foundational’) knowledge base. If therefore pragmatism posits a more relativistic 
notion of knowledge as ‘warrantable assertions’ or revisable postulates, based on 
experience, then how could social work claim to be a profession on the basis of its 
epistemological status, rather than other factors? How could anything claim to be 
anything in an absolute sense? The answer lies not in trying to refute Flexner’s 
claim, but in accepting it and celebrating it, and asking whether social work (or any 
other human service profession for that matter) would want to be aligned to such a 
claim/requirement? Flexner has done more for social work than anyone could have 
imagined. The ‘problem’ (he) created for social work (as social work perceives it) is 
not about what was said, but about the way it has been interpreted and the almost 
overwhelming desire for the profession(s) to want to latch on to notions of certainty 
as a means of establishing and reinforcing credibility. If we accept that the scientific 
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method is flawed by reference to its modes of reasoning (which cannot logically 
verify anything in absolute terms), then it cannot just be social work that does not 
have a discernible knowledge base – nothing does. Medicine draws from a range 
of disciplines to inform its practices (physics, chemistry, neuroscience etc) all of 
which, by definition only possess ‘truths’ as good as the current standards of 
verification, justification and findings which exist relative to the next piece of more 
substantial and predictive piece of evidence.  
 
Pragmatism therefore provides a framework within which apparently competing 
ideologies, assumptions and methodologies might all work together to address the 
issue of dealing with how we experience and come to understand the world. Its 
focus is on the nature of experience and the value of this to our capacity to ‘flourish’. 
There is here a connection to the Aristotelian notion of ‘eudemonia’ (Knight 2007) 
as well as clear parallels to phronesis (Flyvbjerg 2001; Kinsella and Pitman 2012) 
in the context of research activity that will be considered in chapters seven and 
eight, as will the relevance of a new paradigm for social work/ research, taking the 
following formulation of a paradigm as a starting point: a paradigm is seen as: 
“An organising framework that contains the concepts, theories, assumptions, 
beliefs, values, and principles that inform a discipline on how to interpret 
subject matter of concern. The paradigm also contains the research methods 
considered best to generate knowledge and suggests that which is open and 
not open to inquiry at the time.” (Powers and Knapp 1990: 103).  
 
3.4 Mixed Methods Research 
As discussed above and in chapters one and two, these various issues emanating 
from the persistence of particular views regarding the promulgation of knowledge 
can be seen to have been operating for many years and as a result, what constitutes 
knowledge is seen by some as being nothing more than a reflection of which 
method or approach to knowledge creation is regarded as superior. Thus, utilising 
Kuhn’s terminology and using this as a convenient way to represent one of the 
major interpretations of how science operates within a framework of sorts, 
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paradigms (Kuhn 1970, 1996), defined as a “…worldview, complete with the 
assumptions that are associated with that view” (Mertens 2003: 139) can become 
mutually exclusive and reinforcing, and the so-called ‘paradigm’ or ‘science’ wars 
(Howe 1988; Gage 1989; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; 
Labinger and Collins 2001; Morgan 2007; Teddlie and Johnson 2009) referred to 
above are testimony to the debates, reflecting the power of methodological 
assumptions and, implicitly, the importance of knowledge per se and issues of 
politics, fashion and convention (Bergman 2011). These themes are significant in 
that they are incorporated in broad measure in the social constructivist approach to 
science and inquiry (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bloor 1976/1991; Latour and 
Woolgar 1979/1986; Collins 1985/1992; Latour 1992: 1999; Hacking 2000; Searle 
1995: 2010), the ‘movement’ that evolved as a result of the challenges to the 
assumed pre-eminence of the hypothetico-deductive model and positivism.  
 
These epistemological and methodological debates have centred upon the 
presumed pre-eminence of positivistic methodologies, their methods and 
underpinning ideologies over those of the more qualitative and interpretative types 
(Shadish 1995a: 1995b; Hughes and Sharrock 1997). Subsequently however, and 
as the sciences broadly conceived have broadened in their purview and the 
strengths and limitations of each approach relative to their respective foci have 
become apparent, we now see a spectrum of methodological approaches emerging 
with quantitative and qualitative methodologies acting for some as polarities 
(Newman, Ridenour, Newman and DeMarco 2003), with each having their classic 
texts as guides (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Cook and Campbell 1979; Brewer and 
Hunter 1989; Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002; Maxwell and Loomis 2003; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Brewer and Hunter 2006). This division is now seen 
as being less polarised, certainly within the post-positivistic tradition, and is now 
referred to as the qualitative-quantitative interactive continuum or the Qualitative-
Mixed-Method-Quantitative continuum (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009:28). 
According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009:88), there are now five identifiable 
paradigms each with something distinctive to say regarding methods, logic 
(deductive/inductive), epistemology, axiology, ontology, causality (linear/parallel) 
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and the extent of generalisability: positivist, post-positivist, constructivist, 
transformative and pragmatic.  
 
The evolution of a mixed-methods paradigm (to utilise Kuhn’s terminology) can 
perhaps be seen to represent the effects of the practicalities of research endeavour. 
Increasingly, researchers have noted the potential value inherent in all forms of data 
and recognised that, depending upon what it is you want to explore or explain, both 
numeric and other forms of data - text, artefacts - can contribute to ‘scientific’ 
enlightenment. Philosophical concerns as well as practical ones have also 
influenced such developments. According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
“[T]he project of pragmatism has been to find a middle ground between 
philosophical dogmatisms and scepticism and to find a workable solution…to many 
longstanding philosophical dualisms about which agreement has not been 
historically forthcoming.” (p18). Howe (1988) makes the point that “…in practice, 
differences between quantitative and qualitative data, design, analysis, and 
interpretation can be accounted for largely in terms of differences in research 
interests and judgments about how best to pursue them. That differences can be 
accounted for in these ways should prompt suspicion about the need to posit 
different conceptions of reality and different epistemological ‘paradigms’ to account 
for the use of different research methods and should lead one to wonder about 
whether the quantitative-qualitative debate is just an invention.” (p10). Thus, the 
emergence of mixed-methods research (MMR) as a distinctive methodology has to 
some extent been inevitable and is characterised by the use of both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches to collect and analyse data, integrate findings, draw 
inferences (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 
2007; Tashakkori and Cresswell 2007) and develop concepts (Bergman 2010).  
 
Advocates for MMR located within a distinctive paradigm separate from positivism 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985; Smith and Heshusius 1986; Lincoln and Guba 1988; Guba 
and Lincoln 2005) refer to this as the metaphysical paradigm and argue that it is 
composed of three elements: ontology, epistemology and methodology. As a 
response and reaction to the ‘positivist project’ (Hughes and Sharrock 1997), the 
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metaphysical paradigm provided not only a rebuttal of positivism’s ardent claims to 
being the only (methodological) arbiter of the truth [or to some, the Truth], but 
provided also a practical response to broader (implicit) claims regarding the nature 
of reality (ontology), the nature of knowledge itself and the means by which the 
world becomes known to us (epistemology) and the means by which this is 
achieved (methodology).  
 
Morgan (2007) provides an interesting historical account of the ‘science wars’ and 
within this offers a useful typology of the shape of ‘(post-) positivist’ and 
‘constructivist’ paradigms and an account of Kuhn’s postscript to Structures (1970). 
One of the issues considered relates to what extent does the combining of methods 
within research represent simply that (a combination), or does it go further and say 
something about the nature of methodology and, within that, something about the 
relationships (hierarchical or otherwise) between ontology, epistemology, 
methodology and axiology.  
 
Thus, not only are differing methods underpinned by reference to the differing 
ideologies being advocated, but MMR also expects and accepts the utilisation and 
integration of a range of differing forms of data – numeric and narrative (broadly 
speaking), interaction upon and with the data (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2010) as well 
as the utilisation of all our senses and modes of establishing understanding. As 
Jung says:  
“Ich unterscheide vier Funktionen, nämlich Empfindung, Denken, Gefühl und 
Intuition. Der Empfindungsvorgang stellt im wesentlichen fest, dass etwas 
ist, das Denken, was es bedeutet, das Gefühl, was es wert ist, und Intuition 
ist Vermuten und Ahnen über das Woher and das Wohin.” (Jung, 1936 
p270).  
[“I distinguish four functions, namely sensation, thinking, feeling, and 
intuition. Sensation tells us that something exists; thinking tells us what it is; 
feeling tells us what its significance is for us; and intuition tells us where it 
comes from and where it is going”.] 
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Neither type of data in MMR is seen (necessarily) as pre-eminent, other than in 
direct relationship to its functionality and explanatory power relative to the topic 
under inquiry. This is perhaps well illustrated by a study undertaken by Trend 
(1979), often cited as an early exemplar of the power and utility of the MMR 
approach. Evident here is the use made of triangulation. Campbell and Fiske (1959) 
introduced this notion, referring to it as “multiple operationalism”, where more than 
one method is utilised as a form of ‘QA validation’ in order to ensure that the 
explained variance is actually a result of the phenomenon under investigation and 
not a feature of the method itself.  The convergence of findings where more than 
one method is used ‘…enhances our beliefs that the results are valid and not a 
methodological artifact.’ (Bouchard 1976:268). This approach has been 
subsequently elaborated upon (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest 1966) and 
is seen as a particular strength within MMR. In the social work literature, Padgett 
(2009) is a strong advocate for the adoption of a mixed-method approach whilst 
advocating the use of a six-stage framework to orient the researcher and guide their 
practice, with similarities being evident in Cameron’s ‘Five Ps Framework’ 
(Cameron 2011) within the field of nursing research.  In addition, MMR aims to 
enhance the internal validity and trustworthiness of data (inference quality) 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 2008) and external validity and transferability 
(inference transferability) (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2006).  
 
3.5 A Rationale for the use of Mixed Methods 
In terms of a clear rationale for the use of MMR, there are three main advantages 
to be considered. Firstly, MMR can simultaneously address both confirmatory and 
exploratory questions by using both quantitative and qualitative methods. As Punch 
(1998) notes: 
‘Quantitative research has typically been directed at theory verification, while 
qualitative research has typically been more concerned with theory 
generation. While that correlation is historically valid, it is by no means 
perfect, and there is no necessary connection between purpose and 
approach. That is, quantitative research can be used for theory generation 
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(as well as verification) and qualitative research can be used for theory 
verification (as well as generation).’ (pp 16-17). 
 
In this study, Q-method factor analysis is used as a quantitative means to generate 
theory via the emergence of impressions of meaning – the self-referent perspective 
on the topic at hand, whilst semi-structured interviews positioned after the 
completion of the Q-sort grids are used as the qualitative means to aid in the 
verification of theory. In this case and at this stage, theory refers to the ways in 
which professional social workers define, produce, transfer, use, develop and 
disseminate knowledge of and for their profession and their practice. Subsequently, 
both data sets can be used to generate theory regarding a functional epistemology 
for professional (social) work practice.  
 
Thus, in this study I aim to utilise MMR to both generate and verify theory at different 
‘levels’. Merton’s (1968) notion of a ‘middle range theory’ would perhaps be 
appropriate to depict what is being attempted here – to concentrate on a 
‘measurable’ aspect of social life that can then be studied as a separate and specific 
phenomena (the ways in which social workers and other professionals obtain and 
use knowledge in professional practice) and to subsequently generate theory - the 
use of pragmatism within a new social work paradigm.  
Secondly, MMR by virtue of its use of different methods, allows for the maximisation 
of ‘…complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses.’ (Johnson and 
Turner 2003: 299) with triangulation and complementarity being key in this regard 
(Greene et al 1989). Enhancement in this domain results from the interface and 
interplay of both sets of data (Krüger 2001) and given Q-methodology’s claims 
regarding its focus on subjectivity through the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative means (statistical analysis and interpretative narratives), and its potential 
to respond to both constructivist and constructionist narratives (individual and/or 
shared perspectives) (Watts and Stenner 2012), this approach offers the potential 
to engage with the strengths of both statistical analysis and ‘meaning making’ 
through narrative interpretation. Finally, MMR both encourages and can 
accommodate a range of findings, including contradictory ones. According to 
78 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), such divergence can lead to three outcomes: the 
transformation and reorientation of data types (QN/QL – QL/QN), inference quality 
audits and the design of a new study/phase of study. Whilst this may create some 
short-term inconvenience for the researcher,  
‘…in many cases the reappraisal and reanalysis required can reap long-term 
analytic rewards: alerting the researcher to the possibility that issues are 
more multifaceted than they may have initially supposed, and offering the 
opportunity to develop more convincing and robust explanations of the social 
processes being investigated.’ (Deacon, Bryman and Fenton 1998: 61).  
 
Different inferences reflect different voices – utilising a MMR approach with Q 
methodology and its inherently mixed approach (Q-factor analysis and qualitative 
narrative accounts derived from quantitative Q-sorts) alongside semi-structured 
interviews (SSIs) allows the ‘voice’ of the numbers to be seen and the voice of the 
participants to be heard (Kirk and Reid 2002) through their Q-sorts and the SSIs. In 
this way, it is hoped that a resonant articulation of the place, position, structure and 
use of knowledge in contemporary social work practice can be seen, heard and 
responded to.    
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Chapter 4: Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide an account of the quantitative and qualitative methods 
used and their associated rationales, with a detailed account of the processes of 
designing and implementing the study. Attention will focus primarily on Q-
methodology - study design, ethical approval, participant selection, recruitment and 
involvement, Q-set design (concourse), Q-sort administration and construction, 
data collection methods and techniques, and details of the statistical and 
interpretive procedures of analysis. The chapter will also provide a brief and 
relatively non-mathematical exposition of correlation statistics and factor analysis, 
highlighting the similarities and differences between the two major forms of factor 
analysis – R-method and Q-method – before articulating the unique features of Q-
method and its relevance to this study, locating this within the broader philosophical 
context of pragmatism and the methodological paradigm of mixed-methods, 
supported by reference to the use of post-Q-sort semi-structured interviews.  
 
In relation to the qualitative methods utilised, the chapter will discuss the nature of 
the post-Q-sort semi-structured interviews and provide a rationale for these as an 
adjunct to the use of factor analysis as the main investigative tool. It is perhaps 
worth noting that the methodological decision to use a mixed-methods approach 
with a predominantly quantitative element supported by the use of more ‘traditional’ 
qualitative methods in the form of semi-structured interviews was based largely on 
the nature of the inquiry itself and a recognition of the need to effectively handle 
large quantities of data. In addition, the claims of Q-methodology lent themselves 
well to the aims of the research, particularly so in the context of being able to use 
interviews to complement Q’s powerful, but ‘clinical’ statistics in the exploration of 
an inherently ‘interpretative’ phenomena – human subjectivity as represented by an 
individuals self-referent perspective on a particular topic. Thus, it was not a decision 
about which method was ‘better’ than the other – rather it was to recognise that to 
attempt to highlight and come to some understanding of ‘subjectivity’ in relation to 
professional knowledge could be well (if not, better) served by the application of the 
80 
most powerful techniques available in tandem. This was therefore a decision based 
on both an appreciation of the significance of the (mixed-methods) paradigm and 
that of the potential of both quantitative and qualitative methods to make sense of 
a complex topic. To have used one approach instead of the other would have 
represented a lack of understanding on my part as to the potentials inherent in each 
and served simply to perpetuate the myth that some ways of doing research are 
better than others, even where those other methods have not been tried.  
 
4.2 Quantitative Methods: R and Q Method Factor Analysis 
4.2.1 R-Method Factor Analysis 
Factor Analysis (FA) is a multivariate statistical method, common in psychological 
and educational research, although its use in other cognate disciplines in increasing 
(Pett, Lackey and Sullivan 2003), used to explain and describe variability amongst 
observed and correlated variables (correlation coefficient = r) and to identify the 
presence of potentially unobserved or latent variables referred to as ‘factors’. 
According to Kline (1994:5) “…a factor is a dimension or construct which is a 
condensed statement of the relationships between a set of variables.” When 
encountering a large set of observations or dealing with a lot of variables, the 
question arises as to how these might be parsimoniously represented and, within 
this, are there any underlying and unobserved features that might help us account 
for the observed associations (correlations)? The statistical procedures in R-
method Factor Analysis2 are designed to determine whether or not there are any 
distinct constructs that could account for the observed correlations. These 
unobserved constructs – latent variables – are referred to as factors, and the 
strength and direction of influence of the common factors is indicated by the factor 
loadings, represented by the correlation coefficient (r). Factor analysis (of any sort) 
is a data-reduction technique.  
 
                                                 
2 The prefix ‘R’ is nowadays generally applied in discussions regarding factor analysis in order to 
distinguish it from its other variants, specifically in this case, Q-method factor analysis (Stephenson 
1935). The prefix ‘R’, even though capitalised, simply represents the mathematical symbol for the 
correlation coefficient – r. The correlation coefficients are denoted by r, whilst the factor that is 
subject to analysis is the unobserved or latent variable.  
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To illustrate the (historical) significance of revealing the unobserved, one of the 
originators of factor analysis, Charles Spearman (Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient or Spearman’s rho) noticed that school children that did well on tests of 
verbal reasoning also did well on tests of mathematical reasoning and other forms 
of problem solving activity. In order to explain this, an underlying or latent variable, 
the general factor of general intelligence was identified, now referred to as the ‘g-
factor’ (Spearman 1904). In using correlational techniques, Spearman was able to 
‘see’ that which hitherto had remained unseen – ‘general intelligence’. Similar tests 
exist and function in similar ways, notably Pearson’s r (Pearson 1901: 1913; 
Pearson and Heron 1913) and these represent not only significant statistical 
achievements, but also significant theoretical achievements in that inherently 
conceptual, ‘invisible’ and subjective entities were given shape, voice and 
explanatory power. Such apparently ‘hard’ statistical techniques can therefore be 
seen to yield to the requirements of researchers in exploring areas that traditional 
views around both descriptive and inferential statistics might otherwise see as 
unlikely. By modifying their application and using sensitivity in interpretation, it is 
possible to make important inferences regarding unobservable and ‘subjective’ 
entities using ‘objective’ methods. In the area of attachment research for example, 
there is the notion of the ‘internal working model’ – a theoretical template in our 
heads that acts as the benchmark against which we judge the nature and quality of 
relationships with other people (Cassidy and Shaver 2008). Notwithstanding 
advances in cognitive neurosciences and f/MRI scanning techniques, no one has 
yet ‘seen’ the internal working model – its presence is inferred based on a 
theoretical construct predicated on the functionality of behavioural responses in 
interpersonal settings and which, when applied, has useful explanatory powers. The 
shape and form (in the sense of its function for a particular individual) may well be 
revealed more clearly by the application of factor analytic techniques. The latent 
variables (influences) of the particular individuals ‘internal working model’ on their 
behaviour could be revealed by the application of factor analytic techniques, 
particular as the Q-sorting method (see below) has already been used in 
attachment-based research (Waters and Deane 1985), although this approach uses 
Q-sorts in a R-method configuration whereby pre-defined, a priori categorisations 
are used (Block 2008) to test hypotheses regarding trait-based behaviours. This 
however exemplifies well how the creative use of particular methods, particularly 
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those not perhaps readily associated with subjective human qualities, can provide 
interesting inferences regarding subjective qualities and contribute to theory 
development and application. Other subjective states readily observable through 
the application of factor analytic techniques are noted below, with particular 
emphasis on Q-methodology as a factor analytic variant.  
 
Typically, factor analysis proceeds to identify latent constructs (factors) from within 
a set of variables, often those that relate to the identification or measurement of 
particular traits or abilities (speed or response to stimuli; number of items recalled 
in a memory test). Importantly, this represents a significant departure from the 
determination of what is classed as a variable in Q-method factor analysis, as will 
be seen below. When processing data using (R) factor analysis, there are two broad 
approaches available, each dependent for their rationale on the paradigmatic and 
methodological assumptions of the researcher. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA 
or ‘restricted factor analysis’) is used when the underlying factors are assumed to 
be present – that is, the analysis seeks to confirm their presence or otherwise and 
is therefore operating on the basis of a priori assumptions about the type and 
number of factors and therefore follows an essentially deductive approach (Kline 
1994:10). In this regard, CFA functions as a form of structural equation modeling 
(Schumacker and Lomax 2010; Brown 2015). In contrast, exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA or ‘unrestricted factor analysis’) (Fabrigar and Wegener 2012; Ruscio 
and Rosche 2012; Osborne 2014) adopts a more inductive approach in its 
application (Kline 1994: 9; Fabrigar et al 1999; Haig 2005; Williams, Brown and 
Onsman 2010) and makes no a priori assumptions; rather, its position is, as the 
name suggests exploratory and analysis proceeds on the basis of the identification 
of factors suggested by the emergent data and in this regard, is essentially heuristic. 
In addition, it aims to exploit the underpinning principles of abduction, exploiting an 
important precept of scientific inference referred to as ‘the principle of the common 
cause’ (Haig 2005: 303), reasoning from factual premises to explanatory 
conclusions (Ibid: 304) of which there are a number of subtle but distinct forms 
(Schurz 2008), although for our purposes there are really two: habitual abduction 
and creative abduction. In the former, we make inferences towards an explanatory 
hypothesis by reference to a general rule or ‘law’, or to past experience. In the latter, 
there is no benchmark or previous experience upon which to draw or against which 
83 
to compare. Both types follow the same algorithmic pattern, but the processes of 
the latter demand more attention and more creativity than the former. These types 
will be considered further in chapter 7.   
 
In typical R-method or by-variable factor analysis (c/f Spearman and Pearson), 
standardisation (as a form of statistical reductionism) allows for easier direct 
comparisons, and is achieved relative to the entire population of scores for a single 
variable, particularly useful where different units of measurement are being used. 
The final standardised score (the Z-score) is the mathematical expression of the 
distance between a particular absolute score and the mean of the whole measured 
sample, expressed as a proportion of the number of standard deviations. 
Standardisation serves to disassociate the scores obtained from specific individuals 
by reference to the arithmetic mean. Thus, the process of standardisation serves to 
highlight latent variables that may be operating unseen within and across the many 
associations captured within the (initial) correlation matrix. This leads to the 
emergence of a relatively small number of latent variables (the ‘factor’ in factor 
analysis), thereby offering the possibility of a simplified explanation of the myriad 
associations possible, as “…the sheer size of the matrix…is a formidable obstacle 
to discerning the patterns readily disclosed by factor analysis. All that factor analysis 
does is to lend statistical clarity to the behavioural order implicit in the matrix by 
virtue of [similarity or dissimilarity].” (McKeown and Thomas 1988: 50). However, 
the reductionism inherent within the standardisation procedure, whilst admirable, 
necessary and of intrinsic value in the pursuit of the identification of latent variables 
within the context of ‘trait-based’ analyses, actually serves to eradicate anything of 
the individual from the data – that is, (R) factor analysis reduces data about or from 
any one individual to information of a somewhat generalised and aggregate sort, 
useful for the derivation of laws and averages from statistical aggregation, but of no 
value in relation to telling us anything about the individual or the reasons for their 
choices or actions.  
 
This is where the ‘inversion’ of R-method factor analysis into Q-method factor 
analysis provides us with the means of applying powerful correlation techniques to 
the identification and exploration of latent variables that represent subjective states, 
the unit of measurement not being speed of response or some other categorical 
84 
entity, but a ’new’ unit of measurement - ‘psychological significance’ (Stephenson 
1953). However, the mathematics of R-method and those of Q-method are virtually 
identical. Any differences in terms of statistical specificities are more often 
perceived than real and do not reflect any meaningful difference in terms of 
technical specificities. The main concern within this thesis is with the principles and 
products of factor analysis, not with the statistical means by which such principles 
are arrived at or the products realised. By virtue of the similarities in the statistical 
methods used (the ‘how’ of factor analysis), as opposed to what it is that is analysed 
(the ‘what’ in factor analysis), it could be argued that there is essentially an inherent 
combination of statistical processes, whether it be R- or Q-method (Danielson 
2009). However, mathematical complexities notwithstanding, they are nonetheless 
evident and are covered in detail by Adcock (1954), Harman (1976), Rummel 
(1970), Kim and Mueller (1978a: 1978b), Brown (1980), Fabrigar and Wegener 
(2011), Osborne (2014) and Babones (2015).  
 
4.2.2 Q-method Factor Analysis3 
As a particular methodological approach, Q-methodology first appeared in 1935 
following the work of William Stephenson who was by ‘trade’ a physicist. In essence, 
Q-methodology is an adaptation of Spearman’s factor analysis technique 
(Spearman’s r), the development of which and other technical matters were referred 
to above. One of Stephenson’s early insights was to recognise that subjectivity4, in 
the sense that this refers to my view on something as opposed to yours, is readily 
observable by reference to statements we make about certain topics or the 
preferences and behaviours we display relative to them, and as such was amenable 
to measurement and subsequent analysis. Such observable preferences, 
functioning as beliefs about the world and the best ways to adapt and function within 
                                                 
3 In order to avoid any charge of inconsistency, the phrases ‘Q-method factor analysis’, ‘Q-methods’, 
‘Q-methodology’ or simply ‘Q’ will be used interchangeably to denote reference to Q-method factor 
analysis. The particular choice of phrase will be determined by the syntactical context.  
4 The word ‘subjectivity’, when used in the context of experimentation or other forms of inquiry is 
often connoted to possess inherently unreliable characteristics. However, the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (2007) defines subjectivity as ‘The quality or character of being subjective, esp. the ability 
or tendency to present or view facts in the light of personal or individual feelings or opinions.’ This is 
exactly what Q is aiming to measure/display. The negative connotations of subjectivity as 
representing unreliable testimony or statements that cannot be objectively regarded or as being 
‘unscientific’ are, in this context, themselves unreliable, so for the purposes of this thesis, the SOED 
definition will apply.  
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it, influence how we behave. They can be very powerful motivators and can 
therefore be seen to operate upon our environments in myriad ways. However, the 
apparent lack of effort and interest to isolate and measure subjective opinions from 
a broadly positivistic perspective was seen by Stephenson to represent a limitation 
on those methods and approaches, rather than anything inherently ‘unmeasurable’ 
or ‘unscientific’ regarding subjectivity itself as a phenomenon (Penrose 1975). 
However, largely because of the powerful discourse represented by behavioural 
psychology at the time (Watson 1913; Skinner 1945; Zuriff 1986), those aspects of 
the human condition relating to notions such as ‘the mind’ or ‘consciousness’ 
(Blanshard and Skinner 1967) were often regarded as unworthy of study in any 
serious way, and certainly not in any ‘scientific’ way. The development of Q-
methodology represented Stephenson’s “desire to bring a scientific framework to 
bear on the elusiveness of subjectivity.” (Coogan and Herrington 2011: 24). As a 
result of these efforts, Q-methodology was developed which: 
‘...encompasses a distinctive set of psychometric and operational principles 
that, when conjoined with specialised statistical applications of correlational 
and factor-analytical techniques, provides researchers (with) a systematic 
and rigorously quantitative means for examining human subjectivity. From 
the standpoint of Q-methodology, subjectivity is regarded simply as a 
person’s point of view on any matter of personal and/or social importance.  
Corollary to this conception is the twofold premise that subjective viewpoints 
are “communicable” and always from a position of “self-reference”. Thus 
construed, subjective communication is amenable to “objective analysis” and 
understanding provided that the analytical means for rendering such 
communications objective do not in the process destroy or alter the self-
referent properties of such communications. Central to Q-methodology is a 
concern – fortified by operational and statistical specificities – to ensure that 
self-reference is preserved rather than compromised by, or confused with, 
an external frame of reference brought by an investigator in seeking to 
measure subjective phenomena.’ (McKeown and Thomas 1988: 7 – 
emphasis in original). 
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Stephenson understood the nature of the principles underpinning and relating to 
behavioural psychology and argued that subjectivity was not simply something 
internal to the mind, but that it was visible as an activity in the same way as any 
other operant behaviour. The only difference was the perspective from which these 
things were studied. From the behaviourist point of view, an operant behaviour is 
one that is a): emitted spontaneously and b): has some form of relationship 
with/impact upon its immediate environment which makes it meaningful. 
Subjectivity is meaningful to the individual (by definition) and is not just an aspect 
of mind, but something that can be displayed/emitted as a preferential or preferred 
way of behaving and can therefore be seen to have an impact on its immediate 
environment. It is therefore no different to the classifications afforded to other 
operant entities. Brown sums this up well when he states that: 
“Fundamentally, a person’s subjectivity is merely his own point of view. It is 
neither a trait nor a variable, nor is it fruitful to regard it as a tributary 
emanating from some subterranean stream of consciousness. It is pure 
behaviour of the type we encounter during the normal course of the day.” 
(Brown 1980:46). 
Q-methodology is regarded as one of the main approaches for studying issues 
relating to human subjectivity and its communicability on a specific topic or range 
thereon. Subjectivity in this sense is operationalised as referring to an individual’s 
point of view, a self-referent perspective. This means that views on an almost 
limitless range of topics become amenable to rigorous, reliable study and analysis, 
using both statistical techniques (factor analysis) and other more traditional 
methods of inquiry associated with the qualitative tradition, such as semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups. Subjectivity now becomes something that has a shape 
and form and is something that can be seen, measured and analysed using 
powerful statistical and other techniques (Watts 2011) in the same way that Pearson 
used these to make visible ‘general intelligence’.  The main purpose in developing 
Q was to provide a means by which subjectivity could be reliably captured, 
scientifically and experimentally investigated and its characteristics made visible 
and held constant for the purposes of comparison. In order for this to take place, 
and in order to be able to appreciate not only the relevance and significance of Q 
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as a method, particularly as it relates to this study, it is important to consider some 
of the conceptual issues underpinning its genesis. 
 
In Q-method factor analysis (Q), the aim is to emphasise the ‘holistic’ and 
individualised nature of the findings within the data and to reflect the individual’s 
point of view – their self-referent perspective, on the topic being explored. Thus, the 
use of typical R-method factor analysis, providing aggregated data, would appear 
to deny us the very thing we are looking for in this study – individual preferences 
and viewpoints rather than just statistical significance and aggregated 
generalisations. That said, the power inherent within such statistical techniques as 
correlation statistics is inherently valuable in identifying latent variables relating to 
self-reference and individualised viewpoints on important topics, so there is no 
sense of denying the relevance of factor analysis; rather, recognising that its 
strength emerges in a different form when people are regarded as the variables and 
not their traits or abilities, we are able to conceive of correlation as being able to 
represent our data needs when utilised differently. We therefore measure 
something different when using Q-methods – hence the notion of ‘inverting’ R-
methods to create Q-methods – shifting from by-variable analysis to by-person 
analysis. The inversion is in how we treat the data – what we regard as variables, 
what we measure and subsequently, what we interpret.  
‘Factor analysis... is concerned with a population of n individuals each of 
whom has been measured in m tests or other instruments or estimates. The 
(m) (m-1)/2 correlations for these m variables are subjected to... factor 
analysis. But this technique...can also be inverted. We may concern 
ourselves with a population of N different tests (or other items), each of which 
is measured or scaled relatively, by M individuals. The (M) (M-1)/2 
correlations again can be factorised by appropriate theorems.’ (Stephenson 
1936a: 344-345). 
 
Q-method factor analysis treats the data in a different way. The factor analytical 
processes of R-method are still used, but the way in which the data is processed is 
changes.  As a result, a different form of data is obtained, as it is the range of items 
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themselves that are measured, rated or scaled in some way by a collection of 
individuals. The meanings of a range of heterogeneous items (a range of 
statements on a particular topic in this case) can be made homogeneous relative to 
the individual and the items significance or meaning to them can be ascertained. 
What emerges is a rating of the subjective meaning or ‘psychological significance’ 
of the item(s) to that individual (Burt and Stephenson 1939: 276).   
 
This so-called ‘inversion’ of R-methodology to create ‘Q’ is simply that one’s 
attention shifts from the columns of data in a correlation matrix (all the scores for 
everyone in relation to response speeds to visual stimuli for example i.e: one 
variable) to the rows of data - each person’s score(s) across the full range of 
variables (Kline 1994:78), first undertaken by the educationalist and statistician 
G.H. Thompson (Thompson 1935). Stephenson utilised this shift in analytical focus 
– pursuing correlations between persons rather than between tests or variables - 
and developed it. Thus in Q, the participants are the variables, and the traits, tests, 
abilities or items become the sample or population. This is by-person factor analysis 
in contradistinction to by-variable factor analysis (R-method factor analysis). This 
provides a data set that tells us what the individual subject’s responses are to all 
the items (the range of statements – referred to as the concourse of statements), 
and therefore provides us with a holistic view on and of a topic, rather than a data 
set that just provides us with information on isolated entities. We therefore achieve 
a holistic view of something – a viewpoint and a relative position on a topic. In ‘R’ 
we get a typified/standardised measure of the population samples response time to 
a particular test – in ‘Q’ we get a standardised measure of each individuals 
view/position relative to a particular issue/theme etc. As Watts and Stenner (2012) 
point out, ‘...Stephenson is intent on using his new method as a means of 
systematically and holistically identifying different types of people, or different types 
of mood, of viewpoint…across different life domains and contexts’ (p14 – emphasis 
mine).  
 
 
This is the essence of ‘Q’ – instead of subjects being passively measured on a 
range of different variables assessed by reference to different units of 
measurement, they are presented with stimuli – a set of heterogeneous items that 
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represent the collective view on a topic - which they act upon by rank-ordering them 
in a way that is meaningful (psychologically significant) to them, thus rendering the 
items homogenous relative to their own first-person perspective. This first person 
or subjective perspective is also the unit of quantification or measurement. We can 
therefore see the shift from by-variable factor analysis (‘R’) to by-person factor 
analysis (‘Q’) as representing little more, statistically speaking, than a shift from an 
analysis of the columns of data to an analysis of the rows of data – representing an 
approach to holism. However, this shift was hard-won and reflected considerable 
debate between adherents of R-method factor analysis and Stephenson (Burt and 
Stephenson 1939; Burt 1940). The main issue was that of how the transposition 
between and across columns of data to the rows could be managed given that each 
column of data in R-method was based on different units of measurement – speed 
of response; number of items recalled, etc - different responses to different things, 
so a straightforward shift would not allow for direct and holistic comparisons. Thus, 
the data gathered for R-method could not be used for Q-method as a means of 
providing a holistic perspective on any topic: as the units of measurement were not 
consistent, so the outcomes would not be coherent – ‘Transposing R 
methodological data matrices for Q analysis is statistically dubious.’ (Watts and 
Stenner 2012: 15). It was therefore necessary for a new form of data to be 
developed that could be processed using the inverted R-technique (Q). R-
methodological data is obtained when a sample of individuals have been subjected 
to testing across a range of different tests. In Q, data is obtained when a range of 
different items (or tests) are themselves scaled or rated by the sample of individuals. 
The items are subjected to measurement rather than the individuals.  
‘If, then, any list of heterogeneous measurements or estimates can be 
arranged in an order of some kind, or in a scale...[in terms of] 
their...significance for the individual, they may be held to be made 
homogenous with respect to that individual. This last sentence opens the 
way for many applications of Q-technique. The same procedure holds for 
any heterogeneous material whatsoever.’ (Stephenson 1936a: 346-7 in 
Watts and Stenner 2012: 15).  
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The ‘new’ form of data to which Stephenson alluded was based upon the utilisation 
of a new unit of measurement to which we have already referred – ‘psychological 
significance’, accessible though the rank-ordering of stimuli from a subjective or 
first-person perspective (Burt and Stephenson 1939: 276). This approach yields a 
data set where each row of data is made up of the subjective evaluations of each 
item by each individual relative to each other and made homogenous because of 
that. Each row is then treated as a distinct gestalt entity.  
 
However, as with R-method factor analysis, Q-method factor analysis is still 
concerned with the identification of the degree of association or correlation between 
n variables, where the higher the correlation, the greater the 
agreement/alignment/association between these. Having obtained a (high) number 
of correlations, one has to make these patterns meaningful and in order to do this, 
the scores are standardised as they are in R-method. However, in ‘R’, such 
standardisation is achieved relative to the entire population of scores for a single 
variable: in ‘Q’, standardisation is achieved relative to the entire population of 
scores for a single person such that people are the variables, not their traits. The 
single unit of quantification here is that of ‘psychological significance’ and is viable 
as a measure as every score in the ‘Q’ matrix has been made relative to the 
individuals own view on the topic at hand – ‘…relative to the individual and to himself 
[sic] alone.’ (Stephenson 1936b: 208). In addition, the utilisation of a prearranged 
frequency distribution (the ‘Q Sort’) serves to further enhance the standardisation 
process. By using a range of dimensions that define and standardise the nature of 
psychological significance and by applying correlation statistics to the rows of the 
matrix, it is possible to establish the degree of agreement/disagreement (or 
whatever one chooses to represent ‘psychological significance’) and analyse this. 
The means by which the subject’s views are scored/rated is determined by 
reference to the topic at hand and analysis proceeds across and between the entire 
set of rankings across all the individuals involved. In this way, direct comparison is 
possible between each of the individualised Q-sorts. By then applying (Q-) factor 
analysis to the initial correlation matrix, we can reduce the many and varied 
impressions (correlations) to a smaller number of factors (latent variables) which, 
when analysed interpretatively, can highlight and make visible underpinning 
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themes, issues and trends relative to the topic of inquiry derived from the collection 
of statements on that topic.  
 
Of particular import is the capacity of ‘Q’ to highlight ‘marginalised’ viewpoints, 
particularly as these may well be embedded deep within the latent variables 
themselves. Brown (2006) offers an interesting example of this when he recounts 
how a particular Q-sort, scoring fairly low statistically had much greater 
psychological significance when it was realised through interpretative/thematic 
analysis that this particular individual’s capacity to influence the views of those 
others taking part in the study (part of the same community) was very strong 
because of the power that person held over decision-making processes (the latent 
variable). The (Q) factor analysis is looking for groups of persons (as it is they that 
are the variables in ‘Q’) who share the same or similar views on a broad topic. This 
particular means of data reduction and collection does allow for heterogeneous 
items (in the form of statements in this case) to be rendered homogenous relative 
to a particular topic – the homogeneity being representative of latent variables that 
are common and shared to varying degrees in relation to the chosen topic(s). 
 
By reference to the Q-sorting technique (see below), a participant is asked to rank-
order a number of statements (the Q-set) in a way that is in some way meaningful 
or otherwise to them – they are encouraged to articulate a particular point of view – 
their point of view. This being so, that view (being theirs, and not yours or mine) is 
subjective and is emitted spontaneously. The concourse of statements represent 
elements of a particular topic or discourse that one wishes to explore in terms of 
others’ views on this. There is no attempt to impose a priori meanings on people’s 
views, and one may legitimately insert statements into the concourse that actually 
reflect the ‘real-world’ and real issues of the topic under consideration. It is up to 
the participant to decide to what extent a particular statement has meaning for them 
and how they therefore wish to represent it. The particular currency, popularity or 
otherwise of a statement will only be manifest in relation to the particular participant, 
and then only in relation to the other statements within the concourse. It is therefore 
unlikely that any influence could be directly inferred from the external ‘potency’ of a 
particular statement. The extent to which a participant impresses his or her 
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particular view on a given statement represents the degree of psychological 
significance they and only they imbue it with.  
 
“[t]he supposed a priori meaning of the statements does not necessarily 
enter into the Q-sorter’s considerations: participants inject statements with 
their own understanding.” (Brown 1997: 11).  
 
The form or shape a particular Q-sort ultimately takes provides us with an account 
or a picture of an individual’s unique perspective on that topic, and from this we can 
see how these meanings might legitimately be seen to have influence on both 
thought and behaviour. How I view certain things influences how I act on the 
environment – if I hold the view that it is safer to walk on the left-side of the road, 
rather than the right-side (a subjective view – mine), then this will influence how I 
actually behave. In this way, my subjectivity (my self-referent position) can be 
modelled using the Q-sort and from this, we can determine how this subjectivity 
influences how I behave. In the context of this thesis, Q presents itself as a 
particularly pertinent approach as the self-referent perspectives it aims to identify 
and articulate relating to knowledge of and for professional practice correspond well 
with the broader philosophical underpinnings represented in earlier chapters 
relating to ontology and the function of knowledge as a belief or representation of 
the world and how these shape our engagement with it (Schopenhauer 1859). If, 
through my chosen preferences I assert that I think that X instead of Y, or believe 
A rather than B, these assertions are predicated on knowledge forms I possess, 
and mediate my relationship with the world. We can therefore evidence a high 
degree of consonance between the role and function of epistemology in relation to 
ontology and the particular methodology of Q.  
 
However, as Stephenson points out, Q-methodology and the method of Q-sorting 
does not ask the subject “To introspect, or to turn on his [sic] stream of 
consciousness: instead he [is asked to express] his subjectivity operantly, modelling 
it in some manner as a Q-sort. It remains his viewpoint.” (Stephenson 1980:501). It 
is therefore an objective manifestation of a subjective perspective and does not 
seek to distort the natural engagement of the person with his own views. The 
operant subjectivity to which Stephenson refers relates to the participant expressing 
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their subjectivity (their view on a topic) through operating on a series of items (the 
Q-set) in a way that is reliable, scientific and undertaken in response to specific 
conditions of instruction and under experimental-type conditions. Q-methodology 
thus allows the first person or subjective perspective to be studied “…with full 
scientific sanction, satisfying every rule and procedure of scientific method.” 
(Stephenson 1953: 25).  As a result, the critique of the positivist method against the 
scientific study of subjectivity was challenged and seen to be unsupportable.  
 
One of the key differences between R-Factor Analysis and Q-Factor Analysis is its 
exploratory nature. The methodological approach of Q allows for individuals to self-
categorise on the basis of the Q-sort they ultimately produce. The ethos of Q is 
discovery after the fact or a posteriori – there is no hypothesis to be tested at this 
time. It is in fact the rank ordering and classification of statements on a particular 
topic by the participants that generates the focus of the subsequent inquiry and 
exploration. The researcher has no idea how the Q-sorts will be configured – in 
reality these could cover an infinite number of interpretations, and not until the data 
is analysed do we know what it is we are dealing with. There are no theoretical 
assumptions imposed on the participants – how statements are categorised reflects 
their own first-person perspective (‘psychological significance’) and each of these, 
and, where relevant, the collective representations of the P-set become visible. On 
the basis of these, the researcher may then begin to theorise on what is contained 
within the Q-sorts.   
 
It is not in the nature of Q-studies to aim to compare differing groups, certainly not 
at the outset. “[I]ndividual Q studies are probably better suited to the exploration of 
specifics; the viewpoints of specific people, specific groups, specific demographics, 
or the viewpoint at play within a specific institution. This means that most Q 
methodological research questions are likely to retain a relatively strict and narrow 
focus.” (Watts and Stenner 2012: 54 – emphasis in original).  
After the Q-sorts have been produced, it may well become apparent that there are 
in fact distinct groupings within the sample, but these will have emerged on the 
basis of individual subjective views on a particular topic. There has been no attempt 
to test pre-formed group identities or viewpoints; rather, the research question and 
its exploration through the application of a rigorous methodology have allowed 
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forms/viewpoints to emerge naturalistically (Brown 2008).  From this, the researcher 
can begin to explore any themes that emerge and apply theoretical constructs in 
ways that seek to explain the configurations in new and exciting ways. At an 
individual (constructivist) level, the Q-sort is seen as an expression of an individual 
viewpoint, whilst the interpreted factors from all participants reveal the main shared 
(constructionist) discourses operating within the data at a meta-theoretical level. 
 
However, having clear aims regarding the nature of the research and articulating 
these clearly and precisely through the research question is essential. Curt (1994) 
suggests that Q research should be focused on three elements: representations of 
a subject matter; understandings of it and conduct in relation to it. However, these 
should ordinarily be researched as clearly delineated categories. An alternative 
triadic schema put forward by Watts and Stenner (2012) involves causes/reasons; 
definitions and reactions, responses or policies (p55), although one can construct 
unique categorisations. The point is that any study has a clear focus because 
otherwise there is a danger that the concourse statements lack coherency and 
therefore risk confusing participants and limiting their ability to respond meaningfully 
in direct relationship to the research question.  
 
The development of Q as a means of allowing researchers to understand 
subjectivity and to model and measure its impact was also heavily influenced by the 
writings of one of the early American pragmatists, William James. It was James 
(1904) who advocated that consciousness should be properly regarded as a 
function or an activity, rather than as some form of metaphysical entity per se. He 
argued that to see objectivity and subjectivity as separate and distinct entities was 
to conflate both of these above what he referred to as the ‘pure experience’ (James 
1912). James argued that inherent within any experience there were (necessarily) 
both objective and subjective elements: going for a walk involves the objective 
experience of walking, of feeling the wind on your face – the same walk confers 
subjective experiences – enjoyment, exhilaration, tiredness. Each of these is in fact 
necessary for the other to take place. The objective element is characterised by 
object reference (the walk itself and the physical acts involved which can be viewed 
from a third-person perspective) and the subjective element, characterised by self-
reference which only I can refer to (Luhmann 1990). As an approach, Q succeeds 
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in integrating subjective and objective states and is able to provide the means to 
represent these externally and holistically, thus avoiding the (atomistic) dualism 
inherent in more positivistic and reductionist approaches that ignore 
complementarities (Brier 2000). In relation to Q-methodology, the subjective 
element is the ordering of statements to provide ‘my’ impressions5 on a topic – this 
is only available to me and is therefore transitive and immediate. However, the 
finished Q-sort is available to another person and is therefore substantive, 
permanent and objective. The subjective experience has produced the object – and 
a third person studying this object could engage in his or her own subjective 
experience when reflecting on it, thereby generating a new transitive process and 
experience, ad infinitum. In this way, James’s ideas, moving away as they do from 
Cartesian Dualism and the mind/body – subject/object split, emphasising the 
integrative nature of our experiences and their symbiotic nature, provides both a 
platform and a theoretical rationale for a more integrative methodology. James 
himself saw the significance of what we can refer to as a more pragmatic approach 
to inquiry and the methods to be used when he notes: “I seem to read the sighs of 
a great unsettlement, as if the upheaval of more real conceptions, and more fruitful 
methods were imminent, as if a true landscape might result, less clipped, straight-
edged and artificial.” (James 1912: pp21-2). Here it is possible to see the beginnings 
of some of James’s later thoughts and ideas about pragmatism and the very ‘real-
world’ approach to inquiry and the utility of such an approach that both he and 
others advocated for (see Dewey 1929). 
 
Thus, the structure of Stephenson’s methodological approach has a degree of 
consonance with the ideals of pragmatism and its intentions of enhancing the 
relevance of experience and its function in relation to successful action leading to 
better engagement and control over the environment.  
 
                                                 
5 Q-methodology is referred to as a method of impression rather than a method of expression. The 
distinction is to be made between conventional psychometric tests, scales and measures that pre-
define a trait or meaning and aim to have the participant express this a priori determination through 
the medium of the particular test and analyse this using R-method factor analysis. In Q-methods, 
the Q-set (as the equivalent of the test or scale referred to earlier) provides a medium through which 
the participant can impress their own meaning and viewpoint on an item, which is then analysed 
using Q-method factor analysis. As a method of impression, Q has much in common with 
psychometric tests like the Rorschach inkblot test (Rorschach 1921/1942) for example. 
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4.2.3   An Illustration of the Range of Applications of Q-Methodology 
This section provides an overview of a range of Q-methods studies that have been 
undertaken and published. It is not intended to be definitive; rather, it aims simply 
to illustrate not only the robustness of the method in terms of the range of topics to 
which the application of Q is seen as appropriate, but also that subjectivity is indeed 
able to be defined, observed, measured and discussed in meaningful ways. 
 
There is a wide range of studies utilising Q methodology from a diverse range of 
disciplines. The essence of all of these lies in the way Q is able to uncover aspects 
of human subjectivity hitherto regarded as being too difficult to capture and record. 
In this section, I provide an overview of a range of published studies that serve to 
illustrate not only the functionality of Q in relation to subjectivity, but also the ways 
in which the approach itself says something about the value of mixed-methods 
research and the integration of both quantitative (QN) and qualitative (QL) 
approaches and the contribution it can make to scientific progress.  
 
Brown (1980) provides a detailed account of Q methodology, offering what to many 
is regarded as the ‘standard’ [and seminal] work on the topic. Within the paper, 
Brown outlines the processes and procedures for undertaking a full-blown Q study 
with the mathematical analyses being undertaken by hand. Amin (2000), Cross 
(2005), Watts and Stenner (2003; 2005) and Coogan and Herrington (2011) all 
provide accounts of the general applications of Q in the context of exploring differing 
forms of subjectivity – attitudes, opinions and perceptions across both clinical and 
non-clinical settings. Combining the strengths of both QN and QL methods, it is 
claimed that Q provides more in-depth analysis of complex issues of subjectivity. 
Stenner (2009) advocates the use of Q as a generalised constructivist methodology 
whilst Watts (2009), and Grover (2014) focus on the uses of Q in making objective 
that which is inherently subjective. However, Dziopa and Ahern (2011) in their 
systematic literature review on the applications of Q found that there were still many 
misconceptions about its use, particularly in that some researchers still saw it as a 
quantitative approach rather than a means for systematically assessing qualitative 
data. Goldstein and Goldstein (2005) focus on the use of an individual case in the 
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context of individual therapy, highlighting the robustness of Q even in single-case 
designs. Barbosa et al (1998) provide an account of Q methodology as an example 
of statistical methodology used in relation to assessing medical student’s attitudes 
towards computer-based education. Resienberg et al (2001) used Q to explore 
medical student’s perceptions of the best teaching sites whilst Parker and Alford 
(2010) offer an account of Q in dream research and Allgood (1999) focuses on 
capturing ‘transitive’ thought within the context of counselling education. These 
studies illustrate well the types of phenomena Q is able to ‘capture’ and perhaps 
illustrate the robustness of Q as a QN methodology capable of ‘measuring’ some of 
the most subjective and QL-type data quite effectively.  
 
Lazard et al (2011) discuss the role of Q in terms of advancing the case for 
methodological pluralism. In their study they utilise Q and thematic analyses in a 
study on recidivism. Ernest (2001) also reported the value of utilising Q as a means 
to explore some of the limitations of more traditional research approaches whilst 
Shemmings (2006) reports on the use of Q in relation to strengthening 
conceptualisations in psychosocial research. 
 
Block (1961), in his now classic monograph explicates the uses of Q methods within 
the context of personality assessment in clinical psychiatric practice. The aims of 
the research were to establish a coherent and objective means of describing 
personality traits, as psychiatric evaluations of personality were felt to be unreliable. 
Building on this, Zeldow and Bennett (1997) looked at conceptions of optimal 
mental health and sought to establish to what extent these differed from Block’s 
conceptions whilst Fowler and Lilienfeld (2007) explored both self- and observer 
ratings of psychopathy to enhance construct validity of this trait. Churruca et al 
(2014) used Q to explore constructions of bulimia thus continuing to evidence the 
robustness of Q in providing objective measures of subjective phenomena, 
including for example feelings of marginalization (Brown 2006). 
 
In the broad area of social work and related practice, Q studies appear to have 
increasing applicability. Ellingsen (2010) and Ellingsen et al (2010; 2011) provide 
Q-method studies that have a specific focus on research with children (2014). They 
provide accounts of the methods used by reference to empirical studies involving 
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adolescent foster children’s perceptions of ‘family’ in Norway, and student social 
worker’s reasons for studying the profession of social work whilst a study by Daniel 
(2000) describes the use of Q as a means of gathering the views and opinions of 
social workers on the topic of effective parenting whilst also using the method as a 
means to engage people in discussions about the topic with each other, in essence 
using Q to generate debate and to encourage participants to think more deeply 
about important topics. 
 
Lister and Gardener (2006) explored the ways in which clinical psychologists 
engaged ‘hard to engage’ clients. The findings revealed four patterns used by 
professionals to deal with these issues. Studies in this vein can do much to inform 
other disciplines where ‘hard-to-reach’ clients present as a practice issue..  
 
Butler et al (2014) explored the perceptions of mothers with severe mental illness 
towards the Baby Triple P Parenting programme and its perceived effectiveness as 
an intervention. The findings highlighted the presence of three core themes that 
indicated general acceptance of the approach. Given the context of the study, such 
findings are encouraging from a methodological perspective given the low-
invasiveness over more traditional interview-based approaches.  
 
Combes et al (2004) used the approach to engage individuals with intellectual 
disabilities in research to explore their perceptions on person-centred planning, thus 
involving service users in important work around service design and delivery, whilst 
Q has helped refine needs assessments for individuals with severe intellectual 
disabilities and severe challenging behaviours (Kreuger et al 2008). In the same 
broad domain, Exel et al (2007) undertook a Q study focusing on informal carers’ 
attitudes towards respite care thus providing useful data to assist in service 
planning and delivery whilst work by Mackenzie et al (2011) used Q to analyse 
subjective responses relating to perceptions of disability and revealed four factors 
relating to differing paradigms associated with disability and provided evidence for 
the validity of the use of Q in such areas. 
 
De Mol and Buysse (2008) utilised Q methods to explore understandings and 
perceptions of the extent of children’s influence in parent-child relationships. Of 
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particular interest here is the fact that the authors used Q-methods with both the 
children and the adults, thus evidencing the functionality of Q in relation to 
understanding ‘unseen’ forces (bi-directional influence). Wong et al (2004) used Q 
to locate and describe the influence of shared subjectivities on clinical decision-
making in end-of-life care decisions. The findings revealed three underlying factors 
influencing decisions made by participant physicians. These factors were then 
considered in relation to their grounding in terms of ethical principles.  
 
The Q-sort technique [as a method in and of itself] has been utilised extensively in 
relation to attachment-related studies. Clark and Symons (2000) utilise the Q-sort 
method to identify the relationships between attachment security and notions of self 
at age five. This illustrates well the usefulness of Q in identifying significant 
processes within the context of interactions and relationships that are otherwise 
unseen. Subjective perceptions of self-esteem and attachment security were made 
visible by reference to Q-sorts. In a similar vein, Mitchell-Copeland et al (1997) had 
previously explored child-teacher attachment relationships and the relevance to 
social competence in preschool children and Posada et al (2007) assessed the 
impact of maternal behaviours on secure attachment constructs in preschoolers. 
Clements and Barnett (2002) used the Attachment Q-sort devised by Waters (1987) 
to explore attachment security in toddlers with congenital anomalies. These studies, 
whilst using the Q-sort method do not however utilise Q-factor analysis. They use 
R-factor approaches in terms of analysis – they are measuring particular traits, so 
these should be viewed with caution in terms of their alignment with Q-methods 
studies per se. However, they do illustrate the diversity of applications of elements 
of Q-methods and Coyl et al (2010) explored the associations between 
preschooler’s attachment security, parenting behaviours and context as a means of 
understanding the composition of the internal working models of the mothers and 
their children. 
 
Dell and Corotans (2000) utilised Q to explore variability in the perceptions of 
domestic violence. The results revealed the presence of five factors useful in 
understanding how people perceive domestic violence. McCaughan et al (2002) 
used Q to explore the attitudes nurses had to factors they felt prevented them from 
using evidence-based research in clinical decision-making, whilst Prasad (2001) 
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utilised the Q-set to develop a rating scale regarding attitudes of physicians to 
HIV/AIDS that revealed the presence of three factors influencing decision-making. 
Akhtar-Danesh et al (2008) provide an account of a range of topics in the field of 
nursing research that are amenable to Q-methods, many of which were previously 
regarded as being relatively difficult to research in any meaningful way, but which 
can now be revealed and explored in detail through the application of Q.  Ahmed et 
al (2012) used Q as a means of exploring diversity in the value attached to 
autonomous informed choice in antenatal screening for genetic disorders and 
similarities and differences in this value in women from different ethnic origins. 
 
Watts and Stenner (2014) report on a Q study exploring conceptions of love. Factor 
analysis revealed six categorisations of love, interpreted as ‘attraction, passion and 
romance’, ‘unconditional love’, ‘sex and fun’, ‘friendship and spirituality’, ‘a 
permanent commitment’, and ‘separate people, separate lives’. The findings are 
used to discuss the changing face of Britain's relational culture. Wallis et al (2011) 
explored practitioner’s understandings of narrative therapy using Q generating 
interesting results regarding subjective experiences of first-person accounts of the 
efficacy of subjective therapies. Meloche and Mok (2006) used Q to explore 
attitudes of health personnel to knowledge management and dissemination 
processes.   
 
Wint (2013) looked at cyberbullying and what young people worry about in relation 
to being on Facebook whilst Orchard et al (2014) explored similar social media sites 
and identified four viewpoints regarding the ways in which Facebook provided 
gratification whilst work by Davis and Michelle (2011) used Q to explore attitudes of 
audiences, emphasising the enhanced value of this approach over and above 
conventional survey methods in this field. In an unrelated vein in terms of topic, Q 
is used in other fields to explore attitudes in order to enhance marketing techniques 
and understand more fully other consumer-related attitudes and behaviours 
(Stergiou and Airey 2011). 
 
Q can also be used in cross-cultural contexts: Shabila et al (2014) reported on the 
use of Q in exploring women’s perspectives on female genital cutting in Iraq. In this 
context, an awareness of how women perceive these practices is crucial in terms 
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of informing intervention programmes. The four factors that emerged provided 
information on how the practice is perceived as a cultural tradition, the extent to 
which women opposed it as a practice, the role of the law in combating the practice 
and health-related aspects (see also Wolf 2012).  
 
Thus, the applications of Q are in many respects limitless. The importance of 
understanding the first-person perspective within both professional and personal 
domains is clearly apparent. The issue is how the knowledge regarding subjectivity 
gleaned from Q-studies is utilised.  
 
 
4.2.4   Qualitative Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews  
 
As a means of enhancing the external validity of the study and therefore remaining 
true to the mixed-methods paradigm, an opportunity for participants to undertake a 
semi-structured interview was provided. The interviews were offered immediately 
after the completion of the Q-sort grid to provide participants with the opportunity to 
‘debrief’ and a qualitative data set to be generated. The opportunity to participate in 
a post-Q-sort semi-structured interview was made known to participants prior to the 
start of the study, information to this effect being provided in the participant 
information sheet (Appendix 3) and subsequently reiterated at the start of each Q-
sort session. 
 
The interviews are based on the following schedule which is presented to 
participants in written form at the conclusion of the Q-sort session for ease of 
reference. Each question is then responded to and responses noted.   
 
1. Of the statements you placed in the ‘agree’/plus [+] zone, were any of 
particular significance for you? Why was this? 
2. Of the statements you placed in the ‘disagree’/minus [-] zone, were any of 
particular significance for you? Why was this? 
3. Did the process highlight any general issues or thoughts for you in relation 
to knowledge and social work? 
 
102 
In terms of the generation of a qualitative data set, the interview schedule is 
designed to provide participants with the opportunity to articulate their thoughts 
regarding the Q-sort task itself and consider the ways in which they had 
ranked/located their statements. Of importance is the opportunity for them to 
consider whether any particular meanings were apparent to them on the basis of 
their particular configurations – had the process generated new insights for them 
regarding issues of professional knowledge? Were there any significant issues 
emerging for them, prompted by engagement with the study?  
 
The inclusion of semi-structured interviews as part of the overall data collection 
strategy recognises the value of verbal questioning and discussion as an adjunct 
(in this case) to the quantitative approach associated with Q-method factor analysis. 
Having engaged with a (novel) sorting task, participants have the opportunity to 
discuss their thoughts and feelings regarding both process and ‘product’ (reflections 
on their configurations and issues arising therefrom). This not only provides 
opportunities for the researcher to gain valuable feedback on the sorting task and 
associated processes, but also to discover whether there are any inconsistencies 
or difficulties in relation to the concourse of statements (the Q-set) that might 
conceivably compromise the collection of data. From the perspective of the 
participants, their involvement in a more ‘familiar’ research approach (an interview) 
allows them to discuss broader issues regarding the topic (professional knowledge) 
whilst simultaneously providing qualitative data rich in meaning, and from a self-
referent perspective. The interviews allow participants to highlight connections 
between statements and comment and reflect upon how they ranked particular 
statements and the reasons they found to justify this. These commentaries provide 
additional contextual data that can add depth and ‘colour’ to the quantitative data 
provided from the Q-sorts.  
 
In utilising semi-structured interviews in addition to the quantitative methods, a 
number of important and useful principles are brought to bear on the overall study 
that have the potential to enhance its credibility and validity. These elements include 
reflexivity whereby the participant has the opportunity to think about their particular 
approach to the issues at hand. When this is coupled with the openness of the semi-
structured framework, it allows participants to speak freely and to interpret the 
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questions in a way that makes sense to them. This is useful in this context as the 
strategy for collecting the quantitative data employs the reverse technique of a 
forced choice whereby participants must rate all statements within the Q-sort grid 
form -5 to +5, leading inevitably to situations where a participant is unable to rate 
as they would like. Thus, semi-structured interviews can act as a ‘corrective’ to the 
perceived stringencies and limitations of one method, providing a more balanced 
and coherent meta-strategy, as well as counter to any perceived misunderstandings 
or differing interpretations engendered by language use. There are opportunities for 
participants to query any apparent/perceived distortions in relation to the 
statements and the concepts, themes and issues represented.  
 
In addition, the nature of semi-structured interviews allows a degree of flexibility in 
relation to the course of the interview. This privileges the participants agenda and 
their interests, particularly important as a means of enhancing the underlying theme 
of the importance of subjectivity and the self-referent perspective evident within the 
rationale for Q-methods. Thus, the differing approaches (QN and QL) evidence a 
degree of complementarity, harmonised under the rubric of the mixed-methods 
paradigm. In this way, the strengths of the quantitative methods relating to statistical 
significance etcetera and its capacity to handle large quantities of data (2K+ 
correlations) are complemented and enhanced by the inclusion of narrative data 
obtained from participants directly. The use of semi-structured interviews alone 
would be unlikely to capture the full range of meanings provided by participants in 
their rating of the full range of statements (60) and be less able to differentiate 
subtleties in the same way that statistical methods can. Thus, combining both 
approaches seeks to enhance each and provide a more holistic analysis and 
interpretation.  
 
It is also important to state that during the construction of the interview schedule 
and the execution of the interviews themselves, adherence to extant codes of 
professional and research conduct and other guidance was consulted and adhered 
to (British Psychological Society 2010; Social Research Association 2015, 2003). 
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4.3 Procedures and Processes 
4.3.1 Introduction 
When undertaking any form of empirical study, it is essential to be clear about the 
techniques and processes to be used. When using Q methodology, some of these 
are quite specialist and unique to factor analysis, so some explanation of the terms 
and processes involved is required. In terms of doing Q (or any form of research for 
that matter) there are a number of stages and processes involved, the first of which 
relates to the research question. Watts and Stenner (2012) note, “…a good Q 
methodological research question must take into account the nature of the method 
itself.” (p53). This reflects one of Q methods central tenets – that of not imposing a 
priori premises and meanings upon the study – that abduction (Shank 1998; Haig 
2005; Tavory and Timmermans 204) and not theorising from deductive premises is 
one of its key strengths. In relation to the issue of the imposition of meaning, Brown 
(1980) notes that meaning is “attributed a posteriori through interpretation [by the 
participants] rather than through a priori postulation.” (p54). Thus, the design and 
structure of a Q-method study bases itself on the underlying structures and 
principles of effective (Q-) factor analyses. In order for a Q-study to be viable, valid 
and credible, certain principles of design as these appertain to the choice of 
statistical analysis must be followed. In the same way, SSIs utilising the outputs 
from the PQMethod software must ensure that there is sufficient alignment and 
congruence between the differing intentions of these differing approaches. The 
narrative and essentially qualitative components of the study align with an 
essentially thematic approach to data analysis utilising statistically significant 
results from the PQMethod output files. It is here that we can see how a mixed 
methods approach to design has great validity. However, there has to be a 
significant degree of functional congruence between these different approaches, 
which is why the design features of the study were so important – a weakness in 
one area can compromise data from another.   
 
The following sections describe the design of the study and the various procedures 
and processes relevant to its implementation and completion. The range of output 
files lead inexorably to the final statistical analysis within PQMethod (Schmolck 
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2002), each of which was essential in terms of then utilising the PQMethod 
programme for subsequent narrative analysis.  
 
4.3.2 Ethical Issues 
Before embarking on any aspect of empirical activity, appropriate ethical approval 
and consent was required. In many respects, the need for ethical guidance and 
approval of all research involving human subjects is, today, almost axiomatic – 
therefore, before embarking on any aspect of empirical activity, appropriate ethical 
approval was sought and obtained.  
 
In the wake (primarily) of the Nazi atrocities and their medical experiments and 
because of some particular research activities such as Milgram’s studies on 
obedience (Milgram 1963, 1974 – see also Gibson 2013), Zimbardo’s work on 
conformity (Haney et al 1973; Zimbardo 2007), Rosenhan’s use of researchers who 
were seen as ‘sane in insane places’ (Rosenhan 1973) and the use of 
anthropologists to gather intelligence for US Defence programmes (Horowitz 1967), 
research governance is now a central consideration for all practitioners, and the 
need is not only to scrutinise the means by which information/data is obtained (the 
methods) but also the uses to which it will be put and how experiments and/or 
situational manipulation of any sort is to be undertaken. Utilising principles 
emanating fundamentally (at least in broad contemporary perspective) from Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1788/2004), the Declaration of Helsinki on 
medical ethics (World Medical Association 1975/2013) and the Belmont Report 
(1979), fundamental principles of respect for persons, beneficence, justice, fidelity 
(confidentiality), non-maleficence and veracity underpin the research landscape, 
now governed by a range of policies and protocols (Economic and Social Research 
Council 2015; Social Research Association 2003, 2013; British Psychological 
Society 2010; RESPECT Project 2004).  
 
In all forms of social research, respect for autonomy (informed consent; disclosure; 
understanding; voluntariness; surrogate decision-making), nonmaleficence 
(Primum non nocere: “Above all, do no harm”), beneficence (our [research] 
intentions should provide benefit to others; promote utility), justice (fairness; equity) 
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and professionalism in our relationships (veracity, privacy, confidentiality, fidelity) 
are central principles (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). Within these, there are 
three areas that generate much concern: codes and consent, confidentiality, and 
trust (Silverman 2011; Hammersely 2014). Regarding codes and consent, the issue 
is primarily one of ensuring that participants are fully aware that they are being used 
in research and that they are being researched. Within this, there exists the 
necessity to ensure that everyone is fully aware of the nature of the research and 
understand that they have the right to withdraw at any time. These (superficially 
straightforward) axioms become particularly complex in those research arenas 
where issues of vulnerability (Liamputtong 2007; Pittaway, Bartolomei and Hugman 
2010; Aldridge 2014; Gomez 2014; Quinn 2015) and associated matters of capacity 
are present (or at least potentially) and in research contexts where ‘street-style’ 
ethnography (Punch 1994) and covert activity is deemed to be a necessary and 
functional part of the research design (Parker and Ashencaen-Crabtree 2014).  
However, it is important to note that debate continues within the general arena of 
research ethics as to the form such Codes ought to take and what their role should 
be:  
‘However, in some quarters today it is argued that the main focus ought to 
be on principles rather than on detailed specifications. An example of this is 
the British Psychological Society’s Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 
2010). Its preamble suggests that since psychological and social research is 
a complex, changing, and contextually variable activity, with new methods 
and research topics continually emerging, specific rules or prescriptions are 
likely to become outdated quickly. It is also argued that detailed prescriptions 
encourage researchers to follow the letter rather than the spirit of ethics 
codes, which may result in relatively unthinking, and therefore perhaps 
unethical, modes of practice.’ (Hammersley 2014: pp1-2).  
 
It is therefore important to have cognisance of underpinning principles (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013; Macklin 2015) within a critically reflexive perspective: “Critical 
bioethics requires bioethicists to root their enquiries in empirical research, to 
challenge theories using evidence, to be reflexive and to be sceptical about the 
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claims of other bioethicists, scientists and clinicians. The aim is to produce a 
rigorous normative analysis of lived moral experience.’ (Hedgecoe 2004: 1). In this 
study, such an approach was inherent (rather than implicit) and was explicitly 
articulated by reference to the need to acknowledge that issues of informed consent 
took account of the possibility of issues relating to vulnerability in all its forms, even 
though specific actions were not required relative to the participants in this study. 
However, it was important to make visible the fact that active consideration had 
taken place – deciding to take no action is in itself a form of action.  
 
In relation to confidentiality, this refers to the need to protect the participant’s identity 
and to ensure that all means relating to data storage etc where potential identity 
breaches could be foreseen and to manage these. In this study, the involvement of 
practitioners required that permission for this be sought from senior managers in 
the local authorities concerned as participation necessitated time-off from 
work/duties to complete the Q-sort. Thus, as part of this process it was necessary 
to obtain undertakings from managers that not only could staff volunteer, but that if 
they did, they did not have to disclose that they were involved in this if they did not 
wish to. Permissions were granted and in the event, participants were quite open 
about their involvement, and some actively recruited colleagues on my behalf. 
However, the point was to ensure that a robust ethical process was extant and 
functional in terms of managing these issues proactively on behalf of the 
participants.  This of course relates to the issue of trust between the researcher and 
those involved. The processes and procedures developed here were important in 
both establishing and maintaining trust and, ergo, establishing, promoting and 
supporting the credibility of the study and, importantly, the research process per se.   
 
The broad principles referred to above informed and guided not only the actual 
practice of research, but also the choice of paradigm, methodology, methods, and 
processes of engagement, data collection, storage and use. This however is a 
somewhat contested position – whether issues appertaining to paradigm, 
methodology and methods should be subject to ethical scrutiny, or simply seen and 
treated as purely technical matters? (Rosenthal and Rosnow 1984). Within this 
study, the pragmatic paradigm has as one of its fundamental principles the view 
that all action (and in this case, research action) should seek to enhance human 
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wellbeing – maximising adaptation under the principle of homeostasis. Pragmatism 
is more than an instrumental paradigm – it has at its core a range of normative 
principles extending from Jane Addams (1902) through Peirce (1905), through 
James (1912), to Dewey (1938) and beyond (Rescher 1992: 1993: 1994; Rorty 
1999; Bernstein 2010). Thus, in working within a pragmatic framework, such 
normative considerations are axiomatic and have informed all aspects of the study, 
including its design and the use of particular methods. In all areas, considerations 
as to the moral and axiological components of the study have been in the 
foreground as ethical decision-making is situational and context-dependent 
(Hammersley 2014: 13).  
 
 
The study maintained full adherence to and compliance with the University of 
Dundee Ethics and Research Governance Policy, UREC Standard Operating 
Procedures and the University Of Dundee Code Of Practice for Research Ethics on 
Human Participants. Application was made to the University Research Ethics 
Committee for ethical approval (Appendix 1), and following some minor 
amendments regarding procedural issues, the study was given full ethical approval 
– reference UREC 12055 (Appendix 2 – RE UREC 12055 – approved - email thread 
dated 20/6/12). All participants were made aware of the issues for which ethical 
approval had been sought and were advised that the confirmation of ethical 
approval was available for inspection should they wish to see this. In addition, all 
participants were provided with the names and contact details of both the primary 
and secondary supervisors of this thesis.  All of these details were contained in the 
Participant Information Sheet/Agreement to Participate Sheet (Appendix 3).  
 
 
4.3.3 Q-set Design and Content [Concourse of statements] 
In Q methodology, the Q-set or concourse of statements is a central feature in 
relation to the design and implementation of this approach. The Q-set is simply the 
items presented to the participants that they are asked to rank-order according to 
how important or otherwise a particular statement is to them. As Stephenson 
suggests, a Q-set ‘may be composed of objects, statements, descriptions of 
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behaviour, traits and the like’ (1952: 223) or anything else that represents a topic or 
issue. In this case, a range of statements regarding knowledge of and for 
professional social work practice was generated. In designing the Q-set, a scoping 
exercise involving a search of the literature relating to professional knowledge, 
knowledge transfer, professional development and evidence-based practice in 
social work, conversations6 with professional social work staff regarding knowledge, 
skills and ongoing development and a brief content analysis of the main 
newspapers and ‘trade magazines’ over a period of three separate weeks was 
undertaken. These sources provided a range of information that was shaped into 
the concourse of statements (Appendix 4). These were then piloted with a group of 
social work colleagues who were not involved in the main study to check whether 
the statements were meaningful, coherent and adequately representative of the 
issue to be explored. This process acts as a potential corrective against any 
differences in terms of language regarding description and explanation of the 
elements of the topic of inquiry. As was discussed in earlier chapters, the 
constitutive nature of language has to be considered within the context of all 
research activity, and as such, the source of materials used within the concourse to 
represent the topic of knowledge relied upon its degree of alignment to the field of 
expertise of the participants, such that they would recognise any significant 
variance in the language used to express core elements of the topic under scrutiny.  
 
This approach to the design and development of a structured Q-set (the concourse 
of statements) aims to identify key themes from within and across a topic area and 
devise representative statements (in this case) based on these. In experimental-
design terms, this approach is seen by some to be akin to the balanced-block 
approach (Stephenson 1953; Fisher 1960; Brown 1980). In selecting items, there 
are two types of item sampling: unstructured sampling that equates with the use of 
items presumed by the researcher to be relevant to the topic at hand. This does not 
require any form of ‘piloting’ and such a sample of items would then be presented 
to participants. However, using this approach it is possible to either under- or over-
                                                 
6 These conversations I shall refer to as ‘corridor conversations’ as they were brief exchanges with 
professionals and other colleagues, rather than prearranged, structured events. Each colleague was 
asked “What issues are there in social work at the moment with regards to acquiring and using 
knowledge and skills for the job, as well as keeping up-to-date with new developments?” 
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sample some elements as reference to domain experts (social workers in this case) 
is not used. Structured samples however provide a more balanced alternative – 
they are more systematic and seek to avoid the weaknesses in unstructured 
samples. Structured samples also promote theory testing by incorporating 
hypothetical considerations into the sample (in this case, statements relating to 
knowledge use, attachment theory and knowledge of developmental theory). One 
can therefore utilise a priori (deductive) designs representing extant theoretical 
constructs, or inductive designs which emerge from the patterns arising as 
statements are collected and collated. The Q-set design here was balanced by 
reference to the breadth of the scoping exercise and the utilisation of domain 
experts to pilot the initial concourse.  
 
The piloting of the concourse statements ensured that ‘due process’ was applied to 
minimise researcher-effects and as referred to above, domain experts were used 
to provide a degree of validation and independent external authority to the 
statements. These processes are also designed to minimise the possibility of bias, 
even though my own biases and ideas around what constitutes the contemporary 
discourse on knowledge of and for social work and the professions is unlikely to 
permeate the concourse because of the nature of the approach in Q that offsets the 
likelihood of this. The aims of Q are to allow the participants to impose their 
meanings on the statements and the concourse – to attribute meaning ‘... a 
posteriori through interpretation rather than through a priori postulation.’ (Brown 
1980: 54). The researcher’s role is to (simply) compile a sample of statements that 
are broadly representative of the topic of inquiry. Watts and Stenner (2012) suggest 
that ‘[T]he items are thus better thought of as suggestions rather than as statements 
with determinate meaning.” (p64: emphasis in original). The form of the statements 
is such that these are not overtly value-laden, but merely a statement to which a 
participant will assign a value to it based on their own particular perspective. Even 
if I included statements that were ‘biased’ in that they said things like ‘X is better 
than Y’, the participants will assign their own value to it, thus negating any value I 
may have wanted to impose. Brown (1997) makes a similar point when he asserts 
that ‘...the supposed a priori meaning of the statement does not necessarily enter 
into the Q-sorter’s considerations: participants inject statements with their own 
understanding.’ (p11: emphasis in original). Each statement was then randomly 
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assigned a number for the purposes of subsequent analysis and then randomly 
entered into a list to form the concourse of statements.  
 
In constructing the Q-set it is worth noting that it “may be designed purely on 
theoretical grounds, or from naturally-occurring (ecological) conditions, or as 
required for experimental purposes, to suit the particular requirements of an 
investigation.” (Stephenson 1952: 223), although the construction of the Q-set is 
perhaps more labour intensive than Stephenson’s comments on these imply. Curt 
(1994) and Brown (1980) have written in terms of Q-set development being more 
of a craft and an art, rather than a science. One of the major outcomes from the Q-
set is to ensure that participants have had the opportunity to model and express 
their viewpoint on the topic at hand without feeling constrained by limitations 
(perceived or otherwise) imposed by the range of statements made available to 
them. Comments made by the participants immediately after the administration of 
the Q-set provide some indication of how it was perceived in terms of its 
representativeness regarding professional knowledge (see chapter five section 
5.4.1). As Harvey (1997) notes, one of the important human attributes that is 
exploited by Q is the desire to see structure within and impose meaning on all 
‘impinging items and stimuli’ (pp 146-7) – this represents the gestalt; so long as the 
Q-set provides a ’representative condensation of information’ (Watts and Stenner 
2012: 65), the participants will do the rest.  
 
The concourse of statements with n=60 is within what is generally regarded as 
being the normative range for such studies (Curt 1994; Stainton-Rogers 1995) and 
represents broad themes identified from the ‘statement scoping’ exercise referred 
to above. These themes are, in principal at least, representative of the broad issues 
within the profession at the time of the empirical work and the statements are either 
directly worded from comments received or are phrased to represent a number of 
pertinent issues as determined by the scoping exercise. In this way the statements 
can be seen to originate from within the context of the research question/the nature 
of the inquiry and the professional zeitgeist. Coherence was therefore taken to be 
axiomatic within the context of the generation of statements, emanating from the 
professional context – the workplace, professionals in practice, professionals 
supervising and training those in practice as well as papers, reports, journals and 
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professional ‘trade’ magazines that, between them, purport to reflect the 
professional zeitgeist and public opinion on the profession and therefore contribute 
to the production of a balanced Q-set (Watts 2008).  
 
4.3.4 The Participants (P-set) 
The choice and engagement of participants in a Q-methods study is approached in 
a particular way that resonates with the overarching and underpinning methodology 
and philosophy of the thesis per se and with that of the principles of Q: the inversion 
of traditional R-method approaches. One implication of this inversion is that in Q, 
the Q-set (the concourse of statements) becomes the study sample, whilst the 
participants become the variables. This means that there is a greater need to 
ensure that the participants who are more likely to have something meaningful to 
contribute to the study, above and beyond what opportunistic and ‘snowball’ 
sampling might ordinarily achieve. In the course of routinised sampling for general 
testing of traits using traditional psychometric tests, the (essential) randomness of 
the participant sample is likely to be less important that situations where you are 
seeking to explore particular viewpoints on particular topics. In this regard it is 
therefore important to have a P-set that is more (rather than less) representative of 
the topic at hand: we are aiming to explore the viewpoints of participants whose 
particular views matter in relation to the topic. In this case we wish to explore the 
views of professional social workers regarding how they obtain, develop, use and 
share knowledge regarding their practice. It therefore becomes necessary, in order 
to obtain views that can be said to count for something, to utilise those very people 
who themselves represent the people whose views are to be explored! We need to 
avoid a broad, homogenous grouping; thus, a good P-set must always be much 
more ‘theoretical...or dimensional...than random or accidental.’ (Brown 1980: 192). 
Some participant samples may be easily obtained, but it is likely that their views on 
essentially complex and specialist topics would be less than informative. This is not 
of course meant to be in any way disparaging: rather, it reflects a concern to ensure 
that methodological processes and associated methods are as rigorous as 
possible, both technically and theoretically.  
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As referred to earlier, participant sampling in Q-methodological studies is designed 
to utilise those who have something meaningful to say about a particular topic; they 
are a function of the research question being addressed, in this case, “how do social 
workers (and other professionals) get the knowledge they need in order to do their 
job; how do they use it and are some types of knowing and doing better than 
others?” However, in order to ensure as representative a participant sample as 
possible, n=37 were utilised. In Q terms this is sufficient (see Stephenson 1936a, 
1936b, 1953; Stainton-Rogers 1995), although the issue in terms of numbers in Q-
studies is of less concern that it might be in R-method studies.  
 
The large sample sizes typically utilised in more deductive approaches are often 
justified on the basis of the need to generalise to a much larger population, so if 
more participants confirm a particular hypothesis, this is taken to equate with a 
stronger claim to ‘truth’ and practical application, even though for some this a 
questionable assertion (Hughes and Sharrock 1997; Bohman 1999; Okasha 2002). 
Q-studies, as with most small-scale (often qualitative) studies make different claims 
when it comes to generalisation. Whilst small-scale studies are unable to make 
grandiose claims that the findings can be applied to a vast array of others, they can 
(and rightly do) claim to have relevance to others in similar positions or with similar 
characteristics (Watts, O’Hara and Trig 2010) that can have interesting and 
significant effects and implications. After all, if you are one person with a unique 
insight into a situation, that knowledge may be highly relevant and of huge benefit 
to that one other person in the world in a similar position.  
 
The emergence and rise of the service user and carer ‘movement’ (Boxall and 
Beresford 2013; Robinson and Webber 2013; Gant 2012) has resonances to the 
significance and importance of (initially) very small-scale studies into the 
experiences of others, and those (at times) unique and individual viewpoints have 
now grown into a force majeure, and one that the professional service industry has, 
rightly, embraced. Phenomenological approaches (as Q is a variant upon this) have 
much to offer. Q, as a means of capturing a number of individualised views on 
matters of subjective (self-referent) import has much to offer across a range of 
different contexts and research domains.  
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Q-studies generally aim to establish the existence of particular viewpoints on 
particular topics and to explicate and seek to understand what those view are and 
why they may (or may not) be significant. Whether these views can then be 
generalised to other populations is a matter for the researcher to determine based 
on the findings and what it is they feel could usefully be disseminated. Watts and 
Stenner (2012) advocate for the generalisation of “concepts or categories, 
theoretical propositions and models of practice” (p73). Thomas and Baas 
(1992/1993) refer to the process of generalisation from Q-studies as “substantive 
inference” (p22), a notion with clear parallels to “inference to the best explanation” 
(Hume 1748; Harman 1965; Howson 2000; Lipton 2004). However, the participant 
sample relative to the study is simply required to be in a position to respond 
meaningfully to the Q-set, and could in fact be as small as one person. This is 
because in Q-studies, the items in the Q-set constitute the study sample, and not 
the participants. The participants are the independent variables as they act on the 
items. This is a good illustration of the idea that Q is an inversion of the more typical 
R-method studies. In Q we are undertaking by-person factor analysis (how do the 
participants affect the statements – what meanings do they assign to them?) 
whereas in R-studies it is by-item factor analysis because the participants are the 
sample and the items (questions etc) are the variables (how do these variables 
affect the participant?).  
 
The sampling strategy for participants in Q studies is then quite strategic, based 
upon the view that the participants had to be individuals who had something to say 
about the topic being investigated. Thus, random sampling or snowball techniques 
were avoided. The participant group was chosen utilising purposive sampling on 
the basis of them all being qualified social workers across two major domains of 
practice – those working within children’s services and those working within adult 
services. There were no other inclusion or exclusion criteria. Three large local 
authorities were approached and a request, along with a participant information 
sheet sent to each of the children’s and adult’s teams for volunteers. This request 
and information sheet (having been seen and approved by the University Ethics 
Committee – Appendix 2) was sent electronically via a central administrator and 
advised people that senior managers in each of the three Authorities had agreed to 
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practitioners volunteering their work-time for the study if they wished. The only other 
criterion was that there should be a roughly equal proportion of participants from 
each service domain (children/adult services). When participants made contact, I 
explained the process to them, making sure that they were fully aware of the 
purpose of the study and the time commitment likely to be required. They were then 
advised that I would contact them by telephone to make specific arrangements to 
meet at a time and location beneficial to them and other participants in order to 
minimise travel across what is the third-largest geographic region in Scotland, 
covering Aberdeenshire, Aberdeen City and Morayshire, amounting to some 3,400 
square miles/8,700 square kilometres.   
 
 
4.3.5 Procedures and the Administration of the Q-sort 
Once agreement had been reached regarding the date, time and location of the Q-
sorting session and participants had arrived, an overview of the session was given 
and basic demographic information obtained. This was kept to a minimum and 
focused on what was considered to be relevant in terms of providing additional 
richness to the data in relation to subsequent analysis and interpretation. The 
participant’s age, years qualified, gender and an additional categorisation relating 
to the area of practice they were in were noted as well as the option (on the Q-sort 
grid – Appendix 5) for them to agree to a follow-up telephone interview once the 
results were finalised. Such demographic information helps to provide context and 
explanatory power to the data, particularly that generated from the statistical 
information to inform the construction of the factor narratives (see below). As can 
be seen from the commentary and interpretation of the data/results in chapter five, 
the demographic information proved beneficial.  
 
Participants had previously been provided with an information sheet prior to 
agreeing to take part in the study (Appendix 3) and this was discussed, focusing 
particularly on issues of the right to withdraw and confidentiality. Participants were 
then presented with an instruction sheet (Appendix 6) and a blank Q-sort grid 
(Appendix 5). This contained detailed but straightforward information regarding the 
completion of the task. The condition of instruction was made explicit in the 
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information sheet and asked respondents to rate each statement from -5 through 
+5, ensuring that the number of each statement was located somewhere on the grid 
– and that each statement could only be represented once, and each statement 
number must be included. The condition of instruction is an important element within 
the context of the study and is central to ensuring and maintaining the integrity of 
the research question through procedural coherence and consistency. Were 
participants to be unclear as to how they should respond to the statements 
presented to them, then the integrity of the study in its entirety would be 
compromised and the comparison, intercorrelation and factor analysis of the data 
rendered useless.  
 
Discussion and clarification took place where requested so that each participant 
was fully conversant with the processes. I was on hand during the entire completion 
process to answer any queries regarding the completion of the Q-sort grid, but it 
was made clear that I could not and would not discuss the meaning or interpretation 
of any of the statements whilst the study was underway – meaning and 
interpretation was entirely a matter for the participant themselves. It was also 
explained to the participants that the condition of instruction would actually force 
them to make choices they might otherwise not make. The fact that they had to rank 
each and every statement and were not allowed to omit scoring any statements or 
duplicate scorings meant that their choices may well be forced – Q-sort is a forced 
distribution method.  
 
The Q-sort grid (see below) is a tool that allows participants to record/score their 
viewpoints on each statement/item in accordance with the condition of instruction. 
It consists of an inverted quasi-normal distribution curve containing sufficient 
columns to correspond to the rating categories assigned to the study – in this case 
the range was -5 to +5. The degree of kurtosis applied to a distribution was also 
considered. The degree of flatness or steepness is related to the degree of 
complexity of a subject and the perceived expertise of the participant group. In 
situations where lay views on a specialist topic were being sought, the degree of 
kurtosis would be steeper (-3 through +3 = seven points of distribution) than in 
situations where experts were commenting on a subject they were likely to know a 
lot about. In this case, the distribution would be flatter (-5 through +5 = eleven points 
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of distribution). The rationale for this relates to the engagement of participants, the 
extent to which they will contribute meaningfully and the subsequent credibility of 
the data. Flat distributions (more points of distribution) mean that participants have 
the option of being much more discriminating in relation to their responses, easier 
and more likely when you are responding to a topic you know a lot about – not so 
easy when it is unfamiliar. In this latter scenario, it is more likely that participants 
will be less engaged with the study, and whilst they might still complete the grid, the 
extent to which it actually reflects their views could be questionable (Brown 2008). 
Thus, if there are less options for subtle and nuanced responses on an unfamiliar 
topic for an inexperienced or novice participant, the more likely that they will provide 
meaningful responses. 
 
 
Figure 4a: A 60 Item Q-Sort grid – flattened with more points of distribution (11) 
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Figure 4b: A 60-item Q-sort grid – steeper with less points of distribution (7) 
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This near-normal and symmetrical distribution pattern is preferred for a number of 
reasons because it represents the normative assumption that most people 
ordinarily feel very strongly, either positively or negatively, about a comparatively 
limited range of things, but have more moderate or neutral views on many more 
issues. A normal distribution represents this tendency. A symmetrical distribution 
also allows for the mean ranking value to fall conveniently at zero. However, there 
is no particular significance to be attached to the utilisation of the normal distribution 
curve as the distribution used ‘may be of any non-bizarre symmetrical shape’ 
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(Stephenson 1953: 60) as distribution effects appear to be virtually nil (Brown 1980: 
pp288-9). This convenience relating to the zero however has a different resonance 
in relation to Q-methodology. Where, under ordinary circumstances, zero may be 
used to signify indifference or as representing someone having no view at all on a 
topic or issue, in Q the zero operates as a hub from around which positive and 
negative salience emanates and the variability of the Q-sort distribution distends 
outwards to the polarities. Stephenson (1953) referred to this as the ‘distensive 
zero’. This is an important feature within the context of the Q-sort as all items are 
ranked relative to each other, so a ranking of zero may not necessarily equate with 
indifference or unimportance – rather, it may, relative to other rankings, indicate that 
it is actually important, but only insofar as it ‘adds value’ to other rankings when 
considered holistically. These nuances are best exemplified by reference to the 
factor narratives presented in chapter five. In these it can be seen that both zero 
ratings and minus ratings can denote a positive or otherwise meaningful 
interpretation. The converse would also apply – that zero and positive ratings can 
be read as implying disagreement or a negative take on an issue. This is the 
essence of the interpretive nature of Q – and whilst this may well be open to criticism 
from some quarters, the nature of the methodology and the associated methods 
make for credible results when one considers the broader epistemological and 
paradigmatic issues referred to in chapter three and the critique of the (overly-) 
positivistic paradigms.  
 
Participants were then provided with a copy of the concourse of statements and 
asked to look at these. They were referred to the condition of instruction as noted 
on the instruction sheet and were encouraged to study these alongside the 60-item 
Q-sort grid. They were told that there was no time limit, and for those in group-
based settings where a number of practitioners had agreed to meet simultaneously 
to maximise resources (time), they were asked not to discuss their choices with 
anyone else whilst undertaking the sort.  Participants were then given the option of 
having the set of 60 statements on separate slips of paper so that they could 
physically move them into different positions before recording their choice on the 
Q-sort grid, or the numbered list (or both – although no-one chose both). These 
differing options recognised the importance of learning styles and provided a mixed-
approach to the sorting task. They were also given access to pencils and pens and 
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blank sheets of A4 notepaper if they wished to make any notes or use aide 
memoires of some sort. 
In relation to the sorting/scoring of the items, participants were given suggestions 
of strategies they might wish to employ to make the sorting task more manageable. 
These included putting all the ‘definitely agree/definitely disagree’ in two piles, 
before moving on to those likely to be placed more to the middle or at zero. They 
were also advised/reminded that the scores were not to be seen as representing 
absolute values, and that the difference between a +2 and a +3 wasn’t necessarily 
all that significant – at least they were both a plus ranking. They were reminded that 
it would be the statistical analysis that would correlate all the Q-sorts and produce 
a composite based on statistical scores that reflected the overall configuration of 
viewpoints, but that their individual Q-sort would be considered in its own right if it 
were statistically significant in some way, relative to all the other rankings. Thus, 
participants were encouraged to see their Q-sort as a contribution to a much bigger 
picture and not therefore to get too anxious about fine distinctions. Having said that 
however, the point was reiterated that their honest and thoughtful views were 
required in order to provide as honest and accurate overall picture of professional 
social worker views regarding aspects of professional knowledge.  
 
Each sort took approximately 60 minutes to complete, although this varied from 45 
minutes to over 85 minutes. At the conclusion of the sort, the researcher provided 
participants with opportunities to discuss any issues arising from the activity and to 
respond to pre-set questions (Appendix 7 and chapter five, section 5.4). These 
responses and discussions raised issues around the importance of some 
statements to participants and what the scoring meant for them, to difficulties 
participants had in making choices they were totally satisfied with to those relating 
to the relevance of the statements. All of this information was collected and used to 
inform the secondary aspects of analysis (see chapter five for the results and 
chapter six for the discussion). Participants were thanked for their time and effort in 
contributing to the study.  
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4.4 Analysis 
Once all the Q-sort grids had been completed, collected and collated, a unique 
identifier was applied to each one. This was based on the type of practice each 
participant was generally engaged in (social work with children or adults), his or her 
age, gender and years qualified. Thus, a female social worker in children’s services, 
aged 47, female, and qualified for 14 years would have the identifier SW47F14. 
This demographic information allows for further examination within the context of 
the interpretive narratives that emerge following the construction of the factor 
arrays. The information from each of the 37 Q-sort grids was then inputted into 
PQMethod version 2.20 (December 2011) (Schmlock 2002) and analysis 
undertaken. This particular software programme is specifically designed for Q-
method studies and has been constructed utilising the principles of Q-factor 
analysis detailed by Stephenson (1953) and Brown (1980) as opposed to IBM 
SPSS, which is constructed with by-item factor analytic algorithms.   
 
4.4.1 Statistical [Quantitative] Analysis 
PQMethod is a statistical programme, tailored to the requirements of Q-studies that 
utilises the (relatively old) FORTRAN -77-source code programming that is still 
regarded as being of value in programmes wishing to run mathematical-statistical 
algorithms. It is however limited in relation to its graphics capabilities, so the user 
interface is quite ‘unsophisticated’ by today’s standards. The software and system 
is made up of several elements that lead from the inputting of individual Q-sorts to 
the final analysis of the data. The programme has a number of input options:  
 
STATES: this allows for the input of the text of the Q-sort statements. In this 
study, each statement was given a random alphabetic code, ranging from ‘a’ 
(statement 1) to ‘hhh’ (statement 60) and these were inputted into PQMethod 
(Appendix 8).  This was done because PQMethod only allows 60 characters 
per line.  
 
QENTER: this option allows you to enter the data directly from the collected 
Q-sorts. This is a time consuming process, necessitating the input of 2,220 
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pieces of data. Each Q-sort is entered into PQMethod exactly as the 
participants entered their ratings on the Q-sort grid.  
 
QCENT: this option tells the programme to undertake a factor analysis of the 
correlation matrix from the ‘raw’ sorts entered earlier (QENTER), all of which 
are unseen. The choice of QCENT here instructs the programme to run a 
Centroid Factor Analysis rather than a Principal Component Analysis (Option 
= QPCA). Both of these options take the raw data file created by QENTER 
and create a correlation matrix followed by a unrotated factor loadings output 
file created by reference to the chosen method of factor analysis (in this case, 
Centroid Factor Analysis).  
 
QROTATE: this option tells the programme which method of factor rotation 
to undertake. There are two options – QROTATE that allows you to manually 
rotate the factors (Appendix 9) or QVARIMAX that does the rotation for you 
(Appendix 10). In this study, both options were chosen, although manual 
rotation was undertaken on only factors 1 and 2 following initial varimax 
rotation in order to provide a more visually apparent exemplar of the function 
of rotation.  
 
QANALYZE: the rotated factor matrix created by the programme is analysed 
and emerging factors are differentiated based on the original Q-sort 
statements, giving a holistic statistical analyses of the complete Q-set and 
the relationship between all the Q-sorts. According to Schmolck (2011: 11), 
‘The central goal of the analysis consists in the creation of one idealised, 
prototype sort for each factor as the best possible, intrinsically coherent, 
representation of what is general in the individual views associated with the 
factor.’ On the basis of these prototypical Q-sorts (see chapter five, tables 
5n and 5o) we can interpret the nature of the factor based on the prototypical, 
holistic array encompassing all the Q-sorts associated with that particular 
factor.  
 
The statistical analysis using PQMethod v2.20 produces a number of sequential 
output files (Appendix 11 includes Appendices D1-D14: Appendix 12 is the original 
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PQMethod output file). As factor analysis (of any sort) is a data-reduction technique, 
initial output files contain all correlations, and are then followed by reductive files. 
The following sections identify and describe the statistical processes and 
associated output files leading to the emergence of the factor arrays. In chapter 
five, which presents the results from PQMethod v2.20, the same order of 
presentation is followed regarding the output files for ease of reference.  
 
4.4.1.1 Correlation Matrix Between Sorts 
This is the first output file from PQMethod. This file, ‘Correlation Matrix Between 
Sorts’ (Appendix D1) reflects the nature and extent of the relationships between all 
37 individual Q-sorts, providing 2,183 correlations. Correlation statistics are 
employed to measure “…the degree of agreement between two sets of scores 
[gathered from] the same individuals.” (Kline 1994: 18) with +1.0 representing a 
perfect correlation, and -1.0 a perfect negative (or no) relationship. On the basis of 
this information, one can determine those Q-sorts that are either more strongly 
intercorrelated i.e: those participants whose individual Q-sorts are similarly 
configured and which may, on this basis, have commonalities that are significant, 
both statistically and conceptually, or conversely that are less intercorrelated. The 
correlation matrix between the 37 Q-sorts represents all the viewpoints the 
participants have produced and therefore encapsulates all the meanings and all the 
variability present in the study. This is the first measure of association between the 
variables, which in the case of Q-methodology are the participants themselves.  
 
The Correlation Matrix Between Sorts represents the total study variance both in 
terms of individual Q-sorts and the composite of all of these, of which we can identify 
three types – common variance, specific variance and error variance (Kline 1994). 
Common variance refers to those portions of meaning held across or by the group 
as whole. Specific variance refers to that associated with specific Q-sorts and 
reflects particular individualised views, whilst error variance refers to random error 
and ‘white noise’ produced within any analytical system.  
 
Central to the study and the use of Q-factor analysis is the identification of common 
or shared variance. These shared and common portions of variance [meaning] 
constitute the factors (latent variables – see chapter five) within the study that 
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emerge from the individual Q-sorts, and it is these we seek to identify, analyse and 
interpret. As Q-factor analysis is a data reduction technique, there will inevitably be 
fewer factors (shared meanings/commonalities) than there will be individual Q-
sorts. These commonalities represent the key viewpoints held within the participant 
group on the subject(s) being explored, in this case knowledge of and for 
professional (social work) practice. 
 
Each subsequent factor (latent variable) is derived from the presence of varying 
degrees of shared meaning, and Q-factor analysis relies upon the statistical method 
of Centroid Factor Analysis (CFA) or Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) (Haig 2005; 
Norris and Lecavalier 2010; Schmitt 2011; Holmes-Finch 2013) to highlight these 
rather than Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (see Kline 1994; Fabrigar et al 
1999; Suhr 2009) which always and only resolves itself into the best mathematical 
solution.  
 
Given the overarching focus on pragmatism (Peirce 1877: 1905; James 1907; 
Dewey 1929/1980: 1938; Almeder 2007; Koons 2009; Bernstein 2010) as an 
organising framework for both the analysis and interpretation of the findings, using 
a PCA solution would be counterproductive, as a strictly mathematical solution does 
not lend itself to interpretation in the same way as other approaches referred to 
above. The demands of the data and the nature of the study encourage the use of 
exploratory factor analysis which itself holds common ground with the broader 
pragmatic aims of the study regarding the relationship between findings 
(observation) and meaning, and encourages the adoption and adaptation of 
narrative (Spector-Mersel 2010; Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou 2013), 
phenomenological (Akerlind 2012; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014) and 
essentially abductive approaches (Shank 1998; Haig 2005: 2008: 2012). In fact, 
Stephenson (1961) referred to ‘factor analysis as the technical [or methodological] 
extension of Peirce’s theory of abduction, as a way of generating hypotheses de-
novo’ (in Brown 1980: 134). Thus, the use of Q-methodology is both consistent and 
coherent with the theme of abduction (Znaniecki 1934; Shank 1998; Haig 2005: 
2008: 2012) and the application of inductive methods to the analysis of data derived 
from broader statistical and broad-based deductive techniques, providing a degree 
of methodological and theoretical congruence throughout the study. Furthermore, 
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given the limitations of purely statistical methods in providing a full account of the 
meanings (Factors) represented by the numbers, the use of abduction represents 
a more dynamic and phronetic approach to the research process (Aristotle 1976; 
Bernard-Donals 1998; Flyvjberg 2001; Flyvbjerg et al 2012; Haig 2005: 2008: 2012; 
Kinsella and Pitman 2012). As Watts and Stenner (2012) note, using PCA 
‘…generally isn’t attractive in Q methodology. It just deprives us of the opportunity 
to properly explore the data or to engage with the process of factor rotation in any 
sort of abductive, theoretically informed or investigatory fashion.’ (p99).  
 
4.4.1.2 The Initial [Unrotated] Factor Matrix 
The second output file from PQMethod is the ‘Unrotated Factor Matrix’ (Appendix 
D2). This file is produced following the input of all data and the selection of ‘Option 
3’ in the PQMethod programme that asks ‘How many centroids do you wish to 
extract?’ Centroids are the Factors we wish to isolate. The programme was asked 
to extract five centroids/factors. The decision to extract n=5 factors in this study was 
based on the presence of 5 broad conceptual categories referred to in chapter two 
that provide the framework for the analysis of knowledge forms in this thesis: the 
structure of knowledge referred to/identified by participants; the type of knowledge 
(propositional, tacit, experiential, personal); the content of the knowledge (facts, 
assumptions, prescriptions); the use made of knowledge by practitioners and finally, 
how they developed the knowledge (dissemination, alteration).  
 
The process of extraction provides us with a view of the relative positions of all the 
Q-sorts relative to each other set against n=5 extracted factors. These extracted 
factors are those regularities or similar patterns from across and within the entire 
37 Q-sorts. The process of extraction is sequential in that Factor 1 represents the 
first and the largest segment of common variance, Factor 2 the second and so on 
until all study variance has been accounted for. The extraction process continues 
(unseen in PQMethod) until no more common variance is identifiable.  
The unrotated factor matrix shows the initial correlation of each Q-sort with each 
factor. Each factor loading needs to be squared in order to ascertain how much of 
the particular Q-sorts configuration can be explained by each of the factors. This is 
expressed as a percentage in Table 5a as a means of quickly identifying the extent 
to which a particular Q-sort’s configuration can be explained by reference to a 
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particular factor. The Cumulative Communalities Matrix (Table 5c below) gives the 
% equivalence in relation to the extent a particular Q-sort’s configuration can be 
explained by all of the extracted factors. 
 
Once extracted, the eigenvalues of each factor were considered and the Kaiser-
Guttman criteria applied (Kaiser 1960; Guttman 1954) along with Humphrey’s Rule 
(Brown 1980), which states that “…a factor is significant if the cross-product of its 
two highest loadings (ignoring the sign) exceeds twice the standard error.’ (ibid: 
223). Thus, with five factors extracted from the data, the noted eigenvalues were 
obtained, with the % variance (in parenthesis) and the cross product of the two 
highest loadings (Humphrey’s Rule), based on Brown’s (1980: 222) method for 
calculating the standard error (SE) in [parenthesis]: 
 
The calculation for determining the significant factor loading at p<0.01 = 2.58 is: 
2.58 x (1 ÷ √60) (60 = number of items in each q-sort) 
2.58 x (1 ÷ 7.7459) 
2.58 x 0.129 = 0.333 
The calculation for determining the standard error [SE] is:  
1 ÷ (√60) (60 = number of items in the Q-sort) 
1 ÷ 7.7459 x 60 = 0.129 rounded to 0.13 x 2 = 0.26  
(Humphrey’s Rule = twice the standard error) 
Therefore: 
Factor 1 = 9.5202 (variance = 26%) [Standard error = 0.55] 
Factor 2 = 5.7209 (variance = 15%) [Standard error = 0.57] 
Factor 3 = 0.9420 (variance = 3%)   [Standard error = 0.09] 
Factor 4 = 1.1911 (variance = 3%)   [Standard error = 0.11] 
Factor 5 = 0.9524 (variance = 3%)   [Standard error = 0.07] 
 
The general rule is that eigenvalues greater than 1.00 should be considered as 
significant. However, in conjunction with this rule is the extent of the variance 
explained by any given factor. As can be seen, F1 accounts for 26% of the common 
variance, and F2 15% - a total of 41%, so although F4 has an eigenvalue of 1.1911, 
its explanatory power is limited to 3%. It was therefore decided to reject F4 along 
with F3 and F5 as these only accounted for 9% of the variance between them, with 
127 
50% being specific or error variance. It is generally regarded that a combined 
variance of 40% or above equates with a sound factor solution (Watts and Stenner 
2005). However, in addition to this, consideration of the application of Humphrey’s 
Rule (twice the SE) clearly supports the extraction of only Factors 1 and 2; Factors 
3, 4 and 5 do not reach the threshold criteria of 0.26. Thus, the decision was to 
rotate two factors – F1 and F2 following their extraction in order to interrogate these 
both quantitatively and qualitatively using the ‘crib sheet’ and narrative approach 
(see below) conjoined with follow-up telephone interviews (see below).  
 
4.4.1.3 Cumulative Communalities Matrix 
The cumulative communalities matrix (Appendix D3) provides the sum of the 
squared factor loadings (based on the initial extraction of 5 Factors) for each Q-sort 
and indicates how communal (or common) that Q-sort is relative to the others. The 
cumulative variance explained by the extraction of these 5 Factors is 50% - 
however, as we have seen above, Factors 3-5 account for only 9% of this.  
 
Communality is calculated thus (using Q-sorts 2 and 29 as illustrations): 
h2 (Q-sort 2) = loading on F1 – F52 = 
 0.732 + -0.332 + 0.162 + 0.032 + 0.182 = 
        0.53 +   0.11 + 0.02   + 0.01 + 0.03 = 0.70 
 
h2 (Q-sort 29) = loading on F1 – F52 = 
0.082 + 0.492 + 0.042 + -0.252 + 0.102 = 
      0.01 + 0.24   + 0.00   + 0.06   + 0.01 = 0.32 
 
(based on Brown 1980: 223-224). 
 
4.4.1.4 Factor Matrix with an ‘x’ indicating a Defining Sort F1/F2 [Rotated 
Factor Matrix] 
This output file (Appendix D4) provides a list of all the Q-sorts and their relative 
loadings on each of the two extracted factors. The loading of a Q-sort onto a 
particular factor tells us how close it is to the factor’s overall viewpoint i.e: a higher 
loading indicates greater agreement whilst a lower figure represents greater 
divergence from this. 
128 
 
The function of rotation is one of both statistical/mathematical relevance and of 
theoretical relevance, and it also acts as a functional means of visualising the data 
and the relative positions of each Q-sort in a physical concept space (Appendices 
9 and 10).  By comparing the diagrams in these appendices we can see the relative 
positions of the Q-sorts as they cluster together, or not, as the case may be. This 
helps us in appreciating the significance of the numerical representations made 
available in the various output files.  
 
The PQMethod programme rotates the factors orthogonally in order to maintain the 
90-degree relationship that exists between the factor axes and therefore ensures 
that each factor’s statistical independence can be maintained. It is also possible to 
rotate the factors obliquely, but this breaks the 90-degree-rule and is not available 
in PQMethod.  PQMethod rotates the factors into the most relevant orientation – 
into focus, in order to analyse the loadings. This is referred to as varimax rotation 
that is regarded as the most effective and appropriate method of rotating factors. It 
operates statistically by adhering to the principle of simple structure (Thurstone 
1947). This means that varimax rotation tries to ensure that each Q-sort defines 
itself in relation to only one factor so as to ensure that as much of the study variance 
can be accounted for. However, it is possible, and appropriate (if relevant) to 
combine varimax rotation with by-hand rotation. This was undertaken with Factor 1 
and Factor 2 (Appendices 9 and 10) rotating the axes by 18 degrees. In the event, 
the rotation provided no significant advantage above the varimax rotations provided 
by the PQMethod programme and reported in the rotated factor matrix [Factor 
Matrix with an ‘X’ indicating a Defining Sort] as the viewpoints of the two factors 
were sufficiently focused. Rotation seeks to maximise the factor loadings of each 
Q-sort so as to include as much data as possible into the final analysis. However, 
where the loadings are sufficiently robust, by-hand rotation will achieve little. Factor 
rotation could be seen as some sort of methodological/statistical ‘cheating’ – shifting 
the Q-sorts along the axes until a point is reached where they ‘look’ better. Rotation 
simply alters the position of the factors and their viewpoints relative to the Q-sorts, 
but it does not alter the position of the Q-sorts relative to each other. The 
impressions made by the participants on the Q-set remain fixed. With rotation, our 
perspective is sharpened without altering any of the relationships that exist between 
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the Q-sorts, and ergo, the overall messages being delivered (Watts and Stenner 
2012: 129).  
 
Those Q-sorts that are said to be ‘defining’ are those that load significantly 
(statistically speaking) on only one factor; non-defining sorts are those that load 
significantly on more than one factor and are therefore said to be confounded. It is 
only the ‘defining’ sorts that are considered in relation to the construction of the 
factor arrays.  
 
4.4.1.5 Free Distribution Data Results 
This file states the standard deviation for all Q-sorts (Appendix D5).  
 
4.4.1.6 Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks 
This output file offers a simple comparison of how a particular item (statement) has 
been ranked by each of the factors. For example, statement 4 has been ranked at 
11 in relation to F1, but at 53 (out of 60) by F2 (Appendix D6). 
 
4.4.1.7 Factor Scores – F1 [Z-Scores] 
This output file provides a rank ordering of each item/statement based on the 
(standardised) z-score (z-scr). This allows for cross-statement comparisons to be 
made between factors. The z-score is simply the standard score that calculates the 
probability of a score occurring within the normal distribution and is a result of the 
process of standardisation referred to above (Appendix D7). 
 
4.4.1.8 Factor Scores – F2 [Z-Scores] 
As above, but for Factor 2 (Appendix D8). 
4.4.1.9 Descending Array of Differences between F1 and F2 
This output file utilises the Z-score as a means of displaying the greatest and 
smallest differences that hold between the statement rankings. It is possible to see 
at-a-glance which statements were regarded more (or less) positively by each factor 
(Appendix D9).  
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4.4.1.10 Exact Factor Scores in Z-Scores (Z-SCR) and T-Score Units [SPSS] 
This output file was inserted by Schmolck (2011) and provides a link to SPSS 
programmes (Appendix D10).  
 
4.4.1.11 Factor Q-Sort Values for each Statement [F1/F2] 
This particular table is perhaps the most important of all the output files and forms 
the basis for the composite factor arrays (Appendix D11). In essence, this file 
evidences the data-reducing properties of factor analysis. Thirty-seven Q-sorts 
have been condensed into two, representing the degrees of allegiance to a 
particular viewpoint. However, at this point, those viewpoints are statistical. It is the 
construction of the factor narratives, based on these composite factor arrays 
provided by this output file that engages the interpretive and qualitative 
methodologies and methods, thus beginning the integration of the two 
methodologies – quantitative and qualitative. This phase – the interpretation of the 
factors from the statistical data – is the essence of Q. Stephenson (1936a) was at 
great pains to emphasise the holistic nature of the procedures of Q as being distinct 
from the atomistic methods used in R-method factor analysis. The point is that the 
factor arrays should allow us to reach a full explanation of the whole viewpoint for 
each factor.  
 
4.4.1.12 Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. 
Disagreement (Variance across factor Z-Scores] 
This file presents a list of all the statements in the Q-set, beginning with those that 
the factors have agreed most upon, moving down to those where there is most 
disagreement (Appendix D12).   
 
 
4.4.1.13 Factor Characteristics and Standard Errors for Differences in Factor 
Z-Scores 
This output file presents the reliability and error measures for each of the factor 
arrays (Appendix D12). 
 
4.4.1.14 Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1 and Factor 2 with Q-Sort value 
(Q-SV) and Z-Scores (Z-SCR) 
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This file provides information as to those items a particular factor has ranked in a 
significantly different way (Appendix D13).  
 
4.4.1.15 Consensus Statements - Those that do not distinguish between ANY 
pair of Factors (F1 and F2) 
These items are those that have been ranked similarly across both factors by those 
participants who reflect Factor 1 overall, and evidence no statistical significance 
(Appendix D14).  
 
All of the above output files utilise the total weighted scores for each item/statement 
in each Q-sort. These scores are referred to as Z-scores (Brown 1980: 242-243). 
The Z-scores for each statement are then used to locate each statement within 
each factor in its appropriately weighted place (-5 to +5) and create a statistically 
accurate Factor Array – a composite Q-sort based upon all individual Q-sorts and 
representing that factor’s viewpoint.  
 
Other ways of representing the data include the construction of composite factor 
arrays for each of the factors identified. These Q-sort grids are presented with the 
statements located in their statistically correct rank ordered position based on the 
Z-scores provided by PQMethod. These factor arrays form the basis of the factor 
narratives presented in chapter five. This represents the culmination of the factor 
extraction and rotation process – 37 Q-sorts have been reduced to just 2. As such, 
the data reduction process inherent in Q-method has achieved its aims. These two 
composite arrays represent key viewpoints relating to the research question(s). 
However, careful analysis and interpretation of the arrays is important, as is the 
Correlation Between Factor Sorts (Appendix D1). This output file indicates the 
extent to which the Factor arrays intercorrelate. The greater the correlation between 
the scores, the less distinctive is the array. If there is a high correlation, this may 
mean that the Factors are actually saying the same things, but in a slightly different 
way. However, as the data suggests, the correlation is non-significant at <0.01 (0.33 
is the significance level) as the correlation between factor scores is 0.04. This 
suggests that the extracted factors are quite different, and the narratives reflect this. 
The factor narratives are the interpretive outputs from the PQMethod programme 
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and bring together the QN and QL elements of the data extraction and analysis 
processes.  
 
4.4.2 Interpretative [Qualitative] Analysis 
The factor narratives are the product of the interpretation of the meaning and 
significance of the ranked statements in the composite factor arrays. Each 
composite factor array, compiled on the basis of the rank ordering of statements 
confirmed by reference to the Z-scores provides us with a prototypical factor. The 
factor arrays represent holistic viewpoints on the topic under inquiry. The presence 
of two factors allows us to highlight core themes and issues from within each factor, 
interpret what this might be saying regarding the topic of inquiry, highlight key 
themes and issues, then compare and contrast at a number of levels using the 
composite arrays cross-referenced to the various output files referred to in this 
section. By cross-referring in this way, we can not only interpret more accurately, 
but target particular statements that may be indicative of differing views that may 
have significance and relevance to professional practice.  
 
In addition, these holistic and subjective perspectives are further explored and 
analysed by reference to the utilisation of more qualitatively oriented methods in the 
form of post-Q-sort semi-structured interviews along with the use of demographic 
information from the participants, all of which add a further dimension to the 
interpretive process and provide a means of data triangulation.  
 
4.4.2.1 Abductive Analysis 
The descriptive factor narratives will be analysed by reference to abductive 
analysis. Abductive analysis ‘…provides a way to think about research, methods, 
and theories that nurtures theory construction without locking it into predefined 
conceptual boxes. [It] views research as recursively moving back and forth between 
a set of observations and a theoretical generalisation.’ (Tavory and Timmermanns 
2014: 4). In relation to the factor narratives articulated in chapter five, the discussion 
of these will utilise an abductive approach and make a number of inferences 
regarding the meanings inherent within these (Haig 2005, 2005a, 2008; Shank 
1998). As stated earlier, such commentary as may emerge is grounded and situated 
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by reference to the extant factor arrays so any theoretical generalisations are 
founded upon the subjective realities as articulated by the participants.  
Data analysis is in essence a semiotic issue – what is this data a case of? (Peirce 
1903; Weiss 1940; Morris 1946). In the pragmatic tradition emanating from Peirce, 
through James, Dewey, Royce and Mead (amongst others), the construction and 
creation of meaning is the central purpose of data analysis – from wherever the 
data arises and in whatever forms it presents itself. Abduction was, and remains, a 
core and defining feature of the American Pragmatist tradition, with Peirce first 
articulating its importance in terms of contemporary philosophy of science (Peirce 
1905; Fann 1970). In Peircean terms, the logics of both abduction and deduction 
add to our capacity to arrive at a conceptual understanding of particular 
phenomena, whilst the logic of induction adds qualitative ‘detail’ to this scheme as 
well as acting as a ‘self-correcting’ mechanism by reference to extant theories 
brought to bear on the topic at hand. Thus, following data analysis, abduction allows 
us to explore the data and discern patterns and suggest plausible hypotheses or 
rationales for such interpretations as may be put forward – deduction then provides 
the means to further test these, whilst inductive strategies engender further 
theoretical possibilities by reference to ‘covering theories’ which may then lead us 
back to abduction.  
According to Peirce (1905), the processes of induction or deduction are not 
particularly creative as neither leads to new theories. The purpose of abduction 
however is to encourage us to move away from preconceived notions and to create 
new narratives concerning the phenomena under scrutiny – abduction is a creative, 
inferential process with the potential to allow us to think differently about the things 
we can perhaps all see already (Schopenhauer 1819/1851; Paavola 2005). This 
however is in no way meant to imply that abduction is in any way superior to 
deductive or inductive approaches. On the contrary, it is the weakest form of 
inference as it relies for its success upon a ‘situational fit’ between the observed 
facts (via induction) and the application and relevance of general rules (deduction). 
Abduction though derives strength and plausibility through its intersection with 
these other modes of inference and, in particular, its innovative potentials. However, 
as Haig (2005) points out:  
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“It is commonly thought that inductive and deductive reasoning are the only 
major types of inference employed in scientific research. It is well known that 
conclusions of valid deductive arguments preserve the information or 
knowledge contained in their premises, but they do not add new information 
or knowledge. By contrast, inductive arguments are ampliative in that they 
add new information or knowledge to existing information and knowledge. 
However, inductive arguments, though ampliative, are descriptive in 
character because they reach conclusions about the same type of manifest 
attributes mentioned in their premises. Importantly though, science also adds 
to its store of knowledge by reasoning from factual premises to explanatory 
conclusions. This type of inference, which is widely ignored in scientific 
methodology, is known as abduction.” (p 304: emphasis added).  
The abductive approach to inference builds upon and develops Peirce’s ideas 
regarding abduction (Hartshorne and Weiss 1960) and “…consists in studying the 
facts and devising a theory to explain them.” (Ibid: 90), adopting the following 
general schema and necessary auxiliary claims gleaned from broader contextual 
variables:  
“The surprising fact, C, is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.” (Ibid: 117).  
It is important to note however that the (conditional) assertion articulated here 
should not be taken to imply that abductive inference produces truths as a matter 
of course. The suggestion that the theory might be true (or approximately so) is 
sufficient, providing it is plausible given all the circumstances that apply at the time. 
We therefore need to differentiate between the Truth (the goal of ‘Big’ science – 
see chapter three) and the value and utility of the acceptance of theories or 
‘warranted assertions’ or other examples of the truth (Dewey 1938; Boydston 2008 
volume 4) based on other criteria such as predictive success (experiential 
knowledge), simplicity (inference to the best explanation) (Lipton 2004) and 
explanatory capacity (utility), all of which, whilst not constitutive of the Truth, are 
indicative of it. The explanation(s) that emerge from the application of Peirce’s 
abductive heuristic are derived from the initial conditions of plausibility and allow for 
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generative justifications that may then be subjected to further enquiry following 
deductive and inductive processes of logic in order to reduce the approximations 
inherent in the initial formulation. According to Campos (2011)  
“The result of abductive reasoning…is the suggestion of what may plausibly 
be the case or fact that explains an observed phenomenon. This is different 
from the deductive conclusion that something must necessarily be the case 
under given hypothetical or axiomatic conditions and from the inductive 
conclusion that something probably will be the case in a calculable 
proportion of cases, upon the fulfilment of some particular conditions in 
nature.’ (pp 427-428 – emphasis in original). 
 
Abduction is however a credible epistemological process, especially where its 
provisional nature in relation to theory construction is accepted as itself being 
axiomatic. From the perspective of professional practice, this approach has the 
potential to allow for the effective and creative use of all forms of knowing and, set 
within the broader principles of pragmatism, has axiological and epistemological 
credibility and practical functionality. This approach also has the scope to facilitate 
the effective inclusion of evidence-based knowledge along the lines of ‘Mode 2’ 
knowledge production (Gibson et al 1994) although within the pragmatic framework, 
this mode could be extended to include all forms of empirical knowledge, not just 
that derived from experimentation or large-scale studies as articulated by Gibson et al. 
The issues regarding abduction is its orientation towards the explanation of 
observed facts, whilst induction refers itself to the degree of agreement between 
those observed facts and those predicted by inductive inference (Campos 2011: 
428). 
Inherent within the appropriation of a pragmatist approach to research and data 
analysis is the need to explicitly foreground existing theories relevant to the topic of 
inquiry and be acutely aware of the need to both see and think about our 
observations differently (Schopenhaur 1859). These stances may well constitute 
something of a rupture with extant inductive approaches to the analysis of data, 
particularly if we cite grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Chamez 2014; 
Corbin and Strauss 2015) as an ‘exemplar’ of a methodological approach that 
136 
privileges the notion of researchers as ‘tabula rasa’ and “…reifies the process [of 
coding and memo construction] while sacrificing the very reason grounded theory 
came into prominence: to explain and encourage theory construction.” (Tavory and 
Timmermanns 2014:16). Insofar as deductive approaches are concerned, 
abduction would be essentially disallowed insofar as theory creation is concerned 
given the positivistic ‘need’ to justify theory rather than create it. Abductive 
approaches aim to dissolve the demarcation between discovery and justification. 
This approach to theory generation aims to avoid being mechanistic: “The craft of 
theorising in the research act is then to learn how to solve a practical problem: 
making sense of data.” (Tavory and Timmermanns 2014: 6).   
 
Thus, abductive analysis presents itself as a coherent and tangible epistemological 
approach focused on the symbiosis of theory, method and observation, in spite of 
claims and criticisms to the effect that, as put forward by Peirce, it can seem like 
little more than ‘guesswork’ to some (Fann 1970; Rescher 1978; Nathan 2001; 
Paavola 2005). However, what Peirce also acknowledged was the importance of 
socially situated learning and its role in theory construction. Experience and the 
previous learning from this, from across all domains, is used to assist in developing 
‘reasons why’ things happen as they do (proto-theories). In this way, any 
‘guesswork’ is predicated not on serendipity, but on the application of prior learning, 
common-sense in the tradition of Duns Scotus (Bettoni 1961; Wolter 1987; Cross 
2014) and Thomas Reid (Reid 1918/2012; Brookes 2000; Cuneo and Woudenberg 
2004; Wolterstorff 2004) and other forms of tacit and personal knowledge forms – 
Hume would refer to these as ‘habits’ and ‘customs’, whereas Wittgenstein would 
endorse and refer to the necessity of such things as providing the axis around which 
our sense of what is fundamental to our worldview, hinges – a form of 
‘foundationalism’ (or, in everyday parlance, our preconceptions) regarding causality 
(Palinkas 2014; Marsh 2014), normativity and the nature of the world as we 
conceive it to be in both real and abstracted terms from our own vantage point. 
Bourdieu (2003) would conceive of such things as the basis of and for practical 
action, a theme which will be developed below as we progress through the notion 
of ‘practical action’ as being intricately connected to and manifesting as practical 
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wisdom or phronesis (Raz 1978; Flyvjeberg 2001; Kinsella and Pitman 2012; 
Shotter and Tsoukas 2015). 
 
The relevance of abduction in relation to the present study and the findings arising 
therefrom is to utilise this approach in an attempt to provide an account of and for 
the findings within the descriptive factor narratives in a plausible way and to make 
theoretical generalisations regarding their significance and applicability to 
professional practice(s) (Shotter 2015; Edwards and Daniels 2012; Edwards 2011). 
Where plausible interpretation within the confines of existing theory is not possible, 
abductive inference/analysis can provide a means to extend these 
observations/findings into the realm of nascent theory and explanation with 
suggestions as to future means by which plausible interpretation might be made 
possible by reference to methodological and practice-based strategies. In the 
context of professional practice, these possibilities and potentialities need to be 
seen as useful, where this is taken to imply (from a pragmatist standpoint), a theory 
or an explanation taken to be any form of generalisation about observations or 
experience that provides a potentially useful and practical insight about the world 
and how it works, or how it might work in the future. These conceptions are based 
on Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim in that any theory or explanation needs to extend its 
potential (explanatory or otherwise) across time into the future and in this regard be 
(generally) prospective and innovative (Pennacchia 2013) in its orientation.  
 
In relation to the nature of prospective theory/explanation, these do not need to be 
constrained by reference to pre-existing theories in toto. In the social world at large, 
and in that part of the social world where professional and public worlds intersect, 
the people with whom professionals work often have their own explanatory 
frameworks as to why the world (their world) is as it is. These frameworks have as 
much explanatory power for that person as any ‘academic’ theory - perhaps even 
more so. The crux of the matter within a pragmatic epistemology is the perceived 
capacity of that framework to provide meaning to a situation or to provide a plausible 
account to those involved as to why what is, is (Dewey 1910, 1929a) and to aid 
understanding with a view to developing solutions. Pragmatism and its axiological 
138 
underpinnings would not privilege one interpretation over another. However, 
professional ideologies may not see things in the same light and it may be that 
professional and/or organisational discourses of power and incipient forms of 
Foulcauldian governmentality (Lemke 2012) could negate the functional 
equivalency offered from within a pragmatic epistemology. In such circumstances, 
professional values would have a role to play as much as the commitment to valuing 
the role of empowerment and inclusion and the experiences of service users and 
their carers. In this way, practitioners can engage meaningfully with all possible 
perspectives (actual and prospective) within a specific practice context, particularly 
those that appear to have more (rather than less) explanatory traction in a given 
situation. This is one of the strengths of an abductive approach to theory generation 
and the construction of contextual meaning.  
 
The above outputs, processes and analyses are discussed in chapters five and six.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
“The term "behavioural scientist" is one typically reserved for the 
mathematically gifted, and has generally become a better predictor of 
statistical knowledge than it has knowledge of behaviour. This is due, in part, 
to the seductive elegance of such methods as factor analysis, which often 
serve as sublimations for the phenomena they represent; in our case the 
operant nature of human subjectivity. But to elevate method is to mistake for 
fundamental what is only based upon it, and to fail to recognise the role of 
method as a compensation for weaknesses and limitations: were we but 
gifted with insight and clear vision, we could apprehend the character of 
nature directly and would have little need for instrumentation. But what is of 
ultimate elegance is nature itself: of human minds in operation thinking about 
political things. Of such we know very little, and it is only to the probing of 
these mysteries that the technicalities presented in this section have utility.” 
(Brown 1980: 263). 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Chapter three provided an account of the relevance of philosophical positions, 
paradigms of inquiry, ontology, epistemology, methodology and the relationship of 
these to methods of data collection. Chapter four provided an account of the data 
collection methods and techniques used (Q-Factor Analysis). In this chapter the 
processes of both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analyses are 
described and the emergent statistical results and narrative findings articulated.  
 
The methodological approach and those methods utilised here in relation to the 
quantitative dimension are based on Stephenson’s Q-(Factor) Methodology 
(Stephenson 1936a; 1936b; 1953; Burt and Stephenson 1939; McKeown and 
Thomas 1988), derived and adapted from Spearman’s product-moment correlation 
(Spearman’s r technique) (Stephenson 1935). The (Q-sort) data has been 
statistically analysed using Schmolck’s PQMethod software package (Schmolck 
2002), and interpreted by the writer a posteriosi to construct descriptive factor 
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narratives. In addition, comments and feedback from nx20 semi-structured post-Q-
sort follow-up interviews have been included along with basic demographic 
information regarding each participant and provide data from the qualitative 
dimension of the project. 
 
5.1 Analytic Aims and General Strategy 
The overall aim of the analytic process is to deliver both an acceptable ‘factor 
solution’ from the available quantatitive data and a meaningful interpretative 
solution from the qualitative data, with both aspects utilised in the final analysis to 
draw conclusions, condsider implications and make recommendations. 
 
From the quantitative perspective, factor analyses of different kinds are capable of 
producing a potentially infinite number of solutions, so issues relating to what is 
deemed to be both appropriate and acceptable in terms of the (statistical) analysis 
of data and its treatment are determined on the basis of the type of study, the topic, 
the context, the ‘flavour’ of the data and, ultimately, the viewpoint of the investigator, 
rather than pure mathematically-driven options. Q-Factor analysis and its many and 
varied statistical aspects are discussed in considerable detail in Brown (1980: esp. 
pp264-319). Suffice to say however that in spite of their own importance and stature 
in the realm of statistics, the statistical components themselves are but ‘tools’ to 
help us in arriving at a place where analysis and interpretation of the subjective 
views of the participants on the topic at hand can proceed functionally in order to 
deliver meaningful commentary on the phenomena being explored. As Brown 
(1980) makes clear, “These are mechanical conveniences that serve to bring 
relevant phenomena to light: they are for demonstration and serve the requirement 
of empiricism that conceptual representations be public.” (p181). In addition, 
Stephenson (1953) states, “…the importance of Q-technique lies more in the 
psychological application than in any of the statistical devices it employs or 
represents.” (p29).  
The statistical data in and of itself is invariant and no amount of rotation (for 
example) or other forms of statistical ‘manipulation’ can or will alter the factor 
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loadings. If a particular Q-sort correlates significantly with another, this correlation 
will remain so even if subsequent factor rotation does realign the spatial orientation 
in order to provide greater abductive possibilities based on the investigators 
hypotheses (Stephenson 1961). Thus, the statistical analysis per se is of less import 
in terms of its own significance than the information which it provides as a means 
of moving us from large amounts of individual data to a composite, mathematically 
and statistically-robust and valid output that can then be interpreted in terms of 
psychological meaning and significance in relation to the topic at hand. It is 
important to note that the investigator’s role in relation to factor interpretation is not 
one of manipulation simply to suit their own a priori purposes (Brown and Robyn 
2004), in spite of what some might infer:    
“What the critic of factor interpretation usually means to imply is that the 
conclusions reached are arbitrary, which is quite different from saying that 
they are subjective. Q-technique provides instrumentally aided perception, 
and the array of factor scores which results does not lend itself to 
capriciousness: an interpretation, subjective as it may be, must square with 
the known facts. As Hanson (1969: 313) has said: "There is nothing 
subjective about arguing validly to true conclusions. This very much depends 
on the way the world is."” (Brown 1980: 257). 
 
The output files and quantitative data produced by PQMethod v.2.20 (PQM) allow 
for data reduction, factor rotation and the production of reduced and composite 
factor arrays, which are then subjected to critical scrutiny and interpretation. The 
statistical results are presented below in a more accessible form with descriptive 
commentaries, with the raw data from PQMethod v2.20 available in appendices 11 
and 12. Thus, the statistical output from PQMethod v.2.20 forms but one part of the 
analytic process: it (simply) tells us which of the Q-set items (statements) are 
deemed to be important to the participants and it is the content and significance of 
these, based on factor loadings and the Q-scores on those Q-set items, that we are 
ultimately wishing to identify and comment upon. As Brown (1980) says: 
“…in Q, the greatest interest is in the sample elements, the statements, 
since the factor scores they receive reflect an attitude in operation. What is 
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of interest are the attitudes as attitudes quite independently of whoever may 
have provided them. This is not to say that the persons as such are of no 
interest, but the principle of limited independent variety (Keynes, 1921) holds 
that only a small number of factors are likely to be involved in any domain of 
discussion, so factors…are apt to emerge from virtually any set of 
(participants) we might wish to select for study.” (Brown 1980: 247–emphasis 
in original). 
 
In addition, interpretative analysis of the quantitative data is aided by reference to 
the demographic information of participants: type of practice engaged in, age, 
gender and years qualified, as well as reference to the broad categories initially 
postulated relating to structure, type, content, use and development of knowledge 
as discussed in chapter four, so that the statistical findings fit squarely within the 
broader epistemological, phenomenological, pragmatic and professional contexts 
of the study.  
 
From the qualitative perspective, the post-Q-sort interviews are designed to provide 
a qualitative first-person perspective on both process and product – ie: what, if 
anything, was significant to the participant in terms of engaging with the research 
process itself and in relation to what they produced – their particular configuration 
of statements and what particular statements may have meant for them, and why. 
In this way, participants are able to narrate their particular and unique perspective 
on any of the statements as well as providing contextual information that might 
assist in later post-data collection interpretation by the researcher. The adoption of 
both quantitative (QN) and qualitative (QL) approaches recognises not only the 
paradigmatic assumptions carried within such appelations, but actively seeks to 
maximise the strengths of both whilst offsetting their weaknesses insofar as these 
might be seen to impact upon the interpretative ‘solutions’, be they statitstical or 
discursive.  
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5.2 Quantitative Data - Statistical Processes and Results 
Having obtained completed Q-sorts (n=37) the quantitative data from each was 
inputted into PQMethod v.2.20, and the requisite statistical procedures followed. 
There are several procedures and processes involved in the quantitative analyses, 
and the order of presentation of the quantitative findings here mirrors that of the 
PQMethod output file (Appendices 11 and 12), the commentary regarding these 
processes having been presented in detail in chapter four. The descriptive and 
interpretive narratives (the qualitative results) are then presented followed by the 
results and findings from these and the post-Q-sort interviews/discussions. 
 
5.2.1 Correlation Matrix Between Sorts  
The correlation matrix is presented in raw form in Appendix D1. This provides an 
account of the extent and nature of the relationships that exist between all the Q-
sorts in the study and therefore provides a measure of all the study variance. 
Subsequent analyses then reduce and refine this initial data mass to more 
manageable proportions and are presented as the unrotated factor matrix 
(Appendix D2). The strength and relevance of the intercorrelations will be 
highlighted later in tables 5a and 5b. These relationships coalesce to form the 
factors – portions of common variance extracted and identified by reference to 
centroid factor analysis in PQMethod that are both sufficiently large and statistically 
significant to adequately and accurately represent the viewpoints and shared 
meanings of all the participants. In its initial output form, the correlation matrix allows 
us to see the extent of the relationships between all the Q-sorts – the higher the 
figure, the greater the level of alignment of two Q-sorts: Q-sort 1 has a correlation 
of 0.50 with Q-sort 25, meaning that half of their respective variance is shared 
between them. Q-sort 11 shares 0.63 of its common variance with Q-sort 2, whilst 
Q-sorts 23 and 8 share 0.67 portions of variance. Conversely, Q-sorts 7 and 33 
share .00 portions of variance whilst Q-sorts 20 and 30 share only 0.05 portions of 
common variance.  
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Table 5a: Initial [Unrotated] Factor Matrix [Appendix D2 – Raw Scores] 
Q Sort Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
1. sw37f15 0.5536 
30% 
-0.2249 
04% 
-0.3041 
09% 
0.0492 
00% 
0.1702 
03% 
2. sw48f05 0.7354 
53% 
-0.3262 
11% 
0.1648 
26% 
0.0347 
00% 
0.1807 
03% 
3. sw54f12 0.3995 
15% 
-0.2097 
04% 
-0.0715 
00% 
-0.0291 
00% 
-0.2474 
06% 
4. sw45f09 0.6666 
45% 
-0.1633 
02% 
-0.1949 
04% 
-0.0298 
00% 
-0.0947 
01% 
5. sw59f15 0.4961 
25% 
-0.3374 
11% 
-0.0709 
00% 
0.1037 
01% 
-0.0825 
01% 
6. sw61f18 0.5919 
35% 
-0.4295 
17% 
0.0763 
01% 
0.0772 
01% 
-0.0577 
00% 
7. sw55f33 0.6077 
37% 
-0.2603 
07% 
0.2475 
06% 
0.4330 
18% 
-0.2017 
04% 
8. sw51f11 0.7282 
53% 
-0.2834 
08% 
0.2363 
06% 
-0.2159 
04% 
0.0525 
00% 
9. sw36m03 0.6256 
38% 
-0.0379 
00% 
-0.2740 
07% 
-0.2035 
04% 
0.1962 
04% 
10. sw53m22 0.5749 
32% 
-0.1190 
01% 
0.0763 
01% 
-0.1819 
03% 
0.2264 
06% 
11. sw55f13 0.6166 
38% 
-0.3503 
12% 
0.2174 
04% 
0.1479 
02% 
0.1762 
03% 
12. sw59f38 0.4186 
18% 
-0.0376 
02% 
-0.2436 
06% 
0.1664 
03% 
0.1927 
04% 
13. sw55f03 0.5718 
34% 
-0.2788 
08% 
-0.1194 
01% 
0.0053 
00% 
-0.2344 
05% 
14. sw27f01 0.6656 
43% 
-0.1399 
02% 
0.1402 
02% 
-0.2005 
04% 
-0.1750 
03% 
15. nsw54f30 0.6119 
37% 
-0.1041 
01% 
0.1025 
01% 
0.2230 
05% 
-0.1795 
03% 
16. nsw62f40 0.4900 
24% 
-0.3862 
18% 
0.1766 
03% 
0.0958 
01% 
-0.1061 
01% 
17. nsw51f25 0.6732 
45% 
-0.2279 
05% 
-0.1146 
01% 
-0.0807 
01% 
-0.0239 
00% 
18. nsw53f31 0.7437 
55% 
-0.1595 
02% 
-0.0981 
01% 
0.0642 
00% 
0.1260 
02% 
19. nsw50m15 0.7163 
52% 
0.0441 
00% 
-0.0953 
01% 
-0.0131 
00% 
0.1036 
01% 
20. nsw54m13 0.5142 
26% 
-0.2446 
06% 
0.2635 
05% 
0.3729 
14% 
0.2669 
07% 
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21. nsw57m21 0.4550 
20% 
-0.2989 
10% 
-0.0898 
01% 
0.0210 
00% 
0.2780 
08% 
22. nsw33f06 0.4622 
21% 
-0.2229 
05% 
0.1201 
01% 
-0.3083 
10% 
0.0306 
00% 
23. nsw38f01 0.7108 
50% 
-0.2262 
05% 
0.0352 
00% 
-0.2853 
08% 
-0.0931 
01% 
24. nsw47f20 0.5773 
34% 
-0.1873 
04% 
0.1569 
02% 
0.1043 
01% 
-0.1798 
03% 
25. nsw30f04 0.7128 
50% 
-0.1233 
01% 
-0.1556 
02% 
-0.1912 
04% 
-0.1652 
02% 
26. psw24f04 0.2697 
07% 
0.6647 
43% 
0.1442 
02% 
-0.1213 
01% 
-0.1041 
01% 
27. psw53m26 0.0703 
00% 
0.4707 
22% 
0.1020 
01% 
0.0046 
00% 
-0.0557 
00% 
28. psw23m01 0.1198 
01% 
0.6687 
45% 
0.0837 
00% 
-0.2159 
05% 
-0.0263 
00% 
29. psw47f06 0.0820 
00% 
0.4920 
24% 
0.0383 
00% 
-0.2481 
06% 
0.1041 
01% 
30. psw49f23 0.0894 
01% 
0.7088 
30% 
0.0289 
00% 
-0.0726 
05% 
0.1414 
02% 
31. psw22f05 0.0531 
00% 
0.5143 
26% 
-0.3372 
11% 
0.0997 
01% 
-0.1853 
03% 
32. psw36f01 -0.0055 
00% 
0.7587 
43% 
-0.1009 
01% 
0.1890 
04% 
-0.0278 
00% 
33. psw21f013 0.2860 
08% 
0.5213 
27% 
0.0059 
00% 
0.1434 
02% 
0.2000 
04% 
34. psw32f07 0.1736 
03% 
0.7547 
56% 
0.0456 
00% 
-0.1534 
02% 
0.0789 
01% 
35. psw25f01 0.1235 
01% 
0.3959 
16% 
0.1866 
04% 
0.0563 
00% 
-0.1267 
02% 
36. psw46m03 0.3224 
10% 
0.3787 
14% 
0.0774 
01% 
0.2267 
05% 
0.1324 
02% 
37. psw33f10 0.1396 
02% 
0.6584 
43% 
0.0839 
01% 
0.2551 
06% 
-0.2733 
07% 
Eigenvalues 9.5202 5.7209 0.9420 1.1911 0.9524 
% expl var 26% 15% 3% 3% 3% 
 
This table shows the extent to which each individual Q-sort is associated with each 
of the extracted factors (n=5 at this stage) before varimax rotation and optimal 
alignment with each study factor has taken place. The decision regarding which 
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factors to extract was discussed in chapter four, but the eigenvalues at the foot of 
the table indicate that Factors 1 and 2 are prime candidates for extraction as 
between them they explain 41% of the total study variance.  
The percentage figures in each cell represent the factor loading in these terms (%) 
as an aid to interpretation. Q-sort 2 has 53% of its variance aligned to Factor 1 
(specific variance) whilst Q-sort 37 has 43% of its variance aligned to Factor 2. It is 
also important to refer back to the discussion in chapter four regarding the 
application of Humphrey’s Rule and its relevance to extraction decisions in 
conjunction with the eigenvalues and the Kaiser-Guttman criterion. 
The unrotated factor matrix is the first indication of the strength of relationship that 
exists between all the Q-sorts and from this, one can begin to identify those Q-sorts 
that share similar perspectives. The figures and the percentage weightings show 
the extent to which particular Q-sorts (participants) share a common view built upon 
their responses to all of the statements in the Q-set (concourse of statements). We 
can see here for example that Q-sort 8 has 0.53% of its variance aligned to Factor 
1, with only 0.08% accounted for by reference to the elements forming Factor 2 – 
its alignment to other factorial elements is even smaller. However, there is a 
relatively strong alignment to one factor over another, in contrast to Q-sort 3 that 
only has a 15% alignment to factor 1 and much less to any other. Of particular 
interest here is the fact that Q-sort 3 appears to be quite diffuse – it does not load 
on any factor in any meaningful way. This suggests that the statements within this 
individual Q-sort do not form any meaningful pattern that can be recognised – a 
diffuse perspective with perhaps no strong opinions. It is in this way that we can 
begin to see which Q-sorts have meaningful patterns representing strong(er) or 
weak(er) levels of psychological significance, represented here for the first time in 
numerical/statistical forms. 
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Table 5b: An illustration of differing Q-sort loadings 
Q Sort Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
8. sw51f11 0.7282 
53% 
-0.2834 
08% 
0.2363 
06% 
-0.2159 
04% 
0.0525 
00% 
3. sw54f12 0.3995 
15% 
-0.2097 
04% 
-0.0715 
00% 
-0.0291 
00% 
-0.2474 
06% 
 
5.2.2 Cumulative Communalities Matrix 
The cumulative commonalities matrix table reveals the extent of commonality 
(referred to as communality to represent similarity of the community of views) in 
relation to each of the Q-sorts. Communality is calculated via the sum of each Q-
sort’s factor loading (Brown 1980: 223-24 and see chapter four).  
Table 5c: Cumulative Communalities Matrix – based on initial 5 Factor extraction to 
two decimal places [Appendix D3 - raw scores] 
Q Sort Communality   
1. sw37f15 = 0.48 20. nsw54m13 = 0.60 
2. sw48f05 = 0.71 21. nsw57m21 = 0.38 
3. sw54f12 = 0.27 22. nsw33f06 = 0.37 
4. sw45f09 = 0.52 23. nsw38f01 = 0.65 
5. sw59f15 = 0.38 24. nsw47f20 = 0.44 
6. sw61f18 = 0.55 25. nsw30f04 = 0.61 
7. sw55f33 = 0.73 26. psw24f04 = 0.56 
8. sw51f11 = 0.71 27. psw53m26 = 0.24 
9. sw36m03 = 0.55 28. psw23m01 = 0.51 
10. sw53m22 = 0.43 29. psw47f06 = 0.32 
11. sw55f13 = 0.60 30. psw49f23 = 0.54 
12. sw59f38 = 0.30 31. psw22f05 = 0.42 
13. sw55f03 = 0.47 32. psw36f01 = 0.62 
14. sw27f01 = 0.55 33. psw21f013 = 0.41 
15. nsw54f30 = 0.48 34. psw32f07 = 0.63 
16. nsw62f40 = 0.44 35. psw25f01 = 0.22 
17. nsw51f25 = 0.52 36. psw46m03 = 0.32 
18. nsw53f31 = 0.61 37. psw33f10 = 0.60 
19. nsw50m15 = 0.53 % expl Var = 50% 
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This gives us an opportunity to gauge to what extent the view of any given Q-sort 
is similar to all other Q-sorts - the higher the score, the more typical is the Q-sort 
and the more it holds in common with all the other Q-sorts (common variance). 
Conversely, the lower the score, the more at odds is the individual Q-sort with the 
overall configuration, and therefore the more likely it is that these respondents may 
express very different views from the majority (Brown 2006). In this regard, the 
loadings here indicate which Q-sorts might be worthy of particular scrutiny in 
relation to their communality. Those Q-sorts in bold have more than 50% of their 
variance accounted for by reference to common variance (i.e: that held across all 
the Q-sorts) and can therefore be said to be more ‘typical’ of the common views 
impressed.  
We can see that Q-sorts #2, #7, #8, #9, #11, #14, #17, #18, #19, #20, #23, #25, 
#26, #28, #30, #32, #34 and #37 have more than half of their variance in common 
with the other Q-sorts in the group. These Q-sorts are therefore typical – those with 
low communality are atypical as they display and share less in common with the 
other Q-sorts. As a result, their particular configurations may yield interesting 
interpretive results later on.  
 
5.2.3 Rotated Factor Matrix [Factor matrix with an ‘x’ indicating a defining 
sort]  
The loadings here demonstrate the extent to which each Q-sort is associated with 
each of the extracted study factors (n=2) based on the extraction criteria of 
eigenvalues, the Kaiser-Guttman criterion and Humphrey’s Rule. Q-sorts that load 
statistically on only one factor are said to be ‘defining’; other Q-sorts may have a 
high loading on a particular factor, but as they load significantly on more than one 
factor (and are therefore confounded), they are not said to be ‘defining’.  
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Table 5d: [Rotated] Factor Matrix with an ‘x’ indicating a [Statistically] defining sort 
[two decimal places] [Appendix D4 – raw scores] 
 
Q Sort Factor 1 Factor 2 Q Sort Factor 1 Factor 2 
1. sw37f15 0.55x -0.22 20. nsw54m13 0.51 -0.24 
2. sw48f05 0.74 -0.33 21. nsw57m21 0.46x -0.30 
3. sw54f12 0.40x -0.21 22. nsw33f06 0.46x -0.22 
4. sw45f09 0.67x -0.16 23. nsw38f01 0.71x -0.23 
5. sw59f15 0.50 -0.34 24. nsw47f20 0.58x -0.19 
6. sw61f18 0.59 -0.43 25. nsw30f04 0.71x -0.12 
7. sw55f33 0.61 -0.26 26. psw24f04 0.27 0.66x 
8. sw51f11 0.73x -0.28 27. psw53m26 0.07 0.47x 
9. sw36m03 0.63x -0.04 28. psw23m01 0.12 0.67x 
10. sw53m22 0.57x -0.12 29. psw47f06 0.08 0.49x 
11. sw55f13 0.62 -0.35 30. psw49f23 0.09 0.71x 
12. sw59f38 0.42x -0.04 31. psw22f05 0.05 0.51 
13. sw55f03 0.57x -0.28 32. psw36f01 -0.01 0.76x 
14. sw27f01 0.67x -0.14 33. psw21f013 0.29 0.52x 
15. nsw54f30 0.61x -0.10 34. psw32f07 0.17 0.75x 
16. nsw62f40 0.49 -0.39 35. psw25f01 0.12 0.40x 
17. nsw51f25 0.67x -0.23 36. psw46m03 0.32 0.38x 
18. nsw53f31 0.74x -0.16 37. psw33f10 0.14 0.66x 
19. nsw50m15 0.72x 0.04 Eigenvalues 
% expl Variance 
9.62 
26% 
5.55 
15% 
[By-Hand Factor 1 and Factor 2 Rotation – 18 degrees clockwise – Appendix 9 Varimax 
Rotation – Appendix 10.] 
 
The two study factors selected account for 29 of the 37 completed Q-sorts i.e. 29 
of the 37 Q-sorts align themselves significantly to the two extracted factors 
(Appendix D9 – Factor Characteristics). This outcome supports the extraction of 
two factors as discussed above using the eigenvalues, Humphrey’s rule and the 
Kaiser-Guttman criteria. In addition, we should note that the varimax rotation of the 
factors by PQMethod has altered the eigenvalues slightly, evidencing the function 
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of rotation to further focus the alignment of factors: Factor 1 has increased to 9.62 
(from 9.52), whilst Factor 2 has decreased from 5.72 to 5.55.  
 
The rotated factor matrix provides a computational ‘solution’ (PQROT7 in 
PQMethod) in relation to the optimal alignment of Q-sorts to factors. In addition, it 
is possible to undertake by-hand rotation whereby a purely visual operation is 
undertaken rather than using only numeric outputs. This is referred to as 
‘theoretical’ or ‘judgemental’ rotation in contradistinction to statistical rotation 
(Brown and Robyn 2004). Appendix 10 shows the varimax outputs at zero-degrees 
rotation – the default position for the computational rotation. In order to determine 
whether any further alignment of the two extracted factors might be worthwhile, 
theoretical rotation of 18° was undertaken (Appendix 9). However, it can often be 
the case that theoretical or by-hand rotation adds little, if anything, to the varimax 
rotation, although its possibilities should not be ignored: 
“It often happens that the computer's rotational solution is theoretically 
acceptable, a happy accident that saves much time. In instances in which 
this is not the case, however, the investigator should feel free to pursue his 
own rotational solution along the lines presented previously. There are no 
clear-cut guidelines for judgmental rotation since the "best" solution often 
depends on what has occurred in the study up to this point. In a sense, 
theoretical rotation provides an operational basis for what Poincare (1952) 
has called "the selection of facts." Nature does not automatically distinguish 
important from unimportant facts, which only gain their status within the 
context of a theory. Consequently, as Poincare says, we must know how to 
select, and "just as the artist selects those features of his sitter which 
complete the portrait and give it character and life," so the scientist selects 
those facts best suited to contribute to "the sense of the harmony of the 
world" (Poincare, 1952: 22).” (Brown 1980: 261). 
 
                                                 
7 In the PQMethod programme, the acronym PQROT is used to denote the varimax rotational 
function of the programme – ROT = rotate.  
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As can be seen from both Appendix 9 PQROT at 18° clockwise rotation, and 
Appendix 10 at 0° rotation (automatic default) of the Q-sorts8, the clusters are quite 
distinct and remain so after by-hand rotation. Their rotation around the axes serves 
only to move their position relative to the poles of the axes, rather than moving any 
of the Q-sorts into a different factorial alignment or altering their loadings. As a 
result, theoretical or by-hand rotation served no practical purpose. Thus, the 
varimax solution in PQROT is acceptable in terms of providing the appropriate 
factor solution (Watts and Stenner 2012: 126).  
  
The above tables illustrate how the original 2,183 correlations between all 37 Q-
sorts have been analysed, reduced and focused to identify 185 relationships 
(unrotated factor matrix x 5 factors) then, following the extraction of the two study 
factors based on the selection criteria, to 74 (rotated factor matrix – Appendix D2). 
On the basis of the identification of significant portions of meaning and the extent 
to which the Q-sorts load exclusively on one or other factor (‘defining’) or are 
confounded (they load on more than one factor – no exclusivity), we are then able 
to proceed to the analysis of the Q-sorts and their loadings on individual items 
(statements) and identify the particular configuration of statements that constitute 
each of the study factors as represented by the composite factor arrays. The factor 
scorings for each statement are the means by which the array is configured, using 
factor Z-scores for each statement to ensure accurate ranking and rating. We have 
two factors and hence two factor arrays. These represent the views of all 37 
participants on each statement and fall into two distinct groups.  
 
So far, the statistical data has provided us with information regarding the extent of 
the relationships between the 37 Q-sorts and within this, the strength of those 
relationships, statistically speaking. The various procedures and processes within 
PQMethod have then reduced the data and identified two distinct groupings and 
two statistically significant shared portions of meaning – the study factors. The 
                                                 
8 It is the Q-sorts and their clusters that are rotated about the axes, which remain fixed.  
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following tables now focus on the Q-set – the 60 statements (Appendix 4) that each 
of the 37 participants rated across the range -5 through zero to +5 under the forced-
choice condition of instruction (Appendix 3 and Appendix 6 and chapter four for the 
explanation of this) which have now been reduced and aligned to two categories 
(the study factors). On the basis of the Q-sort rankings (-5 > +5) we are able to 
determine the strength of meaning attributed to each statement by each individual 
and by the group as a whole. We are then able to see, interrogate and interpret 
these rankings, displayed as the factor arrays below, to provide us with a picture of 
the meaning these 37 professional social workers have impressed upon these 
statements regarding the topic of inquiry – knowledge use in social work. These 
arrays tell us what these 37 professionals think both individualistically and as a 
group about this topic and what each of these statements means to them. The 
identification of two distinct groupings tells us that as individuals they have 
differential degrees of allegiance and alliance to these two positions, based on the 
degree to which they agree with other participants (or not), identified statistically by 
reference to both Z-scores and Q-sort values. This information provides us with the 
means to interpret these and extrapolate from them regarding a range of issues on 
this topic. Further analysis of individual Q-sorts based on individual rankings are 
also analysed and interpreted by reference to the emergent factor narratives, 
comments provided post-Q-sort and demographic information. These sources 
provide additional information from a phenomenological perspective, but also 
provide a means of data triangulation.  
 
5.2.4 [Normalised] Factor Q-scores for Factor 1 with Z-scores [Ranked] 
[Appendix 1d, 1e etc – raw scores]  
Table 5e is comprised of the following PQMethod output files: ‘Factor scores with 
corresponding ranks’ (Appendix D6); ‘Factor scores – for Factor 1’ (Appendix D7), 
and ‘Distinguishing statements for Factor 1/2’ (indicated by * = significance at 
p<0.01) (Appendix D13) and ‘Factor Q-Sort Values for each statement’ (Appendix 
D11) and provides the detail of each of these with its corresponding Z-score 
(which determines its rank order) and its Q-sort value (-5 through +5). 
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The statements are identified alpha-numerically. This is a product of the input 
limitations of PQMethod in relation to entering data. PQMethod only allows for a 
relatively small number of characters to be entered to describe the statement, and 
as the statements were quite long, it was decided to use letters to identify them. 
These can be cross-checked by reference to the Concourse of Statements 
(Appendix 4). PQMethod assigns the number (1 being the first statement inputted, 
then 2 etc.). This table focuses on those participants whose Q-sorts were 
statistically aligned to the first group – Factor 1, as determined by the rotated factor 
scores (Table 5d above). What this table identifies are all the 60 statements, rank-
ordered by reference to Z-scores. This allows us to see which statements for those 
representing Factor 1 (n=25) were the most through to the least important from the 
perspective of the meanings impressed upon them. Table 5e, and the 
corresponding one for Factor 2 (Table 5h below), form the basis for the factor 
narratives.  
Table 5e: Distinguishing [Ranked] statements at p < 0.05 for Factor 1 by Z-scores (two 
decimal places) where * indicates p < 0.01. 
Item Rank Statement Z-score 
(Z-SCR) 
Q-Score 
(Q-SV) 
47/uu 1 Talking with colleagues about what I do and how I do it helps me to 
learn new stuff and to understand the job better 
1.78* 5 
35/ii 2 I feel confident in making decisions based on my professional 
judgement in most situations 
1.46* 5 
8/h 5 I use whatever knowledge I can to make things work at the time 1.33* 4 
10/j 6 There are some things that every social worker [everyone in my 
job] needs to know; otherwise they couldn’t do the job 
1.32* 4 
40/nn 7 A lot of useful knowledge about social work [my work] is generated 
from actually doing the job 
1.27* 4 
3/c 8 I do things differently depending on the situation I find myself in 1.19* 3 
4/d 11 Specialist knowledge is essential for social work [my job/role] 0.91* 3 
43/qq 12 Using your professional discretion is encouraged in my job 0.85* 3 
1/a 13 Knowing how to do something is more important than just knowing 
about something 
0.85* 2 
31/ee 14 Kids [People] who are securely attached are less likely to have 
serious relationship problems 
0.78* 2 
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32/ff 15 I regularly use [specialised theories and models in my 
assessments] theories and models of attachment in my 
assessments 
0.75* 2 
54/bbb 18 The Bowlby/Ainsworth/Main model of attachment [Theories about 
attachment] helps [help] me to understand why adults behave as 
they do 
0.72* 2 
14/n 19 Doing things according to the demands of the situation sits easily 
with me 
 
0.68* 1 
52/zz 20 All facts about the world and everything in it are only ever 
provisional: nothing is set in stone 
0.64* 1 
30/dd 22 A lot of the theories, research and other ideas that inform what I 
do are drawn from other disciplines and professions 
0.58* 1 
44/rr 23 I have read up on the Dynamic Maturational Model of attachment 
and I use it in my work [Certain types of knowledge are central to 
my work 
0.49* 1 
56/ddd 24 I regularly read books and research papers about developments 
in social work [in my job] 
0.45* 1 
59/ggg 25 A common-sense approach helps me a lot in my job 0.44* 1 
41/oo 26 Linking theory to practice is something I do all the time 0.36* 0 
20/t 27 I’m happy to use knowledge from any source to inform what I do 
so long as it seems to work 
0.19* 0 
13/m 28 My organisation invests heavily in training and staff development 0.18* 0 
22/v 31 Clear guidelines in relation to what I need to know are essential for 
me 
0.07* 0 
6/f 33 It’s important to be able to say what theories you used in a particular 
situation 
0.02* 0 
37/kk 34 Sometimes I just do what needs to be done without really thinking 
about it 
0.01* 0 
19/s 35 What informs my practice has to sit comfortably with what I 
personally believe is right 
0.00* 0 
2/b 37 New knowledge is best if it comes from your own practice and 
experience 
-0.14* -1 
53/aaa 38 Notions about what constitutes social work [what my role is] often 
change depending on how society sees things 
-0.15* -1 
34/hh 39 What is seen as important in terms of practice is determined more 
by what it costs rather than whether it does any good 
-0.16* -1 
7/g 40 I need to understand something properly before I’ll try it out -0.30* -1 
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58/fff 41 What I need to know depends on what I’m involved in at the time -0.37* -1 
15/o 42 There are prescribed ways of doing things and seeing things - 
there has to be in this job 
-0.40* -1 
26/z 45 The theory base of social work [underpinning my work] is full of 
stuff that’s quite specific to social work [that particular role] 
-0.62* -2 
11/k 47 There are some things in my job that cannot be brought into 
question-some theories, ways of doing things and the like 
-0.81* -2 
17/q 48 I base most of what I do and how I do it on what the experts or my 
bosses tell me is important 
-0.95* -2 
21/u 49 Most of what I know about social work [my job] and how to do it 
comes from books and policy and such like 
-1.08* -3 
60/hhh 50 I have little confidence in research findings -1.16* -3 
18/r 51 Specialist knowledge isn’t necessary in my work -1.26* -3 
27/aa 52 Experts and academics rather than practitioners are best placed 
to determine the whole issue of ‘what works’ in social work [in my 
job] 
-1.49* -3 
50/xx 53 I feel I need to know more about procedures and how they work 
than I do about people and how they work 
-1.56* -3 
28/bb 54 ‘Scientific’ or objective knowledge is much more reliable than 
‘experiential’ or subjective knowledge you get from practice 
-1.63* -4 
16/p 55 For the most part I tend to ignore policy and procedure and ‘go with 
the flow’ 
-1.65* -4 
57/eee 56 There’s only so much you need to know to be a good social worker 
[practitioner] 
-1.69* -4 
12/l 57 I practise ‘from the book’ and ‘by the book’; there’s no other way 
to do if you want to get it right 
-1.74* -4 
39/mm 58 There’s not much point in using personal knowledge about life in 
general and applying it to the job – it’s not relevant 
-1.76* -5 
46/tt 60 Theory and practice are like two different worlds to me -1.98* -5 
 
Table 5e above (and the corresponding table for Factor 2 – Table 5h below) 
provides a ranking of all items (statements) from within the Q-sort/concourse of 
statements and as such represents the rank ordering of each factor’s ‘psychological 
significance’ for the sample population as a whole. Those participants who scored 
highest on Factor 1 will have rated these statements more positively and attracted 
a higher Z-score than those favouring a configuration aligned to Factor 2. Below is 
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the Factor 1 and Factor 2 interpretive narratives that should be consulted in order 
to contextualise these tables. In essence, for each factor (or latent variable), those 
items at the top of the list represent those that were agreed with the most, whilst 
those at the foot of the respective tables represent the converse and the most 
contentious for that grouping of individuals.  
 
Table 5f: Items [statements] HIGHER in F1 than in F2 
1 2 3 4 
6 7 8 10 
11 14 20 22 
31 32 34 35 
40 43 45 47 
48 51 52 53 
54 55 59 n = 27 
 
These items are those that were ranked higher in one factor over another.  
 
5.2.5 Consensus Statements for Factor 1 
These consensus statements are those whose rankings and scores do not 
distinguish themselves in relation to either of the study factors and were not 
statistically significant. These form the basis of the composite tables below utilising 
the Q-values and representing a similarity of opinion. The ranking is simply to aid 
interpretation; any apparent lack of continuity between rank numbers is rectified by 
reference to the earlier table referring to the distinguishing statements for that 
factor.  
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Table 5g: Consensus statements for Factor 1 (statements that did not distinguish 
between ANY pair of Factors) where all are non-significant at p>0.01 and where * 
indicates non-significance p>0.05. [Appendix D12] 
Item 
 
Rank Statement Z-score 
(Z-SCR) 
Q-Score 
(Q-SV) 
45/ss 3 Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely in 
order to keep themselves safe 
1.38 5 
55/ccc 4 Sharing my knowledge with others is essential in my job 1.33 4 
51/yy 9 Knowledge of attachment theory [human development] is central 
to my work 
1.12* 3 
48/vv 10 I have a good understanding of attachment theory [the core 
theories that relate to my work] 
1.01* 3 
24/x 16 Some children [people] will deliberately deceive an adult if it helps 
them to stay safe 
0.74 2 
25/y 17 A lot of the knowledge I have about my job could be used in similar 
types of work 
0.72 2 
23/w 21 All social workers [Everyone in my role] should be able to do most 
types of social work irrespective of their particular specialism 
0.62* 1 
38/ll 29 Youngsters [People] who have insecure attachments usually have 
lots of problems 
0.16 0 
33/gg 30 I usually adapt theories to suit my purposes 0.14 0 
29/cc 32 I am able to specifically identify what theories I am using to inform 
my practice at any given time 
0.04* 0 
42/pp 36 Knowing what you should do is more important than knowing what 
you could do 
-0.13* -1 
36/jj 43 It’s fairly clear to me what social work [my job] is all about, so 
having the right sort of knowledge isn’t a problem 
-0.43 -2 
9/i 44 Knowing a lot about a little is better than knowing a little about a 
lot 
-0.60 -2 
49/ww 46 It’s probably fair to say that some parents [people] who hit their 
children [who harm those they care for] were actually only really 
trying to protect them 
-0.73 -2 
5/e 59 Just doing my job on a day-to-day basis is enough to keep me up-
to-date 
-1.78 -5 
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5.2.6 [Normalised] Factor Q-scores for Factor 2 with Z-scores [Ranked] 
Table 5h is comprised of the following PQMethod output files: ‘Factor scores with 
corresponding ranks’ (Appendix D6); ‘Factor scores – for Factor 2’ (Appendix D8), 
and ‘Distinguishing statements for Factor 1/2’ (indicated by * = significance at 
p<0.01) (Appendix D13) and ‘Factor Q-Sort Values for each statement’ (Appendix 
D11) and provides the detail of each of these with its corresponding Z-score (which 
determines its rank order) and its Q-sort value (+5 through -5). 
 
Table 5h: Distinguishing [Ranked] statements at p < 0.05 for Factor 2 by Z-scores (2 
decimal places) where * indicates p < 0.01.    
Item 
 
Rank Statement Z-score 
(Z-SCR) 
Q-Score 
(Q-SV) 
18/r 1 Specialist knowledge isn’t necessary in my work  1.80 5 
30/dd 2 A lot of the theories, research and other ideas that inform what 
I do are drawn from other disciplines and professions  
1.50 5 
50/xx 3 I feel I need to know more about procedures and how they 
work than I do about people and how they work  
1.41 5 
44/rr 4 I have read up on the Dynamic Maturational Model of 
attachment and I use it in my work [Certain types of knowledge 
are central to my work]  
1.39 4 
37/kk 6 Sometimes I just do what needs to be done without really 
thinking about it  
1.18 4 
46/tt 7 Theory and practice are like two different worlds to me  1.13 4 
17/q 8 I base most of what I do and how I do it on what the experts or 
my bosses tell me is important  
1.11 3 
41/oo 10 Linking theory to practice is something I do all the time  1.05 3 
60/hhh 11 I have little confidence in research findings  1.00 3 
56/ddd 12 I regularly read books and research papers about 
developments in social work [in my job]  
1.00 3 
13/m 16 My organisation invests heavily in training and staff 
development 
0.75 2 
39/mm 17 There’s not much point in using personal knowledge about life 
in general and applying it to the job – it’s not relevant 
0.74 2 
19/s 19 What informs my practice has to sit comfortably with what I 
personally believe is right 
0.67 1 
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58/fff 20 What I need to know depends on what I’m involved in at the 
time 
0.62 1 
35/ii 21 I feel confident in making decisions based on my professional 
judgement in most situations 
0.59 1 
40/nn 22 A lot of useful knowledge about social work [my work] is 
generated from actually doing the job 
0.57 1 
15/o 24 There are prescribed ways of doing things and seeing things - 
there has to be in this job 
0.46 1 
57/eee 26 There’s only so much you need to know to be a good social 
worker [practitioner] 
 
0.41 0 
26/z 27 The theory base of social work [underpinning my work] is full 
of stuff that’s quite specific to social work [that particular role] 
0.30 0 
47/uu 28 Talking with colleagues about what I do and how I do it helps 
me to learn new stuff and to understand the job better 
0.28 0 
43/qq 29 Using your professional discretion is encouraged in my job 0.24 0 
3/c 30 I do things differently depending on the situation I find myself 
in 
0.23 0 
16/p 31 For the most part I tend to ignore policy and procedure and ‘go 
with the flow’ 
0.22 0 
1/a 32 Knowing how to do something is more important than just 
knowing about something 
0.16 0 
12/l 33 I practise ‘from the book’ and ‘by the book’; there’s no other way 
to do if you want to get it right 
0.10 0 
27/aa 35 Experts and academics rather than practitioners are best 
placed to determine the whole issue of ‘what works’ in social 
work [in my job] 
0.05 0 
54/bbb 37 The Bowlby/Ainsworth/Main model of attachment [Theories 
about attachment] helps [help] me to understand why adults 
behave as they do 
0.00 -1 
59/ggg 38 A common-sense approach helps me a lot in my job -0.18 -1 
14/n 39 Doing things according to the demands of the situation sits 
easily with me 
-0.20 -1 
21/u 41 Most of what I know about social work [my job] and how to do 
it comes from books and policy and such like 
-0.40 -1 
6/f 43 It’s important to be able to say what theories you used in a 
particular situation 
-0.69 -2 
2/b 45 New knowledge is best if it comes from your own practice and 
experience 
-0.89 -2 
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28/bb 46 ‘Scientific’ or objective knowledge is much more reliable than 
‘experiential’ or subjective knowledge you get from practice 
-1.06 -2 
34/hh 48 What is seen as important in terms of practice is determined 
more by what it costs rather than whether it does any good 
-1.17 -2 
20/t 49 I’m happy to use knowledge from any source to inform what I 
do so long as it seems to work 
-1.25 -3 
53/aaa 50 Notions about what constitutes social work [what my role is] 
often change depending on how society sees things 
-1.30 -3 
7/g 52 I need to understand something properly before I’ll try it out -1.39 -3 
4/d 53 Specialist knowledge is essential for social work [my job/role] -1.41 -3 
31/ee 54 Kids [People] who are securely attached are less likely to have 
serious relationship problems 
-1.43 -4 
8/h 55 I use whatever knowledge I can to make things work at the time -1.54 -4 
52/zz 56 All facts about the world and everything in it are only ever 
provisional: nothing is set in stone 
-1.59 -4 
11/k 57 There are some things in my job that cannot be brought into 
question-some theories, ways of doing things and the like 
-1.66 -4 
32/ff 58 I regularly use [specialised theories and models in my 
assessments] theories and models of attachment in my 
assessments 
-1.68 -5 
10/j 59 There are some things that every social worker [everyone in 
my job] needs to know; otherwise they couldn’t do the job 
-1.72 -5 
22/v 60 Clear guidelines in relation to what I need to know are 
essential for me 
-1.72 -5 
See the commentary in section 5.2.4 above. The same narrative applies here but 
with reference to Factor 2.  
Table 5i: Items HIGHER in F2 than in F1  
5 12 13 15 
16 17 18 19 
21 25 26 27 
28 30 37 38 
39 41 42 44 
46 49 50 56 
57 58 60 n = 27 
These items are those that were ranked higher in one factor over another (and 
see Table 5f above).   
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5.2.7 Consensus statements for Factor 2 
These consensus statements are those for Factor 2 whose rankings and scores do 
not distinguish themselves in relation to either of the study factors and were not 
statistically significant. As with Factor 1 consensus statements (section 5.2.5), 
these form the basis of the composite tables below utilising the Q-values and 
representing a similarity of opinion.  
Table 5j: Consensus statements for Factor 2 (statements that did not distinguish 
between ANY pair of Factors) where all are non-significant at p>0.01 and where * 
indicates non-significance p>0.05. [Appendix D12] 
 
Item 
 
Rank Statement Z-score 
(Z-SCR) 
Q-Score 
(Q-SV) 
25/y 5 A lot of the knowledge I have about my job could be used in similar 
types of work 
1.18 4 
55/ccc 9 Sharing my knowledge with others is essential in my job 1.07 3 
45/ss 13 Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely 
in order to keep themselves safe 
0.89 2 
24/x* 14 Some children [people] will deliberately deceive an adult if it helps 
them to stay safe 
0.79 2 
51/yy 15 Knowledge of attachment theory [human development] is central 
to my work 
0.78 2 
48/vv 18 I have a good understanding of attachment theory [the core 
theories that relate to my work] 
0.70 2 
23/w* 23 All social workers [Everyone in my role] should be able to do most 
types of social work irrespective of their particular specialism 
0.46 1 
38/ll 25 Youngsters [People] who have insecure attachments usually have 
lots of problems 
0.44 1 
29/cc* 34 I am able to specifically identify what theories I am using to inform 
my practice at any given time 
0.09 0 
42/pp 36 Knowing what you should do is more important than knowing what 
you could do 
0.03 -1 
33/gg 40 I usually adapt theories to suit my purposes -0.32 -1 
49/ww 42 It’s probably fair to say that some parents [people] who hit their 
children [who harm those they care for] were actually only really 
trying to protect them 
-0.68 -1 
162 
36/jj 44 It’s fairly clear to me what social work [my job] is all about, so 
having the right sort of knowledge isn’t a problem 
-0.77 -2 
9/i 47 Knowing a lot about a little is better than knowing a little about a 
lot 
-1.08 -2 
5/e 51 Just doing my job on a day-to-day basis is enough to keep me up-
to-date 
-1.32 -3 
See Table 5g above for Factor 1.  
 
5.2.8 Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 2 
This table illustrates how the use of Z-scores allows PQMethod to identify the 
biggest and smallest differences that hold across and between the item rankings 
[statements]. It is possible to determine which items were rated more positively or 
more negatively by which factor grouping.  
Table 5k: Descending array of differences between Factors 1 & 2 [Appendix D9] 
Statement F1 F2 Difference 
10/j. There are some things that every social worker [everyone in my 
job] needs to know; otherwise they couldn’t do the job 
1.32 -1.72 3.03 
8/h. I use whatever knowledge I can to make things work at the time 1.33 -1.54 2.87 
32/ff. I regularly use [specialised theories and models in my 
assessments] theories and models of attachment in my assessments 
0.75 -1.68 2.43 
4/d. Specialist knowledge is essential for social work [my job/role] 0.91 -1.41 2.33 
52/zz. All facts about the world and everything in it are only ever 
provisional: nothing is set in stone 
0.64 -1.59 2.23 
31/ee. Kids [People] who are securely attached are less likely to have 
serious relationship problems 
0.78 -1.43 2.20 
22/v. A lot of the theories, research and other ideas that inform what I 
do are drawn from other disciplines and professions 
0.07 -1.72 1.79 
47/uu. Talking with colleagues about what I do and how I do it helps 
me to learn new stuff and to understand the job better 
1.78 0.28 1.45 
20/t. I’m happy to use knowledge from any source to inform what I do 
so long as it seems to work 
0.17 -1.25 1.44 
53/aaa. Notions about what constitutes social work [what my role is] 
often change depending on how society sees things 
-0.15 -1.30 1.15 
7/g. I need to understand something properly before I’ll try it out -0.30 -1.39 1.09 
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34/hh. What is seen as important in terms of practice is determined 
more by what it costs rather than whether it does any good 
-0.16 -1.17 1.00 
3/c. Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely in 
order to keep themselves safe 
1.19 0.23 0.96 
14/n. Doing things according to the demands of the situation sits easily 
with me 
0.68 -0.20 0.88 
35/ii. I feel confident in making decisions based on my professional 
judgement in most situations 
1.46 0.59 0.86 
11/k. There are some things in my job that cannot be brought into 
question-some theories, ways of doing things and the like 
-0.81 -1.66 0.85 
2/b. New knowledge is best if it comes from your own practice and 
experience 
-0.14 -0.89 0.76 
54/bbb. The Bowlby/Ainsworth/Main model of attachment [Theories 
about attachment] helps [help] me to understand why adults behave as 
they do 
0.72 0.00 0.72 
6/f. It’s important to be able to say what theories you used in a 
particular situation 
0.02 -0.69 0.71 
40/nn. A lot of useful knowledge about social work [my work] is 
generated from actually doing the job 
1.27 0.57 0.70 
1/a. Knowing how to do something is more important than just knowing 
about something 
0.84 0.16 0.69 
59/ggg. A common-sense approach helps me a lot in my job 0.44 -0.18 0.62 
43/gg. Using your professional discretion is encouraged in my job 0.85 0.24 0.62 
45/ss. Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely 
in order to keep themselves safe 
1.38 0.89 0.49 
9/i. Knowing a lot about a little is better than knowing a little about a lot -0.60 -1.08 0.48 
33/gg. I usually adapt theories to suit my purposes 0.14 -0.32 0.45 
51/yy. Knowledge of attachment theory [human development] is central 
to my work 
1.12 0.78 0.34 
36/jj. It’s fairly clear to me what social work [my job] is all about, so 
having the right sort of knowledge isn’t a problem 
-0.43 -0.77 0.33 
48/vv. I have a good understanding of attachment theory [the core 
theories that relate to my work] 
1.01 0.70 0.31 
55/ccc. Sharing my knowledge with others is essential in my job 1.33 1.08 0.26 
23/w. All social workers [Everyone in my role] should be able to do 
most types of social work irrespective of their particular specialism 
0.62 0.46 0.16 
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49/ww. It’s probably fair to say that some parents [people] who hit their 
children [who harm those they care for] were actually only really trying 
to protect them 
-0.73 -0.68 -0.05 
29/cc. I am able to specifically identify what theories I am using to 
inform my practice at any given time 
0.04 0.09 -0.05 
24/x. Some children [people] will deliberately deceive an adult if it helps 
them to stay safe 
0.74 0.79 -0.06 
42/pp. Knowing what you should do is more important than knowing 
what you could do 
-0.13 0.03 -0.17 
38/ll. Youngsters [People] who have insecure attachments usually have 
lots of problems 
 
0.16 0.44 -0.28 
5/e. Just doing my job on a day-to-day basis is enough to keep me up-
to-date 
-1.78 -1.32 -0.46 
25/y. A lot of the knowledge I have about my job could be used in 
similar types of work 
0.72 1.18 -0.47 
56/ddd. I regularly read books and research papers about 
developments in social work [in my job] 
0.45 1.00 -0.55 
13/m. My organisation invests heavily in training and staff development 0.18 0.75 -0.57 
28/bb. ‘Scientific’ or objective knowledge is much more reliable than 
‘experiential’ or subjective knowledge you get from practice 
-1.63 -1.06 -0.57 
21/u. Most of what I know about social work [my job] and how to do it 
comes from books and policy and such like 
-1.08 -0.40 -0.67 
41/oo. Linking theory to practice is something I do all the time 0.35 1.05 -0.69 
19/s. What informs my practice has to sit comfortably with what I 
personally believe is right 
-0.00 0.70 -0.70 
15/0. There are prescribed ways of doing things and seeing things - 
there has to be in this job 
-0.40 0.46 -0.86 
44/rr. I have read up on the Dynamic Maturational Model of attachment 
and I use it in my work [Certain types of knowledge are central to my 
work] 
0.49 1.39 -0.89 
26/z. The theory base of social work [underpinning my work] is full of 
stuff that’s quite specific to social work [that particular role] 
-0.62 0.30 -0.92 
30/dd. A lot of the theories, research and other ideas that inform what I 
do are drawn from other disciplines and professions 
0.58 1.50 -0.92 
58/fff. What I need to know depends on what I’m involved in at the time -0.37 0.62 -0.99 
37/kk. Sometimes I just do what needs to be done without really 
thinking about it 
0.01 1.18 -1.17 
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27/aa. Experts and academics rather than practitioners are best placed 
to determine the whole issue of ‘what works’ in social work [in my job] 
-1.49 0.05 -1.54 
12/l. I practise ‘from the book’ and ‘by the book’; there’s no other way to 
do if you want to get it right 
-1.74 0.10 -1.85 
16/p. For the most part I tend to ignore policy and procedure and ‘go 
with the flow’ 
-1.65 0.22 -1.87 
17/q. I base most of what I do and how I do it on what the experts or 
my bosses tell me is important 
-0.95 1.11 -2.06 
57/eee. There’s only so much you need to know to be a good social 
worker [practitioner] 
-1.69 0.41 -2.10 
60/hhh. I have little confidence in research findings -1.16 1.00 -2.16 
 
39/mm. There’s not much point in using personal knowledge about life 
in general and applying it to the job – it’s not relevant 
-1.76 0.74 -2.49 
50/xx. I feel I need to know more about procedures and how they work 
than I do about people and how they work 
-1.56 1.41 -2.97 
18/r. Specialist knowledge isn’t necessary in my work -1.26 1.80 -3.06 
46/tt. Theory and practice are like two different worlds to me -1.98 1.13 -3.11 
 
5.2.9. Factor (Q-) Scores for Factor 1 and Factor 2 
This table is a list of each statement with the corresponding Q-sort value noted.  
Table 5l:  Factor Q-sort values for each statement [Appendix D11] 
Statement F1 F2 
1/a.  Knowing how to do something is more important than just knowing about something 2 0 
2/b.  New knowledge is best if it comes from your own practice and experience -1 -2 
3/c.  I do things differently depending on the situation I find myself in 3 0 
4/d. Specialist knowledge is essential for social work [my job/role] 3 -3 
5/e. Just doing my job on a day-to-day basis is enough to keep me up-to-date -5 -3 
6/f. It’s important to be able to say what theories you used in a particular situation 0 -2 
7/g. I need to understand something properly before I’ll try it out -1 -3 
8/h. I use whatever knowledge I can to make things work at the time 4 -4 
9/i. Knowing a lot about a little is better than knowing a little about a lot -2 -2 
10/j. There are some things that every social worker [everyone in my job] needs to know; otherwise 
they couldn’t do the job 
4 -5 
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11/k. There are some things in my job that cannot be brought into question-some theories, ways of 
doing things and the like 
-2 -4 
12/l. I practise ‘from the book’ and ‘by the book’; there’s no other way to do if you want to get it right -4 0 
13/m. My organisation invests heavily in training and staff development 0 2 
14/n. Doing things according to the demands of the situation sits easily with me 1 -1 
15/o. There are prescribed ways of doing things and seeing things - there has to be in this job -1 1 
16/p. For the most part I tend to ignore policy and procedure and ‘go with the flow’ -4 0 
17/q. I base most of what I do and how I do it on what the experts or my bosses tell me is important -2 3 
18/r. Specialist knowledge isn’t necessary in my work -3 5 
19/s. What informs my practice has to sit comfortably with what I personally believe is right 0 1 
20/t. I’m happy to use knowledge from any source to inform what I do so long as it seems to work 0 -3 
21/u. Most of what I know about social work [my job] and how to do it comes from books and policy 
and such like 
-3 -1 
22/v. Clear guidelines in relation to what I need to know are essential for me 0 -5 
23/w. All social workers [Everyone in my role] should be able to do most types of social work 
irrespective of their particular specialism 
1 1 
24/x. Some children [people] will deliberately deceive an adult if it helps them to stay safe 2 2 
25/y. A lot of the knowledge I have about my job could be used in similar types of work 2 4 
26/z. The theory base of social work [underpinning my work] is full of stuff that’s quite specific to 
social work [that particular role] 
-2 0 
27/aa. Experts and academics rather than practitioners are best placed to determine the whole 
issue of ‘what works’ in social work [in my job] 
-3 0 
28/bb. ‘Scientific’ or objective knowledge is much more reliable than ‘experiential’ or subjective 
knowledge you get from practice 
-4 -2 
29/cc. I am able to specifically identify what theories I am using to inform my practice at any given 
time 
0 0 
30/dd. A lot of the theories, research and other ideas that inform what I do are drawn from other 
disciplines and professions 
1 5 
31/ee. Kids [People] who are securely attached are less likely to have serious relationship 
problems 
2 -4 
32/ff. I regularly use theories and models of attachment [specialised theories and models] in my 
assessments 
2 -5 
33/gg. I usually adapt theories to suit my purposes 0 -1 
34/hh. What is seen as important in terms of practice is determined more by what it costs rather 
than whether it does any good 
-1 -2 
35/ii. I feel confident in making decisions based on my professional judgement in most situations 5 1 
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36/jj. It’s fairly clear to me what social work [my job] is all about, so having the right sort of 
knowledge isn’t a problem 
-2 -2 
37/kk. Sometimes I just do what needs to be done without really thinking about it 0 4 
38/ll. Youngsters [People] who have insecure attachments usually have lots of problems 0 1 
39/mm. There’s not much point in using personal knowledge about life in general and applying it to 
the job – it’s not relevant 
-5 2 
40/nn. A lot of useful knowledge about social work [my work] is generated from actually doing the 
job 
4 1 
41/oo. Linking theory to practice is something I do all the time 0 3 
42/pp. Knowing what you should do is more important than knowing what you could do -1 -1 
43/qq. Using your professional discretion is encouraged in my job 3 0 
44/rr. I have read up on the Dynamic Maturational Model of attachment and I use it in my work 
[Certain types of knowledge are central to my work] 
1 4 
45/ss. Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely in order to keep themselves 
safe 
5 2 
46/tt. Theory and practice are like two different worlds to me -5 4 
47/uu. Talking with colleagues about what I do and how I do it helps me to learn new stuff and to 
understand the job better 
5 0 
48/vv.  I have a good understanding of attachment theory [the core theories that relate to my work] 3 2 
49/ww. It’s probably fair to say that some parents [people] who hit their children [who harm those 
they care for] were actually only really trying to protect them 
-2 -1 
50/xx. I feel I need to know more about procedures and how they work than I do about people and 
how they work 
-3 5 
51/yy. Knowledge of attachment theory [human development] is central to my work 3 2 
52/zz. All facts about the world and everything in it are only ever provisional: nothing is set in stone 1 -4 
53/aaa. Notions about what constitutes social work [what my role is] often change depending on 
how society sees things 
-1 -3 
54/bbb. The Bowlby/Ainsworth/Main model of attachment [Theories about attachment] helps [help] 
me to understand why adults behave as they do 
2 -1 
55/ccc. Sharing my knowledge with others is essential in my job 4 3 
56/ddd. I regularly read books and research papers about developments in social work [in my job] 1 3 
57/eee. There’s only so much you need to know to be a good social worker [practitioner] -4 0 
58/fff. What I need to know depends on what I’m involved in at the time -1 1 
59/ggg. A common-sense approach helps me a lot in my job 1 -1 
60/hhh. I have little confidence in research findings -3 3 
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The PQMethod output file (Appendices 11 and 12) also provide a table entitled 
‘Factor Q-sort values for statements sorted by consensus. vs. disagreement 
[variance across Z-scores]’. This is not replicated here as Tables 5g and 5j above 
represent this data.    
 
5.2.10. Factor Characteristics 
The PQMethod output file also provides data regarding the number of defining 
variables and other statistical data relating to particular statistical characteristics of 
each identified Factor. 
Table 5m: Factor characteristics [defining variables; composite reliability; Standard 
Error (SE) of Factor Z-Scores [Appendix D12] 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Number of defining variables 18 11 
Average reliability coefficient 0.80 0.80 
Composite reliability 0.99 0.98 
Standard error of Factor Z-scores 0.12 0.15 
 
5.2.11 Factor 1 [F1] Composite Array – Ranked via Z-scores 
Tables 5n and 5o below represent the F1 and F2 arrays derived from the Z-scores 
and provide a composite picture of how each factor would be scored in its ‘ideal 
type’. Table 5p is an amalgam of F1 and F2 composite arrays for illustrative 
purposes. The descriptive factor narratives (see below) are an interpretative 
representation of these composite arrays.  
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Table 5n. Factor 1 [F1] Composite Array – Ranked via Z-scores [Appendix D13] 
-5 
Disagree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 
Neutral 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Agree 
39 28 21 36 42 41 14 1 3 55 47 
5 16 60 9 2 20 52 31 51 8 35 
46 57 18 26 53 13 23 32 48 10 45 
 12 27 49 34 38 30 24 4 40  
  50 11 7 33 44 25 43   
   17 58 22 56 54    
    15 29 59     
     6      
     37      
     19      
 
Table 5o. Factor 2 [F2] Composite Array – Ranked via Z-scores [Appendix D13] 
-5 
Disagree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 
Neutral 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Agree 
32 31 20 6 42 57 19 45 17 44 18 
10 8 53 36 54 26 58 24 55 25 30 
22 52 5 2 59 47 35 51 41 37 50 
 11 7 28 14 43 40 13 60 46  
  4 9 33 3 23 39 56   
   34 21 16 15 48    
    49 1 38     
     12      
     29      
     27      
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Table 5p. F1/F2 Arrays Ranked via Z-scores [Appendix D13].  
-5 
Disagree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 
Neutral 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Agree 
39/ 
32 
28/ 
31 
21/ 
20 
36/ 
6 
42/ 
42 
41/ 
57 
14/ 
19 
1/ 
45 
3/ 
17 
55/ 
44 
47/ 
18 
5/ 
10 
16/ 
8 
60/ 
53 
9/ 
36 
2/ 
54 
20/ 
26 
52/ 
58 
31/ 
24 
51/ 
55 
8/ 
25 
35/ 
30 
46/ 
22 
57/ 
52 
18/ 
5 
26/ 
2 
53/ 
59 
13/ 
47 
23/ 
35 
32/ 
51 
48/ 
41 
10/ 
37 
45/ 
50 
 12/ 
11 
27/ 
7 
49/ 
28 
34/ 
14 
38/ 
43 
30/ 
40 
24/ 
13 
4/ 
60 
40/ 
46 
 
  50/ 
4 
11/ 
9 
7/ 
33 
33/ 
3 
44/ 
23 
25/ 
39 
43/ 
56 
  
   17/ 
34 
58/ 
21 
22/ 
16 
56/ 
15 
54/ 
48 
   
    15/ 
49 
29/ 
1 
59/ 
38 
    
     6/ 
12 
     
     37/ 
29 
     
     19/ 
27 
     
 
5.2.12 Differences and Similarities 
The following tables represent a visual guide to those Q-sort values across each of 
the factors that indicate broad differences (Table 5q) and broad similarities (Table 
5r) of opinion across statements within each of the factors and are derived from the 
PQMethod output file ‘Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus 
.v. Disagreement (Variance Across Z-Scores’) (Appendix D12). The purpose of 
these tables is to focus attention on those aspects of each factor that help to provide 
its context and defining features from a more phenomenological and interpretative 
perspective. As was mentioned above, the statistical workings are the tools by 
which the information that we seek to use to make meaning is presented to us. The 
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use of Z-scores provides a robust statistical backdrop to the hierarchical ordering 
of the statement rankings (Q-sort values).  
 
In the narrative commentaries that follow each table below, a particular 
arrangement of numbers appears at various points in parenthesis for example (27: 
+3) or (5: -4). The first number is used to identify the statement from the concourse 
of statements, whilst the second number refers to the Q-score it was given. The 
scoring is based on the eleven-point scale: -5 through zero (0) to +5 as used during 
the Q-sort administration (see chapter four). Most numbers will be prefixed by the 
operator + or -, whereas those that received a zero (0) score will have no prefix. 
These are utilised in much the same way as citations and signpost the reader to 
statements supporting the claims made herein. Where a statement and its score 
are representative of either Factor 1 or Factor 2, this is indicated by ‘F1’ or ‘F2’. In 
this way, it is possible to refer to the statements and consider the level of 
psychological significance given to each statement and then what the overall 
pattern of the composite array may have to tell us about the topic under inquiry. 
What this means is down to interpretation, but what cannot be avoided is the 
statistical fact that each statement has been assigned a numerical value that is 
representative of its importance to the individuals concerned. Thus, subjectivity 
(psychological significance) is supported statistically, whilst on the basis of this the 
phenomenological interpretation must attempt to make meaning after the 
(statistical) facts. Factor scores represent ‘an attitude in action’.  
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Table 5q: Factor Q-Sort Values indicating a difference of opinion (abbreviated) 
[Appendix D12 – Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus .v. 
Disagreement 
Factor Q-Sort Values indicating a difference of opinion  F1 F2 
46/tt. Theory and practice are like two different worlds to me -5 4 
18/r. Specialist knowledge isn’t necessary in my work -3 5 
10/j. There are some things that every social worker [everyone in my job] needs to know; 
otherwise they couldn’t do the job 
4 -5 
50/xx. I feel I need to know more about procedures and how they work than I do about people 
and how they work 
-3 5 
8/h. I use whatever knowledge I can to make things work at the time 4 -4 
39/mm. There’s not much point in using personal knowledge about life in general and applying 
it to the job – it’s not relevant 
-5 2 
32/ff. I regularly use theories and models of attachment [specialised theories and models] in 
my assessments 
2 -5 
4/d. Specialist knowledge is essential for social work [my job/role] 3 -3 
52/zz. All facts about the world and everything in it are only ever provisional: nothing is set in 
stone 
1 -4 
31/ee. Kids [People] who are securely attached are less likely to have serious relationship 
problems 
2 -4 
60/hhh. I have little confidence in research findings -3 3 
57/eee. There’s only so much you need to know to be a good social worker [practitioner] -4 0 
17/q. I base most of what I do and how I do it on what the experts or my bosses tell me is 
important 
-2 3 
16/p. For the most part I tend to ignore policy and procedure and ‘go with the flow’ -4 0 
12/l. I practise ‘from the book’ and ‘by the book’; there’s no other way to do if you want to get it 
right 
-4 0 
22/v. Clear guidelines in relation to what I need to know are essential for me 0 -5 
27/aa. Experts and academics rather than practitioners are best placed to determine the whole 
issue of ‘what works’ in social work [in my job] 
-3 0 
47/uu. Talking with colleagues about what I do and how I do it helps me to learn new stuff and 
to understand the job better 
5 0 
 20/t. I’m happy to use knowledge from any source to inform what I do so long as it seems to 
work 
0 -3 
37/kk. Sometimes I just do what needs to be done without really thinking about it 0 4 
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The above table represents those statements where the greatest degree of 
difference between the two factors emerged in relation to the statements. The 
rankings and hierarchy of difference has been computed on the basis of the Z-
scores, and is therefore statistically robust. On the basis of this it is possible to see 
significant differences evident in relation to how theory and its relationship to 
practice are perceived (46: F1/-5; F2/+4), that specialist knowledge was required 
for social work (18: F1/-3; F2/+5) and subsequently reinforced (4: F1/+3; F2/-3) and 
that some type of underpinning or ‘foundational’ knowledge was necessary for all 
social workers (10: F1/+4; F2/-5). These differences are contextualised somewhat 
by reference to the issue of there only being a certain amount of knowledge required 
to be a social worker (57: F1/-4; F2/0) and by the perceived relevance of procedures 
and ‘proceduralisation’/technical-rational approaches to practice. F2 were of the 
view that an understanding of procedures was more important than an 
understanding of people (50: F2/+5; F1/-3), suggesting a basis for a lack of 
spontaneity or pragmatism in their approach (8: F2/-4; F1/+4). In addition, a 
significant difference was evident in the importance attached to the use of personal 
knowledge to inform practice. F2 tended to see this as being of little value, there 
being little point in using it, in contrast to F1 (39: F2/+2; F1/-5). F2 also differed 
significantly in the way they perceived the nature of knowledge: that facts about the 
world are always only ever provisional was disputed (52: F2/-4; F1/+1), and the 
level of confidence in research findings being low perhaps underscored this (60: 
F2/+3; F1/-3). What was deemed to be important by practitioners was for F2 
determined largely by managers (17: F2/+3; F1/-2) and by experts and academics 
(27: F2/0; F1/-3), although this presents itself as a different emphasis to that of the 
level of confidence in research – there is a sense of F2 expecting to be told ‘what 
works’ rather than finding out for themselves either through practice or by reference 
to research, a view supported in other ways (37: F2/+4; F1/0). A somewhat 
‘restricted’ range of knowledge sources seems to be expected by F2 in contrast to 
F1 (20: F2/-3; F1/0) and talking with others not as central to the roles undertaken 
by F2 in contrast to F1 (47: F2/0; F1/+5). F1 tended to work in relation to the 
prevailing context (12: F1/-4; F2/0) but were mindful of the necessity of policy, 
perhaps indicative of the nature of much of the work undertaken by this group (16: 
F1/-4; F2/0). F2 on the other hand practised ‘by the book’, thus giving clarity to the 
otherwise apparently contradictory statement that ‘clear guidelines’ were not 
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essential for them (22: F2/-5; F1/0). F1 referred to regularly using specialist 
assessments, whereas F2 denied this to be so (32: F1/+2; F2/-5). This was given 
some support by reference to the awareness of the role of secure attachment 
behaviours (31: F2/-4; F1/+2).  
 
There appear to be differences across a number of domains here: the nature of 
knowledge in practice; the types and the sources of knowledge; the relationship 
between theory, research and practice and how knowledge was used and 
disseminated.  
 
Table 5r: Factor Q-Sort Values indicating a similarity of opinion (abbreviated) 
[Appendix D12– Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus .v. 
Disagreement (Variance Across Z-Scores)] 
Factor Q-Sort Values indicating a similarity of opinion F1 F2 
49/ww. It’s probably fair to say that some parents [people] who hit their children [who harm those 
they care for] were actually only really trying to protect them 
-2 -1 
29/cc. I am able to specifically identify what theories I am using to inform my practice at any given 
time 
0 0 
24/x. Some children [people] will deliberately deceive an adult if it helps them to stay safe 2 2 
23/w. All social workers [Everyone in my role] should be able to do most types of social work 
irrespective of their particular specialism 
1 1 
42/pp. Knowing what you should do is more important than knowing what you could do -1 -1 
55/ccc. Sharing my knowledge with others is essential in my job 4 3 
38/ll. Youngsters [People] who have insecure attachments usually have lots of problems 0 1 
48/vv. I have a good understanding of attachment theory [the core theories that relate to my work] 3 2 
36/jj. It’s fairly clear to me what social work [my job] is all about, so having the right sort of 
knowledge isn’t a problem 
-2 -2 
51/yy. Knowledge of attachment theory [human development] is central to my work 3 2 
33/gg. I usually adapt theories to suit my purposes 0 -1 
5/e. Just doing my job on a day-to-day basis is enough to keep me up-to-date -5 -3 
25/y. A lot of the knowledge I have about my job could be used in similar types of work 2 4 
9/i. Knowing a lot about a little is better than knowing a little about a lot -2 -2 
175 
45/ss. Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely in order to keep 
themselves safe 
5 2 
56/ddd. I regularly read books and research papers about developments in social work [in my job] 1 3 
13/m. My organisation invests heavily in training and staff development 0 2 
28/bb. ‘Scientific’ or objective knowledge is much more reliable than ‘experiential’ or subjective 
knowledge you get from practice 
-4 -2 
43/qq. Using your professional discretion is encouraged in my job 3 0 
59/ggg. A common-sense approach helps me a lot in my job 1 -1 
 
The above table represents those statements where the greatest degree of 
similarity between the two factors (groupings) emerged in relation to the statements. 
The rankings and hierarchy of difference has been computed on the basis of the Z-
scores, and is therefore statistically robust. On the basis of this it is possible to see 
that both groups understand elements of theory (49: F1/-2; F2/-1: 38: F1/0; F2/+1: 
24: F1/+2; F2/+2: 45: F1/+5; F2/+2) whilst both feel that they can identify the 
theories they are using to inform their practice (29: F1/0; F2/0) and can identify the 
core theories that relate to their work (48: F1/+3; F2/+2: 51: F1/+3; F2/+2) which 
they agree they adapt to suit their purposes (33: F1/0; F2/+1). Both factors were in 
agreement that they needed a depth of knowledge in preference to breadth (9: F1/-
2; F2/-2) and that they read books and research papers regularly (56: F2/+3; F1/+1) 
and recognised that their organisation invested in training and development (13: 
F2/+2; F1/0). Both groups agreed that a generic approach to social work was 
important (23: F1/+1; F2/+1) and that sharing one’s knowledge with others was 
important (55: F1/+4; F2/+3), although whether this happened in ways people felt 
good about is perhaps moot given some of the differences recorded in the table 
above. In addition, both groups felt that a lot of the knowledge they utilised was 
readily transferable (25: F2/+4; F1/+2). Both were similarly oriented towards a view 
that ‘scientific’ knowledge was less reliable than experiential knowledge (28: F1/-4; 
F2/-2) and that using professional discretion was encouraged (43: F1/+3; F2/0) 
whilst ‘common-sense’ was helpful in a general sense (59: F1/+1; F2/-1) and that 
being aware of context and the influence this may have on actions recognised to 
some extent (42: F1/-1; F2/-1), although both were of the view that knowing what 
one needed to know was not easy as the nature of social work was ‘fluid’ and 
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changeable (36: F1/-2; F2/-2) and as such, just doing the job was not sufficient to 
keep up-to-date (5: F1/-5; F2/-3).  
 
The Q-values on these statements illustrate similarities in a range of domains 
regarding the nature of knowledge; the form it takes and its use and dissemination. 
These comparisons, and those formed on the basis of the factor narratives (see 
below) are at the centre of the Q-method approach. As Brown (1980) reminds us  
“…the two factor arrays are placed side by side and compared, the 
differences and similarities in scores providing the bases for description and 
theorising…reference can be made back to the theory originally stimulating 
the study, or the original theory can be abandoned in favour of hypotheses 
reached de novo, i.e., as emergent from the data themselves.” (p 262). 
 
5.3 Factor Interpretation from Quantitative Data 
This section will discuss the main interpretative findings from the data represented 
above. The factor narratives are based on the author’s interpretation of the factor 
arrays for each individual factor, and as with the commentaries on differences and 
similarities of opinion above, are written in such a way as to ‘evidence’ the 
interpretive aspects by reference to particular statements and the (ranked) Q-score 
values assigned to them. 
 
5.3.1 Factor 1 Descriptive Narrative 
Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 9.52 and explains 26% of the variance. The average 
age of the participants representing F1 is 49 years old (n=25) whilst the mean for 
years qualified is 16 years.  
 
5.3.2 Interpretation of Factor 1 Scores 
Speaking with colleagues (47: +5) and sharing their knowledge (55: +4) was very 
important, as was the opportunity to utilise their professional judgement (35: +5) 
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and discretion (43: +3) in a way they felt confident with. They felt they had both the 
ability and the opportunity to use different types of knowledge from a range of 
different sources (8: +4), including that derived from day-to-day practice itself (40: 
+4). Respondents were likely to approach practice situations differently depending 
on the situation itself (3: +3), using whatever knowledge was felt to be most 
appropriate (8: +4) – there was no ‘set’ approach that should or indeed could be 
applied to all situations (58: -1). These ‘situational’ components suggest that the 
context within which respondents are best able to practise is one that allows for 
discussion, encourages autonomy and a flexibility of approach and one that values 
their expertise.  
 
Respondents felt that some type of ‘foundational’ knowledge was important for their 
practice (10: +4), although this was not seen in absolute terms (11: -2) in relation 
either to ‘Knowing that’ or of ‘Knowing how’ (15: -1). Respondents also believed that 
there was a need to have as much knowledge as possible (57: -4) as simply ‘doing 
the job’ (5: -5) was not, in itself, enough. However, there was a definite need for 
specialist knowledge (4: +3; 51: +3; 48: +3) and respondents felt that they regularly 
used such knowledge (32: +2; 18: -3). Other statements (45: +5; 31: +2; 24: +2; 54: 
+2; 44: +1; 38: 0) all support the presence, importance and use of (highly) 
specialised knowledge and skills within the context of day-to-day practice. These 
practitioners are clearly not ‘theory-less’ in relation to their actions although where 
theoretical constructs challenged particular value structures, the issues were 
perhaps less clear (49: -2), particularly in areas of emotive practice. The importance 
attached to the application of theory to practice and of the need to recognise the 
importance of doing this (46: -5) was clear, as was the value attached to experiential 
and other forms of knowledge (39: -5; 28: -4; 21: -3) including that derived from 
research (56: +1; 60: -3; 41: 0). However, F1 respondents were clear that all 
knowledge was provisional (52: +1) which perhaps moderates any sense of 
indifference towards the source and credibility of their knowledge and highlights the 
importance of context in all domains for these respondents. Aligned to this is the 
importance of respondents being able to specifically identify and apply (1: +2) 
particular types of knowledge and theories (29: 0; 6: 0) to inform practice, wherever 
this may arise from (27: -3; 17: -2), although a significant arbiter as to the value of 
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such knowledge and practice was its relevance to and impact upon people (50: -3). 
However, respondents in no way sought to ‘idealise’ their own individual practices 
and sources of experiential knowledge without due consideration (2: -1) being given 
to its relevance and utility (58: -1; 34: -1) and similar thought being given to whether 
they understood the situation sufficiently before acting (7: -1), although spontaneity 
was seen as inevitable at times (37: 0). However, that this spontaneity might be 
‘bounded’ is strongly implied by reference to the need for guidelines (22: 0) and the 
presence of an ethical base underpinning the application of tacit and other forms of 
experiential knowledge (19: 0; 42: -1). However, the issue of having clear guidelines 
should not be taken to imply that practice was seen simply as the application of 
procedure (12: -4; 16: -4). Rather, knowing the parameters for practice, particularly 
in childcare social work, was essential (10: +4), although what practitioners felt they 
needed to do and how they ought to do it was very much an issue of context-
dependence (17: -2; 8: +4).  
 
Being able to respond to the demands of the situation (14: +1), whatever they might 
be (23: +1) and feeling able to adapt knowledge to suit each particular situation (3: 
+3; 33: 0) was clearly important for these respondents (16: -4; 12: -4). In addition, 
feeling able draw on a range of knowledge and theories, irrespective of whether this 
was specifically of and for social work (26: -1) was seen as essential (30: +1; 59: 
+1), as was transferable knowledge (25: +2) and recourse to experiential 
knowledge previously used successfully in practice (40: +4; 20: 0). These 
responses suggest that practitioners were comfortable with a more eclectic 
approach in terms of knowledge acquisition, use and development. In addition, 
having both breadth and depth of knowledge was valued (9: -2) as was the 
awareness that knowledge needs to be adapted and adaptable as the nature of the 
broader social work task was seen to change (36: -2), although this was not seen 
as being a purely ‘reactive’ stance (53: -1). In addition, the organisational and 
broader structural contributions to knowledge and practice were seen as being 
valuable with respondents recognising the role of training (13: 0), although there 
was a strongly felt sense of practitioners being more reliant upon their own 
knowledge-finding resources and other available structures and mechanisms over 
and above the contributions of training (8: +4; 15: -1).  
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5.3.3 Factor 2 Descriptive Narrative 
Factor 2 has an eigenvalue of 5.72 and explains 15% of the variance. The average 
age of the participants representing F2 (n=12) is 33 years old whilst the mean for 
years qualified is 7.5 years. 
 
5.3.4 Interpretation of Factor 2 Scores 
F2 respondents were of the view that specialist knowledge wasn’t necessary within 
their work (18: +5; 23: +1; 4: -3) and that much of what they needed to know was 
transferable (25: +4) and could be drawn from a range of other disciplines and 
professions (30: +5; 26: 0). This appears to eschew any sense of specialist 
knowledge being essential in terms of underpinning their practice. The use of 
personal and other forms of experiential knowledge tended to be seen as being less 
of an option/less favourable (17: +3; 39: +2; 2: -2) although the perceived 
value/utility of such forms of knowledge was seen quite differently (28: -2; 19: +1; 
40: +1). However, there seemed to be an issue regarding how practice-
based/experiential and other ‘new’ knowledge could be effectively disseminated 
and transferred (2: -2) or indeed used (5: -3).  
 
What F2 respondents did and how they did it appears to be dominated by reference 
to procedural requirements (50: +5; 15: +1), practising ‘from the book and by the 
book’ (12:0) and acting in accordance with what experts or their bosses advised 
(17: +3). This appeared to influence the way in which respondents approached the 
use of knowledge and adds some context to other expressed views relating to what 
types of knowledge were seen as being important. Many felt that using knowledge 
from any source so long as it was likely to work was something to be avoided (8: -
4; 20: -3) or approached with caution (58: +1; 27: 0; 1: 0). Operating within and in 
response to the demands of the situation was somewhat uncomfortable for F2 
respondents (3: 0; 42: -1; 14: -1; 59: -1), particularly where this seemed to imply a 
move away from stated procedure (12: 0; 27: 0; 50: +5; 15: +1). This suggests that 
the knowledge used by F2 respondents was that ‘given’ to them in the shape of 
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procedures and other mandated forms – a preference it seems for ‘propositional’ 
and ‘procedural’ knowledge effectively ‘produced’ by the organisation. 
 
Sharing knowledge with others and talking with colleagues helped respondents to 
understand their roles and their practices (55: +3; 47: 0), particularly as some felt 
unclear about the nature of the social work task/their role at times (36: -2) even 
though the broad nature of this was felt to be rather ‘fixed’ and somewhat 
disconnected from what was happening in society (53: -3). This seemed to restrict 
some people in terms of how much (57: 0; 9: -2) and what they felt they needed to 
know (46: +4; 18: +5; 50: +3) and whether they actually needed to understand 
something (15: +1), or just to respond to situations as instructed/expected (7: -3; 
42: -1) without thinking things through (37: +4). The use of professional judgement 
and discretion was seen as being an important aspect of practice (35: +1; 40: +1; 
43: 0; 3: 0; 16: 0; 34: -2), although the respondent’s sense of being able to use this 
was muted (15: +1; 33: -1; 14: -1). Respondents were of the view that their roles 
and functions were somewhat fixed (52: -4; 7: -3; 4: -3) and imposed upon them 
(32: -5; 20: -3; 14: -1; 15: +1; 39: +2; 50: +5), but felt that what they actually needed 
to know was something they should determine for themselves within these 
parameters (22: -5; 11: -4; 21: -1), even though what they felt they needed to know 
seemed to be quite specific to their role (10: -5) rather than social work per se (36: 
-2). In this regard, earlier statements appear to suggest a context where the 
application of ‘propositional’ knowledge, derived from external sources (experts or 
managers) and translated into working procedures had negated the perceived value 
of respondent’s own meanings, interpretations and actions based thereon.  
 
Respondents did try to link theory to practice (41: +3) and regularly read books and 
research papers (56: +3) but had little confidence in research findings (60: +3), 
leading to a feeling that theory and practice were quite distinct (46: +4; 6: -2). The 
role of academics, other experts and the role of training was acknowledged (27: 0; 
13: +2) and respondents felt that they did use some specialist theories/certain types 
of knowledge (44: +4; 51: +2; 48: +2) and appeared to appreciate the rather 
sophisticated ways these might manifest themselves in practice (45: +2; 24: +2; 38: 
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+1; 31: -4; 49: -1; 54: -1). They did feel however that they did not use specialised 
assessments in their practice (32: -5) and saw little need to articulate such theory 
as they did use (29: 0; 6: -2), even though they were aware of it (46: +4). The notion 
of ‘theory-less’ practice appeared more to do with a lack of the felt need to explicate 
their rationale(s) for what they were doing rather than ‘running on empty’ and being 
unaware of the underpinning theory. In a similar way, the use of personal knowledge 
was seen as somewhat redundant (39: +2), even though its value was recognised 
(40: +1; 19: +1). This suggests that personal/implicit forms of knowing and doing 
are present but tend to remain not only hidden from view, and even hidden from 
consciousness.  
 
5.4 Qualitative Data - Post-Q-sort Interviews (n=20) 
As referred to earlier (chapter 4 – section 4.2.4), participants were given the 
opportunity to engage in a post-Q-sort semi-structured interview based on the 
following three questions:  
1. Of the statements you placed in the ‘agree’/plus [+] zone, were any of 
particular significance for you? Why was this? 
2. Of the statements you placed in the ‘disagree’/minus [-] zone, were any 
of particular significance for you? Why was this? 
3. Did the process highlight any general issues or thoughts for you in 
relation to knowledge and social work? 
 
The opportunity to do this was designed to provide an opportunity for a ‘de-briefing 
session’ so that participants might raise any issues and discuss their thoughts 
regarding the Q-sorting task immediately after the event. This provided possibilities 
for both added depth in terms of the Q-sort task and deeper insights into the 
meanings participants may have ascribed to certain statements, recognising the 
centrality of language as a potentially defining feature in their understandings, as 
well as ongoing feedback regarding the proceeses of data collection. 
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The opportunity was open to all participants, but of necessity the sampling strategy 
was modified to allow for spatial sampling (Sarantakos 2012) whereby recognition 
is given to the fact that participants are only temporarily available and as such, data 
needs to be collected before they disperse. Given that the participants from the 
main purposive sample (see section 4.3.4) were geographically dispersed and very 
busy professionals, to have suggested separate interview time as part of the overall 
design was felt to be impractical, and may have even been counterproductive in 
that participants may have considered this if in an alternative design and deemed it 
to be too time consuming, and would have chosen not to participate. Thus, such an 
opportunistic but nonetheless credible approach was justified within the confines of 
the overall purposive sampling strategy referred to in chapter 4.   
 
However, some chose not to undertake this element of the study, simply 
acknowledging that the process was ‘interesting’. A number referred to the ‘forced 
choice’ aspect of the task – how difficult it felt to have to make “really difficult 
decisions about important things”, but said no more. Those that did agree (n=20) to 
take the time to respond to the questions referred to above made a number of 
comments, and these are noted below.  
 
The process of data generation and collection involved presenting participants with 
a printed sheet containing the three questions and the interviewer (myself) posing 
each question directly to them. Their responses were noted and subsequently 
‘constructed’ into more ‘fluent’ responses taken directly from the notes on the 
general comments made. The presentation of the interview response as a more 
‘coherent’ narrative is permissible within the confines of the functions of 
triangulation with the quantitative results and the objectively verifiable positioning of 
statements on the individual Q-sort grid. The participant responses consisted 
primarily of statements relating to which of them were of more or less import to them 
– a fact easily verified by reference to the individual’s particular Q-sort. Thus, 
researcher bias is offset by reference to this; the role of the researcher was simply 
to connect and correct grammatically, not to interpret their utterances at this time; 
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interpretation was (and is) distinct from the data collection process, and this took 
place once all data  (QN and QL) had been collected.  
 
5.4.1 Qualitative Results - Participant Responses 
The qualitative results from the empirical work are represented below. Each 
participant is referred to by their unique identifier which also appears on their Q-sort 
grid. In this way, it is possible to cross-refer and triangulate the quantitative and 
qualitative data-sets with the concourse of statements.  
 
These responses provide important information concerning a participant’s 
reflections of the Q-sort process and the sorting task itself insofar as it ‘forces’ them 
to make choices regarding the importance they attach to statements (or not as the 
case may be). Thus, these commentaries provide a rich source of additional data 
regarding both process and product as well as valuable data of a contextual nature. 
This contextual information can assist not only in understanding why a participant 
placed a particular statement in a particular place, but can reveal the presence of 
undelying structures and influences not readily apparent from numerical data sets. 
Thus, it can complement and contextualise otherwise non-significant data in 
important ways, particularly where particpants have rated some statements as ‘0’ 
(zero). This could be seen as an indicator of indifference, when in fact it may make 
more meaningful sense whan set against an emergent context that may indicate 
the underpinning or overarching professional zeitgeist for that individual. It can also 
provide insights into the significance or otherwise of the demographic information 
obtained from participants – do their profiles ‘make sense’ in the context of this, the 
quantitative data and the interview data?   
 
(PSW24f04) “The ones about using knowledge from a number of sources. It’s so 
important that we get to know as much as possible – social work is so diverse. The 
negative ones – the main one was disagreeing that scientific knowledge was of 
more use than practice knowledge. There’s so much to get from practice – we need 
to make sure that’s emphasised more. I feel my practice efforts are as ‘scientific’ as 
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anything you might read in a journal. You learn so much from doing the job – that’s 
the scientific bit! The interesting thing for me was having a chance to think about 
how we go about our business and really, how much we do need to know” [F2] 
 
(SW36m03) “What was important for me was the fact that using your professional 
discretion was acknowledged in the research. Too often we are told to follow 
procedures and this can limit how you operate. And the one linked to it about doing 
things according to the situation - you need to be flexible. All of mine in the minus 
zone were about how unclear things were. We need to question everything – and 
what we do and how we do it. Social work is so changeable and how we have to 
respond is changing all the time. It’s hard to keep track of everything.” [F1] 
 
(SW61f18) “The one about having confidence in your own decision-making ability I 
strongly agreed with. I am confident because I feel supported – not just by my 
manager, but by the team. I’ve been qualified a long time so if I feel I can’t make 
decisions, then there’s something wrong. The ones I rated lower were to disagree 
that specialist knowledge isn’t needed – there’s lots of specialist knowledge and 
that changes too – because the other one I thought was significant but in a 
‘negative’ sense was that social work was clear-cut – it’s anything but, at least to 
me.” [F1] 
 
(NSW47f20) “It was good to see statements about social workers being able to do 
most things, irrespective of the type of client they worked with. And the use of theory 
in practice – I guess this is what we all claim to be able to do, but I do. The other 
ones I rated low were on training and just ‘following orders’ as it were. There has to 
be rules but we need to be clear that at the end of the day it’s me that has to make 
the decision – or at least start the ball rolling, and that’s based on knowing the 
people and their situations. [F1] 
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(SW55f13) “The ones about theory – especially attachment theory. In my field of 
work, I use that all the time. Keeping up-to-date is really important. You need to 
understand theory because it helps you to make sense of situations and helps folks 
get a sense of why things might be as they are. For me though, I thought it was 
important to reflect the fact that practitioners are often disregarded as experts – too 
often managers think they know best and won’t let you get on with it…I know my 
stuff, theories and, probably more importantly, the families I work with. That’s why I 
felt strongly against those other statements and they could only go in the minus 
zone” [F1] 
 
(PSW49f23) “I think the value of research in our practice is limited. I see very little 
research in my work – all I see are the procedures we have to follow that map it all 
out. If the research is there, then it’s been diluted before it gets to me. And the one 
about specialist knowledge was interesting – social work is generic. And the 
statements I disagreed with were to get across the point that the policy is there for 
a reason – the work I do is driven through procedure.” [F2] 
 
(NSW30f04) “I felt that being able to talk to my colleagues was the most important 
aspect of my job. This is encouraged in my team and we all do it. I also agreed 
strongly that knowing how to do things was more important than just knowing about 
things – it’s not what you do that makes the difference – it’s how you do it. And 
sometimes you don’t have to do a lot. The ones that were least like what I do and 
how I am were about how much you needed to know because…about just doing 
the job – you can get by to some extent but you need to study and think about what 
you do.” [F1] 
 
(SW27f01) “To me and my practice, certain theoretical approaches are essential, 
but it’s also about being able to do things well – knowing how to do something – 
how to talk to people for instance, is really, really important. The others that were 
rated as low reflected in some way the ones higher up. Overall it felt important to 
make the point that social work is a thinking and feeling activity” [F1] 
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(NSW50m15) “Talking and sharing things with your colleagues. You don’t always 
get time to do this type of thing in supervision, so having a culture in the team that 
is open about what we do is really healthy, but I was interested to see comments 
about ‘doing things by the book’. Of course we all do that, but it is important to 
remember that practice is situated in the here and now, so you have to be flexible. 
But I know that a lot of people feel that ‘ticking the boxes’ is what it’s all 
about…social work by numbers.” [F1] 
 
(SW53m22) “Being able to respond to the situation – and feeling that it’s OK to do 
this. That’s so important in the work I do. And although I didn’t put this one in the 
‘high 5’, the one about using info from wherever was important. They all connect. 
Most of mine seemed to be about knowing yourself – and having the confidence to 
get on with things. Managers manage – practitioners practise…and how important 
is experience? What I learn from doing the job teaches me much more than pieces 
of research can, but that’s seen as being unprofessional almost.” [F1] 
 
(PSW22f05) “There were statements about using knowledge from different places. 
I scored these the highest and the one about procedures. I need to understand 
procedures and follow them closely. I thought the statement about research needed 
to go low because there’s not much of that in what I do – even if you agree with new 
ideas, the approach we adopt is just about delivering the services and the packages 
of care – and that needs to be the same for everybody.” [F2] 
 
(SW37f15) “Professional judgement – there was one about that and about talking 
with your colleagues. It’s important to me to be able to discuss things, especially 
when it’s getting more and more difficult out there. Having supervision and talking 
there is fine, but it’s a different type of support you get from blethering with your 
colleagues. The less favourable ones for me – it didn’t raise an issue, but I felt that 
‘going with the flow’ was so important so had to disagree with that one. And the one 
about having enough just by doing the job – not sure that’s possible, certainly not 
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in my team. We all read stuff and talk to each other. Training is important and there’s 
a lot of good stuff going on.” [F1] 
 
(PSW47f06) “I thought it was really important for us to get training. I really enjoy 
that and it makes sure that I’m up to date all the time. I scored low the one about 
needing to understand something before you deal with it – that’s almost 
impossible…you don’t have time. All situations are different – but I guess it could 
mean different things to different people.” [F2] 
 
(PSW46m03) “Yes – the one about specialist knowledge – what we do is quite 
straightforward mostly. It’s also important to make sure that you do what your team 
manager tells you. The other ones were…interesting I suppose – there are things 
that we all need to understand in the same way but I think it’s different – sometimes 
things can change.” [F2] 
 
(SW59f15) “Knowing how to do things appropriately and with best effect – too often 
people think they can just follow policy and assume it’ll all work out OK. That’s naïve 
in my opinion. It’s also important to recognise that social work is a highly specialised 
activity and as such requires thought and application. But, yes, the others…using 
professional discretion – that’s not allowed – well, it is but it’s not exactly broadcast 
- and I certainly feel that I have to follow the ‘party line’ – one that me and others 
sometimes think isn’t right. The other one was about knowing what social work was 
all about – I wish! Sometimes it’s one thing then it’s something else. Policy changes 
with the wind and we’re often left in the dark about why things have changed.” [F1] 
 
(PSW33f10) “It’s important to do what is right – to do the right thing, so knowing 
what you should do. I linked that to what was important to me – values. On the other 
side - that things change so much – nothing is fixed…but we can only do the job 
well and make a difference if we keep up-to-date and follow the guidelines. There’s 
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so much information that we have to have it condensed and ready to use…how do 
I find out what’s the latest craze in social work?” [F2] 
 
(SW55f08) “The plus statements – most of those were about being clear about what 
was expected of you – that’s why guidelines are important, but the one regarding 
doing things by the book, I had to disagree with that because it is so simplistic. 
There are rules and procedures – we all know that, and one of my +5’s referred to 
guidelines, but you have to work within these in as flexible a way as you can. We 
need to have more confidence in our own abilities and feel supported by managers 
and the system as a whole – the courts and the rest…the police…schools...” [F1] 
 
(NSW57m21) “The comments I rated most important were linked to values I guess 
– it’s OK doing what we think is the right thing, but you have to have some kind of 
compass. Your value base is there – assuming it’s intact and working! Knowledge 
comes from all sorts of sources, so to be too prescriptive equates with being 
restrictive – that’s unhelpful. As professionals, we are primarily responsible for our 
own actions – ‘following orders’ isn’t going to cut it. I must be something of an 
anarchist though! The statements about doing what our bosses tell us, and only 
practising ‘by the book’ – they were the ones I found less easy to understand. Doing 
things in that way assumes ‘the book’ is right and the person who wrote it knows all 
there is to know!” [F1] 
 
(SW55f33) “The main ones for me in the plus zone were about theory and practice 
– and in the minus zone too. I spend a lot of my time talking to students – so sharing 
what you know – and what you don’t know is important. In terms of minus 
statements, the thing about theory and practice being different worlds - I’m a 
practice teacher, so for me, these things are so connected. They have to be – 
students come to me for guidance on how to integrate the two, although I know that 
some practitioners do find it difficult to make the links sometimes. They’re often so 
busy…” [F1] 
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(NSW53f31) “The statements that focused on using specific theories – they were 
high on my list because they’re sort of the backbone of what I do – attachment 
theory, and other stuff obviously so helps me to make sense of what I’m doing. I 
found the ones about not being able to use personal knowledge and theory and 
practice being different really interesting. For me, I had to disagree with those. I 
wonder if anyone put those at the top? When you’re in the field, you take ‘you’ with 
you, so personal knowledge is integral to what I do…theory and practice inform 
each other and I always try to be informed.” [F1]. 
 
The findings from the results presented above are discussed in chapter six. It is 
however worth noting that it is entirely possible to undertake other forms of interview 
based on the participant’s Q-sort grids. In order to extend and expand the range of 
qualitative data, one could interview participants post-Q-sort analysis and focus on 
individual responses to statements in the context of their relevance to the 
participant’s professional environment/context. Such an approach would require 
further time allocated to a study, and could only take place once the intitial Q-sort 
analysis (quantitative) had taken place using PQ-Method. Nonetheless, the option 
exists, particularly relevant in those situations where individual responses/profiles 
might be of particular value. This might for example be pertinent in those situations 
where staff in particular organisations might provide insights into particular modes 
of organisational functioning. In this study however, the focus was on the overall 
profile based on the two professional (sub-) groups (practitioners working with 
children and those working with adults).  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
‘The task is not so much to see what no one yet has seen, but to think what 
nobody yet has thought about that which everyone sees’. 
(Schopenhauer 1819/1851) 
‘The criteria for professional knowledge…have been largely socially 
determined and influenced by both broad philosophical and historical shifts 
which in turn have influenced the adoption of different models of practice. 
This changing concept of professional knowledge has resulted in an 
emphasis on different forms of knowledge believed to be needed by the 
profession in order to foster competent practice.’ (Drury-Hudson 1997: 37).  
 
In this chapter I shall discuss the results and associated findings from both a 
statistical and an interpretative perspective, locating these within a wider discussion 
on professional knowledge, epistemology and pragmatism. The discussion will 
encompass the perceived implications of the results and findings for social work 
and other forms of professional practice, located within a wider philosophical 
framework. In addition, I will articulate and map a pragmatic epistemological 
framework of and for professional knowledge for social work that refers to how we 
ought to define knowledge, how we ought to approach its production, its 
transferability, its use, its development and its dissemination, conceptualising this 
framework as an ‘engaged epistemology’. In addition, I shall consider some of the 
possibilities for and implications of the utilisation of such a framework from a 
professional and systemic perspective in relation to the impact on service delivery 
systems that can only function if they themselves produce knowledge in order to 
deliver their ‘products’ and function effectively. The chapter will conclude with a 
commentary on the perceived limitations, future possibilities and innovative features 
of this study.  
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6.2 Statistical Results 
As mentioned in chapter five, the factor analytic statistical processes of PQMethod 
offer themselves as a functional tool for the emergence of factor arrays and the 
development of descriptive factor arrays, which are then subjected to interpretative 
analysis. The results of the statistical data analysis presented in chapter five identify 
two clear factors emerging from the 37 Q-sorts. As a data reduction technique, Q-
method has achieved its aims and made homogenous those views that were initially 
heterogeneous and within this rendered visible a first person, subjective perspective 
on professional knowledge in social work practice. On the basis of the statistical 
outcomes, the factor arrays were ‘converted’ into factor narratives and the narrative 
findings of these are discussed below. 
 
6.3 Narrative Findings 
The structure of each of the factor narratives can be seen in chapter five; the 
interpretation of the item scores suggests a number of differences between the two 
factors as well as a number of similarities, and it is within this context that I will 
discuss the findings and comment on the significance or otherwise of these 
adopting an abductive approach to this analysis as referred to in chapter four.  In 
doing this, I will relate the findings to extant frameworks and discussions regarding 
knowledge and social work (Gray, Sharland, Heinsch and Schubert 2014; Gray, 
Joy, Plath and Webb 2013, 2012; Gray and Schubert 2013, 2012; Gredig and Marsh 
2010; Gredig and Sommerfeld 2008; Trevithick 2008; Drury-Hudson 1997) and 
professional practice more generally across the human services (Edwards and 
Daniels 2012; Edwards 2011), recognising within this that much can be gleaned 
from other forms of professional practice in very different areas such as seamanship 
(Knudsen 2009) organic farming (Baars 2010), where the theoretical and practice 
potentials of ‘experiential science’ are acknowledged:  “Recognising that there are 
multiple elements contributing to the process of acquiring knowledge, experiential 
science draws on a broad field of scientific methods thereby integrating the 
hermeneutic approach of social sciences and the Humanities with the established 
methods of contemporary natural science.” (Baars 2020 p1).  
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This eclectic (and essentially pragmatic) attitude helps in providing a baseline within 
a contemporary frame of reference before the discussion is extended by reference 
to pragmatism and the utilisation of two significant mechanisms – abduction (Fann 
1970; Hintikka 1998; Shank 1998; Paavola 2004, 2005; Haig 2005a, 2008; Tavory 
and Timmermans 2014) and phronesis (Hustedde 2015; Müller 2015; Glanville 
2014; Ord 2014; Petersén and Olsson 2014; Shotter and Tsoukas 2014a, 2014b; 
Kinsella and Pitman 2012; Spicker 2011; Thomas 2010; Long 2002; Flyvbjerg 2001; 
Arnaud and LeBon 2000 and see chapter four) as means to move towards a 
different appreciation of the definition, development, transfer and utilisation, 
development and dissemination of a wider range of knowledge in professional 
social work and other forms of professional practice (Di Bucchianico 2014; Lewin 
2013; Probst and Christinck 2007). Thus, the discussion will focus on a pragmatic 
epistemology for professional practice, not just social work practice (Liljegren 2012), 
based on the view that issues regarding knowledge – its definition, production, 
transfer, use, development and dissemination – have principles in common with 
other forms of professional activity and on this basis, that the model suggested here 
would have traction across a range of professional disciplines.  
 
6.4 Interpreting the Factor Narratives  
The interpretation of each factor array into a descriptive factor narrative in the 
preceding chapter represents a holistic picture of what those participants appear to 
be saying about the issue of knowledge of and for social work based on their 
configuration of the Q-sort statements. It is an interpretation of the viewpoints 
impressed within the factor arrays through the particular configurations of the 
statements, and each of these arrays is saying something meaningful regarding the 
topic at hand. It must however be noted that any interpretation is just that: an 
interpretation. As Watts and Stenner (2012) note:  
“An interpretation is always and forever an interpretation. It is nonetheless 
true that Q-methodological interpretation is a rather special case, inasmuch 
as your presentation (of the findings) is very thoroughly constrained by the 
structure of the factor array.”  (p63). 
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The interpretations reflect and express what was impressed into the factor arrays, 
and unlike more traditional qualitative approaches that use, say, interview 
techniques, which interpret the participants utterances, Q-methods allows for a 
more rigorous approach to evolve and be applied to the participant’s views. The 
weighting of statements by participants, along with opportunities to comment on 
how this felt - what they agreed or disagreed with, understood or found difficult, 
constitutes a twin-track approach to data collection and analysis, and in the process 
of interpretation one is drawing on the statistical robustness of factor analysis to 
augment the qualitative elements (post-Q-sort interviews) and give focus to the 
interpretative process by signalling its broad relevance in terms of what was of more 
(or less) ‘psychological significance’. The configurations of the arrays are 
determined not by the investigator, based on his/her ‘personal’ preferences or ideas 
about what they think is most important, but by the statistical weightings of each 
statement relative to all others as a product of (in this case) the use of PQMethod 
software for the Q-factor analysis. The numbers tell us that each statement has a 
(statistical) weight to it and it is on this basis, and this basis alone that they are 
‘ranked’ as representing the degree of ‘psychological significance’ – the import 
attached to it holistically by all participants.  
 
Thus, the interpretative process is ‘bounded’ by the realities of the results and the 
factor arrays. Any interpretation of the meanings inherent within the factor 
narratives, the focus of this part of chapter six, has to reflect both coherence and 
congruence with the factor arrays – what was rated in what way is objectively 
verifiable. Any subsequent interpretation on the part of the investigator can be 
checked against the factor arrays to determine whether the meanings assigned to 
these are realistic, the issue of whether another person agrees with a particular 
interpretation notwithstanding of course. However, the interpretation of the factor 
narratives and the articulation of the meanings felt to be present must evidence a 
degree of congruence with the descriptive narratives recounted in chapter five, 
which in their turn must align meaningfully with the factor arrays, which themselves 
were derived from the statistical analysis. Thus, triangulation of all forms of data is 
evident.  
194 
 
At this point, I shall make comment on what I think are the underlying meanings 
represented within each factor array based on an interpretation of the descriptive 
factor narratives and, drawing on the factor Q-sort differences and similarities (see 
chapter five: Tables 5q and 5r respectively) as a starting point, discuss the 
significance or otherwise of these as they relate to knowledge of and for 
contemporary social work and other forms of professional practice (Messenger 
2013; Edwards and Daniels 2012; Mäkitalo 2012; Nerland and Jensen 2012; 
Edwards 2011; Baars 2010; Knudsen 2009; Kemmis 2005; Eraut 2000, 1994). In 
order to maintain consistency with the overall philosophical and methodological 
approach of the study, I shall utilise an essentially abductive approach to the 
interpretation and analysis of the descriptive narratives as referred to in chapter 
four.   
 
6.5 Making Meaning after the Fact: Meanings within the Factors 
As a starting point, I shall consider the differences and similarities emerging from 
within the factor arrays and the descriptive narratives and consider what these may 
represent regarding knowledge of and for social work and other forms of 
professional practice. What do these differences and similarities mean, and what 
are these saying about knowledge of and for professional (social work) practice 
more generally? What are the themes and issues within each of the respective 
factor arrays, and what might these tell us about the relationship (if any) between 
the nature of the task/role and knowledge definition, production, transfer, use and 
dissemination? Do the socio-political, economic, organisational and broader 
professional contexts play a role in determining the shape and form of professional 
knowledge and the ways in which it is utilised? These and other themes will be 
considered and then located within the contemporary research and professional 
landscape regarding knowledge of and for social work, before discussing the shape 
and function of a pragmatic epistemology for social work knowledge and the 
potential contribution this might have in terms of the definition, production, transfer, 
utilisation, development and dissemination of professional knowledge in 
contemporary practice (Martela 2015). 
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As in earlier chapters, where reference is made to Q-sort statements and Q-sort 
values, the previous nomenclature will be adopted: statement number: Factor(s)/Q-
sort value – for example, (50: F2/+5; F1/-3). Utilising this approach triangulates the 
data and provides a focus in capturing what the pragmatists would see as the 
‘surprising observation’ by signposting the reader to particular statements.  
 
6.6 Differences within the Factor Arrays  
Utilising the factor Q-sort vales that indicate a difference of opinion across the two 
factors (based on their ranking from z-scores), it is possible to identify a range of 
themes emerging within and across the two identified factors. There are though 
significant areas of overlap and many of the statements can therefore be interpreted 
differently depending on the context within which they are read and their 
juxtaposition with other statements that may act to mediate a particular 
interpretation. In relation to the differences noted, the major themes emerging 
include: the relationship between theory and practice; the use, relevance, source 
and extent of different types and forms of knowledge, the utilisation of research 
findings and the role of colleagues as representing communities of practice. In 
addition, features of the particular types of practice respondents are engaged in 
emerge and appear to account for some of these differences. 
  
6.6.1 Theory and Practice 
One of the most striking observations is that each factor saw the relationship 
between theory and practice quite differently – the two factors were almost at polar 
extremes on this point (46: F1/-5; F2/+4). F1 respondents were clear that the 
integration of theory and practice was essential - almost axiomatic for them in 
relation to their practice, whereas F2 felt a clear divide was apparent, regarding the 
two as being ‘like different worlds’. For F1 respondents, having a level of confidence 
in research findings (60: F1/-3) suggests that research per se is valued because it 
was seen as a source of new knowledge for them (57: F1/-4), although there were 
issues regarding its credibility, based largely upon its perceived provenance (27: 
196 
F1/-3). In contrast, F2 respondents appeared somewhat ambivalent regarding this 
issue (27: F2/0), although other statements suggest that the source (provenance) 
of knowledge for them was established and accepted (17: F2/+3). F1 saw this 
differently, indicating a tendency towards self-reliance (17: F1/-2; 12: F1/-4).  That 
F1 respondents necessarily made use of specialist assessments (32: F1/+2) 
suggests they did utilise research findings (60: F1/-3), this interpretation being 
supported by reference to the fact that they also appeared to understand the 
specialised language inhering within those theoretical accounts incorporated into 
such assessments (31: F1/+2). This would support the view that F1 respondents 
did integrate theory into practice as the type of knowledge being referred to is not 
only highly specialised (18: F1/-3; 4: F1/+3) but is largely research-based (see 
Cassidy and Shaver 2008; Crittenden and Claussen 2000; Crittenden 2008), and it 
may be that given this finding, the availability and use of specialist assessment tools 
in this context may represent a constructive means of knowledge transfer, and could 
be seen to reflect and represent the potential utility of ‘Mode 2’ knowledge 
production as a viable option to be developed and enhanced within practice settings 
(Gibbons et al 1994 and see Gray and Schubert 2012). However, the status of 
research-based knowledge for F1 practitioners was moderated by reference to the 
fact that they saw the need to use whatever knowledge they felt they needed to in 
order to make things ‘work’ – whatever knowledge that might be or wherever it might 
be from (8: F1/+4).  
 
By way of contrast, F2 respondents were clearly of the view that theory and practice 
were ‘like different worlds’ (46: F2/+4) and were less sure as to their use of specialist 
models and assessments (32: F2/-5) or the underpinning theories likely to be 
reflected in these (31: F2/-4), and they even had doubts as to whether they in fact 
needed or used any specialist knowledge at all (18: F2/+5; 4: F2/-3). However, other 
statements not ‘significant’ within the differences/similarities ratings would offset 
these notions as being absolute, as it would appear that F2 respondents did have 
specialist knowledge regarding underpinning theories (30: F2/+5), but saw their job 
and their role as being largely devoid of any requirement for them to utilise these. 
This suggests that F2 respondents did not feel their work had a strong theoretical 
component within the context of actual practice, in spite of regularly reading books 
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and research papers (56: F2/+3), and that they might therefore be occupying the 
‘theory-less’ domain as referred to by Howe (1988), and not making use of theory 
as Drury-Hudson (1998) suggests simply because they saw no need so to do (6: 
F2/-2; 29: F2/0). This however could be a function of the job role itself and the nature 
of the tasks, rather than any inherent disregard of these elements by respondents, 
as other statements within the concourse suggest (46: F2/+4).  
 
Perhaps unwittingly, F2 respondents were, within and perhaps because of their 
particular roles, simply responding to the ‘packaging’ of knowledge within 
procedures and set protocols that had all but erased from view what explicit 
theoretical material there might have been prior to its incorporation into the 
procedure(s) they adopted and implemented, thereby limiting their capacity and 
ability to articulate the theory and use it meaningfully (Rosen 1994). If this is the 
case, then their understanding of what was expected of them appears to be a 
function of the expectations and meanings attributed to these procedural forms of 
practice by their managers/organisations and by the specifications of their job role. 
These ‘packages’ of practice appear to contain what Geertz (1973) would see as 
‘webs of meaning’. This is an example of the role and relationship of the subjective 
meanings of different parties functioning in a different way as inter-subjective 
meanings: the intermingling of the psychological and the cultural (Vygotsky 1978; 
Wertsch 1985). Often unarticulated, the ‘rules’ of different types of social conduct 
(in this case, professional practice as one form of social conduct) are often present 
themselves as a series of ‘norms’ against which people determine the parameters 
for acceptable behaviour/practice. From a pragmatic perspective, Dewey’s notion 
of ‘mind’ is apposite as this includes both individual subjectivities and the meaning 
structures of the culture(s) and social institutions that surround those individual 
subjectivities; in this case, those of the organisation (Dewey 1929a: 303). As Taylor 
notes in the context of the functional attributes of methodology and its capacity to 
reveal meanings within social contexts: 
‘…what we are dealing with here is not subjective meaning, which can fit into 
the categorical grid of behavioural political science, but rather intersubjective 
meanings. It is not just that the people in our society all or mostly have a 
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given set of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a given set of goals. The 
meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds of 
the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which 
cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially 
modes of social relation, of mutual action.’ (1977: 119). 
 
This type of formulation appears to provide a plausible explanation for what F2 
respondents were engaged in and with. The proceduralised practices they were 
expected to undertake had almost taken on a life of their own and had ‘within them’ 
established norms that appear to have the capacity to influence behavior and 
practice in terms of knowledge production and use. Similar phenomena are present 
in other fields. Engel (1980), writing about the limitations of the bio-medical model 
within medicine and the impact of ‘unconscious’ theoretical models on physicians 
notes that: 
‘Commonly physicians are largely unaware of the power models exert on 
their thinking and behavior. This is because the dominant models are not 
necessarily made explicit. Rather, they become that part of the fabric of 
education which is taken for granted, the cultural background against which 
they learn to become physicians. Their teachers, their mentors, the texts they 
use, the practices they are encouraged to follow, and even the medical 
institutions and administrative organisations in which they work, all reflect 
the prevailing conceptual models of the era.’ (1980: 535). 
 
The particular profession(al) referred to here is to some extent irrelevant – what 
Engel is referring to is a generalised phenomena, and one to which managers and 
others within institutions/organisations appear susceptible. The ‘prevailing 
conceptual models’ in this instance are those relating to the form or shape particular 
service provision is to take and the ways it is to be delivered.   
 
 
It is however not uncommon to have to revisit the whole theory-to-practice issue - 
it is one that has permeated not just social work but other forms of professional 
practice for decades (Baars 2010; Hoffmann, Probst, and Christinck 2007) and 
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hinges on issues of knowledge definition, production, transfer and its translation for 
use in practice (Heinsch, Gray and Sharland 2015; Avby, Nilsen and Dahlgren 
2014; Gray, Sharland, Heinsch and Schubert 2014; McMillin 2014; Lemay and Sá 
2013; Gray, Joy, Plath and Webb 2012). The most obvious example to draw upon 
is the evidence-based practice (EBP) debate in terms of its genesis and 
appropriation in and across social work and other professions. However, it is worthy 
of note that this particular ‘debate’ has as its primary focus the definition, production, 
transfer and utilisation of research-based empirical knowledge, with a clear 
‘hierarchy’ visible (Skaerbaek 2010; Goldenberg 2009; Evans 2003). Within much 
of the (voluminous) extant literature on EBP (Sackett et al 1996; Sheldon 2001; 
Webb 2001; Rosen 2003; Gilgun 2005; Gray, Plath and Webb 2009; Gambrill 2011; 
Nevo and Slonim-Nevo 2011; Gray et al 2012; Gray et al 2013; Avby, Nilsen and 
Dahlgren 2014; Plath 2014, Thyer 2014) reference is made to the definition, 
production, transfer and utilisation of other forms and types of knowledge 
(experiential, tacit, and personal) only en passant. Whilst much of the available 
commentary does make exhortations regarding the use other forms of knowing, it 
still privileges research-based knowledge and focuses its main attentions of the 
translation and use of this into practice with much less concern over the articulation 
and development of mechanisms for the translation and use of these other forms of 
knowing (Börjesson, Bengtsson and Cedersund 2014; Hackett and Taylor 2014; 
Kotzee 2014; Kothari et al 2012; Venkitachalam and Busch 2012; Baars 2010; 
Eraut 2000; Shaw and Shaw 1997; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Polanyi 1967). As a 
result, the EBP debate is commonly perceived as being the only debate worth 
having regarding knowledge of and for social work (and other professions) and one 
that social work (and other professions) must engage in so that it might address 
apparent shortcomings in its status and pedigree as a ‘scientific’ discipline (Guo 
2014; Martinez et al 2014; Shaw 2014; Sommerfeld 2014; Guerrero 2013; Brekke 
2012; Longhofer and Floersch 2012; Marsh 2012).  
 
Views regarding the perceived centrality of knowledge derived from empirical 
research as being a defining criterion for seeing practice as either worthy or, in its 
absence, irresponsible, are often given traction by the findings of serious/significant 
case reviews (NSPCC 2013; Vincent 2013; Vincent and Petch 2012) that often 
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criticise those approaches to practice that do not appear to be wholly and explicitly 
evidence-based (Blom-Cooper 1985; Reder, Duncan and Gray 1993; Reder and 
Duncan 1999: 2004; Hammond 2001; Laming 2003: 2009; O’Brien, Hammond and 
McKinnon 2003; Scottish Government 2012; Bradford Children Safeguarding Board 
2013; Rochdale Borough Safeguarding Children Board 2013; Coventry 
Safeguarding Children Board 2013). Where other forms of knowing and doing have 
been adopted by practitioners that appear to run counter to proceduralised and 
‘externalist’, evidence-based approaches in situations where serious incidents or 
fatalities have occurred, criticism can be swift and harsh, including 
‘recommendations’ that social workers be sent to prison (Brandon et al 2012; Butler 
and Drakeford 2012; Oxfordshire Safeguarding Children Board 2015). This is 
however not to say that being unable to justify one’s actions by reference to 
important (formal) theoretical perspectives or coherent and tried and tested 
interventions is necessarily acceptable, particularly where there would appear to be 
no reference at all to such mechanisms and tools and total reliance upon ‘personal 
style’ or what Shaw refers to as the “alchemy of intuitionism” (2012: 54). 
 
On the contrary, the complexity of much social work practice today is but one reason 
why theoretical applications are of particular value. The etymological root of theory 
derives from the term theoria, which means to view or behold (Howell 2013). Thus, 
theory represents a particular way of viewing the world, and although such 
perspectives may not necessarily represent the world as it actually is, the presence 
of a range of theoretical perspectives assists in helping us to understand situations 
and guide us in responding to them as they materialise. Whether the theory is the 
right theory is moot; this is where the use of professional and other forms of 
judgement and discretion becomes important and the application of other forms of 
knowing – tacit and experiential knowledge for example. These can help in 
contextualising the application of theory in order to maximise the ‘degree of fit’ in 
any given situation. Thus, to approach a situation in either a ‘theory-less’ way, or by 
trying to make some formal theory ‘fit the facts’ of a given (and unique) situation 
does little good. What is required is the capacity and ability to bring to bear on any 
given situation a range of extant theoretical perspectives and other knowledge 
forms derived from a range of sources that can be applied contextually with the aim 
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of maximising the degree of success or, in pragmatic terms, ‘maximise 
homeostasis’. Where practitioners are criticised for not using ‘preferred’ forms of 
knowing and doing, such criticisms represent ideologically driven structural 
determinants regarding how we ought to define, produce, use and justify particular 
types and forms of knowledge within professional practice that fail to take account 
of the fullest range of available resources available to practitioners. If this is indeed 
the case, then such approaches may actually serve to discourage the adoption and 
integration of other ways of knowing and doing with a concomitant risk of 
institutionalising a proceduralised, instrumental and narrow epistemology and 
seeing this as the normative frame of reference. If this occurs, and is without 
challenge, such an approach may stifle creativity and innovation, marginalise the 
role of empathy and the importance of human relationships within practice and, 
catastrophically, be regarded as normative for contemporary professional practice 
thus creating a challenge to social work’s value base – not just in terms of what it 
espouses regarding its primary purposes (IFSW 2014), but what ought to be in the 
context of how we execute forms of practice and the basis on which this is done, 
separating out fact (the ‘what’) from value (the ‘how’ and the ‘why’) (Hackett and 
Taylor 2014; Kotzee 2014; Longhofer and Floersch 2014; Rosiek and Pratt 2013). 
 
6.6.2 Types and Forms of Knowledge 
In relation to types and forms of knowledge, there were clear differences evident 
regarding the need for and presence of underpinning knowledge, the use of 
propositional and personal knowledge, and the relevance and perceived 
importance of procedural knowledge. In addition, there were discrete differences 
regarding both the breadth and depth of knowledge required and differences 
regarding the sources from which knowledge was obtained in order to inform 
practice: experts/managers, research findings, other disciplines and both personal 
and practice-based knowledge, and the value attached to this. 
 
6.6.2.1 ‘Foundational’ or Underpinning Knowledge 
In the context of this study, notions of ‘foundational’ or underpinning knowledge 
refer to the view that certain types of knowledge have an essential quality about 
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them, such that its presence and content is regarded as being necessary in order 
to allow practitioners or other professionals to have at least a basic and working 
understanding of the role they are in (Stevenson 1971; Carew 1979; Philp 1979; 
Howe 1980; Caspi 1992; Drury-Hudson 1998; Payne 2001, 2014; Healy 2005; Cha, 
Kuo and Marsh 2006; Parton 2008; Trevithick 2008; Gray and Schubert 2013). This 
follows the position of both Hume and Wittgenstein and does not imply that such 
knowledge is in any way fixed or immune from being revised. The findings of this 
study revealed differences in relation to the extent respondents felt this to be 
important, which appears to say much about the changing nature of contemporary 
professional (social work) practice. F1 respondents were of the view that in order to 
function as a social worker, certain knowledge was essential. They felt that the 
absence of such could preclude people from doing the job (10: F1/+4) such was its 
perceived importance and pivotal influence. This represents a belief that there is a 
need for a corpus of knowledge to be available to all social workers, which all have 
both access to and possession of in order to function at what might be regarded as 
a ‘default’ or ‘basic’ level.  
 
F2 respondents on the other hand felt quite differently (10: F2/-5).  However, F2 
views regarding this perhaps reflect a more rounded view on what the content of 
such knowledge should be that could usefully be seen as necessary to underpin 
social work in the twenty-first century. They were strongly of the opinion that what 
in fact informs their practice is readily drawn from other disciplines and professions 
(30: F2/+5; 40: F2/+1), but this they saw in finite terms (57: F2/0), further reinforcing 
a perception of them having a restricted and restrictive view on what counts as 
necessary knowledge. They themselves were however disinclined to draw on this 
explicitly (20: F2/-3), still being reliant on ‘packages’ of knowledge, the main source 
of which derived from managers, experts or academics (17: F2/+3; 27: F2/0). This 
suggests that they tended to use and rely upon forms of knowledge that were more 
pre-defined and ‘pre-packaged’, thus restricting their application of a wider range of 
applicable knowledge to given situations (8: F2/-4). Here again, this position may 
well be explicable by reference to the nature of the tasks undertaken by F2 
respondents in the context of their particular form of practice.  
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What counts as underpinning knowledge for social work – the ‘knowledge base’ - 
has been, and continues to be widely discussed and debated as referred to above 
and continues to exercise the minds of the profession and academia alike (Barth et 
al 2014; Hamilton 2014; Healy 2014; McCarthy 2014), including a revival of feminist 
approaches (Munson and Saulnier 2014). The contemporary analogues 
representing the shape and content for this corpus would be curricula, content and 
skills guidance from professional, statutory and regulatory bodies (PSRBs) – the 
Scottish Social Services Council (SSSC), the Health and Care Professions Council 
(HCPC), the Care Council for Wales and the Northern Ireland Social Care Council, 
informed by the recommendations of the Social Work Reform Board (Department 
for Education 2010; Moriarty and Manthorpe 2014) as well as other knowledge 
brokers (for example, Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE), Institute for 
Research and Innovation in Social Services (IRISS)), and professional 
organisations (British Association of Social Work). The perceived necessity for a 
formalised or codified (Eraut 2000) corpus of (largely propositional) knowledge can 
be seen by reference to (for example), the Standards in Social Work Education 
(Scottish Executive 2003), the Key Capabilities in Child Care and Protection 
(Scottish Executive 2006; Bruce and Whincup 2012), the Professional Capabilities 
Framework (PCF) in England, which replaced the Health and Social Care and 
Health National Occupational Standards for Social Workers (the NOS), issued by 
The College of Social Work (The College of Social Work 2012), all of which either 
specify or recommend the knowledge, values and skills required of social workers, 
usually at the point of qualification. In addition, the (new) knowledge and skills 
statements for children and families and adult social workers, issued by the Office 
of the Chief Social Workers (Department of Health 2015; Department for Education 
2014), informed as these were by reports into social work education in England 
(Croisdale-Appleby 2014; Narey 2014) both posit similar requirements for an 
essential corpus of knowledge, with the children and families statement requiring 
practitioners to undertake a test after their first year of practice and both statements 
aligning competence to contracts and terms of employment following the Assessed 
and Supported year in Employment (ASYE) (Skills for Care 2012).  
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Of interest is the fact that each of these documents, to varying degrees now 
recognise and articulate that there is, and has to be, a broader reach for, and range 
of knowledge to inform social work practice, one that takes account of that available 
from other disciplines and service users and carers (Gant 2012), in spite of the ways 
in which such organisations aim to ‘standardise’ and ‘legitimate’ professional 
knowledge (Nerland and Karseth 2015). In this regard, the historical debate 
regarding social work’s status as a profession and its rather eclectic use of 
knowledge from a range of disciplines so articulately questioned and criticised by 
Flexner (1915) has proven itself to be one of the profession’s strengths, certainly 
by current standards (Burgess 2012; Cameron and Lart 2012: 2003; Cameron et al 
2012; Littlechild and Smith 2013; Martin 2013; Guile 2012; Williams 2012). 
However, these statements focus on the types of knowledge required – implicitly 
the inference is on technical propositional knowledge, and say less regarding the 
form these ought to take and the sources from which they might legitimately be 
derived, and although there is some reference to experiential knowledge and the 
use of intuition, there is still an emphasis on evidence from research (Department 
of Health 2015: 4; Department for Education 2014: 2), whereas there are equally 
strong claims made for the role of contextual and other forms of evidence (Brown 
2015). As a result, there is still a focus on ‘knowing that’ in preference to the 
perceived relevance of ‘knowing how’ or ‘knowing why’? (Ryle 1971/1946). It is 
these three types of knowing that need to comprise the purview of professional 
knowledge, for if we are to take seriously the issue of determining what the corpus 
of knowledge for the profession ought to look like, there has to be conscious and 
explicit engagement with the relevance of other and all forms of knowing.  
 
6.6.2.2 Experiential Knowledge 
It is instructive in light of the above comments to note that opportunities for the use 
of experiential knowledge, including that derived from personal experience 
(personal knowledge) as well as knowledge from practice were not seen by F2 
respondents as being appropriate (39: F2/+2) in contrast to F1 respondents (39: 
F1/-5). F2’s orientation towards a somewhat restricted knowledge use (8: F2/-4; 20: 
F2/-3) confirms the sense of personal knowledge (as one form of knowledge) being 
seen as of little value, in contradistinction to F1 (8: F1/+4; 20: F1/0), who were quite 
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specific about its centrality (39: F1/-5). F2 were more aligned to the use of 
procedural knowledge (50: F2/+5) (Drury-Hudson 1998), a form of propositional or 
codified knowledge, indicating the adoption of a form of instrumental practice 
regarded as normative (12: F2/0) for them and which was to some extent 
unquestioned (52: F2/-4). These impressions suggest that forms of experiential 
knowledge i.e. from practice were seen as being less than valued and therefore 
less or inaccessible within the context of their particular spheres of engagement. 
This of course does not mean that the practitioners themselves devalued it; rather 
that the context of knowledge use for them was oriented towards proceduralisation 
based on the ways in which practice was structured in their environments. This 
appears to create the effect of disallowing the use of some forms of knowledge (8: 
F2/-4) whilst promoting or privileging others, resulting in a rather limited (and 
limiting) view of what they in fact felt they needed to know in order to do their jobs 
effectively (10: F2/-5; 20: F2/-3; 12: F2/0). F1 respondents were in distinct contrast 
on all these areas – and in some, significantly so.  
 
6.6.2.3 Tacit Knowledge 
Aligned to the issues regarding experiential knowledge is the use of tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi 1967; Zeira and Rosen 2000; Kothari et al 2012; Venkitachalam and Busch 
2012). Its use is strongly implied by both sets of respondents, with F2 indicating a 
stronger reliance on this form of knowing (37: F2/+4; F1/0). However, the assertion 
is, not surprisingly, implicit, but the F2 preference could be explained by reference 
to their broader perspective on knowledge use being more proceduralised. They 
may in fact simply do what they need to do without thinking about it because they 
don’t feel the need to think about – the ‘routinisation’ of practice negates this as a 
requirement. The explicit articulation of tacit knowledge forms is very difficult – as 
Polanyi (1967) asserts, “we know more than we can say” (p4), whilst Wittgenstein 
(1980) noted that “Perhaps what is inexpressible … is the background against 
which whatever I could express has its meaning” (p16), a sentiment echoed by 
Shaw (2012) when he says “While we may remember once being aware of the 
understanding necessary for action [in relation to tacit knowledge] we typically are 
now unable to describe the knowing that our actions reveal.” (p53).  
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One implication of this could be that the development of knowledge, values and 
skills through the ‘novice-expert’ continuum (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Fook, Ryan 
and Hawkins 2000; Eraut 2000; McPherson 2005) is potentially compromised as 
the transition from novice to expert presupposes, and is predicated upon, flexible 
and creative thinking, and within this the use of tacit and intuitive knowledge. This 
raises an interesting issue in relation to the current vision of and arrangements for 
the development of practice across the UK by the four PSRBs and other 
organisations as discussed above, particularly in relation to ASYE and NQSW 
(Newly Qualified Social Workers) initiatives (Smith, Williams and Ward 2015; Grant, 
Sheridan and Webb 2014; Manthorpe et al 2014; Welch, Lerpiniere, and Young 
2014; Hussein et al 2013; Novell 2013; Carpenter et al 2012; Tighe 2011). If all 
forms of knowledge and knowing are not regarded equally, or some not even 
favourably, then do current practices that privilege particular forms of knowledge 
run counter to what we know about the use of experiential and tacit knowledge? 
This of particular moment when we consider the almost axiomatic nature of tacit 
knowledge, particularly as “[It] exists in that time when action is taken that is not 
understood, when understanding is offered without articulation, and when 
conclusions are apprehended without an argument” (Altheide and Johnson 1994 
p492). 
 
6.6.2.4 Procedural Knowledge 
Another striking difference to emerge across the factors refers to the perceived 
importance of procedures, or as Drury-Hudson (1998) refers to it, procedural 
knowledge within the context of respondents’ roles and tasks. F2 respondents felt 
that the use and ergo their knowledge of procedures was more central to their 
current practice than knowledge regarding people (50: F2/+5; F1/-3). This may well 
be a reflection of what I will refer to as the emergence of, and increasing presence 
of organisational social work as opposed to professional social work or, following 
Liljegren (2012), organisational professionalism and occupational professionalism 
(Evetts and Dingwall 2002; Evetts 2003, 2007).  
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The trend towards proceduralisation as a preferred mode of engagement was most 
marked in F2 respondents whose demographic profiles were quite different from 
those of F1 in that most worked in adult services and in contexts where the social 
work task was focused on the commissioning of services rather than their delivery. 
This may well offer a plausible explanation for this apparent preference in that the 
structuring of the social work task in such contexts by managers/the organisation 
represents a way of packaging knowledge such as to meet organisational/economic 
goals most effectively, in contradistinction to the nature of the broader social work 
task for F1 respondents who were predominantly working in child care and child 
protection settings. In this practice context, the social work task was more fluid and 
context-dependent in relation to appropriate responses, whereas the F2 context 
tended to reflect a more organised and instrumental approach to tasks that had in 
fact been pre-defined by others for the use of practitioners – a ‘care 
management/commissioning’ role and one that could be seen as implicitly risk-
averse. 
 
Policies and procedures that routinise practice can seek to eliminate or significantly 
reduce the likelihood of adverse outcomes, even where ‘personalised’ approaches 
are being adopted (Ellis 2014; Gardner 2014; Glasby 2014; Houston 2014; Lymbery 
2014, 2014a, 2013, 2012; Ferguson 2012; Netten et al 2012) These tasks would be 
(pre-) determined on the basis of needs-based assessments and would result in 
practitioners making arrangements with service providers to deliver specified 
services at times/in ways discussed by them with the service recipient. Thus, the 
means by which services were delivered following a determination of need were 
more proceduralised and the social work task routinised in response to this. This 
type of practice context also helps to explain why F2 respondents felt that theory 
and practice were strongly perceived as being separate entities (46: F2/+4) - there 
was little need to theorise over the tasks they were involved in, as this had already 
been done on their behalf, although recent findings by Høybye-Mortensen (2015) 
and Gray, Joy, Plath and Webb (2013) in their large survey of Australian social 
workers suggests that for some practitioners, this is preferable. F2 respondents 
were somewhat sanguine regarding ‘practising by the book’ (12: F2/0) although this 
view is given more weight by reference to their apparent procedural preferences 
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(50: F2/+5; 16: F2/0). This finding is echoed by Gray, Joy, Plath and Webb (Ibid) 
who found a distinction existed between practitioners who preferred to engage with 
the whole EBP process, and those that did not.  
 
This suggests that ‘the book’ (procedures) represents the collective consciousness 
in terms of ways to behave and practice based on ideologies of welfare (Hothersall 
2010) and practice that are perhaps less than transparent, but that do reflect the 
incipient increase of managerial practices (Mearns 2014), still evident today even 
in relation to developments designed to enhance service user choice, involvement 
and ‘personalisation’. One of the functions of ‘the book’ would appear to be to collate 
a range of different types of broad technical knowledge, codify it and package this 
in a particular way for practitioners to implement in a standardised manner. This 
‘procedural package’ is likely comprised of a range of different types of knowledge, 
much of it empirical and research-based, but shorn of its variety, diversity and 
complexity, and then presented as an organisational procedure. In effect, an array 
of potential knowledge forms is blended into the most easily digestible and 
deliverable package.  
 
By way of contrast, F1 respondents disagreed regarding a preference for 
proceduralisation (50: F1/-3; F2/+5), although they did elsewhere note that the 
availability of guidelines to set parameters around their practice was important (22: 
F1/0). This however points up a rather subtle distinction in terms of the nature of 
practice. Guidelines refer to the need to follow certain procedures in terms of certain 
actions that need to take place – applying for legal order for example. When 
applying for child protection orders or referring a child to the children’s hearing 
system for example, practitioners have to ensure that specific processes are 
adhered to and specific procedures followed (Hothersall 2014). This ‘boundary’ 
delineates the extent to which practice can be wholly spontaneous and as such 
represents a means by which accountability can be seen to rest within certain 
parameters. If practitioners have ‘followed the rules’ so to speak, then individual 
responsibility for particular courses of action and the framing of risk as a normative 
part of the situation becomes possible.  
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6.6.2.5 The Use of Discretion 
The distinction between ‘proceduralisation’ and the utilisation of guidelines is further 
highlighted relative to each of the factors when we note that F2 respondents 
disagree strongly about the need for guidelines for them (22: F2/-5; F1/0). If we 
adopt a definition of guidelines as one similar to that referred to above, then 
spontaneity and action in-context is wholly permissible within the frame of reference 
where guidelines exist and are used to guide (albeit in quite explicit ways in relation 
to certain processes) and orient practice along morally-correct and legally precise 
routes – as a guide to effective, ethical and legal practice. Where proceduralisation 
is clearly seen and/or felt to be the norm then arguably guidelines are redundant – 
follow the procedures and there is little use for any guidance, other than to follow 
and implement the procedures. This way of accounting for the response to 
statement 22 makes sense if proceduralised practice is the norm and discretion is 
actually not required. The organisation has done the work in relation to the function 
of guidelines and the relevance of discretion by incorporating these into procedure, 
thereby eliminating (at least in theory) any need for interpretation within the context 
of practice situations – discretion is not required. Evans and Harris (2004) refer to 
this in the context of the applicability of Lipsky’s (1980) notion of ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’ in social work (Evans 2010, 2011). They found in their study that both 
the ‘curtailment’ thesis – where discretion is curtailed because of the presence of 
rules and procedures – and the ‘continuation’ thesis – where discretion persists in 
spite of, or even because of, the proliferation of rules and procedures, had some 
degree of traction and conclude that the ‘all-or-nothing’ argument, where the use of 
professional discretion within practice is either good or bad is unhelpful, a view 
supported by Carey and Foster (2012) who conclude in their work concerning the 
implementation of ‘radical’ perspectives that some forms of ‘deviant’ social work still 
occur even in highly proceduralised settings. Interestingly, Høybye-Mortensen 
(2015) notes that in her study, the presence of theoretically-rich decision-making 
tools (as proceduralised form-filling) was more helpful to workers than those 
situations where such tools were used in the context of guidance – workers 
preferred to have had the work regarding theoretical interpretation done for them. 
 
210 
The issue of discretion relates to the issue of F1 and F2 practitioners feeling able 
to use whatever knowledge they felt was relevant and functional for given situations. 
F1 respondents were clear that they used a range of knowledge forms, emanating 
from a range of sources, and could apply these to practice situations. Using Drury-
Hudson’s typology (Drury-Hudson 1997), these would equate with theoretical, 
empirical, personal, practice-based (or experiential) and procedural knowledge 
forms. The respondent’s criterion was that such knowledge ‘worked’ at the time (8: 
F1/+4; 20: F1/0). This stance may well be a reflection of the nature of the tasks 
engaged in (Avby, Nilsen, and Ellström 2015) – statutory child care work does have 
a certain ‘fluidity’ about it, and relational (Lymbery 2013; Ruch 2012; Hennessey 
2011; Ruch, Turney and Ward 2010; Trevithick 2003) and contextual (Dunk-West 
2013; Dunk-West and Verity 2013; Rogowski 2013, 2010; Coulshed and Orme 
2012; Healy 2012, 2005; Mäkitalo 2012; Mullaly 2007) dimensions of this type of 
work are arguably more dynamic than those applying to F2 respondents whose 
tasks were more in commissioning and managing services rather than delivering 
them, reflecting a more organisational demeanour within their practice (Cooper 
2005). F1 respondents can here be seen to reflect the underlying principles of a 
pragmatic approach to their practice (Petersén and Olsson 2014; Rosiek and Pratt 
2013; Liljegren 2012; Smeby and Heggen 2012; Cavaleri 2004, 2008, 2011; Gredig 
and Sommerfeld 2008) although this was never explicitly referred to as such. This 
accords with the general level of misunderstanding that attaches itself to 
pragmatism - that it is a purely instrumental heuristic devoid of any meaningful 
cogency and with little capacity to function as a credible epistemology, a point 
discussed at length below. F2 respondents however were more likely to draw on 
‘codified’ knowledge ‘given’ to them by their managers in the form of procedures 
and protocols (17: F2/+3; F1/-2). In addition, F2 were less concerned about what 
they felt they needed to know (57: F2/0; F1/-4) in order to the job, a fact perhaps 
best explained by reference to the proceduralisation thesis which may also offer 
some clarity concerning their claim that they don’t feel the need to think about things 
– they just do it (37: F2/0; F1/-4) because they see their knowledge requirements 
as being determined by others (Nerland and Karseth 2015; Kavanagh 2013).  
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Evidence from the present study would certainly support the view that F1 
practitioners valued the capacity and opportunity to use a range of differing forms 
of knowledge to inform their practice (8: F1/+4) which, coupled with a sense of being 
encouraged to apply discretion in what was used, when and how (12: F1/-4; 35: 
F1/+5; 3: F1/+3; 43: F1/+3; 42: F1/-1) allowed them a level of flexibility which was 
accepted as sitting within certain parameters, particularly in terms of legal 
processes and other procedural matters (10: F1/+4; 1: F1/+2). However, these 
procedural elements were not necessarily perceived as being the central driving 
force behind practice for F1 respondents (15: F1/-1); rather, they are perhaps a 
representation of a more holistic take on the interface between the dynamic nature 
of practice and the constructive and creative interaction of differing forms of knowing 
and doing, set in a broad context defined by the perceived utility and functionality 
of processes designed to promote the best interests of those they work with. In 
Scotland, the children’s hearing system (CHS) (Kearney 2014; McK Norrie, K 
2013a: 2013b) is generally seen as being much less adversarial than the English 
Court system (Liljegren, Höjer and Forkby 2014; Schmid 2014; Whitehead 2014; 
Whyte 2014) and although still imperfect (Thomson, McArthur and Camilleri (2015), 
change and reform are evident (Bambrough, Shaw and Kershaw 2014; Gupta and 
Lloyd-Jones 2014; Hothersall 2014), which may account for elements of this 
particular perception which runs counter to some views regarding childcare social 
work (Rogowski 2011, 2012). Timescales between referral, formal proceedings and 
substantive decisions are much reduced for example, thus providing practitioners 
with a timely focus for their actions and a felt sense of when things may be resolved. 
The availability of a (relatively) ‘rapid’ response from the CHS (in this case) to their 
interventions has the potential to keep experiential knowledge much more 
contemporary and allow reflections both ‘in’ and ‘on’ action(s) (Schön 1983) to 
benefit from the juxtaposition with tangible outcomes.  
 
6.6.2.6 The Use and Value of Research Findings 
One indicator of the move towards particular modes of knowledge production is that 
relating to research in social work – the use of research findings and the practice of 
research to inform professional activity and the corpus of knowledge of and for the 
profession. Of significance in relation to the findings in this study is that respondents 
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across the two factors differed in relation to the level of perceived confidence they 
had in such findings, with F2 having less than F1 (60: F2/+3; F1/-3). The EBP 
movement and its noted difficulties in terms of the translation of findings into usable 
knowledge forms (Barth et al 2014; Gray, Sharland, Heinsch and Schubert 2014; 
Armstrong et al 2013; Gray, Joy, Plath and Webb 2013: 2012; Luitgarden 2009) 
may have relevance here, although a distinction should be made between the 
translation of research findings into context-relevant knowledge (Gibbons 2000) 
(something EBP is criticised for not doing well that can be applied, as required, 
using professional discretion and judgement (Høybye-Mortensen 2015; Ellis 2014; 
Shotter and Tsoukas 2014a, 2014b; Gambrill 2011; Luitgarden 2009; Taylor and 
White 2001) as against EBP findings being interpreted and implemented en masse, 
diluted and shorn of specificity, such that a generalised and generic interpretation, 
imposed by the organisation, is all that is presented for use. This latter mode of 
translation essentially ignores the relevance of context and the importance of 
reflexivity (Alley, Jackson and Shakya 2015; McMillin 2014; Sudsawad 2007; 
McCormack 2002) and provides little more than generalist interpretations to be 
applied across the board with no opportunity for their creative use or any 
discernment in terms of applicability.  
 
Such practices perhaps help to explain why some practitioners have little faith in 
research findings – their application is perhaps interpreted as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach that is to be imposed in practice situations– or at least that is the 
expectation. Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) claimed that practitioners applied a ‘truth’ 
and a ‘utility’ test to research evidence before implementation, whilst Weiss (1979) 
refers to the influence on research acceptance and implementation of the ‘4 I’s’ – 
interests, ideology, information and institutions. These elements appear to resonate 
for the respondents in this study. Although F1 and F2 respondents showed differing 
degrees of confidence in such findings, with F1 generally feeling more receptive 
(60: F1/-3), disquiet regarding the authority of academics and experts in 
determining ‘what works’ was in evidence (27: F1/-3). This suggests that research 
as new knowledge was valued, although its source and ergo the means of its 
production, generalisability and applicability were in question. This suggests that F1 
practitioners were able to appreciate the value of the content of research, but this 
213 
was compromised by reference to other factors, a point to be considered below in 
the context of the utilisation of a pragmatic epistemology. F2 respondents however 
were less concerned regarding the issues of who produced evidence to support 
‘what works’ (27: F2/0), understandable in relation to the broader frame of reference 
applied to their practice (18: F2/+5; 50: F2/+5; 8: F2/-4; 52: F2/-4; 17: F2/+320: F2/-
3), which was essentially procedurally driven.  
 
In relation to these points, we can refer to the implications of ‘hierarchical’ 
inferences and assumptions espoused and promulgated by proponents of EBP and 
broad-based positivistic models of the world. In generally failing to acknowledge or 
recognise that issues relating to poor transferability, use and applicability are 
possible correlates of these assumptions, an unworkable and unsustainable model 
of knowledge production and utilisation is perpetuated. To illustrate the 
contemporary nature of this, I will refer to Brekke (2012) who puts forward the case 
for a ‘science of social work’ – a not unworthy exhortation in broad measure. 
However, his baseline is positivistic – his exemplar is the engineering model of 
science: “Social Work is a goal directed profession, and our science should be as 
well. The following are the goals for a science of social work modelled on the goals 
for engineering science…” (p462).  
 
The argument here is contemporary; it is also redolent of those that have gone 
before and shows no sign of abating. So even in light of changes to research 
methods that are more inclusive and participatory for example, the assumption 
underlying these claims is that the findings of such ‘social work engineering’ ought 
to be largely predictive and generalisable across all domains. In addition, these 
assumptions make further assumptions that any failure of the findings in the practice 
context are a reflection of the failings of the practitioner, rather than a reflection of 
the problems some would see as inherent in such models and approaches. 
Contrary, and more interpretive approaches would see their assumptions about 
research as more akin to Hammersley’s view (Hammersley 2000) of what Shaw 
(2014) refers to as the enlightenment model of science. Such a model sees 
research as “providing resources that practitioners can use to make sense of the 
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situations they face and their own behaviour, rather than telling them what is best 
to do.” (Hammersley 2000: 393 cited in Shaw 2014: 2 – emphasis mine). These 
contemporary debates reflect what Shaw (Ibid: 2), in a slightly different context, 
refers to as ‘structural arrogance’. 
 
These findings suggest that broader structural factors and determinants perceived 
as flexible, facilitative and supportive (Mullaly 2007; Wormer 2007; Wormer, 
Besthorn and Keefe 2007) can help in encouraging the application of the widest 
possible forms of knowing and doing within practice. As a result, the role of the 
practitioner in the definition, production and the determination of how to make the 
best use of available knowledge should be seen as an important variable and not 
as a simple adjunct to the exhortations of producers of research-based knowledge 
and policy-makers or managers. If we are to build knowledge in the most effective 
way (LeCroy 2010) and contribute meaningfully to a clearly articulated, functional 
and inclusive ‘science of social work’ (Brekke 2012; Göppner 2012; Longhofer and 
Floersch 2012; Marsh 2012; Nurius and Kemp 2013; Anastas 2014; Shaw 2014; 
Sommerfeld 2014; Gehlert 2015), we must formulate and articulate a coherent, 
underpinning epistemological framework that allows for the inclusion and use of all 
forms of knowledge and knowing on an equitable footing.  
 
6.7 Similarities Between Factors  
The above then represent the main differences of opinion as impressed and 
subsequently expressed by respondents. I shall now consider the similarities of 
opinion/ areas of broad agreement that were significant across the factors.  
 
In terms of the similarities across the factors, it is important to recognise the 
mediating and contextualising role these ratings can play. They indicate areas of 
commonality that in some instances moderate and add further meaning to the 
differences referred to earlier. The similarities of opinion referred to are a reflection 
of the similarities of statistical weighting, as was the case with the differences of 
opinion, but interpretative analysis will contextualise these by cross-reference to the 
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differences noted as well as to those statements not statistically significant enough 
to be included in these two categorisations. These will be referred to in order to add 
‘colour’ and depth to the interpretations of the factor arrays (Watts and Stenner 
2012:55).  
 
Statements from the factors arrays indicating a similarity of opinion (based on factor 
Z-scores) alluded to issues and themes relating to: identification and use of theory; 
the nature of social work practice and its tasks; the types of knowledge used and 
the sharing of knowledge with others.  
 
6.7.1 Theory Use 
A large number of statements (eight from twenty) referred in some way or another 
to theory and its application.  There was broad agreement across some statements 
that alluded to the practical manifestations or application of theory (49: F1/-2; F2/-
1; 24: F1/+2; F2/+2; 38: F1/0; F2/+1; 45: F1/+5; F2/+2) indicating that respondents 
were attuned to its presence in practice, especially those theories felt to be ‘core’ 
to their practice (48: F1/+3; F2/+2; 51: F1/+3; F2/+2) or having a particular 
resonance –behaviour designed to promote safety for example (45: F1/+5; F2/+2) 
or rationales (accepted or otherwise) as to why people may harm others (49: F1/-2; 
F2/-1). However, in addition, and perhaps of more significance for the purposes of 
this study, was agreement that the capacity to specifically identify theories being 
used in practice was only evident to some extent (29: F1/0; F2/0) as was the 
capacity to adapt theories to context (33: F1/0; F2/-1). 
 
6.7.2 The Nature of the Task and of Social Work 
A number of statements are present that in some ways refer themselves to the 
broad nature of social work and the roles and functions undertaken by respondents. 
There was agreement that all social workers should be able to undertake most types 
of practice, irrespective of their particular specialism (23: F1/+1; F2/+1) thus 
implying that the core elements of the social work role and its tasks were in fact 
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generic. This was given further credibility by the shared and agreed view that a lot 
of the knowledge respondents had could, they felt, be used in similar types of work 
(25: F1/+2; F2/+4) with F2 respondents agreeing with this more strongly, which 
perhaps reflecting a greater alignment to the health and social care agenda within 
their roles, not unsurprising given the care management/commissioning role they 
had. However, both sets of respondents felt a degree of uncertainty regarding what 
their job and social work itself was actually about (36: F1/-2; F2/-2). This had the 
potential to make respondents feel unsure about what knowledge they in fact 
needed to undertake their role. This has implications for knowledge development, 
transfer and use, and in the absence of clarity about role, task and purpose, leaves 
practitioners unsure how to act. The potential significance of this is given added 
weight when juxtaposed with the agreed view that just doing one’s job on a day-to-
day basis was not sufficient to keep up-to-date (5: F1/-5; F2/-3).  
 
6.7.3 Types of Knowledge and its Use 
Respondents had similar views regarding how they undertook their roles and how 
they might use knowledge. Both factors agreed that knowing what they should do 
was less important than knowing what they could (or perhaps, ought) to do (42: F1/-
1; F2/-1). This suggests that both factors saw the potentials within their practice for 
creativity and innovation (Pennacchia 2013). Given the emergent profile of F2 
respondents within their particular roles, this suggests a desire for them in particular 
to be able to function more creatively, particularly as they felt drawn to procedural 
approaches. Creativity, and the desire for this might then be seen to have potential 
as both factors indicated a preference and a need for a breadth of knowledge over 
depth (9: F1/-2; F2/-2). However, this breadth seems to be referred to in general 
terms, as F1 respondents in particular certainly evidenced a depth of knowledge by 
reference to their use of specialist knowledge (18: F1/-3) and assessments (32: 
F1/+2; F2/-5). 
 
Both factors said that they regularly engaged with books and research papers (56: 
F1/+1; F2/+3) as well as organisations that invested in training (13: F1/0; F2/+2), 
so had access to codified or propositional knowledge, but both agreed that the 
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reliability of such, and the confidence they had in it was less than that which they 
afforded to experiential or ‘subjective’ knowledge (28: F1/-4; F2/-2). Both factors 
therefore indicated a strong preference for an approach to practice that valued 
experiential knowledge. F1 had earlier indicated that they did in fact have a degree 
of confidence in research findings (60: F1/-3), but F2 maintained a distinct lack of 
faith in this regard (60: F2/+3). It would appear that the issue for F1 is not so much 
about the relevance of research, but the lack of confidence in the value afforded to 
experiential knowledge. In addition, both factors were generally agreed that the use 
of ‘common-sense’ was of value to them, although less so for F2 (59: F1/+1; F2/-
1). However, whether or not one had discretion in what knowledge one used 
seemed to seemed to vary across the factors, with F1 feeling that this was 
encouraged, whilst F2 were less emphatic about it (43: F1/+3; F2/0). Such 
expressions clearly support a view that the ability to integrate different forms of 
knowledge, and to be able to use discretion as to how, is important.  
 
6.7.4 Sharing Knowledge with Others 
Both factors indicated agreement on the importance of sharing their knowledge with 
others (55: F1/+4; F2/+3), seeing it as essential. However, there was a significant 
difference on a related theme between the factors identified earlier that appears to 
identify a subtle difference in relation to practice. F1 are noted to have strong 
agreement with talking to colleagues about what they do as it helps them learn and 
understand the job better (47: F1/+5). In contrast, F2 were less inclined to see this 
as important (47: F2/0). Whilst both of these statements refer broadly to the issue 
of sharing and talking, both emphasise different aspects of this. The similarity 
between factors is evident in statement 55 that makes reference to sharing 
knowledge with others, rather than making specific mention of colleagues. In 
addition, the sharing of knowledge could be interpreted more widely as referring to 
knowledge of a situation, knowledge of an outcome or a plan - facts or information 
more generally, whereas statement 47 refers specifically to the act of talking with 
colleagues about what they do for a specific purpose – to help understanding. Thus, 
F2 appear to appreciate the need to share information (as do F1 and as would most 
professionals) but the practice of talking with colleagues about their work was 
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clearly less of an issue for F2. Once again, one could interpret this as being a 
function of the nature of the role and broader organisational context for them 
(Hussein et al 2014; McBeath and Austin 2014; Plath 2014; Whittaker 2011; Cooper 
2005; Menzies-Lyth 1988) with implications for the role of supervision, 
team/organisational and professional cultures (Chang and Lin 2015; Nerland and 
Karseth 2015; Messenger 2013) cultures and the relevance and presence of 
communities of practice that include closer ties between academic institutions and 
practitioners (Bartunek and Rynes 2014; Calvert-Minor 2011; Lavoué, George and 
Prévôt 2011; Gannon-Leary and Carr 2010; Kakavelakis 2010).  
 
6.8 Summary of Themes and Issues arising from Differences and 
Similarities 
From the analysis of the descriptive factor narratives and the use of the statistically 
weighted differences and similarities, a number of recurrent themes can be 
discerned. The relationship between theory and practice in its various guises (Van 
De Ven and Johnson 2006) is clearly an issue and is perhaps more evident as a 
cause for some concern in relation to F2 respondents. Their perception is that these 
two domains are quite separate and likely to remain such so long as the manner in 
which they are expected to practice remains as it is. F1 respondents, largely 
functioning in much more ‘fluid’ environments saw the connections between theory 
and practice as being more intrinsic and generally felt they did use this adequately 
and effectively. However, if the nature of the task one is engaged in is in fact a 
significant mediator regarding the perception one has of the relevance and/or import 
of theory, both as a concept but also as a functional tool, then exhortations for 
practitioners to use theory without there being any consideration of this fosters a 
‘theory-less’ approach that risks pathologising practitioners and their best efforts. It 
also increases the chances that practitioners will become less and less able to 
effectively identify and use research in a critical way and apply it according to the 
situation, or at all.  
 
The nature of the social work task was identified as having traction in terms of 
practice and the types and forms of knowledge required and used. Both factors felt 
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that having a clear understanding of what social work and their respective roles 
were within that left something to be desired. This reflects the fact that social work 
is situated within a volatile landscape, often because of changing requirements and 
demands from government and PSRBs and changes to service user’ and carer 
expectations, often in response to new initiatives or changes to the law. The 
introduction of the ‘personalisation’ agenda (Ellis 2014; Gardner 2014; Glasby 
2014; Houston 2014; Lymbery 2014, 2013, 2012; Sims and Cabrita-Gulyurtlu 2014; 
Dodd 2013; Power, Lord and DeFranco 2013; Ferguson 2012; Netten et al 2012) 
and (in England) the recent enactment of the Care Act (2014) are examples of how 
practitioners can feel deskilled, particularly if they do not have a clear sense of what 
their role might be in these new arrangements, especially when new knowledge and 
skill sets might be required. There are implications here for the efficient and effective 
transfer and utilisation of knowledge and the recognition of the value of a flexible 
and responsive repertoire of knowledge upon which to draw.  
In practice environments where tasks are the focus of the role (as it appears in 
terms of F2 respondents), it could well be argued that the nature of the task 
determines the means one adopts to achieve it. In the case of F2 respondents, the 
proceduralisation of many aspects of service-delivery, as they clearly perceived it, 
may compromise the need for them to engage actively with other types of forms of 
knowledge and its use. The service delivery structures may also have 
compartmentalised the required knowledge and ‘packaged’ it in such a way as to 
avoid the need for creative thinking and spontaneous action. One interpretation of 
this is that the nature of the tasks, and the needs of the service-users involved are 
perceived in a way that allows the organisation to respond to its statutory, service 
and financial obligations as their main priority. In the context of increasing austerity 
(Asenova, Bailey and McCann 2015; Carey 2015; 2014; Banks 2014; Cunningham 
and James 2014; Garrett 2014; Lee 2014; McDermott 2014; McKay 2014; 
Milbourne and Cushman 2014; Power 2014; Gray and Webb 2013; Jordan and 
Drakeford 2012; Beresford 2012; Slater 2012; Wright 2012) organisations are 
increasingly employing non-qualified or fully qualified individuals for very routine 
posts. In the area of adult services, the role of the Mental Health Officer (MHO) in 
Scotland or the Approved Mental Health Practitioner (AMHP) role in England 
requires many of the characteristics evidenced by F1 respondents to be extant, 
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whereas the assessment task, which constitutes a significant part of the care-
manager’s role, is increasingly being undertaken by less qualified or unqualified 
individuals (Samuel 2011). As a result of this compartmentalisation of role and 
function and the ways in which knowledge is managed by the organisation 
(Massaro, Dumay and Garlatti 2015; Deverell and Burnett 2012; Gau 2011; Downie 
and Loudfoot 1978) the expectations of staff regarding their own knowledge needs 
and requirements may well be being altered. Örtenblad (2001) provides a useful 
way of conceptualising this phenomena as being the difference between 
‘organisational learning’, which refers to understanding existing processes, and the 
‘learning organisation’ which is characterised by dynamism and the development of 
new and the creative use of existing organisational and other forms of knowledge 
(Wang and Ahmed 2003; Rowley and Gibbs 2008). The same processes can be 
seen to be evident in relation to initial assessments in children and families settings 
(BASW 2013).  
The types and forms of knowledge used, preferred or perceived as being allowed 
or discretionary, including the use of research findings (Beddoe 2011), and the 
sharing of knowledge and experiences with others and with colleagues are all 
significant and interrelated themes (Weinberg 2015). In terms of the range of 
knowledge felt to be required, respondents were clear that having breadth was 
preferable to depth, although this should be considered in relation to the emphasis 
on the need for specialist knowledge – it seems that having a breadth of knowledge, 
with depth as required was the order of the day. The type and form of knowledge 
felt to be required was clearly seen as deriving from a range of other disciplines, 
and that such knowledge could also be used in and across a range of other settings 
is perhaps to be seen as a significant strength for the profession rather than a 
weakness (á la Flexner), given the increasing requirement to be multi-professional 
and trans-disciplinary in one’s orientation (Petch 2013; Satterfield et al 2009). Brier 
(2000) notes in relation to this that “…the lack of a recognised place and value of 
phenomenological knowledge in relation to the general mechanistic scientific 
ontology…still seems to be the only generally accepted background for the 
transdisciplinary areas to build on.” (p433). Respondents would likely endorse such 
a view, given that they were generally at ease with drawing and utilising knowledge 
from such diverse sources, at least in principal. One of the important findings from 
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this study is that where a particular set of tasks is used to define the role undertaken 
by a professional, then there appear to be interesting effects on how knowledge is 
perceived and used. These kinds of issues require to be considered, particularly as 
there are shifts in the professional terrain that are likely to increase the number and 
range of specific tasks assigned to professional staff – assessments of need under 
the Care Act 2014 is but one example. In spite of rhetoric surrounding the Care Act 
2014, that it heralds a move away from ‘care management’ it is likely that the 
commissioning role will increase. Thus, changes to practice brought about by 
changes to legislation and policy, in their wake brings about changes to the type of 
knowledge produced and the ways in which it is, or is not, used. 
 
Aligned to this is the use of discretion and professional judgement: it was certainly 
felt to be crucial for all respondents as it allowed a feeling of having a degree of 
control over the shape and the progression of the situation – some capacity to have 
a defining influence, one based on their knowledge and understanding of the 
situation. Witt-Hansen (1980) refers to ‘situations of powerlessness’ and ‘postulates 
of impotence’ fostered by the pursuit and reference to purely objective-
mathematical knowledge when expected to be used as the only form of knowing. 
Indeed, a range of knowledge, with varied provenance and a broader external 
context perceived as supportive and facilitative were seen as key in supporting 
good practice. However, the sharing of knowledge and experience appeared to be 
perceived differently, which raises issues regarding the extent to which notions of 
‘communities of practice’ and ‘learning organisations’ are extant and seen as being 
of value (Massaro, Dumay and Garlatti 2015; Senge 2014; Dochy, Gijbels, Raes 
and Kyndt 2014; Gillberg and Vo 2014; Deverell and Burnett 2012; Hatch 2012; 
Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2011), not just in terms of practice per se, but also in 
terms of the support given to the development of professional epistemologies, 
particular at the level of the professional community (Calvert-Minor 2011; Schatzki 
1996). 
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We now move to a consideration of how a pragmatic epistemology might provide a 
meaningful and sustainable way forward in addressing many of the issues referred 
to above.   
  
223 
Chapter 7: Conclusions, Limitations, Innovations and Future 
Possibilities 
 
7.0 A Different Approach  
The issue of what constitutes knowledge, its status and the various manifestations 
it takes have long been the subject of discussion and debate, as discussed in 
chapter two. One the debates within epistemology that needs to concern us here is 
whether there is, or in fact whether there can or ought to be, any knowledge that is 
‘foundational’ in the sense that it acts as a reference point or benchmark for 
everything else. This is an important feature of the wider debate regarding 
professional knowledge, and necessitates a considered view from an 
epistemological perspective. In essence, issues of foundationalism in epistemology 
refer themselves to the question as to whether or not what we know has a secure 
foundation, such that we are prepared to act upon it at the time, and whether our 
beliefs can therefore be justified (recall that one interpretation of knowledge was 
that it was a ‘justified true belief’ (Gettier 1963)), not that such underpinning 
structures are assured or certain in the absolute given Hume’s recognition of the 
limits of induction.  
 
In the absence of assured knowledge, we must therefore accept that our beliefs 
(the basis of knowledge and action) and our understanding of the nature of things, 
including professional practice of whatever sort, are fallible and therefore open to 
revision based on experience and/or additional knowledge from other sources. If 
we accept this, then we must also submit ourselves to and experience circular 
reasoning or infinite regress (Hume 1748) because of the limitations inherent within 
epistemology. From such a position, these represent, respectively, the claims of 
deductive versus inductive approaches to inference and reasoning (see chapter 
three), although they should not necessarily be assumed to be arguments from 
‘antiquity’ as current debates in the field of quantum theory recognise similar 
tensions: 
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“If quantum theory encourages us to keep fluid our conception of what is 
reasonable, it also encourages us to recognise that there is no universal 
epistemology, no single sovereign way in which we may hope to gain all 
knowledge…There is a kind of epistemological circle: how we know an entity 
must conform to the nature of that entity; the nature of the entity is revealed 
through what we know about it. There can be no escape from this delicate 
circularity.” (Polkinghorne 2002: 87). 
 
The search for foundationalism and ultimately, certainty, in the philosophy of 
science is in essence an attempt to resolve (or at least respond to) Hume’s (famous) 
‘problem of induction’, even though Aristotle and others had noted its presence 
much earlier. However, it was in A Treatise of Human Nature (Book 1, part iii, §6 – 
“Of the inference from the impression to the idea”) and later in 1748 in An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (§iv – “Sceptical doubts concerning the 
operations of the understanding”) that Hume first articulated his powerful and 
classic formulation that now has the status of a philosophical ‘classic’. As a result, 
inductive reasoning remains “…the glory of science” and “…the scandal of 
philosophy” (Broad 1952: 143). The essence of the problem of induction is that our 
opinions regarding what we have not observed have no justification at all and never 
will have (on the ‘strong’ interpretation of Hume9). On this basis, Hume’s assertion 
has the potential to deny epistemic credibility to every product of science and to 
every effort of common sense. Popular characterisations of the ‘problem’ refer to 
the white swan conundrum – “All swans are white” (Taleb 2007). However, this 
cannot be a substantive claim simply because we have never seen a black swan, 
and we cannot infer, logically, that we never will see a different coloured swan. 
Ergo, our claims lack full epistemic credibility. 
 
In the context of this thesis, the issue is whether there is any form of knowledge in 
social work (or any other type of professional practice) that can lay claim to being 
‘foundational’ or immune to revision? The short and unequivocal answer is ‘no’, 
                                                 
9 Schlagel (1984) however provides an interesting reply to Hume’s overarching 
scepticism. 
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certainly from an epistemological perspective; and this applies to reasoning from 
deductive premises too as the deductive/inductive divide is illusory, as both refer to 
each other epistemologically and rely on each other for their progression towards 
closer and closer approximations of what is regarded as being accurate about the 
world. Therefore, absolute claims for knowledge cannot be justified (in the 
epistemological sense) and upheld, so social work’s knowledge, at least 
epistemologically and, ceteris paribus, is as credible as that of any other profession, 
irrespective of the source of such knowledge. If we therefore accept the 
epistemological argument, then the issues focus on what constitutes necessary 
knowledge for the profession, rather than what ought to be its foundations. If we 
accept the legitimacy of the epistemological arguments, the question regarding 
knowledge of and for professional practice then becomes a different one – viz: how 
do we fully integrate and utilise all forms of knowing into a coherent epistemology 
for social work and (arguably) other forms of professional practice?  
 
For professional practice, and in social work practice specifically, the issues are 
two-fold: firstly, the lack of epistemic credibility for all knowledge claims should be 
taken seriously and therefore requires that the profession and all its stakeholders 
recognise the consequences of this. These, simply, are that even with the best 
empirical, research-based evidence, doubts as to its efficacy and ‘completeness’ 
must remain. The recorded outcomes of any Random Controlled Trial (RCT), the 
‘gold standard’ of research endeavour are, and can only be, provisional simply 
because they are, by reference to Hume’s problem, fallible. As such, (and this is 
the second point), there can be no foundational knowledge in the epistemic sense 
for anything, even medicine and physics. Therefore, the results of our 
practice/actions can themselves only be provisional. Our actions may however work 
well and bring about success (however defined), but conversely, they may not 
succeed. Notwithstanding poor practice, these ‘failures’ in terms of professional 
actions may be as a result of many things, including the fact that our knowledge 
was incomplete, poorly aligned or not sufficiently relevant to a particular situation. 
The perceived shortcomings may have as much to do with the quality of the 
knowledge and its sources as they do with the context and the skills of the 
practitioner. To assume that ‘scientific’ knowledge is context independent is 
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dangerous. Thus, rather than referring to knowledge as foundational or 
underpinning, it should be regarded as being relevant and necessary at that time 
and in that place. Add to this the idea that all knowledge is provisional and fallible 
because of its epistemic status and that it will change over time, and we can then 
consider Stevenson’s idea of putting knowledge into a ‘frame’ (of reference) rather 
than it being seen as a ‘body of knowledge’ (Stevenson 1971) which implies that it 
is in some senses, fixed. As Stevenson aptly notes, “…to try and build a social work 
house on the shifting sands of social science theory is asking for trouble’. (Ibid: 226).  
 
One of the limitations of the debate within social work concerning its knowledge is 
the general lack of discussion and debate from a philosophical and epistemological 
perspective that takes account of the broader debates from within the philosophy of 
science, there being only a few exceptions to this general rule (Gredig and 
Sommerfeld 2008; Taylor and White 2001; White 1997; Sheppard 1995, 1998; 
Smith 1987; Philp 1979). Many assumptions appear to be inherent within the 
professional knowledge debate – mostly that the more ‘scientific’ we are in relation 
to our discoveries, then the more accurate and relevant the results are likely to be, 
a theme discussed in chapters two and three.   One of the failings of the social work 
profession (and many others besides) is that it has generally not engaged with the 
epistemological and functional epistemic issues regarding knowledge, such that the 
EBP movement has been allowed to exert a disproportionate influence on the 
profession and its practices without any serious challenge on epistemic grounds 
being made or taken seriously. This is a significant issue, for if we accept the 
argument laid out above as valid (i.e. that epistemic fallibility is the norm for all forms 
of knowledge), then all forms of knowledge have the potential to be as epistemically 
valid as all other forms; ergo, personal, experiential (Kemmis 2005) and tacit 
knowledge can lay claim to the same epistemic status as research-based and other 
forms of technical knowledge and, ceteris paribus, accepted as valid for social work 
and other forms of professional activity and brought to bear on the profession and 
its stated tasks (IFSW 2014) providing that such claims are reasonable and lie 
within the parameters currently acceptable to the epistemic (professional) 
community.  
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In some respects, some of these arguments regarding types of knowledge are 
already extant and generally provide us with a ‘map’ of the terrain, but do not 
engage in any philosophical or epistemological discussions in order to argue the 
case from these perspectives. Often, there are implicit and somewhat general 
statements or exhortations to consider and use multiple forms of knowledge from a 
range of sources, but no coherent or cogent epistemic framework or any challenge 
to current perspectives is apparent. For example, Grey and Schubert (2013) state 
that “ [knowledge-building processes] are shaped by broader professional debates 
on epistemology, methodology, theory and social relevance as well as political, 
sociocultural and economic trends, such as economic globalisation, advances in 
information and communication technologies and human rights discourses…” 
(p341), but they do not refer to where such epistemological discussions are 
necessarily, and of necessity, taking place – nor, importantly does there appear to 
be a specific epistemological agenda for the professional knowledge debate to 
contribute to (Weinberg 2015; Göppner 2012;  Calvert-Minor 2011).  
 
There is much to be lauded regarding the value ascribed to more participatory forms 
of research and those that foreground the experiences of service users and their 
carers (Gant 2010). Not only do these approaches ascribe value to such 
experiential knowledge forms emanating from those involved, but they also point to 
a greater acceptance of the need for a plurality of forms of knowledge creation 
within research (Bradbury 2015; Lawson et al 2015; Aldridge 2014; Burke, Albert 
and Albert 2014; Groundwater-Smith, Dockett and Bottrell 2014; Harding and 
Norberg 2014). However, the debate continues as to the relative epistemic status 
to be accorded to these ‘other’ forms of knowledge and knowing that (generally) are 
not seen to reside within the positivist canon (Guo 2014; Brekke 2013, 2012; 
Guerrero 2013; Mullen, Bledsoe and Bellamy 2007). Thus, the epistemological case 
for the relevance and utility of a diverse range of knowledge forms in professional 
practice is lacking in spite of its centrality and, when these principles are articulated 
in a functional framework, they can provide the profession(s) and its agents with a 
working structure that can confidently facilitate the effective integration and use of 
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the fullest range of knowledge and ways of knowing and doing, acknowledging the 
value of all as contributions to our understanding of what it means to ‘do’ social 
work.  
In order to illustrate the complexities of grappling with certain types and forms of 
knowledge from within a professional context, I shall consider the issue of making 
the claim that intuition (Cath 2012), feelings, tacit and experiential knowledge (Gau 
2011; Iwai and Ishino 2009) have the same epistemic force and status as evidence 
as that produced via Random Controlled trials (RCTs), here set as the ‘gold 
standard’ for experimentalists. 
 
Referring to the writings of F.H. Bradley (Ferreira 1999), we can orient ourselves 
towards the role and perceived relevance of feelings in relation to the act of making 
judgements; a judgement in this context referring to the degree of truth of something 
and the extent to which we place our faith in our understanding of the situation and 
act upon it. Bradley (1914) believes that feelings and ‘instinct’ (c/f: tacit knowledge) 
should be elevated and regarded as the sole criterion of philosophical truth. He 
argues that reasoning (via deduction/induction) is important but that experiential or 
felt knowledge is crucial as the final arbiter in the determination of the adequacy of 
any theory or judgement we make because it either ‘satisfies’ or it does not. Such 
satisfaction derives from our capacity to grasp the essence of a situation from broad 
perspective. It is at the level of feelings that, according to Bradley, we are most 
attuned to reality (Bradley 1914). Rational or relational thought is inherently limited, 
and so the full apprehension of a thing (an object, a situation, an experience) has 
to be embraced both sensuously and intellectually in order fully apprehend its 
meaning and come to a degree of understanding. The degree to which we can 
understand anything, the extent of its truth-value, is necessarily finite as earlier 
discussions (see especially chapter three) have highlighted, and it is in this 
particular regard that Bradley’s thoughts align themselves in interesting ways to the 
philosophical underpinnings of pragmatism, as well as affording us a means of 
considering the value of the intuitive focus in relation to knowledge creation and 
use.  
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As Bradley argues (Ibid: 253), (and Peirce, James and Dewey under the rubric of 
pragmatism), any Truth, in order to be Truth, must necessarily be universal, always, 
and at all times. As this is not possible because conditions external to our 
understanding are themselves unknown (at least in part), the truth is therefore 
contingent and contextual (to greater or lesser degrees) and never fully realised. 
However, this is not a sceptical position – rather, Bradley makes the (broadly 
pragmatist) point that we can, “in a progressively increasing but never complete 
manner, include the conditions that had previously remained external to the 
judgement” (Ferreira 1999: 5) and thereby decrease the extent to which our 
belief/judgement is false. Accordingly: 
“Can the conditions of the judgement ever be made complete and compared 
within the judgement? In my opinion this is impossible. And hence with every 
truth there still remains some truth, however, in its opposite. In other words 
you can never pass wholly beyond degree.” (Bradley 1914: 253). 
 
It is instructive here to consider what Bradley is suggesting – that all knowledge is 
inherently relative to the greater whole and that knowledge, will and feelings are 
interdependent, and we can therefore never have a complete understanding or 
knowledge of anything (Bradley 1883/1922). Thus, knowledge is incomplete, fallible 
and built from both reason and intuition. In relation to professional practice, the use 
of tacit/intuitive knowledge is often seen as being a somewhat risky platform upon 
which to build ones edifice of justifiable knowledge used to inform such practice, 
particularly in ‘high-risk’ areas like child care. Serious/Significant Case Reviews 
have, implicitly and/or explicitly, often condemned practitioners for operating on this 
basis, even where this is inferred by reference to the default position of being able 
to verify one’s actions by reference to empirical evidence (Blom-Cooper 1985; 
Reder, Duncan and Gray 1993; Reder and Duncan 1999, 2004; O’Brien, Hammond 
2001; Hammond and McKinnon 2003; Bradford Children Safeguarding Board 2013; 
Rochdale Borough Safeguarding Children Board 2013; Coventry Safeguarding 
Children Board 2013; Scottish Government 2012; Laming 2003, 2009) and that 
which has in some ways been ‘verified’ or ‘legitimated’ by reference to external 
‘expert’ sources (the KSS statements from the Chief Social Workers being a case 
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in point perhaps). Operating solely on the basis of ‘gut feelings’ is not wise, but if 
we are to engage meaningfully, not only with people and their lived realities, but 
with the ‘whole’ situation, given that holism is something of a watchword in social 
work practice now, we have to accept the role feelings (Ruch 2012; Edwards 2011) 
and other attributes play in decision-making and judgements (Blom et al 2014; 
Hackett and Taylor 2014; Taylor 2013).  
 
The proceduralisation of practice removes the centrality of feelings in helping to 
determine how to act, other than whether the procedure itself ‘feels’ right. F2 
respondents in this study were clearly of the view that feelings generally played little 
or no part in their practice. As a result, proceduralised practices ignore the 
importance of the humanistic and philosophical dimensions of social work and other 
forms of professional activity and contradict one of the professions central tenets – 
seeing the whole person/situation (Bronfenbrenner 1979, 1986; Mullaly 2007; van 
Wormer 2007). This is not to suggest that humanistic or epistemological 
philosophising is necessarily the most direct, effective nor efficient way to advise, 
guide and assist people in distress, or support those who are struggling to make 
sense of their lives, but principles of moral philosophy underpin the profession’s 
value base and as epistemological principles underpin how we come to understand 
the world, why are these conspicuous by their absence in academic and other 
professional debates about knowledge of and for professional practice?  
 
In terms of constructing knowledge, which is fundamentally important in allowing us 
to engage with the world and those others within it, including the people who receive 
social work services in this discussion whilst ignoring the basic principles of 
knowledge construction that posits the value of many different ways of knowing and 
doing is to condemn professional practice to a proceduralised and instrumentally 
focused strait-jacket. The focus of the purpose of our knowledge and how we know 
should be predicated upon the value of encouraging ‘human flourishing’, certainly 
in the context of social work and other human service professions. If Aristotle’s 
eudemonia is not the basis for social work, then the profession may have a bigger 
crisis to deal with than what type of knowledge is the ‘best’.  What is ‘best’ is actually 
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a distortion of focus – what works to maximise eudemonia ought, prima facia and a 
priori, to be the focus of the profession, and not economics, political expediency or 
paradigmatic politics.  
 
If we then accept the legitimacy of the philosophical argument for the need for an 
appropriate understanding of the structure of knowledge, and the epistemic 
arguments concerning its functions, issues regarding its source become subsumed 
under such a purview. In this way we are able to conceive of a more transparent 
and practically-oriented application of philosophical principles to generate and 
support the creation of a different, inclusive and practice/action orientated 
epistemology, one that recognises explicitly what Gredig and Sommerfeld (2008: 
293) refer to as the ‘hybrid nature’ of practice-based knowledge. This reflects an 
underpinning principle of the pragmatist tradition: that all our knowledge, for social 
work and for life in general, ultimately derives from, and returns to, inform our 
experience(s) (practice).  
 
7.1 A Pragmatic Epistemology for Professional Knowledge: Developing 
Situated Forms of Knowing and Doing 
In responding to the findings of this study and attempting to make meaning from the 
responses of the participants in a plausible way, it has been necessary to make a 
number of inferences using elements of the process of abduction as a 
methodological strategy (Paavola 2004). In doing this, reference has been made to 
theoretical and other material and to ideas that have some level of explanatory 
traction in providing a reasoned and reasonable understanding for what was 
‘psychologically significant’ in relation to professional knowledge for the 
respondents in the context of their felt experiences of day-to-day social work 
practice. The earlier chapters of this study have made reference to many of the 
philosophical, paradigmatic, methodological and professional discussions 
regarding knowledge in its various forms, manifestations and observed (and 
unobserved) uses. These provide the broad context for the rationale of the study 
and the justification for the choice of methodology and associated methods which 
of necessity are located within the pragmatic approach to the research endeavour, 
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all of which is designed to make some small contribution to the on-going discussions 
and debates regarding knowledge use in social work, conceptions of ontology and 
plausible structures for an epistemology and, by extension, these for other forms of 
cognate professional activity. 
 
A corollary of this is that the study also makes a small contribution to those 
discussions around what may or may not constitute a ‘science of social work’ 
(Brekke 2012; Göppner 2012; Longhofer and Floersch 2012; Marsh 2012; Nurius 
and Kemp 2013; Anastas 2014; Shaw 2014; Sommerfeld 2014; Gehlert 2015) by 
reference to what a functional epistemology for this might look like, as it is generally 
agreed that there is currently no existing framework that covers all social care 
knowledge (Pawson et al 2003; Gray and Schubert 2013), and although 
pragmatism would not attempt to be so prescriptive, it does promote diversity and 
inclusivity predicated on the need for relevance and functionality of knowledge.  
 
The details of what a ‘science of social work’ ought or might look like will continue 
to be discussed and debated and a form will no doubt ‘evolve’. However, what is 
required to inform and encourage this evolution is a coherent epistemological 
framework that privileges all forms of knowing on an equitable basis. This does not 
of course assume or presume that such a framework would be, could be or indeed 
ought to be the only one to be applied to issues appertaining to the definition, 
production, transfer, use, dissemination and development of social work 
knowledge: that would be too narrow and arrogant and would actually run counter 
to the whole ethos of pragmatism, with its rationale being centred on the 
development and growth of knowledge as a function of experience. Any framework 
(as a form of knowing – knowing how to organise and develop knowing) must of 
necessity evolve and not remain fixed. However, what the contribution of a 
pragmatic epistemology promises is a practically-oriented, iterative framework that 
recognises explicitly the reciprocal and symbiotic relationship that exists between 
knowing and doing - between theory and practice, and the importance of different 
forms of knowing and doing within this. If pragmatism privileges anything it is only 
that knowledge that best achieves its goals – the maximisation of success – of 
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homeostasis – of ‘ends-in-view’ (Dewey 1930 p223) and by extension, the 
enhancement of human flourishing or eudemonia. Such a framework not only has 
epistemological credibility (Jackson 2014; Levi 2012; Bernstein 2010; Biesta 2010; 
Goldenberg 2009; Hogan 2009; Koons 2009; Shook and Margolis 2009; Comesaña 
2008; Lundestad 2008; Cooke 2006; Rescher 2001, 2008; Menand 2001; Bohmann 
1999; Rorty 1982, 1999, Almeder 1986: 2007; Thayer 1980; Dewey 1929, 1929a, 
1933/2013, 1938; Murray 1912; James 1907; Peirce 1903, 1905) but accords well 
with social work’s axiology (Bader 2015; Borden 2013; Biesta 2010; Beatty, Dean 
and Leigh 2009; Minteer 2001; Bayles 1967) and sits comfortably as a guiding 
paradigm for research activity (Biddle and Schafft 2014; Morgan 2014b; Hall 2013) 
which aims to foreground the importance of the personally-relative nature of social 
life.  
 
Pragmatism speaks to the need to recognise that all beliefs (whether they function 
accurately as knowledge or not) have the right to enter into public (or private) 
discourse, but in order to gain and ultimately maintain (renegotiable) validity, they 
must evidence a recognisable degree of functionality. If the belief has no basis in 
relation to action and experience, its status is negligible. However, that is not the 
same as saying that a previously unsustainable belief cannot (nor should not) be 
reconsidered in the future. Fallibility is not simply a product of the thing itself, but is 
also a process. All beliefs (and therefore, ‘truths’) are revisable in light of experience 
and new forms of evidence, so whilst absolute relativism is not sustainable, all future 
beliefs, supported or not at the time, are subject to the effects of both fallibilism and 
the process(es) of revisability. Pragmatism, as a pluralistic approach, would 
contend that there are no rational grounds for discrediting any form of discourse – 
there is a place for all entries into intelligibility, even those that would stand against 
it, providing these are in fact intelligible. 
 
In developing and articulating a pragmatic epistemology for social work, I will make 
reference to themes and issues in the literature regarding social work and 
professional knowledge more generally in order to contextualise pragmatism and 
its core principles. In doing this, it will highlight the contribution that an appreciation 
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of the importance of the principles of epistemology per se can make to the 
knowledge debate generally (Gringeri, Barusch and Cambron 2013) as well as the 
contribution to the research process in social work and cognate disciplines of a 
distinctively pragmatic epistemology, with the aims of clarifying what ought to be 
the focus of future discussion and action, in an attempt to move the debate forward 
in a meaningful way.  
 
7.2 Models and Muddles regarding Social Work and Knowledge 
The findings from this study highlighted a number of key themes and issues relating 
to knowledge of and for social work and for professional knowledge more generally. 
It suggests a profession still confused about what it ought to know, how it ought to 
come know these things, how it ought to use what it thinks it knows and how it ought 
to make what it knows useful in the best possible way. 
 
The literature relating to social work knowledge has a lengthy and voluminous 
history, and yet confusion still remains. In most discussions and reviews of this 
broad topic, the focus still tends to lean towards evidence-based or research-based 
knowledge (EBP) and how this is and ought to be implemented and utilised. In 
reality however, this paints an unrepresentative picture of the issues, and I refer 
back to chapter two where a detailed discussion of the extant literature on the topic 
was presented. That discussion highlighted many of the tensions evident regarding 
the issue of knowledge of and for social work, but importantly located and 
considered these in a much broader philosophical context recognising the 
importance of thinking about epistemology and the contributions this field of study 
has to offer to the social work knowledge debate. In approaching the terrain in this 
way, important insights and observations have been gleaned from the philosophy 
of science and that of logic and epistemology. This is a different approach to that 
which has generally gone before, which tends only to provide us with postulated 
models of how knowledge ought to be generated and used, but it has been one that 
has seen research-based knowledge having a privileged status, particularly that 
with more ‘positivistic’ tendencies. The issue here is not that such knowledge is of 
no value: on the contrary, scientific knowledge has proven its value beyond 
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measure, but in the context of the human services, focusing overly much on these 
particular modes of production/creation, we have side-lined and minimised the 
potentials of other forms of knowing.  
 
As a result, the profession(s) continues to try and make some square pegs fit into 
some round holes, and rather than thinking what other ways might help address the 
issues at hand, it continues to seek certainty from its efforts by reference to what 
are perceived as more accurate and assured interpretations of the world and its 
problems. We could spend an eternity considering what A said about the best way 
to deal with X or Y, and what B then said in response, and how C thought they were 
both wrong. This achieves little in terms of the meta-task - the need to harness the 
best we know to enhance our capacity to deliver the best we can. Thyer and Myers 
(2011) make a very valid observation that encapsulates not only the essence of the 
problem we seem to have developed for ourselves, but also provide some 
semblance of a route to a solution to these circular and regressive arguments when 
they say that: 
“EBP is correctly seen as a process of inquiry intended to help practitioners 
and their clients make important decisions about the services the clients 
receive. EBP is a process: a verb, not a noun. There is no such thing as 
evidence-based practices, since in EBP one decides what services to 
provide by taking into account not only research evidence but also client 
preferences and values, situational circumstances, professional ethics, the 
practitioner’s existing skills, and available resources.” (p 8).     
 
These comments are important in several ways. Firstly, they refer to EBP as ‘a 
process of inquiry’. In this, the claim is that it is but one of a variety of processes 
rather than the process. Secondly, they refer to a ‘process of inquiry’, not 
experimentation or observation or discussion or theorisation. Inquiry is therefore 
here taken to mean that it is and ought to be inclusive and all embracing – of any 
or all of these ways. Thirdly, they reacquaint us with the function of grammatical 
forms – the process of inquiry is active, not passive – it is therefore iterative. 
Applying pre-determined, decontextualised findings from research or any other form 
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of inquiry is passive. I would argue that safeguarding should be conceived of in the 
same way – both are active, not passive and as such demand, even at a basic level, 
reflection (Schön 1983) and iteration, core components of a pragmatically-oriented 
abductive approach, realising too the possibilities inherent within a phronetic 
approach to inquiry in the social and other sciences (Raz 1978; Flyvjeberg 2001; 
Kinsella and Pitman 2012; Shotter and Tsoukas 2015).  
 
To provide some illustration to support the rationale for a ‘new’ pragmatic 
epistemology for the profession, we need only look at the current terrain within 
which discussion, research and analysis of social work knowledge is taking place. 
For example, Gray, Joy, Plath and Webb (2012) identified eleven studies from the 
literature published between 2000 and 2010 that considered what barriers and 
facilitators to implementation of research-based knowledge (EBP) existed. They 
identified a range of barriers that included inadequate agency resources dedicated 
to EBP, poor skills and knowledge of practitioners in terms of understanding what 
EBP was or how to use it, agency cultures that did not promote the use of EBP, a 
poor degree of fit between the products of research and the requirements of those 
likely to want to/need to use it, the attitudes of practitioners towards EBP – that they 
did not trust it, nor did they feel it was applicable, and a lack of opportunity to discuss 
the relevance of EBP findings, thus militating against effective implementation. In 
terms of facilitators, these were much less clear, but did refer generally to situations 
where a strategic approach to EBP/research use was taken, particularly at the 
organisational level where use was then much greater and more appreciated 
(pp160-164). Similar findings are echoed within each of the factors within this study. 
Thus, the issue of using what for many is seen as, or assumed to be, essential and 
core to contemporary practice is not only confused, but it is articulated in such a 
way that it is difficult for people to even understand what it is they are supposed to 
be using or doing. The authors note that “EBP is not clearly or consistently defined 
in the human services and much ambiguity prevails.” (p158).  
 
Gray and Schubert (2013) in their review identified ten different models of social 
work knowledge production from within the literature (Rothman and Thomas 1994; 
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Humphreys et al 2003; Karvinen-Niinikoski 2005; Gould 2006; Flaskas 2007; 
Gredig and Sommerfeld 2008; Robinson et al. 2008; Payne and Aga-Askeland 
2008; Trevithick 2008; Alexanderson et al. 2009) and noted the main features, 
which included taking account of: the research context, the production process for 
knowledge, the use of evidence-based practice, reference to Mode 1 and/or Mode 
2 knowledge, knowledge translation issues, the organisational context, 
organisational change and how knowledge is utilised. They note however that, 
“…none of the identified models provides a comprehensive holistic approach 
incorporating all aspects of the research process...” (Ibid p342). They also note that: 
“For such models to encapsulate the process of producing knowledge within 
social work, as many key elements as possible consistent with wider 
multidisciplinary understandings of knowledge production must be 
incorporated. In our view, linear models, which are dominant in the social 
work literature, are highly simplified and need to be extended, at a minimum, 
to incorporate the factors affecting the context in which knowledge is 
produced and used (Gray and Schubert 2012).” (Ibid p344).   
 
They essentially reiterate earlier exhortations from within and across the literature 
that a model of some sort is required, but offer no substantive way forward in 
relation to what such a model might look like, nor how it might function. However, 
their reference to their earlier work is to their own attempt at constructing just such 
a model of knowledge production and transfer and one “…that was developed out 
of perceived synergies between the new theory of knowledge production and the 
growing body of literature on evidence-based social work.” (Gray and Schubert 
2012 p 204). Unfortunately, they then make it clear that their model is limited in that 
“…it does not represent the full gamut of forms of accepted knowledge in social 
work, such as tacit, theoretical and conceptual knowledge”, although they concede 
that “[knowledge-building processes] are shaped by broader professional debates 
on epistemology, methodology, theory and social relevance as well as political, 
sociocultural and economic trends, such as economic globalisation, advances in 
information and communication technologies and human rights discourses…” (Ibid 
p341. This however appears to make the assumption that these other (somewhat 
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confusingly labelled) forms of knowledge and these debates are in fact ‘accepted’. 
The acceptance, and ergo the agreement of and for such a plurality of forms and 
types of knowledge and the breadth of the debates within and across the 
professional social work community are by no means apparent, as the discussion 
within this thesis makes clear. If there is any agreement at all, then it is that there is 
in fact no agreement. The debate rages on. However, their ‘evidence-based 
knowledge production model’ (Ibid p206) is of interest and usefully refers to the 
utility of ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production (Gibbons et al 1994), even though this 
mode still privileges a research-based approach that aims to generate “…socially 
accountable, usable knowledge that directly addresses social problems…” (Gray 
and Schubert 2012 p207).  
 
Marsh and Fisher (2008) claim that “…social work generally does not have enough 
people engaged in knowledge production, and even among the mainly academic 
researchers thus engaged, there are few large-scale social work studies generating 
evidence for practice.” (p207). It is interesting to note here that the authors make 
reference to “large-scale studies” as if these are the only sorts of studies that are 
worthy of paying attention to or engaging with. This sort of comment serves only to 
perpetuate the ‘myth’ of the centrality of research-oriented knowledge based upon 
positivistic models.  
 
The transfer of research-based knowledge to practice continues to be a source of 
concern (Alley, Jackson and Shakya 2015; Gray, Sharland, Heinsch and Schubert 
2014; Plath 2014; Armstrong et al 2013; Gray, Joy, Plath and Webb 2013), as does 
how it is then used (van de Luitgarden 2009) and understood (Avby, Nilsen and 
Dahlgren 2014; Nevo and Slonim-Nevo 2011). Here again though it can be seen 
that the primary focus is still on research-based knowledge, largely to the exclusion 
of a consideration of those production and transfer issues relating to other types of 
knowledge emanating from other sources or representing other types of knowledge 
(experiential, tacit, common-sense) (Edwards and Daniels 2012; Kothari et al 2012; 
Orlikowski 2002, 2006), and knowing (Brier 2000) and the role of context (Healy 
2014; Meijers et al 2006; Gibbons 2000). Rutter and Fischer (2013) make the point 
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that “The application of knowledge is therefore highly contingent on context: and 
research knowledge competes with other, including powerful experiential, 
knowledge, as well as values, in guiding social care practice.” (pp6-7) and they go 
on to say that “…methodological quality cannot be the arbiter of what is evidence. 
The authority of research evidence over practitioner experience is also doubtful, yet 
there is relatively little discussion in the literature about power, authority and 
relevance to context.” (Ibid p9). Thus, the literature is replete with the recognition 
that many elements of the current ‘knowledge landscape’ of social work are 
problematic, and yet these have remained such for a long time.  
 
As a result, these discussions provide suggestions that are only partially relevant to 
the wider debate not simply because they are focused on a particular type of 
knowledge, but also because they do not engage in any consideration of how other 
modes of knowledge production might usefully be transferred. However, Nutley et 
al (2011) offers a six-fold map of the ‘key features’ of the ‘knowledge terrain’, 
identifying concerns as being located relevant to: (i) the types of knowledge relevant 
to the effective implementation of EBP; (ii) the ways in which research knowledge 
is utilised; (iii) models of the processes of implementation; (iv) the conceptual 
frameworks that enable understanding of EBP implementation; (v) the main ways 
to intervene to increase the uptake of EBP and (vi) different ways of conceptualising 
what EBP means in practice. They advocates for a whole-system change regarding 
the way knowledge models are conceptualised and provide a useful typology of the 
relationship between (for example) explicit and tacit knowledge, drawing on the 
psychological literature regarding different types of memory (p129).  
 
All of these studies, and many others besides, illustrate beyond doubt that the social 
work knowledge debate is complex, confused and confusing, with powerful views 
and agendas leaving their mark. It would not be inconceivable to draw upon many 
hundreds of similar studies to illustrate and ‘evidence’ what is already apparent – 
that the social work knowledge debate is recursive in its attempts to clarify what 
should reasonably lay claim to be treated as relevant and reliable knowledge of and 
for the profession and what are the best ways to obtain it and use it. In this broad 
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summation of the issue, there is also an implicit recognition of the nature and 
relevance of underpinning paradigms, methodological approaches, methods, 
ethics, evaluation strategies, organisational cultures, context and values amongst 
other competing themes. To try and deal with each of these issues separately is not 
only to set oneself an all-but-impossible task, but is also to risk leaving out some 
issue or other which someone somewhere would deem to be central to the fullest 
possible understanding of the myriad issues involved.  
 
The task now is to articulate, contextualise and justify the introduction and use of a 
pragmatic epistemology for social work (and related professions) that is able to 
provide a critical framework within which issues of knowledge definition, production, 
transfer, utilisation, dissemination and development can be located. In order to see 
that such a ‘pragmatic project’ is not only desirable but, I would argue, necessary, 
we can still discern from within the literature recurrent and repetitive themes 
regarding social work and knowledge that suggest the issues are still as 
pronounced and uncertain as they ever have been (see for example, Schön 2001). 
The primary concern here has to be how to effectively include all relevant forms of 
knowledge and ways of knowing into the professional canon. The ‘models’ and 
approaches that are extant still appear to be confused and confusing, and none of 
them articulate a coherent and plausible way forward to legitimise all forms of 
knowing in the search for ‘what (really) works (most of the time)’, and it is this that 
represents one of the the main barriers to effective knowledge production and use 
in professional practice. The more that the profession dissects, discusses and 
debates the various elements of the topic, the more confusing things will continue 
to be. But by adopting a clear, coherent, systematic and experience-based 
approach to inquiry, much could be gained by the profession(s) both in terms of 
practical knowledge and, significantly, clarity of vision. In this, pragmatism can be 
conceived as a ‘healing philosophy’ (Lewis 2007).  
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7.3 A Pragmatic Epistemology 
‘Any problem of scientific inquiry that does not grow out of actual (or 
“practical”) social conditions is factitious; it is arbitrarily set by the inquirer’ 
(Dewey 1938: p499). 
The essence of a pragmatic epistemology rests on a number of key features that 
provide both focus and a critical perspective. These include: its rejection of the 
ontological assumption that there is only one objective reality; its view as to what it 
sees as functioning as ‘knowledge’; its alignment to instrumentalism; its relationship 
to experience; how it conceives of inquiry and how it sees this proceeding, and its 
commitment to fallibilism (Martela 2015; Bernstein 2010; Fantl and McGrath 2009; 
Koons 2009; Shook and Margolis 2009; Cooke 2006). It therefore offers a distinctive 
view regarding the nature of ontology, the structure and role of epistemology and 
the nature of scientific inquiry (see chapter two). It provides a framework whereby 
the purposes of inquiry and of knowledge are simply (but not simplistically) seen as 
being ways of helping us to address the issues of dealing with how we experience 
and come to understand the world in a practical sense. Practical here though does 
not just mean how we might undertake practical things – it is also practical for me 
to understand something conceptually if it subsequently allows me to engage with 
the world on a more functional basis. All ontological and epistemological matters 
are intricately connected to experience, particularly in the form of pragmatism 
articulated by Dewey in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), although the framework 
here also draws on the thinking and writings of Charles Sanders Peirce 1877, 1903, 
1905) and William James (1904, 1907, 1912, 1968), D. L Murray (1912), G.H Mead 
(1967) and C.H Cooley (1902, 1956).  
 
These elements are also central to the critical stance afforded by pragmatism. Its 
rejection of certain ontological assumptions, its conception of what counts as 
knowledge, its instrumentalism and focus on experience as the basis for inquiry all 
provide a framework for a discursive critique with the ‘end-in-view’ providing a 
functional and visible benchmark for its efficacy as a framework by asking whether 
what what was done, worked? Pragmatism provides the means by which everyone 
can critically approach not only their practice based on this benchmark, but they 
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can also use it as a critical basis to evaluate their knowledge-defining, knowledge-
producing, knowledge-transferring, knowledge-using, knowledge-developing and 
knowledge-sharing strategies. The outcome-focus of pragmatism is ideally suited 
to this.   
 
The framework discussed here is a framework for ‘scientific’ inquiry – a pragmatic 
theory of ‘scientific’ inquiry. The use of inverted commas is simply to re-emphasise 
that the nature of ‘scientific’ is a contested notion as discussed in chapter three, and 
that the pragmatic emphasis is more on the word inquiry. Dewey himself was clear 
on this point: “Sciences themselves are outgrowths of some phase of social culture, 
from which they derive their instruments, physical and intellectual, and by which 
their problems and aims are set.” (Dewey 1928 p311).  
 
The framework is built upon and around the pragmatic principle, as mentioned in 
chapter three, the basis of which is: 
Pragmatic Principle > A Person will be rationally justified in accepting a 
proposed proposition [P] as true if: 
i): there is at that time no currently available conscious inference, 
inductive or deductive, from any other previously known or justified 
beliefs that would either confirm or disconfirm P;  and: 
ii): there is a distinct possibility that by accepting P as being true or 
likely to be so, it will produce consequences more likely to contribute 
to the enhancement of cognitive and/or moral utility than would be the 
case if we did not accept P as being true, or likely to be so.  
At the most basic level, as human beings we need to act in relation to the world. 
Merely observing the world is not sufficient; we engage in and with the world and 
as such, all the beliefs (knowledge) we have are essentially (revisable) guides to 
future action (James 1907 p23) and are based on the outcomes of these 
experiences. In this way, pragmatism locates the value of knowledge (beliefs) in the 
nature of our practical existence and experience. The aim of pragmatism and its 
243 
approach is to utilise our experience as a means by which we build knowledge of 
the world in the shape of ‘warranted assertions’ (Dewey 1938 p7), rather than 
absolute knowledge or belief, based on the appreciation that we can never have a 
complete understanding of anything (c/f Hume 1748/2008; Howson 2000; Lange 
2008; Wiley 2012).  
 
Any ‘warranted assertion’ is judged in terms of its capacity to enhance the 
achievement of our goals, whatever they might be: conceptual understanding, 
improved practical action or being able just to ‘do’ (social) life a little better than 
before. This approach provides each of us with the opportunity to generate our own 
forms of ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ grounded in our own reality and that help us to make 
sense of the world. As each of us will have our own preferences regarding the 
‘warranted assertions’ or beliefs about the world that work best for us, we can avoid 
the descent into absolute relativism and scepticism (Grayling 2009) as our nature 
is such as to lead us to prefer and to repeat those actions (underpinned by our 
beliefs) that are more likely to lead to the achievement of our goals, at whatever 
level these may be at, including those assertions that act at the collective level. As 
Hogan (2009) notes, “…our rules of method and our ontology emerge out of our 
struggle to adjust to the problems of living.” (p386). This is of course should not be 
taken to imply that we can believe anything we want to: this would run counter to 
the pragmatic maxim as well as what to Wittgenstein referred to as ‘background 
beliefs’ (Wittgenstein 1969: para 162). We all rely upon certain standards regarding 
what is plausible in terms of what to believe and this therefore minimises (though 
does not eradicate absolutely) the possibility of such anarchic relativism.  
 
Taking the above into consideration, we can now consider what a pragmatic 
framework might look like. In essence, there are three elements to consider in 
relation to the process of inquiry. Firstly, when we experience a situation we are 
unfamiliar with, or one in which we experience some form of level of doubt, we 
recognise the need to respond to this by adjusting our behaviour and responses in 
some way. At a basic level, this may involve pure reflexes - a biological and pre-
cognitive response, or it may involve intuition or the utilisation of past experiences 
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in the form of habits. Such a response may be appropriate because it is successful 
and therefore functional – it fulfils the second element of the pragmatic principle.  
However, if the response requires a more cognitive and reflective approach, we 
then engage in a different form of inquiry, that which “…is the controlled or directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original 
situation into a unified whole.” (Dewey 1938 pp104-105). This type of approach is 
not just relevant to what we might refer to as ‘scientific’ inquiry. Note that Dewey’s 
rendition of an inquiry does not tie itself down to any particular approach or method. 
The purpose of inquiry is to resolve or alter the situation: the means by which this 
takes place are to be determined by reference to the nature of the situation, the 
context and the means available to the individual, the most basic of which is the 
capacity to reflect on the situation, such that one becomes aware of the need to act 
(Dewey 1929a).  
 
Thus, inquiry using ‘scientific’ methods or ‘common-sense’ (with its parallels to 
pragmatism – see Jackson 2014; Lundestad 2008; Fieser 2000) instigates a 
process of reflection, exploration and iteration – abduction (Shank 1998; Haig 2005, 
2008, 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014), a ‘scientific attitude’. “The scientific 
attitude may also be defined as that which is capable of enjoying the doubtful; 
scientific method is, in one aspect, a technique for making use of doubt by 
converting it into operations of infinite inquiry.” (Dewey 1929 p228). The inquiry thus 
engages principles of reflection and systematic iteration, moving between our 
current situation and how we understand it, our past experiences that may have 
some similarities to our current one and all the ‘data’ we have in front of us. This 
does not mean that we have to adopt formal, scientific procedures. Dewey (1938) 
reminds us: “Scientific subject-matter and procedures grow out of the direct 
problems and methods of common sense, of practical uses and enjoyments.” (p66). 
The aim of inquiry, simply, is to unify all that we have before us into a coherent 
whole such that we reach a ‘warranted assertion’ – an understanding or solution 
that works – then – and which can then form the basis of future actions. The 
warranted assertion is a hypothesis regarding whether or not we have achieved our 
aim – the resolution of indeterminacy. If we feel we have, then the particular inquiry 
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ceases; if we feel we have not resolved matters satisfactorily by reference to our 
existential and experiential situation, we continue to inquire until we do reach some 
form of conclusion, one though that is, of necessity, provisional, as all conclusions are 
(Toulmin 1958).   
 
In relation to the more collective aspects of inquiry, and that which relates to the 
sorts of inquiry undertaken in the context of social work practice and research (and 
other professions), we should note that the main difference (and the only one from 
a pragmatist perspective) is that we have to demonstrate an adherence to the 
generally accepted standards of the field or profession – of the ‘community of inquiry 
(Calvert-Minor 2011; Schatzki 1996). This is an important point because it 
addresses the assumption that there is a legitimate hierarchy of inquiry, classically 
represented by the view that a Random Controlled Trial is a ’better’ type of inquiry 
than interviews or observations for example.  This assumption has simply taken the 
criteria of the (positivist) scientific community in relation to its standards and applied 
them across the board – problematising, arguing and, significantly, convincing 
others of the veracity of their claims, as if they ought to apply to everyone. In 
pragmatism, and in social life generally, the final arbiter of the effectiveness of any 
inquiry is whether it achieves its purposes. Powell (2001) articulates this well, 
asserting that: “To a pragmatist, the mandate of science is not to find truth or reality, 
the existence of which is perpetually in dispute, but to facilitate human problem-
solving’ (p884). This however does not necessarily equate with the ends justifying 
the means, as the discussion referred to in chapter three regarding Asch (1956), 
Milgram (1963, 1974) and Haney, Banks and Zimbardo (1973) and their studies on 
obedience and conformity clearly shows, although the findings from these studies 
have (ironically perhaps) proven themselves. However, the value-base of social 
work, professional and research standards and ethics all provide a backstop to 
maintain the integrity of all processes of inquiry.  
By adopting a ‘preferred mode’ of knowledge production and use, social work (and 
other professions) arbitrarily limits itself to a narrow perspective on and of the world. 
There is an inconsistency in the way social work currently organises its knowledge 
when set against the way practitioners would suggest it should in fact be organised: 
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to use Dewey’s phraseology, there is a ‘felt difficulty’. The current model(s) for social 
work and professional knowledge do not appear to be working as well as they could 
and we may be in danger of going down the route some feel medicine has 
traversed: as Miles (2013) notes:  
‘[M]odern medicine places great emphasis on the study of organ systems 
and the use in practice of objectively measurable biological indices of 
dysfunction and disease. While no one lucid would argue against the 
fundamental importance of such an approach, a point can be reached where 
such an emphasis becomes disproportionate in the sense that this so-called 
objectification of the somatic ignores (or rejects) the human dimension of 
illness and risks reaching a point where the patient is seen as part of the 
disease, rather than the disease being seen as part of the patient. Western 
medicine has ventured dangerously close to precisely such a point.’ (p 329).   
 
This does not mean that we should enter into a Cartesian doubting of all our beliefs 
about what works in social work (or in medicine or anything else), but as Peirce 
(1868) makes clear: ‘A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason 
to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a 
positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend 
to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.’ (p 141). The introduction 
of a pragmatic model for social work and professional knowledge is based upon the 
empirical findings of ‘doubt’ in the hearts of practitioners and, on the basis of the 
literature, large elements of the profession. It is with these thoughts in mind that a 
pragmatic epistemology of and for social work is presented as a real alternative to 
the current ‘model muddle’ extant within and across the profession(s).  
 
Any theoretical model, like the one proposed here, is for the pragmatist nothing 
more than an organising framework through which problems are perceived and 
subsequently organised. In order to understand the role such a model has, we can 
refer to Dewey’s notion of a general ‘theory of inquiry’ (Dewey 1938), most clearly 
articulated in How We Think (1910/2007). Here, he outlines a 5-stage process: 
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 i): a felt difficulty; 
 ii): its location and definition [problem identification]; 
 iii): suggestion of possible solutions [theory application]; 
iv): development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion [inquiry]; 
v): further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection, 
that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief [reflection; phronesis; 
philosophising] (p 72).  
 
Any theoretical model must be consciously explicated and subjected to continued 
evaluation and re-evaluation. A model is but a tool – much like the complex 
statistical processes of Q-factor analysis – as complex as they are, they are a 
means to an end, as is Dewey’s (or anyone else’s) model. However, of significance 
here is Dewey’s insistence on a general theory of inquiry rather than a theory (or 
model) of scientific inquiry. The focus is on the inquiry; and a pragmatic model 
permits common-sense inquiry as well as scientific inquiry. In this way, pragmatism 
offers us all a way out of ‘idealised’ notions of science. The issue is not 
methodological but one of process and progress towards one’s goals which, under 
the pragmatic maxim, are (simply) to maximise functioning and stability within the 
context of everyday human life. Rorty (1991) is a staunch critic of the scientific 
method – for him, there is no method or approach per se that can reliably give the 
truth. Instead, different truth propositions have either better or worse pragmatic 
consequences. In this, Rorty not only eschews the ‘tyranny of method’ (Bernstein 
1983), but also avoids the ‘trap’ of relativism because he holds on to the analysis 
of consequences and sees these as the arbiter of the effectiveness of the pragmatic 
approach to inquiry. One of the critical aspects of the pragmatic model is its 
emphasis on critiquing all outcomes to see if they can be improved upon. With its 
acceptance of fallibilism as a core construct of its epistemology, pragmatism 
permits of new possibilities at any and every stage. It therefore provides an 
inherently critical perspective on knowledge – in terms of its production, use, 
translation, development and dissemination, and therefore represents a ‘healing 
philosophy’ – an integrative approach for (emergent) post-positivist thinking and 
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methodologies. Pragmatism thus offers us a way out of ‘idealised’ notions of 
science and instead provides a platform upon which inquiry, in all its manifestations, 
can rest easily simply because they (different approaches) all have equal validity 
depending on the purpose of said inquiry. It negates Bernstein’s nemesis.   
 
The justification for the pragmatic model is that it provides for the possibility of better 
consequences for social work and other professions simply because it enables a 
plurality of views (methods) to be a part of its overall schema. Pragmatism also 
offers us a view of nature (the world) that is essentially systemic and thus has great 
coherence with the underpinning, holistic ethos of professional social work and 
other human service professions. Pragmatic metaphysics are important in terms of 
how its overall orientation enables us to locate the individual within context. 
Pragmatism takes account of all levels of existence – physicochemical (the physical 
world), psychophysical (biological) and that of ‘mind’ (psychological) (Dewey 
1929a) in much the same way as contemporary ecological models do 
(Bronfenbrenner 1979: 1986; Mullaly 2007; van Wormer 2007; Jack 2012; 
Gitterman and Germain 2013; Manfredo et al 2014; Payne 2014; Magasi et al 2015; 
Ruth et al 2015; Simplican et al 2015) even though the levels may have different 
labels. Nonetheless, these help emphasise the intermingling of psychological and, 
importantly, cultural beliefs and perceptions, all of which inform knowledge 
production and use.  
 
In addition, this broad metaphysics underscores the need for a broad scholarship 
so that as professionals we might come somewhat closer to understanding what it 
is we, and those we work with, wish and need to achieve. In this, pragmatism 
promises a place for interdisciplinarity such that we might understand the individual 
from as many perspectives as possible. As a corollary of this, such a broad 
metaphysics demands that we also draw from the interdisciplinarity inherent within 
differing sources of knowledge and of knowing. Such interdisciplinarity opens the 
way for the adoption of a range of critical perspectives to inform the process of 
inquiry: all manner of social and behavioural sciences, feminist studies, literary 
studies, religious studies and others. In allowing such a broad perspective, and 
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admitting of these possibilities, pragmatism’s conception of mind is able to 
accommodate well to the ‘social’ and to foreground the centrality of people’s needs 
as a legitimate topic for pragmatic inquiry.  
 
Neo-pragmatists like Fraser (1989) would contend that the ‘social’ must include the 
welfare systems that exist and to which many involved with social work have or 
need access to (Rescher 1972). West (1993) makes an interesting connection to 
the theme of ‘human flowering’ (flourishing) as being a core political pragmatic ideal, 
echoing Aristotle’s eudemonia. These writers have as their focus the issue of social 
justice as a core pragmatic agenda item – as does social work. West’s political 
pragmatism ‘calls for the reinvigoration of a sane, sober, and sophisticated 
intellectual life in [America] and for regeneration of social forces empowering the 
disadvantaged, degraded, and dejected. It rejects the faddish cynicism and 
fashionable conservatism rampant in the intelligentsia and general populace’ (West 
1989: 239 in Lewis 2007: 308). Such a pragmatic political philosophy would offer 
professionals a range of tools for cultural criticism that would aim for ‘a more 
egalitarian redistribution of wealth and power that includes the elimination of 
poverty, a head-on assault against white supremacists ideas and practices…a 
monumental pushing back of patriarchal and homophobic structures and a cultural 
renaissance that gives moral meaning and social hope for citizens in a more free, 
just—and ecologically sound—future.’ (West 1993: ix). Thus, the problems faced 
by social work (and other professions) is not the lack of ambition, but, as Lewis 
(2007) claims ‘The problem is a lack of adequate theoretical and philosophic 
underpinning that support that role and a sufficient constituency within [the 
professions] to put that theoretical underpinning to work’ (p 308). 
 
The structure of pragmatism and its approach to inquiry thus provides us with the 
essential ingredients for a functional approach to inquiry and problem resolution 
and, ergo, research. It also provides an approach to reasoning that is located within 
the realms of ‘everyday’ experience (abduction) and that is therefore available to 
everyone – professionals and service users alike, that resonates with common 
human experience – itself the basis of all knowledge, belief and action (Prus and 
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Puddephatt 2009). Its underpinning principles have epistemic credibility by virtue of 
the commitment to fallibilism and the recognition that all solutions and outcomes 
are, by reference to this, only ever provisional. It also provides us with a solid basis 
for accepting that the ultimate value of inquiry lies in its capacity to enhance human 
well-being or eudemonia or, in keeping with the pragmatic principle, the restoration 
and maintenance of homeostasis. Finally, such an approach sits comfortably with 
social work’s overall purposes and its stated aims – its commitment to social justice 
(broadly defined) is well served by reference and adherence to pragmatism.  
 
7.4 Modelling a Pragmatic Epistemology 
Figure 7a below represents a schematic of a pragmatic epistemology of and for 
social work practice. In its purview it refers itself to the main themes and domains 
of interest within and across the social work knowledge debate, all of which were 
evident in the findings of this study – knowledge definition, production, transfer, use, 
development and dissemination.  
 
During the course of this study and in reviewing the literature it has become 
apparent that the whole social work knowledge terrain is confused by the myriad 
terms and meanings applied to the issues being considered. There is a plethora of 
models and multiple terminologies. The model for a pragmatic epistemology aims 
to simplify this by utilising precise terminology that itself has within it multiple 
interpretations. This is not oxymoronic – the term ‘inquiry’ for example is relatively 
straightforward to understand, but as a notion it has multiple meanings, in much the 
same way that pragmatism would actually see the process itself – as being 
constituted of various ways and means of undertaking an inquiry, none of which 
should necessarily be uniquely privileged. The definitions for each of the phases 
and domains within this epistemology are set out and discussed below.  
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Figure 7a. A Schematic of a Pragmatic Epistemology10 
1. KNOWLEDGE: DEFINITION 
1.1. WARRANTED ASSERTIONS 
 
2. KNOWLEDGE: PRODUCTION 
2.1. EXPERIENCE – FACTS - INTUITION  
2.2. DOUBT 
2.3. METHODS  
2.4. CONTEXT 
2.5. INQUIRY – INFERENCES 
2.6. RESEARCH - PHRONESIS 
 
3. KNOWLEDGE: TRANSFER 
3.1. SITUATIONAL - CONTEXTUALISED 
3.2. GENERAL – DECONTEXTUALISED 
3.3. CONSULTATION 
 
4. KNOWLEDGE: USE 
4.1. PRAGMATIC MAXIM 
4.2. CONTEXT 
4.3. TYPES/FORMS 
4.4. PERSONAL 
4.5. ORGANISATIONAL 
4.6. COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE 
4.7. COMMUNAL/PUBLIC 
 
5. KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION 
5.1. INDIVIDUAL 
5.2. COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE 
5.3. ORGANISATION 
5.4. COMMUNAL/PUBLIC 
5.5. PHRONESIS – RESEARCH 
5.6. KNOWLEDGE BROKERING 
 
                                                 
10 This schematic is presented in linear fashion. However, as with the process of inquiry itself, the 
model is iterative and each ‘section’ may be aligned to or juxtaposed with any other section at any 
given time, depending on the situation and the complexity of the processes and issues involved.  
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7.5 Definitional Terms within a Pragmatic Epistemology 
7.5.1 Knowledge: Definition  
Knowledge is here defined as being a ‘warranted assertion’. This is a belief that is 
strong enough to prompt action. It can be made up of any kind of knowledge, and 
be drawn from any source: experience (of life, from practice – hence experiential 
knowledge), common-sense understandings (common-sense knowledge), intuition 
(intuitive knowledge), know-how-to knowledge (tacit knowledge), and propositional 
knowledge (knowledge of facts – ‘knowing that’, as well as derivatives thereof: 
empirical knowledge, procedural knowledge, theoretical knowledge, process 
knowledge, practical knowledge. The issue here is that when we are in a position 
to act on the basis of what we think we know, and are confident that our belief (our 
knowledge) is plausible enough for us to act on the basis of it, where that knowledge 
comes from is irrelevant. The current view is to use only that knowledge derived 
from what are perceived and argued to be legitimate sources, but as the discussion 
above has illustrated, these are assertions based on assumptions of the pre-
eminence of the prevailing standards of the community which are, in large measure, 
a distortion of the real meaning of inquiry. The justification for this definition of 
knowledge, and the implications for action that arise therefrom are mitigated by 
reference to the ‘plausibility’ caveat i.e. that what we believe has to be plausible by 
reference to our standard belief systems.  
 
7.5.2 Knowledge: Production 
Knowledge production is defined here as arising by reference to our experience, by 
reference to facts about the world and our place in it – these facts may have been 
drawn from codified sources, experience or via any one of the sources referred to 
under ‘knowledge definition’ above, and by reference to intuition – that which we 
know but of which we cannot say how we know it, or necessarily why we know it 
(2.1).  The catalyst for the production of knowledge (or the restoration of the 
previous state or its betterment) is the presence of some manifestation of doubt. 
This might be referred to as disequilibrium, anxiety, confusion or any other synonym 
or applicable term (2.2). When we experience doubt, we are prompted to act in 
some way or other – we must act in response to the doubt – this action will manifest 
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as a way of acting in response to the doubt. The methods(s) we use are largely 
dependent on the situation/context we are in and the nature of the doubt 
experienced (2.3). It may therefore be appropriate to use highly ‘scientific’ methods 
– a RCT or it may be more appropriate to utilise a more interpretive, person-centred 
or participatory approach or mixed-methods. The method should match the 
presenting situation – the context (2.4) but be open to reflexive change on the basis 
of the results of drawing inferences from the process of the inquiry. These 
inferences may be deductive, inductive or abductive, with this iterative process 
generating a phronetic approach to the process of inquiry (2.5). Subsequent to this, 
the process of initial inquiry may lead to the development of a formal research 
process (2.6) in order to produce knowledge in a more controlled and defined way. 
The principles governing this ‘formalised’ approach are the same for that of inquiry, 
although the methodological approach and the methods may be developed by 
reference to more explicit and formal criteria, although its orientation must be 
phronetic (iterative).  
 
7.5.3 Knowledge: Transfer 
In order to determine whether the knowledge we possess is appropriate, we need 
to consider whether it is situational knowledge of a contextualised (3.1) sort, or more 
generalised knowledge of a decontextualised (3.2) nature, or it may have elements 
of both. By ‘situational’ is meant knowledge (from whatever source) that appears to 
have a higher degree of relevance to the particular situation and its context than 
‘general’ knowledge which is knowledge that could be applied to more or less any 
situation and has little specificity to the context at hand, although it may have 
relevance (for example, the law). The decision of which knowledge to transfer or 
choose to use is one for the practitioner. Here, they draw on their own judgement 
as to what they think is more likely to be of most use by reference to the pragmatic 
maxim. It may be however that certain policies/procedures or other 
protocols/statutes regarding what knowledge to use are extant, so the choice may 
well be a ‘forced’ one. Nonetheless, the presence and underpinning axiology 
inherent within the pragmatic maxim ought to orient the practitioner to a rejection of 
these extant ways of doing if they appear to be at odds with the context or their 
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assessment and understanding of the broader situation. It is in situations like this 
that consultation with colleagues or others may take place (3.3). 
 
7.5.4 Knowledge: Use 
What knowledge use, and how to use it are inherent and symbiotic components of 
this dimension. When using knowledge, what is used and, importantly, how it is 
used are guided by reference to the pragmatic maxim (4.1). The applicability and 
ergo the use of the knowledge is applied to the specific context (4.2) with due regard 
being had of the changing nature of this, as any intervention is likely to generate 
some reaction. The type or form of knowledge used is determined by reference to 
context, but can legitimately be drawn from any plausible source (4.3). In using 
knowledge, this is likely to represent a personal investment of one’s own personal 
resources (energy, emotions) and may exact a personal cost (distress, feelings of 
achievement or otherwise) (4.4.). Similarly, the use of knowledge will represent an 
investment from or via the organisation in terms of time, money or other material 
resources, as well as time and support for the practitioner to address issues brought 
by the act of using the knowledge (support, supervision, consultation, evaluation) 
(4.5). The use of knowledge will always involve a personal and an organisational 
element, and it may also involve colleagues – a community of practice (4.6), either 
in terms of facilitating and supporting the use of such knowledge directly, and/or in 
terms of supporting its use by supporting the individual and/or the organisation in 
understanding how the knowledge was used – was it used correctly, is it of use to 
other practitioners, or the wider community/public? (4.7).  
 
7.5.5 Knowledge: Development and Dissemination  
This refers to the role of the individual (5.1), of any communities of practice (team 
members, wider organisational colleagues, other agencies, professional 
organisations etc) (5.2), the organisation (5.3) and the wider community or public 
(5.4) in relation to developing and/or disseminating the knowledge used. Any or all 
of these may undertake such development, and such activity may involve the 
instigation of formal research processes, methodologies and methods as referred 
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to in 2 above, but would proceed phronetically following abductive analysis of its 
potential (5.5). The dissemination of knowledge may involve the use of formal 
knowledge brokers, or the use of others at a local level providing a similar service, 
including the organisation itself that may choose to incorporate and share its 
knowledge findings in policies/procedures and other codified forms (5.5). 
 
It is however necessary to point out that the schematic representation of the model 
presented above underplays its dynamic nature, much like the evidence will always 
underdetermine the ‘facts’. Once we understand the overall process and the 
relevance and interrelationships between the elements, it becomes possible to 
move these around to suit ones purposes. The actors who understand and engage 
with the model and use this in a way that suits the purposes of the situation inject 
the dynamism. The model is simply a model – a theoretical construct that may assist 
practitioners in engaging with situations in ways that generate new synergies and 
connections – ones that may never have existed before. The success of the model 
(any model) is dependant on the extent to which the practitioner makes it work for 
them, and the extent to which organisations allow practitioners to spend time using 
the model, reflecting on and refining its applications as these relate to their 
situations.  
 
7.6 Possibilities for and Some Implications of a Pragmatic Epistemology 
If we refer back to the beginning of this section we can see how ‘cluttered’ the 
current social work knowledge landscape is with its various models and claims of 
privilege for certain approaches over others. Each of these models says something 
important and of relevance, and even those who argue for the pre-eminence of 
certain ways of knowing and doing over others do so with style and commitment. 
However, what none of them do with any ease is present the issues 
straightforwardly nor in a way that recognises the value of diverse ways of knowing 
and doing. The broader philosophical, epistemological and professional literature, 
as well as some of the social work literature is able to provide an overview of the 
many issues extant in this discussion, but it is a very large overview with many 
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elements and as such it is difficult to disentangle these in such a way as to make 
them accessible in order that understanding them may contribute something useful 
to the debate and to practice, rather than simply perpetuating the debate, ad 
nauseum.  
 
A pragmatic epistemology does not seek to ‘better’ these models or to dismiss the 
important discussions contained within the various writings that do exist. What it 
does seek to do is to simplify the matter by referring to core principles that are 
applicable to all the issues raised elsewhere. In doing so, it allows for the various 
discussions to (re-) orient themselves to what really matters about professional 
knowledge and to consider, more realistically, how to make the best use of the 
widest range of knowledge in order that adaptation to the needs and demands of 
the situation can be as focused as possible within practice (Borden 2013). A 
pragmatic epistemology is inclusive, rooted in experience and practice, value-laden, 
and democratic.  
 
The findings from this study suggest that practitioners are working in complex and 
contested environments, often unsure of how they ought to come to understand the 
problems they are to deal with, and what to bring to bear on these from the 
perspective of relevant, functional knowledge. Do they simply do what others have 
told them to do, irrespective of whether this seems to ‘fit’ with what their senses and 
experience tell them, or do they just ‘have a go’, not knowing whether the knowledge 
they think might be useful is allowed or valued? What do they do with the knowledge 
they have amassed, sometimes over many years? How could others benefit from 
this? These and other themes and issues identified from within this study accord 
with what the broader literature also testifies too – a confused and confusing terrain 
regarding one of the most important assets they possess – knowledge.  
 
In developing a pragmatic epistemology, consideration has to be given to some of 
the implications that might arise from its adoption as a credible framework. In terms 
of issues relating to the source and types of knowledge this framework seeks to 
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endorse, any concerns over legitimacy or appropriateness can be monitored and 
responded to by reference to the practitioner’s own professionalism, external 
referents (codes of conduct; professional standards; contractual obligations) and 
motivations, as well as by employer/organisational policies, strategies, review, 
development and support mechanisms. One of the issues within debates such as 
this one is that there is a tendency to try and construct models and processes 
regarding knowledge and practice that encompass and legislate for any and all 
eventualities in terms of where it might or ought to come from and how it should or 
must be used. That should not be the function of such discussions or the models 
that these espouse. If the profession accepts the philosophical, epistemological and 
practice-related arguments that precede and underpin the adoption of such a 
model, then nothing is lost in relation to accountability. On the contrary, there is 
much to be gained by practitioners taking full ownership of what they know and with 
what they do with what they know. After all, one must assume that such 
professionals are both morally responsible and possess agency in line with 
Aristotle’s theory of responsibility (Müller 2015).  There was in this study a sense of 
detachment from those respondents who were engaged in routinised practice, 
although their passion for the work they were involved in was still evident, if muted. 
By recognising, honouring and celebrating creativity, the profession and the people 
who receive services and employers are all going to benefit. 
 
7.6.1 Implications for Individuals 
It is then the responsibility of all those actors involved in practice to take 
responsibility for their own actions or inactions, for their choices and the 
consequences that follow. It is also the responsibility of those who are charged with 
delivering these (very) human services (the employers/organisations) to ensure that 
they use the resources they have to best effect. The biggest resource of any human 
service is the people who populate it, and they bring with them all of themselves 
and lots of knowledge and experience. To be sure, this needs to be ‘topped up’, 
developed, shaped and guided to suit the purposes of those it is intended to benefit, 
but to deny the essence of what it is to be a knowing human being with full agency 
is to trivialise what it means to be a professional. It is therefore important that the 
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concept of the ‘learning organisation’ be made explicit and functional (Massaro, 
Dumay and Garlatti 2015; Deverell and Burnett 2012; Gau 2011; Örtenblad 2001). 
Current frameworks in professional social work aim to reflect these aspirations in 
the shape of support, guidance and assistance given to newly qualified staff under 
NQSW/ASYE schemes (Smith, Willimas and Ward 2015; Grant, Sheridan and 
Webb 2014; Manthorpe et al 2014; Welch, Lerpiniere and Young 2014; Novell 2013; 
Carpenter et al  2012; Skills for Care 2012) and various manifestations of 
continuous professional development programmes for qualified (Brady 2014; 
Moriarty and Manthorpe 2014a; Halton, Scanlon and Powell 2013) and experienced 
staff, all of which are ‘pegged’ to professional/registration and career enhancement. 
Thus, it is not the function of a model of knowledge to provide solutions to issues of 
accountability.  
 
7.6.2 Implications for Organisations   
It is important that the systems that support and provide services are sufficiently 
attuned to their role in this pragmatic endeavour. Cavaleri (2005) draws interesting 
parallels between systems thinking and the principles of pragmatism. He rightly 
notes: “Systems thinking and pragmatic knowledge creating-processes are both 
defined by their grounding in how things actually work in practice.” (p379) and to 
this extent they are both concerned with cause-and-effect. Systemic thinking is 
likewise concerned with defining systemic patterns of causal relationships (Senge 
1990), and the writings of a number of systems thinkers have pragmatism imbued 
throughout their writings (Churchman 1971; Ackoff 1974; Argyris 1990). The 
significance of a pragmatic epistemology for organisations and other systems is that 
it also helps the system to identify what works well, and why this might be so. The 
adoption of the pragmatic principle at an organisational level can help to identify 
and build upon past successes and enhance organisational excellence 
(Alexanderson et al 2009; Martinez-Brawley 1995). If a system becomes perturbed, 
then the response has to be to inquire into the reason for this. Using the framework 
referred to above, an organisation can seek to remove the ‘doubt’ and restore the 
system to optimal functioning. In this way, a pragmatic learning organisation 
(Cavaleri 2008, 2011; Edwards 2011) can maximise its own resources (people and 
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the knowledge they possess) by attending to its own proximal organisational needs 
and its resource needs by encouraging that resource (its people) to maximise their 
own resource potential (Rowley and Gibbs 2008; Kaiser, Fordinal and Kragulj 2014; 
Senge 2014).  
 
This is a complementary process whereby the experiences of the system are 
influenced by the very things it seeks to manage. In symbiotic response to (let us 
assume) poor staff performance, poor development processes or micro-
management, the systems resources become less than efficient – the knowledge 
generating processes of the system used to identify and maintain optimum 
performance - beliefs (warranted assertions about the best way to maintain 
optimum functioning of the system), in this case about how to act towards 
employees - are compromised by the beliefs (warranted assertions) of the 
employees themselves about the beliefs (warranted assertions) of the organisation 
– a vicious circle. The knowledge management of the system needs to be 
interactive, engaged and adaptive by reference to the utilisation of the pragmatic 
‘lens’ (Cavaleri 2011; Labedz, Cavaleri and Berry 2011; Gabbay et al 2003). 
 
7.6.3 Implications for Practice and for Knowing and Doing 
What organisations (and the profession(s)) need to do is to give practitioners 
‘permission’ to inquire in these ways and to apply the knowledge they possess, as 
individuals in ways they believe are relevant and appropriate. The value-base of the 
profession, the employment contract and other structural elements protect service 
users and the organisation from poor practice because of poor knowledge use in 
the same way that these structural elements aim to protect against other things. A 
model of professional knowledge is not explicitly designed to do this – nor should it 
be. If such a model does have some function in this regard, it is extant by virtue of 
the model’s aim to encourage the best possible use of the fullest possible range of 
knowing to inform doing in order to maximise success (outcome-focus) and 
enhance wellbeing (value and process focus). To attempt to create a model of 
knowledge and knowing that legislates against any future ‘malpractice’ based on 
poor knowledge use is to misunderstand this whole issue.  
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In terms of practice, if the profession, its organisations and those practitioners 
concerned consider the principles of the model outlined above and relate these to 
practice situations, there are likely to be significant changes to practice. As the 
results of this study seem to show, many practitioners in particular fields of practice 
already function in ways that evidence alignment to the principles and properties of 
a pragmatic epistemology. Through the use of the (learning) organisations systems 
and processes already extant: training, CPD, supervision, team cultures (Chang 
and Lin 2015; Nerland and Karseth 2015; Messenger 2013) systems could be 
developed to facilitate the articulation of the knowledge processes operational 
within practice contexts. Knowledge from a range of sources could be factored in to 
daily practice through simple recording tools to form a baseline of knowledge for 
practitioners to use. Knowledge-brokering activities, already visible in many if not 
all organisations to some extent, could be more easily tailored to the needs of 
practitioners by reference to their increased capacity to articulate not only what they 
do know, but also what they feel they need to know. The democratic ethos of 
pragmatism, and the everyday-nature of inquiry should be capitalised on to prompt 
engagement with knowledge definition, production, transfer, use, development and 
dissemination. All of us ‘inquire’ every day into all aspects of daily life. The principles 
of ‘scientific’ or ‘professional’ inquiry are merely more systematic; their underpinning 
principles are common, universal and available to all.  
 
This section has provided an analysis and interpretation of the findings from this 
study and argued that the philosophical traditions of pragmatism could provide a 
viable means of representing ontology, a functional epistemology and a contribution 
to discussions regarding the philosophy of science for social work practice and 
research. Its orientation to issues of ontology, epistemology, the nature of inquiry 
and its commitment to fallibilism provide a means to go beyond the current debate 
between realism and interpretivism by emphasising its starting point as being 
located within our everyday lived experience.  
 
261 
All inquiry, and pragmatic scientific inquiry in particular, starts from and with the 
problematic situations we face in social life, giving such inquiry an essentially 
humanistic and normative character. The social work profession is exactly this, writ 
large. The contribution of any form of ‘scientific’ endeavour is ultimately judged 
solely on its capacity to resolve human problems, address human needs and widen 
our understanding of what is possible, providing us with some of the means to 
achieve our hopes and aspirations. Pragmatism acknowledges the fallibility of all 
methods and approaches to achieve absolute certainty, and unlike other 
approaches to science, takes seriously the value of utilising those that have proven 
themselves to be more reliable than others in reaching warrantable assertions. In 
the end, all our inquiries should “end in conclusions which, when they are referred 
back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more 
significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful.” 
(Dewey 1929a pp9-10).  
 
Social work is located within the realm of those everyday, ordinary life-experiences 
– our own and those of the people we work with and for. We must therefore not 
privilege the means by which we might come to understand these, but use the best 
of all we have to do the best we can. It is therefore important to recognise that the 
development of a model such as the one referred to above, based on empirical 
inquiry and theoretical consideration, has practical relevance to the profession and 
to those who constitute this. This model is a contribution to the means by which 
professionals can utilise the fullest array of knowledge in the pursuit of their craft 
and the delivery of services that can claim to be as fully informed as possible. It 
avoids the circuitous debates regarding what should or should not be privileged by 
providing a more democratic focus on the use of the fullest range of human (and 
professional) knowledge in a way that encourages autonomy, foregrounds 
accountability and offers the means for future research and development in and of 
its potentials across a plethora of professional contexts.  
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7.7 Limitations and Innovations  
7.7.1 Limitations 
As with any study, it is important to reflect upon its perceived limitations, be they 
theoretical and/or empirical. It is acknowledged that the sample size (n=37) may not 
be representative of the whole class of social workers to which attention was 
focused. At one level, this represents an issue of generalisability from the empirical 
perspective and, ergo, raises issues concerning external validity (Silverman 2014; 
Wetcher-Hendricks 2011) referred to in chapter four. However, the findings do 
resonate with the broader literature so there is a degree of coherence in this regard 
that lends support to the validity of the findings. It might also have been more 
beneficial to have been more purposive in relation to the sample. A future study 
along these lines might well seek to identify n x social workers from two or more 
particular fields/areas of practice. This could enable the researcher to inquire more 
into the extent to which particular roles influence knowledge definition, use, 
development etc. beyond that achieved here.   
 
Quantitative and qualitative analyses might also have had more of a focus on the 
significance or otherwise of individual Q-sorts and commentary may well have 
considered these. This type of analysis might well have practical relevance in 
informing locally based knowledge management strategies and could have impact 
at a number of levels. In particular, the mixed method approach adopted here has 
the potential to enhance the credibility of both types of data.  
 
In relation to the qualitative elements of the study, it is acknowledged that follow-up 
interviews would have been beneficial. If these had been undertaken at (say) an 
interval of twelve months, this would have provided important information on the 
extent to which views at the time of the first data-collection tranche held over time, 
and to what extent they were then accurate. This would then facilitate inquiry based 
on the nature of professional knowledge in terms of its changing and evolving 
nature, as posited by pragmatism. Of particular interest through such an approach 
would be the opportunity to discern what particular elements of earlier views had 
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changed, and what it was practitioners felt had prompted this. There is scope here 
to engage in longitudinal research, which would address broader aspects of validity.  
 
These limitations notwithstanding, the inquiry as conducted utilised the available 
methods as effectively as possible and as a result, the many potentials evident in 
using Q-methods in social work research are more evident.  
 
7.7.2 Innovations 
There are a number of innovations evident within this study. Firstly, the adoption of 
a mixed-methods approach not only utilises the strengths of both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, whilst minimising the impact of their inherent weaknesses 
(see chapter four), but such an approach remains faithful to the pragmatic 
paradigm. Secondly, the use of a factor analytic approach, with its statistical 
credentials, adds weight to the validity of the study. Third, the adoption of Q-
methodology with its focus on the importance of subjectivity (‘self-referent 
perspectives’) allows for ‘hidden meanings’ within (copious amounts of) data to 
emerge and be analysed. Finally, the use of the approach referred to here has 
enormous potential as it is applicable to an almost infinite number of situations, 
particularly those where difficult or ‘taboo’ themes may need to be explored. As 
chapter four illustrated, there are many topics where Q has been applied 
successfully.  
 
Both the limitations of the study and its innovations provide possibilities for the 
future. Excitingly, Q-methodology has not yet ‘surfaced’ within social work as a 
‘method of choice’ for researchers. Its (relative) simplicity, powerful statistics and 
elegant descriptiveness offers the potential for an emergent corpus of studies 
utilising Q that could focus on topics perhaps not yet fully explored, or those that 
are rather more difficult to engage with using more ‘traditional’ qualitative 
approaches. Furthermore, its capacity to process large amounts of data not only 
provides the opportunity to undertake large studies on topics of relevance to the 
profession(s), but to explore some of the ‘darker’ or more ‘difficult’ areas of social 
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work practice around abuse and neglect, violence, and employment or professional 
matters using large samples to increase validity. Conversely, it is flexible enough to 
justify its use in small-scale studies.  
 
Another innovative feature of this study has been its philosophical approach. The 
study has utilised philosophical/epistemological arguments to address professional 
and practical issues, thus evidencing the value of ‘practical philosophy’. At the 
practice level, being aware of how we make and draw inferences and how these 
can and ought to be tested and refined is absolutely fundamental to every 
professional, and yet most would probably shy away from the very mention of the 
word ‘philosophy’, let alone ‘epistemology’. This is what professional social workers 
do every day – they draw inferences based on their observations and experiences 
and act accordingly. This is epistemology in action. Moral philosophy ‘in action’ is 
represented by reference to both our personal and professional value base, so 
there is no compelling reason for the underpinning principles of knowledge 
definition, creation and use not to be articulated in an easily digestible form, in the 
same way as virtue ethics is.  
 
This study has highlighted and articulated a functional means by which the benefits 
of the underpinning principles of a pragmatic epistemology can be brought to bear 
on the real world of social work practice.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Dundee Ethics Application 
UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS 
COMMITTEE APPROVAL FORM 
Title of project: UNDERSTANDING PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 
Name of lead Investigator: STEVE J HOTHERSALL, School of Education, Social Work and 
Community Education 
Status: Student 
Other Academic Staff involved: PROFESSOR TIM KELLY [Principal Supervisor] and DR IAN BARRON 
[Second Supervisor], School of Education, Social Work and Community Education 
E-mail address: S.Hothersall@dundee.ac.uk 
Date: 9th May 2012 UREC Ref no. (LEAVE BLANK): 
  YES NO N/A 
1 Will you describe the main procedures to participants in advance so 
that they are informed about what to expect in your study? 
   
2 Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary?    
3 Will your participants be able to read and understand the 
participant information sheet? 
 
 
  
4 Will you obtain written informed consent for participation?    
5 If the research is observational, will you ask participants for their 
consent to being observed? 
   
 
6 Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research 
at any time without penalty and for any reason? 
 
 
  
7 With questionnaires, will you give participants the option of 
omitting questions they do not want to answer? 
 
 
  
 
8 Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with full 
confidentiality and that, if published, it will not be identifiable as 
theirs? 
 
 
  
9 Will you give participants a brief explanation of the purpose of the 
study at the end of their participation in it, and answer any 
questions? 
 
 
  
10 Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants in any 
way? 
   
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11 Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing either 
physical or psychological distress or discomfort? If Yes, give details 
on a separate sheet and state what you will tell them to do if they 
should experience any problems (e.g. who they can contact for 
help). 
  
 
 
12 Do participants fall into any of the 
following special groups? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If YES please specify disability. 
Children (under 18 years of 
age) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Children under 5 years of 
age 
 
Pregnant women 
 
Participants studied with 
respect to contraception or 
conception 
People with disability (e.g. 
learning or communication 
difficulties) 
Note that you may also need to 
obtain satisfactory Disclosure 
Scotland (or equivalent) clearance. 
People in custody 
 
People engaged in illegal 
activities (e.g. drug-taking) 
Non-human animals  
 
Patients 
More than 5000 
participants 
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Please tick either Box A or Box B below and provide any details required in support of 
your application. If you ticked NO to any of Q1-9 or YES to any of Q10-12 then you must 
tick Box B. 
 
A. I consider that this project has no significant ethical implications to be brought before 
the University Research Ethics Committee. 
 
 
 
State the purpose of the research. Give a brief description of participants and procedure 
(including the planned sample size and methods and tests used). This description must make 
clear what participants are expected to do. You must also make clear how data (e.g. video 
tapes) will be kept confidential and secure. Note that this description will be read by non-
specialists and must be readily comprehensible by a lay person. 
 
You must attach intended information and consent forms and copies of any questionnaires 
you plan to use. 
 
The research aims to explore the [subjective] views of professional social workers and other 
(non-social work) professionals on the topic of professional knowledge, and elements thereof, by 
utilising a Q-methods approach. Participants are presented with a number of statements (the Q-
sample – attached) and are asked to sort these into an array locating each statement somewhere 
across a continuum to indicate those they most agree with (+5) through to those they least agree 
with (-5). This is referred to as the condition of instruction. Participants must however place all 
statements somewhere in the Q-sort, although there are no particular time constraints and they 
can change their minds as to what goes where as many times as they like until they are satisfied 
with their array. At this point, the procedure is complete. A blank Q-sort is attached. P-set 3 
however will have a slightly different condition of instruction (see below).  
 
Participants of P-set (group) 1 will be qualified social workers employed within a local authority 
social work area and recruited via email. Permission has been obtained from the Head of 
Children’s Services for me to make direct (e-mail) contact with social workers and invite them to 
participate. My invitation e-mail will contain basic information regarding the study and have 
attached to it a copy of the Participant Information Sheet. If a social worker wishes to 
participate in the study, they will be asked to e-mail me to confirm this and I will then contact 
them with details regarding the completion of the Q-Sort.  
 
Participants of P-set (group) 2 will be non-social workers but will possess a professional 
qualification and have considerable previous professional experience in an unrelated profession 
(business studies, accountancy, computing) and will be recruited via e-mail from across the 
Robert Gordon University staff pool. Permission for me to approach staff directly has been 
obtained from the respective heads of departments and the protocol for initial contact and 
invitations to participate will be as for P-Set 1 above. Both P-sets are randomly matched on other 
broad demographics including the possession of a professional qualification. 
 
Participants of P-set (group) 3 will match the characteristics of P-set 2 but will be working on a 
slightly different condition of instruction from the other P-sets. In the case of P-set 3, they will 
be asked to score the statements as they think social workers will have scored them.  
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I aim to recruit 6-12 participants in each P-set (group). One of the benefits of the Q approach is 
that it can effectively deal with small sample sizes. However, I will ensure that data sets, once 
produced, are of equal numbers from each of the P-sets prior to analysis. Data provided will be 
numerical and apart from age, gender and years qualified (P-set 1), there will be no identifying 
material at all unless participants undertaking the Q-Sort agree to be involved in phase 2 (see 
below). The use of 3 P-sets allows for the triangulation of data sets.  
 
All data will be securely stored through a password-protected system. There is no identifying 
information on the Q-sort other than age range, gender and length of/type of qualification. 
However, there is the option for participants to identify themselves if they wish to participate in 
a second phase inquiry relating to the factor scoring of their responses, post-analysis by 
undertaking a semi-structured interview (max of 4 from each P-set). The specific questions to be 
contained in any interview schedule can only be determined once analysis with Q-Method 
(http://www.lrz.de/~schmolck/qmethod/) has been completed in order to establish which 
questions were weighted significantly. However, questions will be of the order of ‘You rated 
highly on statement(s) X and Y: why was this particularly important/unimportant to you?’ and 
responses noted. All responses from the interview phase will be analysed thematically and may 
be subjected to subsequent analysis with Q-Method.   
 
In relation to the initial Q-Sort phase, venues will be negotiated and specific terms and 
conditions as set out in the appropriate participant information sheet(s) will apply. There are no 
additional risks anticipated in relation to the initial Q-Sort and all original paper-based data will 
be stored securely for a period of 2 years following the completion of the thesis to which this 
empirical work applies, after which time it will be securely destroyed in its entirety. The 
resultant data-set produced via Q-Method analysis will be securely held for a period of 5 years 
following the completion of the thesis, after which time it will be deleted.  
 
In relation to subsequent semi-structured interviews, a separate protocol and participant 
information sheet will be submitted for final ethical approval once an interview schedule is 
developed subsequent upon the initial Q-Method analysis having generated a range of weighted 
questions. In the interim, the following information may be of use: interviews would be of 1-hour 
(max) duration at a negotiated venue and written consent from each participant would be 
obtained prior to interviews being organised. A SSI schedule will be available and all respondents 
will be asked the same [semi-structured] questions. Responses will be noted by the researcher 
using pen and paper and subsequently analysed thematically. Initial Q-Sort responses and 
subsequent SSI’s will be matched by the use of a simple numeric coding system to reintroduce 
anonymity into the analysis. Original researcher notes and thematic analyses arising from these 
will be coded numerically and stored securely for the same periods as referred to above. 
 
Arrangements appertaining to de-briefings are noted in the participant information sheet(s), 
although given the nature of the study and the tasks involved, I do not anticipate a specific 
requirement for de-briefing in the normal sense of that phrase. However, should a participant 
require further information about the study or its rationale etc, my details are available should 
they wish to contact me.  
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B. I consider that this project may have ethical implications that should be brought before 
the Ethics Committee. 
 
Please provide all the further information listed below in a separate attachment. Note that this 
description will be read by non-specialists and must be readily comprehensible by a lay person. 
 
1. Title of project. 
2. Purpose of project and its academic rationale. 
3. Brief description of methods and measurements and how data will be stored. 
4. Participants: recruitment methods, number, age, gender, exclusion/inclusion criteria. 
5. Consent and participant information arrangements, debriefing. 
6. A clear statement of the ethical considerations raised by the project and how you intend to deal 
with them. 
7. Estimated start date and duration of project. 
 
 
 
I am familiar with the University of Dundee Code of Practice for Research on Human 
Participants, and have discussed them with the other researchers involved in the project. I 
confirm that my research abides by these guidelines. 
 
 
Signed:  .............................................    Print Name: Steve J Hothersall                 Date: 
9/5/12 
(Lead Investigator) 
 
 
There is an obligation on the lead researcher to bring to the attention of the Ethics Committee 
any issues with ethical implications not covered by the above checklist. 
 
UREC v. 1.9, 15 December 2006 
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Appendix 3 Participant Information Sheet/Agreement to Participate Sheet 
 
‘Understanding professional and other forms of knowledge’ 
A study being undertaken by Steve J Hothersall as part of his PhD. 
Principal PhD Supervisor: Professor Tim Kelly – T.B.Kelly@dundee.ac.uk  
Second PhD Supervisor: Dr Ian Barron – I.G.Z.Barron@dundee.ac.uk  
 
INVITATION TO TAKE PART IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
You are being invited to take part in a research study, which is looking into people’s views 
on professional knowledge: how people get it, how important it is, how it is used etc. The study 
will look at the views of both social work professionals and non-social work professionals so as to 
provide a point of comparison. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
This study is exploring the views of social work professionals and non-social work 
professionals regarding professional knowledge. All professionals undergo training of some sort or 
another before they begin their work and once in practice they need to use this alongside 
knowledge gained through experience and other forms of training and development. I want to try 
and understand where people get their knowledge from, how they use it and whether some sorts 
of knowledge are seen as being more useful or important than other sorts. I shall be doing this by 
presenting participants with 60 randomly numbered statements that are to be rated according to 
whether it is more or less like you/your view about a particular statement. So, if you disagree 
really strongly with a particular statement, you would rate it at -5, whereas if you agree really 
strongly about another statement, it would be rated as +5, and so on until all the statements have 
been assigned a ‘score’ in the Q-sorter, which is like an inverted pyramid. There are no right or 
wrong answers: what is important is how important or not you think the statement is in relation 
to you. The Q-sort will be done as a paper-based exercise and if you agree to take part, you will 
be given copies of the statements and instructions on how to complete the Q-sorter.  
I hope that participation in this research will benefit academics and practitioners in social 
work and other forms of professional practice by helping us to understand more about how we 
develop and use professional knowledge. I hope that it will have practical benefits by contributing 
to issues relating to workforce development and planning, continuous professional development 
and both pre-and post-qualifying social work education.  
 
TIME COMMITMENT 
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The study will require you to spend about 15 minutes reading through the instructions and 
then 1 hour (max) completing the Q-sort.  
   
TERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without explanation. 
I would however ask that you email me to simply advise that you’ve changed your mind.  
 
RISKS 
There are no known risks for you in this study. However, if you find spending a continuous 
period on a particular task difficult, please advise me before the start of the study and we can 
arrange for you to have a break mid-way through. 
 
COST, REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and there are no inducements offered 
or implied or any penalties for not completing the Q-sort. I would however be very grateful if you 
could complete the Q-sort if you have agreed to do so. There are no financial benefits likely to 
arise for anyone in relation to this research. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The data I shall collect will not contain any personal information about you except your 
gender, your age and the number of years you have held a professional social work qualification 
(if you are in that group), all of which is written on the bottom of the Q-Sorter. Once you have 
completed the Q-Sort, that’s the end of your involvement. If however you would be happy to 
participate in a further, confidential semi-structured telephone interview, which again would last 
no more than an hour, please note your name and a contact number on the Q-Sorter when you 
complete it. If you do provide your contact details for the semi-structured interview, your 
responses are (obviously) no longer anonymous, although they are still confidential and no 
identifying information of any sort will appear in the final results/thesis, and in the event that 
the results are published or are otherwise made available in the public domain, there will be no 
identifying features that could link you personally to the study.  
 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
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I will be glad to answer your questions about this study at any time. Alternatively, you 
might want to contact either of my supervisors (details above) who will similarly be happy to 
discuss with you any questions or queries you may have at any time.  
If you want to find out about the final results of this study, you should contact myself as noted 
below. 
 
WHAT TO DO NEXT? 
If you agree to participate in this study, please email me at s.hothersall@rgu.ac.uk stating 
that you have read and understood the information above and that you agree to take part in the 
study. There’s a bit below you might want to cut and paste to save yourself some time:  
 
“Dear Steve,  
 
I have read and understood the Information relating to your study entitled ‘Understanding 
professional and other forms of knowledge’ and I agree to take part in it. Please contact me with 
the details of when, where and how I can do this.  
 
[Insert your name, email address and a contact number here]” 
 
As soon as I hear from you I’ll be in touch to fix up a mutually convenient date, time and place to 
meet in order to do the Q-Sort.  
 
I look forward to hearing from you soon. Many thanks. 
 
Steve 
 
s.hothersall@rgu.ac.uk  
 
01224 263227 
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Appendix 4 Concourse of Statements 
 
1.   Knowing how to do something is more important than just knowing about something 
 
2.   New knowledge is best if it comes from your own practice and experience 
 
3.  I do things differently depending on the situation I find myself in 
 
4.   Specialist knowledge is essential for social work [my job/role] 
 
5.   Just doing my job on a day-to-day basis is enough to keep me up-to-date 
 
6.   It’s important to be able to say what theories you used in a particular situation 
 
7.   I need to understand something properly before I’ll try it out 
 
8.   I use whatever knowledge I can to make things work at the time 
 
9.   Knowing a lot about a little is better than knowing a little about a lot 
 
10.   There are some things that every social worker [everyone in my job] needs to know; otherwise they 
couldn’t do the job 
 
11.   There are some things in my job that cannot be brought into question-some theories, ways of doing 
things and the like 
 
12.   I practise ‘from the book’ and ‘by the book’; there’s no other way to do if you want to get it right 
 
13.   My organisation invests heavily in training and staff development 
 
14.   Doing things according to the demands of the situation sits easily with me 
 
15.   There are prescribed ways of doing things and seeing things - there has to be in this job 
 
16.   For the most part I tend to ignore policy and procedure and ‘go with the flow’ 
 
17.   I base most of what I do and how I do it on what the experts or my bosses tell me is important 
 
18.   Specialist knowledge isn’t necessary in my work 
 
19.   What informs my practice has to sit comfortably with what I personally believe is right 
 
20.   I’m happy to use knowledge from any source to inform what I do so long as it seems to work 
 
21.   Most of what I know about social work [my job] and how to do it comes from books and policy and such 
like 
 
22.   Clear guidelines in relation to what I need to know are essential for me 
 
23.   All social workers [Everyone in my role] should be able to do most types of [social] work irrespective of 
their particular specialism 
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24.   Some children [people] will deliberately deceive an adult if it helps them to stay safe 
 
25.   A lot of the knowledge I have about my job could be used in similar types of work 
 
26.   The theory base of social work [underpinning my work] is full of stuff that’s quite specific to social work 
[that particular role] 
 
27.   Experts and academics rather than practitioners are best placed to determine the whole issue of ‘what 
works’ in social work [in my job] 
 
28.   ‘Scientific’ or objective knowledge is much more reliable than ‘experiential’ or subjective knowledge 
you get from practice 
 
29.   I am able to specifically identify what theories I am using to inform my practice at any given time 
 
30.   A lot of the theories, research and other ideas that inform what I do are drawn from other disciplines 
and professions 
 
31.   Kids [People] who are securely attached are less likely to have serious relationship problems 
 
32.   I regularly use [specialised theories and models in my assessments] theories and models of attachment 
in my assessments 
 
33.   I usually adapt theories to suit my purposes 
 
34.   What is seen as important in terms of practice is determined more by what it costs rather than whether 
it does any good 
 
35.   I feel confident in making decisions based on my professional judgement in most situations (2/21=19) 
 
36.   It’s fairly clear to me what social work [my job] is all about, so having the right sort of knowledge isn’t a 
problem 
 
37.   Sometimes I just do what needs to be done without really thinking about it 
 
38.   Youngsters [People] who have insecure attachments usually have lots of problems 
 
39.   There’s not much point in using personal knowledge about life in general and applying it to the job – it’s 
not relevant 
 
40.   A lot of useful knowledge about social work [my work] is generated from actually doing the job 
 
41.   Linking theory to practice is something I do all the time 
 
42.   Knowing what you should do is more important than knowing what you could do 
 
43.   Using your professional discretion is encouraged in my job 
 
44.   I have read up on the Dynamic Maturational Model of attachment and I use it in my work [Certain types 
of knowledge are central to my work] 
 
45.   Some children [people] become aggressive or behave strangely in order to keep themselves safe 
 
46.   Theory and practice are like two different worlds to me 
 
47.   Talking with colleagues about what I do and how I do it helps me to learn new stuff and to understand 
the job better 
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48.   I have a good understanding of attachment theory [the core theories that relate to my work] 
 
49.   It’s probably fair to say that some parents [people] who hit their children [who harm those they care 
for] were actually only really trying to protect them 
 
50.   I feel I need to know more about procedures and how they work than I do about people and how they 
work 
 
51.   Knowledge of attachment theory [human development] is central to my work 
 
52.   All facts about the world and everything in it are only ever provisional: nothing is set in stone 
 
53.   Notions about what constitutes social work [what my role is] often change depending on how society 
sees things 
 
54.   The Bowlby/Ainsworth/Main model of attachment [Theories about attachment] helps [help] me to 
understand why adults behave as they do 
 
55.   Sharing my knowledge with others is essential in my job 
 
56.   I regularly read books and research papers about developments in social work [in my job] 
 
57.   There’s only so much you need to know to be a good social worker [practitioner] 
 
58.   What I need to know depends on what I’m involved in at the time 
 
59.   A common-sense approach helps me a lot in my job 
 
60.   I have little confidence in research findings 
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Appendix 5 Q-Sort Grid 
-5 
[Disagree 
strongly/Most 
unlike me] 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 
[Neutral/ 
Unimportant 
to me] 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
[Agree 
strongly/Most 
like me] 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
   
Notes:  
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Appendix 6 Q-Sort Instructions 
 
‘Understanding professional and other forms of knowledge’ 
 
A study being undertaken by Steve J Hothersall as part of his PhD. 
Principal PhD Supervisor: Professor Tim Kelly – T.B.Kelly@dundee.ac.uk 
Second PhD Supervisor: Dr Ian Barron – I.G.Z.Barron@dundee.ac.uk 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE Q-SORT  
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. I hope you will find it enjoyable.  
You will now have 60 randomly numbered statements in front of you and a Q-Sorter, 
which looks like an inverted pyramid. You will see a range of scores at the top of 
the Q-Sorter going from -5 (totally disagree/not like me at all) on the left, through to 
+5 (absolutely agree/just like me) on the right. The other boxes (-4/-3/-2/-
1/0/+1/+2/+3/+4) are gradations of those extremes, with 0 representing a 
completely neutral position.  
What you need to do is to put the number of each statement in a different box to 
correspond with whether it is more/less like you or your view about it 
(disagree/agree). So, if you disagreed really strongly with a particular statement, 
you would write its number under the column marked -5. If you agreed really 
strongly about another statement, its number would go in one of the boxes under 
+5, and so on until you’ve put a different number in every box in the Q-Sorter from 
-5 to +5 (including 0).  
Sometimes people find it easier to look through all the statements first and do a 
‘rough’ estimation of those they feel really strongly about one way or the other (-5 
or +5). Next, they might consider those that they feel strongly about, but perhaps 
not quite so much as the previous ones (these would be under -4 or +4), and so on, 
leaving perhaps until last those that would go under ‘0’ as being of no particular 
import or interest to them. But it’s entirely up to you how you do it and where you 
put the numbers! And if you need to change your mind, that’s fine [because you 
probably will!]. All you need to do is to write a different number in each box: you 
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cannot put the same number in two or more boxes! The completed Q-Sort must 
have all the numbers 1-60 in there somewhere. 
Once this is done, check and make sure that you’ve noted on the form your gender, 
your age and the number of years you’ve been qualified as a social worker, and 
that’s it. You could add comments at the bottom if you wanted – were some 
questions ‘odd’? Did you find certain questions difficult to score? etc, and if you are 
happy to be contacted subsequently and in confidence to undertake a short semi-
structured interview (no more than 1 hour), then please write your name and phone 
number on the Q-Sorter and I’ll get back to you.  
Good luck…and many thanks. 
 
Steve 
 
The University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Dundee has 
reviewed and approved this research study. 
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Appendix 7 Post-Q-Sort Questions 
 
Of the statements you placed in the ‘agree’/plus [+] zone, were any of particular 
significance for you? Why was this? 
Of the statements you placed in the ‘disagree’/minus [-] zone, were any of 
particular significance for you? Why was this? 
Did the process highlight any general issues or thoughts for you in relation to 
knowledge and social work? 
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Appendix 8 Input Data 
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Appendix 11 Appendices D1 – D14 [Data Output Files] 
Appendix D 1 
PQMethod2.20               phd2                                                                                  
PAGE    1 
Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2     
 
Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
 
      Sort    1       2      3       4      5       6      7      8       9     10    11     12    13    14    15     16    17    18    19    20    21    22    23     24    25    26     27    28     29    30    31    32    33     34    35    36     37 
 1 sw37f15    100  053  028  043  027  036  043  045  046  028  046  042  045  030  038  026  045  047  055  036  037  020  033  034  050  001  *16  *07  *09  *07  002  *15  *02  *07  *17  016  *11  
 2 sw48f05    053  100  036  047  043  058  067  066  048  046  063  032  046  058  054  047  053  060  050  054  048  037  050  038  050  003  *10  *10  *11  *10  *27  *33  005  *13  *08  025  *11 
 3 sw54f12    028  036  100  037  029  045  032  036  024  015  033  033  020  042  032  021  033  047  015  007  008  006  039  025  040  *01  *04  *01  001  *03  002  *12  *14  *13  *10  000  *02 
 4 sw45f09    043  047  037  100  043  050  034  044  046  037  045  025  051  051  047  046  047  053  056  024  041  038  047  033  050  000  007  *01  *08  *06  008  *25  005  002  *08  008  *01 
 5 sw59f15    027  043  029  043  100  048  046  034  025  032  037  013  062  023  030  040  047  034  031  040  039  035  049  037  045  *17  *27  *31  *03  *23  000  *28  003  *11  003  010  *17 
 6 sw61f18    036  058  045  050  048  100  055  063  035  024  059  030  051  045  046  049  045  050  035  049  026  031  052  038  044  *14  *02  *22  *16  *22  *18  *33  *06  *20  *15  014  *28 
 7 sw55f33    043  067  032  034  046  055  100  054  014  025  050  013  052  050  062  053  041  045  041  053  039  016  037  053  033  011  *08  *10  *22  *19  *18  *18  000  *15  006  023  001 
 8 sw51f11    045  066  036  044  034  063  054  100  040  046  057  033  047  066  037  050  057  058  051  047  034  051  067  047  054  004  *12  *01  002  *03  *23  *23  *01  *07  *01  014  *16 
 9 sw36m03    046  048  024  046  025  035  014  040  100  048  036  036  035  035  026  019  054  054  048  022  043  044  056  019  061  012  011  010  *07  *06  004  *07  024  020  *03  019  *03 
 10 sw53m22    028  046  015  037  032  024  025  046  048  100  042  016  020  040  031  035  045  044  047  039  045  042  052  041  046  012  000  *04  *01  *01  *13  *21  027  003  004  006  *10 
 11 sw55f13    046  063  033  045  037  059  050  057  036  042  100  035  025  049  051  037  042  065  036  054  030  032  049  048  037  *14  *09  *16  *19  *17  *20  *29  000  *08  *01  018  *10 
 12 sw59f38    042  032  033  025  013  030  013  033  036  016  035  100  016  029  018  016  031  056  027  026  027  010  025  026  025  *05  *04  004  002  008  013  013  018  *02  *01  011  008 
 13 sw55f03    045  046  020  051  062  051  052  047  035  020  025  016  100  041  031  036  051  035  043  038  028  042  047  045  064  *08  *12  *06  *10  *16  *07  *19  000  *16  *07  018  *08 
 14 sw27f01    030  058  042  051  023  045  050  066  035  040  049  029  041  100  046  043  047  051  043  027  018  034  045  041  055  020  *12  012  *08  *03  *06  *19  000  004  012  013  003 
 15 nsw54f30   038  054  032  047  030  046  062  037  026  031  051  018  031  046  100  041  038  051  046  039  036  009  039  047  030  022  002  001  *09  *10  001  *16  008  001  002  007  017 
 16 nsw62f40   026  047  021  046  040  049  053  050  019  035  037  016  036  043  041  100  033  037  026  041  051  034  045  039  037  *11  *17  *18  *18  *21  *13  *29  *05  *22  *01  001  *12 
 17 nsw51f25   045  053  033  047  047  045  041  057  054  045  042  031  051  047  038  033  100  057  044  033  038  040  059  048  054  003  001  *13  002  *14  *06  *15  *01  003  *01  010  *03 
 18 nsw53f31   047  060  047  053  034  050  045  058  054  044  065  056  035  051  051  037  057  100  050  038  044  030  049  038  045  003  001  000  *02  *09  *02  *10  014  007  003  016  004 
 19 nsw50m15  055  050  015  056  031  035  041  051  048  047  036  027  043  043  046  026  044  050  100  030  048  024  043  042  047  029  003  010  011  008  010  *13  020  017  013  021  009 
 20 nsw54m13  036  054  007  024  040  049  053  047  022  039  054  026  038  027  039  041  033  038  030  100  037  028  038  044  029  *12  *17  *17  *06  *05  *16  *10  013  *11  004  023  *08 
 21 nsw57m21   037  048  008  041  039  026  039  034  043  045  030  027  028  018  036  051  038  044  048  037  100  026  035  023  024  003  *20  *26  *10  *10  *08  *29  016  *19  *15  *06  *23 
 
 
3
5
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 nsw33f06   020  037  006  038  035  031  016  051  044  042  032  010  042  034  009  034  040  030  024  028  026  100  055  041  040  *01  *01  *06  008  *11  *19  *29  *02  *05  000  003  *14 
 23 nsw38f01   033  050  039  047  049  052  037  067  056  052  049  025  047  045  039  045  059  049  043  038  035  055  100  045  067  009  *07  *04  007  *14  *14  *19  007  002  013  000  *05 
 24 nsw47f20   034  038  025  033  037  038  053  047  019  041  048  026  045  041  047  039  048  038  042  044  023  041  045  100  042  008  002  *07  *05  *10  *10  *08  001  *17  008  004  010 
 25 nsw30f04   050  050  040  050  045  044  033  054  061  046  037  025  064  055  030  037  054  045  047  029  024  040  067  042  100  006  *02  007  *05  000  006  *15  017  002  001  014  005 
 26 psw24f04    001  003  *01  000  *17  *14  011  004  012  012  *14  *05  *08  020  022  *11  003  003  029  *12  003  *01  009  008  006  100  030  053  036  056  045  041  034  059  038  022  046 
 27 psw53m *16  *10  *04  007  *27  *02  *08  *12  011  000  *09  *04  *12  *12  002  *17  001  001  003  *17  *20  *01  *07  002  *02  030  100  035  022  023  020  027  039  030  011  028  057  
 28 psw23m01   *07  *10  *01  *01  *31  *22  *10  *01  010  *04  *16  004  *06  012  001  *18  *13  000  010  *17  *26  *06  *04  *07  007  053  035  100  047  063  033  055  033  056  019  027  044  
 29 psw47f06  *09  *11  001  *08  *03  *16  *22  002  *07  *01  *19  002  *10  *08  *09  *18  002  *02  011  *06  *10  008  007  *05  *05  036  022  047  100  047  019  030  028  049  003  021  030 
 30 psw49f23   *07  *10  *03  *06  *23  *22  *19  *03  *06  *01  *17  008  *16  *03  *10  *21  *14  *09  008  *05  *10  *11  *14  *10  000  056  023  063  047  100  044  055  046  058  019  036  038 
 31 psw22f05   002  *27  002  008  000  *18  *18  *23  004  *13  *20  013  *07  *06  001  *13  *06  *02  010  *16  *08  *19  *14  *10  006  045  020  033  019  044  100  045  031  036  027  018  036 
 32 psw36f01  *15  *33  *12  *25  *28  *33  *18  *23  *07  *21  *29  013  *19  *19  *16  *29  *15  *10  *13  *10  *29  *29  *19  *08  *15  041  027  055  030  055  045  100  030  052  029  036  055 
 33 psw21f03   *02  005  *14  005  003  *06  000  *01  024  027  000  018  000  000  008  *05  *01  014  020  013  016  *02  007  001  017  034  039  033  028  046  031  030  100  042  032  027  039  
 34 psw32f07   *07  *13  *13  002  *11  *20  *15  *07  020  003  *08  *02  *16  004  001  *22  003  007  017  *11  *19  *05  002  *17  002  059  030  056  049  058  036  052  042  100  044  044  044 
 35 psw25f01 *17  *08  *10  *08  003  *15  006  *01  *03  004  *01  *01  *07  012  002  *01  *01  003  013  004  *15  000  013  008  001  038  011  019  003  019  027  029  032  044  100  017  042  
 36 psw46m03  016  025  000  008  010  014  023  014  019  006  018  011  018  013  007  001  010  016  021  023  *06  003  000  004  014  022  028  027  021  036  018  036  027  044  017  100  034 
 37 psw33f10  *11  *11  *02  *01  *17  *28  001  *16  *03  *10  *10  008  *08  003  017  *12  *03  004  009  *08  *23  *14  *05  010  005  046  057  044  030  038  036  055  039  044  042  034  100 
[* = minus] 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2   
 
Unrotated Factor Matrix  
                    Factors 
                                       1                    2                3                4                  5 
 SORTS 
  1 sw37f15        0.5536    -0.2249    -0.3041      0.0492      0.1702 
  2 sw48f05        0.7354    -0.3262      0.1648      0.0347      0.1807 
  3 sw54f12        0.3995    -0.2097    -0.0715    -0.0291    -0.2474 
  4 sw45f09        0.6666    -0.1633    -0.1949    -0.0298    -0.0947 
  5 sw59f15        0.4961    -0.3374    -0.0709      0.1037    -0.0825 
  6 sw61f18        0.5919    -0.4295      0.0763      0.0772    -0.0577 
  7 sw55f33        0.6077    -0.2603      0.2475      0.4330    -0.2017 
  8 sw51f11        0.7282    -0.2834      0.2363    -0.2159      0.0525 
  9 sw36m03      0.6256    -0.0379    -0.2740    -0.2035      0.1962 
 10 sw53m22      0.5749    -0.1190      0.0763    -0.1819      0.2264 
 11 sw55f13        0.6166    -0.3503      0.2174      0.1479      0.1762 
 12 sw59f38        0.4186    -0.0376    -0.2436      0.1664      0.1927 
 13 sw55f03        0.5718    -0.2788    -0.1194      0.0053    -0.2344 
 14 sw27f01        0.6656    -0.1399      0.1402    -0.2005    -0.1750 
 15 nsw54f30       0.6119    -0.1041      0.1025      0.2230    -0.1795 
 16 nsw62f40       0.4900    -0.3862      0.1766      0.0958    -0.1061 
 17 nsw51f25       0.6732    -0.2279    -0.1146      -0.0807    -0.0239 
 18 nsw53f31       0.7437    -0.1595    -0.0981      0.0642      0.1260 
 19 nsw50m15       0.7163      0.0441    -0.0953    -0.0131      0.1036 
 20 nsw54m13       0.5142    -0.2446      0.2635      0.3729      0.2669 
 21 nsw57m21       0.4550    -0.2989    -0.0898      0.0210      0.2780 
 22 nsw33f06       0.4622    -0.2229      0.1201    -0.3083      0.0306 
 23 nsw38f01       0.7108    -0.2262      0.0352    -0.2853      -0.0931 
 24 nsw47f20       0.5773    -0.1873      0.1569      0.1043    -0.1798 
 25 nsw30f04       0.7128    -0.1233    -0.1556    -0.1912    -0.1652 
 26 psw24f04       0.2697      0.6647      0.1442    -0.1213    -0.1041 
 27 psw53m26       0.0703      0.4707      0.1020      0.0046    -0.0557 
 28 psw23m01       0.1198      0.6687      0.0837    -0.2159    -0.0263 
 29 psw47f06       0.0820      0.4920      0.0383    -0.2481       0.1041 
 30 psw49f23       0.0894      0.7088      0.0289    -0.0726       0.1414 
 31 psw22f05       0.0531      0.5143    -0.3372      0.0997     -0.1853 
 32 psw36f01              -0.0055      0.7587    -0.1009      0.1890     -0.0278 
 33 psw21f03       0.2860      0.5213      0.0059      0.1434       0.2000 
 34 psw32f07       0.1736      0.7547      0.0456    -0.1534       0.0789 
 35 psw25f01       0.1235      0.3959      0.1866      0.0563     -0.1267 
 36 psw46m03       0.3224      0.3787      0.0774      0.2267       0.1324 
 37 psw33f10       0.1396      0.6584      0.0839      0.2551     -0.2733 
 
 Eigenvalues       9.5202         5.7209        0.9420       1.1911         0.9524 
 % expl.Var.                26                15                 3                 3                   3 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2     
 
Cumulative Communalities Matrix  
                Factors 1 Thru .... 
                                         1                2                3                   4                5 
 SORTS 
  1 sw37f15        0.3065     0.3571     0.4496     0.4520     0.4809 
  2 sw48f05       0.5408     0.6472     0.6744     0.6756     0.7082 
  3 sw54f12        0.1596     0.2035     0.2087     0.2095     0.2707 
  4 sw45f09        0.4444     0.4711     0.5091     0.5100     0.5189 
  5 sw59f15        0.2461     0.3600     0.3650     0.3757     0.3825 
  6 sw61f18        0.3503     0.5348     0.5406     0.5466     0.5499 
  7 sw55f33        0.3693     0.4370     0.4983     0.6858     0.7264 
  8 sw51f11        0.5303     0.6106     0.6664     0.7130     0.7158 
  9 sw36m03      0.3914     0.3929     0.4679     0.5094     0.5478 
 10 sw53m22      0.3305     0.3447     0.3505     0.3836     0.4348 
 11 sw55f13        0.3802     0.5029     0.5502     0.5720     0.6031 
 12 sw59f38        0.1752     0.1766     0.2360     0.2636     0.3008 
 13 sw55f03        0.3269     0.4047     0.4189     0.4190     0.4739 
 14 sw27f01        0.4430     0.4626     0.4822     0.5224     0.5531 
 15 nsw54f30       0.3744     0.3853     0.3958     0.4455     0.4778 
 16 nsw62f40       0.2401     0.3893     0.4204     0.4296     0.4409 
 17 nsw51f25       0.4532     0.5051     0.5182     0.5247     0.5253 
 18 nsw53f31       0.5531     0.5785     0.5881     0.5923     0.6081 
 19 nsw50m15       0.5131     0.5150     0.5241     0.5243     0.5350 
 20 nsw54m13       0.2645     0.3243     0.3937     0.5328     0.6040 
 21 nsw57m21       0.2070     0.2963     0.3044     0.3048     0.3821 
 22 nsw33f06       0.2136     0.2633     0.2777     0.3728     0.3737 
 23 nsw38f01       0.5052     0.5564     0.5576     0.6390     0.6477 
 24 nsw47f20       0.3333     0.3684     0.3930     0.4038     0.4362 
 25 nsw30f04       0.5081     0.5232     0.5475     0.5840     0.6113 
 26 psw24f04       0.0727     0.5146     0.5354     0.5501     0.5609 
 27 psw53m26       0.0049     0.2265     0.2369     0.2369     0.2400 
 28 psw23m01       0.0144     0.4615     0.4685     0.5151     0.5158 
 29 psw47f06       0.0067     0.2488     0.2502     0.3118     0.3226 
 30 psw49f23       0.0080     0.5105     0.5113     0.5166     0.5366 
 31 psw22f05       0.0028     0.2673     0.3811     0.3910     0.4253 
 32 psw36f01       0.0000     0.5756     0.5858     0.6215     0.6223 
 33 psw21f03       0.0818     0.3535     0.3535     0.3741     0.4141 
 34 psw32f07       0.0301     0.5997     0.6018     0.6254     0.6316 
 35 psw25f01       0.0153     0.1720     0.2068     0.2100     0.2260 
 36 psw46m03       0.1039     0.2474     0.2534     0.3048     0.3223 
 37 psw33f10       0.0195     0.4530     0.4600     0.5251     0.5998 
 
cum% expl.Var.               26               41                44                47              50 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2                               
 
Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort 
 
                   Loadings 
 
 QSORT                          F1                                      F2 
  
  1 sw37f15         0.5536 X    -0.2249  
  2 sw48f05         0.7354     -0.3262  
  3 sw54f12                   0.3995 X    -0.2097  
  4 sw45f09         0.6666 X    -0.1633  
  5 sw59f15         0.4961     -0.3374  
  6 sw61f18         0.5919     -0.4295  
  7 sw55f33        0.6077     -0.2603  
  8 sw51f11         0.7282 X    -0.2834  
  9 sw36m03       0.6256 X    -0.0379  
 10 sw53m22      0.5749 X   -0.1190  
 11 sw55f13        0.6166     -0.3503  
 12 sw59f38        0.4186 X    -0.0376  
 13 sw55f03        0.5718 X    -0.2788  
 14 sw27f01        0.6656 X    -0.1399  
 15 nsw54f30      0.6119 X    -0.1041  
 16 nsw62f40      0.4900     -0.3862  
 17 nsw51f25      0.6732 X    -0.2279  
 18 nsw53f31      0.7437 X    -0.1595  
 19 nsw50m15    0.7163 X      0.0441  
 20 nsw54m13   0.5142     -0.2446  
 21 nsw57m21    0.4550 X    -0.2989  
 22 nsw33f06      0.4622 X    -0.2229  
 23 nsw38f01      0.7108 X    -0.2262  
 24 nsw47f20      0.5773 X    -0.1873  
 25 nsw30f04      0.7128 X    -0.1233  
 26 psw24f04      0.2697       0.6647 X 
 27 psw53m26    0.0703       0.4707 X 
 28 psw23m01    0.1198       0.6687 X 
 29 psw47f06      0.0820       0.4920 X 
 30 psw49f23      0.0894       0.7088 X 
 31 psw22f05      0.0531       0.5143  
 32 psw36f01              -0.0055       0.7587 X 
 33 psw21f03      0.2860       0.5213 X 
 34 psw32f07      0.1736       0.7547 X 
 35 psw25f01      0.1235       0.3959 X 
 36 psw46m03   0.3224       0.3787 X 
 37 psw33f10      0.1396       0.6584 X 
 
 % expl.Var.              26               15 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2  Jul  4 13     
 
Free Distribution Data Results 
 
 QSORT            MEAN     ST.DEV. 
  
  1 sw37f15        0.000     2.700 
  2 sw48f05        0.000     2.700 
  3 sw54f12        0.000     2.700 
  4 sw45f09        0.000     2.700 
  5 sw59f15        0.000     2.700 
  6 sw61f18        0.000     2.700 
  7 sw55f33        0.000     2.700 
  8 sw51f11        0.000     2.700 
  9 sw36m03     0.000     2.700 
 10 sw53m22     0.000     2.700 
 11 sw55f13        0.000     2.700 
 12 sw59f38        0.000     2.700 
 13 sw55f03        0.000     2.700 
 14 sw27f01        0.000     2.700 
 15 nsw54f30      0.000     2.700 
 16 nsw62f40      0.000     2.700 
 17 nsw51f25      0.000     2.700 
 18 nsw53f31      0.000     2.700 
 19 nsw50m15    0.000     2.700 
 20 nsw54m13    0.000     2.700 
 21 nsw57m21    0.000     2.700 
 22 nsw33f06       0.000     2.700 
 23 nsw38f01       0.000     2.700 
 24 nsw47f20       0.000     2.700 
 25 nsw30f04       0.000     2.700 
 26 psw24f04       0.000     2.700 
 27 psw53m26     0.000     2.700 
 28 psw23m01     0.000     2.700 
 29 psw47f06       0.000     2.700 
 30 psw49f23       0.000     2.700 
 31 psw22f05       0.000     2.700 
 32 psw36f01       0.000     2.700 
 33 psw21f03       0.000     2.700 
 34 psw32f07       0.000     2.700 
 35 psw25f01       0.000     2.700 
 36 psw46m03     0.000     2.700 
 37 psw33f10       0.000     2.700 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2     
Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks 
                                                                                                 Factors 
No.  Statement                                                   No.            1           Rank                          2          Rank 
  1  a\                                                          1        0.85   13      0.16   32 
  2  b                                                           2     -0.14   37    -0.89   45 
  3  c                                                           3        1.19     8      0.23   30 
  4  d                                                           4        0.91   11    -1.41   53 
  5  e                                                           5      -1.78   59    -1.32   51 
  6  f                                                           6        0.03   33    -0.69   43 
  7  g                                                           7      -0.30   40    -1.39   52 
  8  h                                                           8        1.33     5    -1.54   55 
  9  i                                                           9      -0.60   44    -1.08   47 
 10  j                                                         10        1.32     6    -1.72   59 
 11  k                                                         11      -0.81   47    -1.66   57 
 12  l                                                         12      -1.74   57      0.10   33 
 13  m                                                         13        0.18   28      0.75   16 
 14  n                                                         14        0.68   19    -0.20   39 
 15  o                                                         15      -0.40   42      0.46   24 
 16  p                                                         16      -1.65   55      0.22   31 
 17  q                                                         17      -0.95   48      1.11     8 
 18  r                                                         18      -1.26   51      1.80     1 
 19  s                                                         19        0.00   35      0.70   19 
 20  t                                                         20        0.19   27    -1.25   49 
 21  u                                                         21      -1.08   49    -0.40   41 
 22  v                                                         22        0.07   31    -1.72   60 
 23  w                                                         23        0.63   21      0.46   23 
 24  x                                                         24        0.74   16      0.79   14 
 25  y                                                         25        0.72   17      1.19     5 
 26  z                                                         26               -0.62   45      0.30   27 
 27  a\a\                                                      27      -1.49   52      0.05   35 
 28  bb                                                        28      -1.63   54    -1.06   46 
 29  cc                                                        29        0.04   32      0.10   34 
 30  dd                                                        30        0.58   22      1.50     2 
 31  ee                                                        31        0.78   14    -1.43   54 
 32  ff                                                        32        0.75   15    -1.68   58 
 33  gg                                                        33        0.14   30    -0.32   40 
 34  hh                                                        34      -0.16   39    -1.17   48 
 35  ii                                                        35        1.46     2      0.59   21 
 36  jj                                                        36      -0.43   43    -0.77   44 
 37  kk                                                        37        0.01   34      1.18     6 
 38  ll                                                        38        0.16   29      0.44   25 
 39  mm                                                        39      -1.76   58      0.74   17 
 40  nn                                                        40        1.27     7      0.57   22 
 41  oo                                                        41        0.36   26      1.05   10 
 42  pp                                                        42      -0.13   36      0.03   36 
 43  qq                                                        43        0.85   12      0.24   29 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2     
 
Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks 
                                                                                                                                         Factors 
No.  Statement                                                   No.            1           Rank                          2          Rank 
 
 44  rr                                                        44        0.49   23       1.39     4 
 45  ss                                                        45        1.38     3        0.90   13 
 46  tt                                                        46      -1.98   60       1.13     7 
 47  uu                                                        47        1.78     1        0.28   28 
 48  vv                                                        48        1.01   10       0.70   18 
 49  ww                                                        49      -0.73   46     -0.68   42 
 50  xx                                                        50      -1.56   53       1.41     3 
 51  yy                                                        51        1.12     9       0.78   15 
 52  zz                                                        52        0.64   20    -1.59   56 
 53  a\a\a\                                                    53      -0.15   38    -1.30   50 
 54  bbb                                                       54        0.72   18      0.00   37 
 55  ccc                                                       55        1.33     4      1.08     9 
 56  ddd                                                       56        0.45   24      1.00   12 
 57  eee                                                       57      -1.69   56      0.41   26 
 58  fff                                                       58      -0.37   41      0.62   20 
 59  ggg                                                       59        0.44   25    -0.18   38 
 60  hhh                                                       60      -1.16   50      1.00   11 
 
 
 
     Correlations between Factor Scores 
 
                1              2 
 
    1     1.0000  -0.0373 
 
    2    -0.0373   1.0000 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2    
 
Factor Scores -- For Factor    1 
 No.  Statement                                                     No.     Z-SCORES 
  47  uu                                                                 47        1.776 
  35  ii                                                                35        1.456 
  45  ss                                                                 45        1.383 
  55  ccc                                                               55        1.333 
   8  h                                                                       8        1.330 
  10  j                                                                 10        1.317 
  40  nn                                                                 40        1.266 
   3  c                                                                       3        1.191 
  51  yy                                                                 51        1.121 
  48  vv                                                                 48        1.014 
   4  d                                                                       4        0.914 
  43  qq                                                                 43        0.853 
   1  a\                                                                      1        0.845 
  31  ee                                                                 31        0.779 
  32  ff                                                                32        0.749 
  24  x                                                                  24        0.737 
  25  y                                                                  25        0.719 
  54  bbb                                                                54        0.717 
  14  n                                                                  14        0.679 
  52  zz                                                                 52        0.639 
  23  w                                                                  23        0.625 
  30  dd                                                                 30        0.580 
  44  rr                                                                 44        0.494 
  56  ddd                                                                56        0.455 
  59  ggg                                                               59        0.438 
  41  oo                                                                41        0.355 
  20  t                                                                  20        0.186 
  13  m                                                                  13        0.183 
  38  ll                                                                 38        0.158 
  33  gg                                                                 33        0.137 
  22  v                                                                  22        0.069 
  29  cc                                                                 29        0.044 
   6  f                                                                      6        0.025 
  37  kk                                                                 37        0.011 
  19  s                                                                  19       -0.002 
  42  pp                                                                 42       -0.134 
   2  b                                                                       2       -0.136 
  53  a\a\a\                                                            53       -0.148 
  34  hh                                                                 34       -0.161 
   7  g                                                                      7       -0.297 
  58  fff                                                                58       -0.370 
  15  o                                                                 15       -0.401 
  36  jj                                                                 36       -0.434 
   9  i                                                                      9       -0.604 
  26  z                                                               26       -0.617 
  49  ww                                                              49       -0.728 
  11  k                                                               11       -0.808 
  17  q                                                               17       -0.952 
  21  u                                                               21       -1.077 
  60  hhh                                                          60       -1.157 
  18  r                                                                 18       -1.259 
  27  a\a\                                                            27       -1.491 
  50  xx                                                               50       -1.558 
  28  bb                                                              28       -1.633 
  16  p                                                                16       -1.655 
  57  eee                                                              57       -1.692 
  12  l                                                               12       -1.745 
  39  mm                                                                39       -1.757 
   5  e                                                                     5       -1.785 
  46  tt                                                               46       -1.978 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2     
 
Factor Scores -- For Factor    2 
 No.  Statement                                                     No.     Z-SCORES 
  18  r                                                                         18        1.805 
  30  dd                                                                      30        1.504 
  50  xx                                                                       50        1.414 
  44  rr                                                                        44        1.386 
  25  y                                                                         25        1.185 
  37  kk                                                                       37        1.180 
  46  tt                                                                        46        1.133 
  17  q                                                                         17        1.107 
  55  ccc                                                                      55        1.076 
  41  oo                                                                       41        1.046 
  60  hhh                                                                     60        1.002 
  56  ddd                                                                     56        1.001 
  45  ss                                                                         45        0.895 
  24  x                                                                          24        0.795 
  51  yy                                                                        51        0.780 
  13  m                                                                         13        0.748 
  39  mm                                                                      39        0.738 
  48  vv                                                                         48        0.699 
  19  s                                                                            19        0.696 
  58  fff                                                                          58        0.619 
  35  ii                                                                            35        0.593 
  40  nn                                                                         40        0.566 
  23  w                                                                          23        0.464 
  15  o                                                                           15        0.459 
  38  ll                                                                           38        0.442 
  57  eee                                                                       57        0.410 
  26  z                                                                            26        0.301 
  47  uu                                                                         47        0.280 
  43  qq                                                                         43        0.237 
   3  c                                                                                 3        0.229 
  16  p                                                                           16        0.218 
   1  a\                                                                               1        0.157 
  12  l                                                                             12        0.104 
  29  cc                                                                          29        0.095 
  27  a\a\                                                                      27        0.047 
  42  pp                                                                         42        0.033 
  54  bbb                                                                      54        0.000 
  59  ggg                                                                       59       -0.180 
  14  n                                                                           14       -0.200 
  33  gg                                                                         33       -0.316 
  21  u                                                                           21       -0.402 
  49  ww                                                                       49       -0.677 
   6  f                                                                                  6       -0.689 
  36  jj                                                                        36       -0.768 
   2  b                                                                              2       -0.893 
  28  bb                                                                      28       -1.064 
   9  i                                                                                9       -1.081 
  34  hh                                                                       34       -1.166 
  20  t                                                                           20       -1.250 
  53  a\a\a\                                                                 53       -1.301 
   5  e                                                                                5       -1.324 
   7  g                                                                                7       -1.386 
   4  d                                                                                4       -1.412 
  31  ee                                                                        31       -1.426 
   8  h                                                                               8       -1.538 
  52  zz                                                                         52       -1.592 
  11  k                                                                          11       -1.660 
  32  ff                                                                         32       -1.681 
  10  j                                                                           10       -1.716 
  22  v                                                                           22       -1.722 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2    
 
Descending Array of Differences Between Factors   1 and   2 
 No.  Statement                                                   No.      Type   1   Type   2   Difference 
  10  j                                                                 10          1.317     -1.716         3.033 
   8  h                                                                     8          1.330     -1.538         2.867 
  32  ff                                                                   32          0.749     -1.681         2.430 
   4  d                                                                     4          0.914     -1.412          2.326 
  52  zz                                                                52          0.639     -1.592         2.231 
  31  ee                                                                 31          0.779     -1.426         2.205 
  22  v                                                                   22          0.069     -1.722         1.791 
  47  uu                                                                 47          1.776       0.280         1.496 
  20  t                                                                     20          0.186     -1.250         1.436 
  53  a\a\a\                                                         53        -0.148     -1.301         1.152 
   7  g                                                                     7        -0.297     -1.386         1.089 
  34  hh                                                                  34        -0.161     -1.166         1.005 
   3  c                                                                       3          1.191       0.229         0.962 
  14  n                                                                   14          0.679     -0.200         0.879 
  35  ii                                                                    35          1.456       0.593         0.863 
  11  k                                                                     11        -0.808     -1.660         0.852 
   2  b                                                                     2        -0.136     -0.893         0.757 
  54  bbb                                                               54          0.717       0.000         0.717 
   6  f                                                                       6          0.025     -0.689         0.715 
  40  nn                                                                40          1.266       0.566         0.700 
   1  a\                                                              1          0.845       0.157         0.688 
  59  ggg                                                                59          0.438     -0.180         0.618 
  43  qq                                                                 43          0.853       0.237         0.616 
  45  ss                                                                45          1.383       0.895         0.488 
   9  i                                                                      9        -0.604     -1.081         0.477 
  33  gg                                                              33          0.137     -0.316         0.453 
  51  yy                                                               51          1.121       0.780         0.341 
  36  jj                                                                   36        -0.434     -0.768         0.334 
  48  vv                                                                 48          1.014       0.699         0.315 
  55  ccc                                                                 55          1.333       1.076          0.257 
  23  w                                                                 23          0.625       0.464         0.161 
  49  ww                                                               49               -0.728     -0.677       -0.051 
  29  cc                                                                   29          0.044       0.095       -0.051 
  24  x                                                                     24          0.737       0.795       -0.057 
  42  pp                                                                  42        -0.134       0.033       -0.167 
  38  ll                                                                  38          0.158       0.442       -0.284 
   5  e                                                                       5        -1.785     -1.324       -0.461 
  25  y                                                                  25          0.719       1.185       -0.466 
  56  ddd                                                               56          0.455       1.001       -0.547 
  13  m                                                                   13          0.183       0.748       -0.566 
  28  bb                                                                 28        -1.633     -1.064       -0.569 
  21  u                                                                   21        -1.077     -0.402       -0.675 
  41  oo                                                                41          0.355       1.046       -0.690 
  19  s                                                              19        -0.002       0.696       -0.698 
  15  o                                                              15        -0.401       0.459       -0.860 
  44  rr                                                             44          0.494       1.386      -0.893 
  26  z                                                              26        -0.617       0.301       -0.918 
  30  dd                                                             30          0.580       1.504       -0.924 
  58  fff                                                            58        -0.370       0.619       -0.989 
  37  kk                                                             37          0.011       1.180       -1.168 
  27  a\a\                                                           27        -1.491       0.047       -1.537 
  12  l                                                              12        -1.745       0.104       -1.848 
  16  p                                                              16        -1.655       0.218       -1.873 
  17  q                                                              17        -0.952       1.107       -2.059 
  57  eee                                                            57        -1.692       0.410       -2.102 
  60  hhh                                                            60        -1.157       1.002       -2.158 
  39  mm                                                             39        -1.757       0.738       -2.495 
  50  xx                                                             50        -1.558       1.414       -2.972 
  18  r                                                              18        -1.259       1.805       -3.064 
  46  tt                                                             46        -1.978       1.133       -3.111 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2      
Exact Factor Scores (ß la SPSS) in Z-Score and T-Score units 
                                                                                                        Factors 
No.  Statement                                                   No.          1                            2 
  1  a\                                                           1      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  2  b                                                            2      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  3  c                                                             3      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  4  d                                                            4      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  5  e                                                           5      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  6  f                                                             6      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  7  g                                                            7      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  8  h                                                            8      0.00  50    0.00  50 
  9  i                                                              9      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 10  j                                                          10      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 11  k                                                         11      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 12  l                                                          12      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 13  m                                                        13      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 14  n                                                         14      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 15  o                                                         15      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 16  p                                                         16      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 17  q                                                         17      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 18  r                                                         18      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 19  s                                                         19      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 20  t                                                         20      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 21  u                                                         21      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 22  v                                                         22      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 23  w                                                        23      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 24  x                                                         24      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 25  y                                                         25      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 26  z                                                         26      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 27  a\a\                                                   27      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 28  bb                                                       28      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 29  cc                                                        29      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 30  dd                                                       30      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 31  ee                                                       31      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 32  ff                                                         32      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 33  gg                                                        33      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 34  hh                                                        34      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 35  ii                                                          35      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 36  jj                                                          36      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 37  kk                                                        37      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 38  ll                                                           38      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 39  mm                                                      39      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 40  nn                                                        40      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 41  oo                                                        41      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 42  pp                                                        42      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 43  qq                                                        43      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 44  rr                                                            44      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 45  ss                                                           45      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 46  tt                                                           46      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 47  uu                                                         47      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 48  vv                                                          48      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 49  ww                                                       49      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 50  xx                                                         50      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 51  yy                                                         51      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 52  zz                                                          52      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 53  a\a\a\                                                 53      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 54  bbb                                                      54      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 55  ccc                                                        55      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 56  ddd                                                       56      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 57  eee                                                       57      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 58  fff                                                          58      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 59  ggg                                                        59      0.00  50    0.00  50 
 60  hhh                                                       60      0.00  50    0.00  50 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2             
Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement 
                                                                                                  Factor Arrays 
No.  Statement                                                                      No.        1      2 
  1  a                                                                          1         2      0 
  2  b                                                                           2        -1     -2 
  3  c                                                                           3          3     0 
  4  d                                                                          4          3    -3 
  5  e                                                                          5         -5    -3 
  6  f                                                                           6          0    -2 
  7  g                                                                          7         -1    -3 
  8  h                                                                          8          4    -4 
  9  i                                                                           9        -2     -2 
 10  j                                                                        10        4     -5 
 11  k                                                                       11       -2     -4 
 12  l                                                                        12       -4      0 
 13  m                                                                     13        0      2 
 14  n                                                                      14        1     -1 
 15  o                                                                      15       -1      1 
 16  p                                                                      16       -4      0 
 17  q                                                                      17       -2      3 
 18  r                                                                      18       -3      5 
 19  s                                                                      19        0      1 
 20  t                                                                      20        0     -3 
 21  u                                                                     21       -3     -1 
 22  v                                                                     22        0     -5 
 23  w                                                                    23        1      1 
 24  x                                                                     24        2      2 
 25  y                                                                    25        2      4 
 26  z                                                                    26       -2      0 
 27  a\a\                                                              27       -3      0 
 28  bb                                                                 28       -4     -2 
 29  cc                                                                  29        0      0 
 30  dd                                                                30        1      5 
 31  ee                                                                31        2     -4 
 32  ff                                                                  32        2     -5 
 33  gg                                                                 33        0     -1 
 34  hh                                                                34       -1    -2 
 35  ii                                                                   35         5     1 
 36  jj                                                                   36       -2    -2 
 37  kk                                                                 37        0      4 
 38  ll                                                                   38        0      1 
 39  mm                                                              39       -5      2 
 40  nn                                                                40        4      1 
 41  oo                                                                41        0      3 
 42  pp                                                                42       -1     -1 
 43  qq                                                                43        3      0 
 44  rr                                                                 44        1      4 
45  ss                                                                      45        5      2 
 46  tt                                                                      46       -5      4 
 47  uu                                                                    47        5      0 
 48  vv                                                                   48        3      2 
 49  ww                                                                  49       -2     -1 
 50  xx                                                                    50       -3      5 
 51  yy                                                                    51        3      2 
 52  zz                                                                     52        1     -4 
 53  a\a\a\                                                            53       -1     -3 
 54  bbb                                                                 54        2     -1 
 55  ccc                                                                  55        4      3 
 56  ddd                                                                 56        1      3 
 57  eee                                                                 57       -4      0 
 58  fff                                                                   58       -1      1 
 59  ggg                                                                 59        1     -1 
 60  hhh                                                                60       -3      3 
 
 
Variance = 7.167 St. Dev. = 2.677 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2      
Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. Disagreement (Variance across Factor Z-
Scores)  
 
                                                                                            Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                        No.          1        2 
 
 49  ww                                                                      49        -2      -1 
 29  cc                                                                         29          0        0 
 24  x                                                                          24           2        2 
 23  w                                                                         23           1        1 
 42  pp                                                                       42        -1      -1 
 55  ccc                                                                      55          4        3 
 38  ll                                                                         38          0        1 
 48  vv                                                                      48          3        2 
 36  jj                                                                        36       -2      -2 
 51  yy                                                                      51          3        2 
 33  gg                                                                      33          0      -1 
  5  e                                                                             5        -5      -3 
 25  y                                                                        25          2        4 
  9  i                                                                              9        -2      -2 
 45  ss                                                                       45          5        2 
 56  ddd                                                                   56          1        3 
 13  m                                                                      13          0        2 
 28  bb                                                                     28        -4      -2 
 43  qq                                                                     43          3        0 
 59  ggg                                                                    59          1      -1 
 21  u                                                                       21        -3      -1 
  1  a\                                                                            1          2        0 
 41  oo                                                                     41          0        3 
 19  s                                                                        19          0        1 
 40  nn                                                                     40          4        1 
  6  f                                                                             6          0      -2 
 54  bbb                                                                  54          2      -1 
  2  b                                                                            2        -1      -2 
 11  k                                                                       11        -2      -4 
 15  o                                                                       15        -1        1 
 35  ii                                                                       35          5        1 
 14  n                                                                       14          1      -1 
 44  rr                                                                      44          1        4 
 26  z                                                                       26        -2        0 
 30  dd                                                                    30          1        5 
  3  c                                                                            3          3        0 
 58  fff                                                                    58        -1        1 
 34  hh                                                                   34        -1      -2 
  7  g                                                                           7        -1      -3 
 53  a\a\a\                                                           53        -1      -3 
 37  kk                                                                   37          0        4 
 20  t                                                                      20          0      -3 
 47  uu                                                                   47          5        0 
 27  a\a\                                                               27       -3        0 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2    
 
                                                                                            Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                      No.           1        2 
  
 22  v                                                                          22           0      -5 
 12  l                                                                           12       -4        0 
 16  p                                                                          16        -4        0 
 17  q                                                                          17        -2        3 
 57  eee                                                                      57        -4        0 
 60  hhh                                                                     60        -3        3 
 31  ee                                                                        31          2      -4 
 52  zz                                                                         52          1      -4 
  4  d                                                                                4          3      -3 
 32  ff                                                                          32          2      -5 
 39  mm                                                                     39        -5        2 
  8  h                                                                                8         4      -4 
 50  xx                                                                        50        -3        5 
 10  j                                                                           10          4      -5 
 18  r                                                                           18        -3        5 
 46  tt                                                                         46        -5        4 
 
 
Factor Characteristics 
                                          Factors 
 
                                         1         2 
 
No. of Defining Variables             18               11 
 
Average Rel. Coef.                       0.800           0.800 
 
Composite Reliability                  0.986         0.978 
 
S.E. of Factor Z-Scores                 0.117         0.149 
 
 
 
 
Standard Errors for Differences in Factor Z-Scores 
 
(Diagonal Entries Are S.E. Within Factors) 
 
            Factors           1                   2 
 
                1              0.166           0.190 
 
                2              0.190           0.211 
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Path and Project Name: c:/pqmethod/projects/phd2    
 
Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1/Factor 2 
(P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown. 
 
                                                                                       Factors 
                                                                                            1                        2 
 No. Statement                                                   No.           Q-SV  Z-SCR                    Q-SV      Z-SCR   
  
  47 uu                                                                    47        5    1.78*       0     0.28  
  35 ii                                                                      35        5    1.46*       1     0.59  
  45 ss                                                                     45        5    1.38        2     0.90  
   8 h                                                                         8       4    1.33*     -4   -1.54  
  10 j                                                                       10        4    1.32*     -5   -1.72  
  40 nn                                                                   40        4    1.27*       1     0.57  
   3 c                                                                         3        3    1.19*       0     0.23  
   4 d                                                                        4        3    0.91*     -3   -1.41  
  43 qq                                                                   43        3    0.85*       0     0.24  
   1 a\                                                                       1        2    0.85*       0     0.16  
  31 ee                                                                   31        2    0.78*     -4   -1.43  
  32 ff                                                                    32        2    0.75*     -5   -1.68  
  25 y                                                                    25        2    0.72        4     1.19  
  54 bbb                                                               54        2    0.72*     -1     0.00  
  14 n                                                                    14        1    0.68*     -1   -0.20  
  52 zz                                                                   52        1    0.64*     -4   -1.59  
  30 dd                                                                 30        1    0.58*       5     1.50  
  44 rr                                                                   44        1    0.49*       4     1.39  
  56 ddd                                                               56        1    0.45*       3     1.00  
  59 ggg                                                                59        1    0.44*      1   -0.18  
  41 oo                                                                 41        0    0.36*       3     1.05  
  20 t                                                                    20        0    0.19*     -3   -1.25  
  13 m                                                                  13        0    0.18*       2     0.75  
  33 gg                                                                 33        0    0.14      -1   -0.32  
  22 v                                                                   22        0    0.07*     -5   -1.72  
   6 f                                                                       6        0    0.03*     -2   -0.69  
  37 kk                                                                 37        0    0.01*       4     1.18  
  19 s                                                                   19        0    0.00*       1     0.70  
   2 b                                                                      2      -1  -0.14*     -2   -0.89  
  53 a\a\a\                                                         53      -1  -0.15*     -3   -1.30  
  34 hh                                                                34      -1  -0.16*     -2   -1.17  
   7 g                                                                       7      -1  -0.30*     -3   -1.39  
  58 fff                                                                  58      -1  -0.37*       1     0.62  
  15 o                                                                    15      -1  -0.40*       1     0.46  
   9 i                                                                         9      -2  -0.60      -2  -1.08  
  26 z                                                               26      -2  -0.62*       0     0.30  
  11 k                                                              11      -2  -0.81*     -4                 -1.66  
  17 q                                                              17      -2  -0.95*       3     1.11  
  21 u                                                              21      -3  -1.08*     -1   -0.40  
  60 hhh                                                         60      -3  -1.16*       3     1.00  
  18 r                                                              18      -3  -1.26*       5     1.80  
  27 a\a\                                                        27      -3  -1.49*       0     0.05  
  50 xx                                                            50      -3  -1.56*       5     1.41  
  28 bb                                                            28      -4  -1.63*     -2                 -1.06  
  16 p                                                              16      -4  -1.65*       0     0.22  
  57 eee                                                           57      -4  -1.69*       0     0.41  
  12 l                                                                12      -4  -1.74*       0     0.10  
  39 mm                                                          39      -5   1.76*       2     0.74  
   5 e                                                                   5      -5  -1.78    -   3   -1.32  
  46 tt                                                               46      -5  -1.98*       4     1.13  
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Consensus Statements  --  Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY Pair of Factors. 
 
All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01, and Those Flagged With an * are also Non-Significant at P>.05. 
 
 
                                                                                          Factors 
 
                                                                                                      1                                       2 
 No.  Statement                                                   No.           Q-SV   Z-SCR                 Q-SV Z-  SCR   
 
   5  e                                                                 5     -5   -1.78      -3   -1.32   
   9  i                                                                     9      -2   -0.60      -2   -1.08   
  23* w                                                                23         1     0.63        1     0.46   
  24* x                                                                   24         2     0.74        2     0.79   
  25  y                                                                     25         2     0.72        4     1.19   
  29* cc                                                                29         0     0.04        0     0.10   
  33  gg                                                                   33         0     0.14      -1   -0.32   
  36* jj                                                                36       -2   -0.43      -2   -0.77   
  38* ll                                                                38         0     0.16        1     0.44   
  42* pp                                                             42       -1   -0.13      -1     0.03   
  45  ss                                                                45         5     1.38        2     0.90   
  48* vv                                                                  48         3     1.01        2     0.70   
  49* ww                                                             49       -2   -0.73      -1   -0.68   
  51* yy                                                                  51         3     1.12        2     0.78   
  55* ccc                                                                 55         4     1.33        3     1.08   
 
 
QANALYZE was completed at 09:55:46 
 
 
 
 
 
3
7
3
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
SORTS          1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30 
  
  1 sw37f15  100  53  28  43  27  36  43  45  46  28  46  42  45  30  38  26  45  47  55  36  37  20  33  34  50   1 -16  -7  -9  -7 
  2 sw48f05   53 100  36  47  43  58  67  66  48  46  63  32  46  58  54  47  53  60  50  54  48  37  50  38  50   3 -10 -10 -11 -10 
  3 sw54f12   28  36 100  37  29  45  32  36  24  15  33  33  20  42  32  21  33  47  15   7   8   6  39  25  40  -1  -4  -1   1  -3 
  4 sw45f09   43  47  37 100  43  50  34  44  46  37  45  25  51  51  47  46  47  53  56  24  41  38  47  33  50   0   7  -1  -8  -6 
  5 sw59f15   27  43  29  43 100  48  46  34  25  32  37  13  62  23  30  40  47  34  31  40  39  35  49  37  45 -17 -27 -31  -3 -23 
  6 sw61f18   36  58  45  50  48 100  55  63  35  24  59  30  51  45  46  49  45  50  35  49  26  31  52  38  44 -14  -2 -22 -16 -22 
  7 sw55f33   43  67  32  34  46  55 100  54  14  25  50  13  52  50  62  53  41  45  41  53  39  16  37  53  33  11  -8 -10 -22 -19 
  8 sw51f11   45  66  36  44  34  63  54 100  40  46  57  33  47  66  37  50  57  58  51  47  34  51  67  47  54   4 -12  -1   2  -3 
  9 sw36m03   46  48  24  46  25  35  14  40 100  48  36  36  35  35  26  19  54  54  48  22  43  44  56  19  61  12  11  10  -7  -6 
 10 sw53m22   28  46  15  37  32  24  25  46  48 100  42  16  20  40  31  35  45  44  47  39  45  42  52  41  46  12   0  -4  -1  -1 
 11 sw55f13   46  63  33  45  37  59  50  57  36  42 100  35  25  49  51  37  42  65  36  54  30  32  49  48  37 -14  -9 -16 -19 -17 
 12 sw59f38   42  32  33  25  13  30  13  33  36  16  35 100  16  29  18  16  31  56  27  26  27  10  25  26  25  -5  -4   4   2   8 
 13 sw55f03   45  46  20  51  62  51  52  47  35  20  25  16 100  41  31  36  51  35  43  38  28  42  47  45  64  -8 -12  -6 -10 -16 
 14 sw27f01   30  58  42  51  23  45  50  66  35  40  49  29  41 100  46  43  47  51  43  27  18  34  45  41  55  20 -12  12  -8  -3 
 15 nsw54f30  38  54  32  47  30  46  62  37  26  31  51  18  31  46 100  41  38  51  46  39  36   9  39  47  30  22   2   1  -9 -10 
 16 nsw62f40  26  47  21  46  40  49  53  50  19  35  37  16  36  43  41 100  33  37  26  41  51  34  45  39  37 -11 -17 -18 -18 -21 
 17 nsw51f25  45  53  33  47  47  45  41  57  54  45  42  31  51  47  38  33 100  57  44  33  38  40  59  48  54   3   1 -13   2 -14 
 18 nsw53f31  47  60  47  53  34  50  45  58  54  44  65  56  35  51  51  37  57 100  50  38  44  30  49  38  45   3   1   0  -2  -9 
 19 nsw50m15  55  50  15  56  31  35  41  51  48  47  36  27  43  43  46  26  44  50 100  30  48  24  43  42  47  29   3  10  11   8 
 20 nsw54m13  36  54   7  24  40  49  53  47  22  39  54  26  38  27  39  41  33  38  30 100  37  28  38  44  29 -12 -17 -17  -6  -5 
 21 nsw57m21  37  48   8  41  39  26  39  34  43  45  30  27  28  18  36  51  38  44  48  37 100  26  35  23  24   3 -20 -26 -10 -10 
 22 nsw33f06  20  37   6  38  35  31  16  51  44  42  32  10  42  34   9  34  40  30  24  28  26 100  55  41  40  -1  -1  -6   8 -11 
 23 nsw38f01  33  50  39  47  49  52  37  67  56  52  49  25  47  45  39  45  59  49  43  38  35  55 100  45  67   9  -7  -4   7 -14 
 24 nsw47f20  34  38  25  33  37  38  53  47  19  41  48  26  45  41  47  39  48  38  42  44  23  41  45 100  42   8   2  -7  -5 -10 
 25 nsw30f04  50  50  40  50  45  44  33  54  61  46  37  25  64  55  30  37  54  45  47  29  24  40  67  42 100   6  -2   7  -5   0 
 26 psw24f04   1   3  -1   0 -17 -14  11   4  12  12 -14  -5  -8  20  22 -11   3   3  29 -12   3  -1   9   8   6 100  30  53  36  56 
 27 psw53m26 -16 -10  -4   7 -27  -2  -8 -12  11   0  -9  -4 -12 -12   2 -17   1   1   3 -17 -20  -1  -7   2  -2  30 100  35  22  23 
 28 psw23m01  -7 -10  -1  -1 -31 -22 -10  -1  10  -4 -16   4  -6  12   1 -18 -13   0  10 -17 -26  -6  -4  -7   7  53  35 100  47  63 
 29 psw47f06  -9 -11   1  -8  -3 -16 -22   2  -7  -1 -19   2 -10  -8  -9 -18   2  -2  11  -6 -10   8   7  -5  -5  36  22  47 100  47 
 30 psw49f23  -7 -10  -3  -6 -23 -22 -19  -3  -6  -1 -17   8 -16  -3 -10 -21 -14  -9   8  -5 -10 -11 -14 -10   0  56  23  63  47 100 
 31 psw22f05   2 -27   2   8   0 -18 -18 -23   4 -13 -20  13  -7  -6   1 -13  -6  -2  10 -16  -8 -19 -14 -10   6  45  20  33  19  44 
 32 psw36f01 -15 -33 -12 -25 -28 -33 -18 -23  -7 -21 -29  13 -19 -19 -16 -29 -15 -10 -13 -10 -29 -29 -19  -8 -15  41  27  55  30  55 
 33 psw21f03  -2   5 -14   5   3  -6   0  -1  24  27   0  18   0   0   8  -5  -1  14  20  13  16  -2   7   1  17  34  39  33  28  46 
 34 psw32f07  -7 -13 -13   2 -11 -20 -15  -7  20   3  -8  -2 -16   4   1 -22   3   7  17 -11 -19  -5   2 -17   2  59  30  56  49  58 
 35 psw25f01 -17  -8 -10  -8   3 -15   6  -1  -3   4  -1  -1  -7  12   2  -1  -1   3  13   4 -15   0  13   8   1  38  11  19   3  19 
 36 psw46m03  16  25   0   8  10  14  23  14  19   6  18  11  18  13   7   1  10  16  21  23  -6   3   0   4  14  22  28  27  21  36 
 37 psw33f10 -11 -11  -2  -1 -17 -28   1 -16  -3 -10 -10   8  -8   3  17 -12  -3   4   9  -8 -23 -14  -5  10   5  46  57  44  30  38 
374 
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS         31  32  33  34  35  36  37 
  
  1 sw37f15    2 -15  -2  -7 -17  16 -11 
  2 sw48f05  -27 -33   5 -13  -8  25 -11 
  3 sw54f12    2 -12 -14 -13 -10   0  -2 
  4 sw45f09    8 -25   5   2  -8   8  -1 
  5 sw59f15    0 -28   3 -11   3  10 -17 
  6 sw61f18  -18 -33  -6 -20 -15  14 -28 
  7 sw55f33  -18 -18   0 -15   6  23   1 
  8 sw51f11  -23 -23  -1  -7  -1  14 -16 
  9 sw36m03    4  -7  24  20  -3  19  -3 
 10 sw53m22  -13 -21  27   3   4   6 -10 
 11 sw55f13  -20 -29   0  -8  -1  18 -10 
 12 sw59f38   13  13  18  -2  -1  11   8 
 13 sw55f03   -7 -19   0 -16  -7  18  -8 
 14 sw27f01   -6 -19   0   4  12  13   3 
 15 nsw54f30   1 -16   8   1   2   7  17 
 16 nsw62f40 -13 -29  -5 -22  -1   1 -12 
 17 nsw51f25  -6 -15  -1   3  -1  10  -3 
 18 nsw53f31  -2 -10  14   7   3  16   4 
 19 nsw50m15  10 -13  20  17  13  21   9 
 20 nsw54m13 -16 -10  13 -11   4  23  -8 
 21 nsw57m21  -8 -29  16 -19 -15  -6 -23 
 22 nsw33f06 -19 -29  -2  -5   0   3 -14 
 23 nsw38f01 -14 -19   7   2  13   0  -5 
 24 nsw47f20 -10  -8   1 -17   8   4  10 
 25 nsw30f04   6 -15  17   2   1  14   5 
 26 psw24f04  45  41  34  59  38  22  46 
 27 psw53m26  20  27  39  30  11  28  57 
 28 psw23m01  33  55  33  56  19  27  44 
 29 psw47f06  19  30  28  49   3  21  30 
 30 psw49f23  44  55  46  58  19  36  38 
 31 psw22f05 100  45  31  36  27  18  36 
 32 psw36f01  45 100  30  52  29  36  55 
 33 psw21f03  31  30 100  42  32  27  39 
 34 psw32f07  36  52  42 100  44  44  44 
 35 psw25f01  27  29  32  44 100  17  42 
 36 psw46m03  18  36  27  44  17 100  34 
 37 psw33f10  36  55  39  44  42  34 100 
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Unrotated Factor Matrix  
                Factors 
                   1         2         3         4         5 
 SORTS 
  1 sw37f15       0.5536   -0.2249   -0.3041    0.0492    0.1702 
  2 sw48f05       0.7354   -0.3262    0.1648    0.0347    0.1807 
  3 sw54f12       0.3995   -0.2097   -0.0715   -0.0291   -0.2474 
  4 sw45f09       0.6666   -0.1633   -0.1949   -0.0298   -0.0947 
  5 sw59f15       0.4961   -0.3374   -0.0709    0.1037   -0.0825 
  6 sw61f18       0.5919   -0.4295    0.0763    0.0772   -0.0577 
  7 sw55f33       0.6077   -0.2603    0.2475    0.4330   -0.2017 
  8 sw51f11       0.7282   -0.2834    0.2363   -0.2159    0.0525 
  9 sw36m03       0.6256   -0.0379   -0.2740   -0.2035    0.1962 
 10 sw53m22       0.5749   -0.1190    0.0763   -0.1819    0.2264 
 11 sw55f13       0.6166   -0.3503    0.2174    0.1479    0.1762 
 12 sw59f38       0.4186   -0.0376   -0.2436    0.1664    0.1927 
 13 sw55f03       0.5718   -0.2788   -0.1194    0.0053   -0.2344 
 14 sw27f01       0.6656   -0.1399    0.1402   -0.2005   -0.1750 
 15 nsw54f30      0.6119   -0.1041    0.1025    0.2230   -0.1795 
 16 nsw62f40      0.4900   -0.3862    0.1766    0.0958   -0.1061 
 17 nsw51f25      0.6732   -0.2279   -0.1146   -0.0807   -0.0239 
 18 nsw53f31      0.7437   -0.1595   -0.0981    0.0642    0.1260 
 19 nsw50m15      0.7163    0.0441   -0.0953   -0.0131    0.1036 
 20 nsw54m13      0.5142   -0.2446    0.2635    0.3729    0.2669 
 21 nsw57m21      0.4550   -0.2989   -0.0898    0.0210    0.2780 
 22 nsw33f06      0.4622   -0.2229    0.1201   -0.3083    0.0306 
 23 nsw38f01      0.7108   -0.2262    0.0352   -0.2853   -0.0931 
 24 nsw47f20      0.5773   -0.1873    0.1569    0.1043   -0.1798 
 25 nsw30f04      0.7128   -0.1233   -0.1556   -0.1912   -0.1652 
 26 psw24f04      0.2697    0.6647    0.1442   -0.1213   -0.1041 
 27 psw53m26      0.0703    0.4707    0.1020    0.0046   -0.0557 
 28 psw23m01      0.1198    0.6687    0.0837   -0.2159   -0.0263 
 29 psw47f06      0.0820    0.4920    0.0383   -0.2481    0.1041 
 30 psw49f23      0.0894    0.7088    0.0289   -0.0726    0.1414 
 31 psw22f05      0.0531    0.5143   -0.3372    0.0997   -0.1853 
 32 psw36f01     -0.0055    0.7587   -0.1009    0.1890   -0.0278 
 33 psw21f03      0.2860    0.5213    0.0059    0.1434    0.2000 
 34 psw32f07      0.1736    0.7547    0.0456   -0.1534    0.0789 
 35 psw25f01      0.1235    0.3959    0.1866    0.0563   -0.1267 
 36 psw46m03      0.3224    0.3787    0.0774    0.2267    0.1324 
 37 psw33f10      0.1396    0.6584    0.0839    0.2551   -0.2733 
 
 Eigenvalues      9.5202    5.7209    0.9420    1.1911    0.9524 
 % expl.Var.          26        15         3         3         3 
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Cumulative Communalities Matrix  
                Factors 1 Thru .... 
                   1         2         3         4         5 
 SORTS 
  1 sw37f15       0.3065    0.3571    0.4496    0.4520    0.4809 
  2 sw48f05       0.5408    0.6472    0.6744    0.6756    0.7082 
  3 sw54f12       0.1596    0.2035    0.2087    0.2095    0.2707 
  4 sw45f09       0.4444    0.4711    0.5091    0.5100    0.5189 
  5 sw59f15       0.2461    0.3600    0.3650    0.3757    0.3825 
  6 sw61f18       0.3503    0.5348    0.5406    0.5466    0.5499 
  7 sw55f33       0.3693    0.4370    0.4983    0.6858    0.7264 
  8 sw51f11       0.5303    0.6106    0.6664    0.7130    0.7158 
  9 sw36m03       0.3914    0.3929    0.4679    0.5094    0.5478 
 10 sw53m22       0.3305    0.3447    0.3505    0.3836    0.4348 
 11 sw55f13       0.3802    0.5029    0.5502    0.5720    0.6031 
 12 sw59f38       0.1752    0.1766    0.2360    0.2636    0.3008 
 13 sw55f03       0.3269    0.4047    0.4189    0.4190    0.4739 
 14 sw27f01       0.4430    0.4626    0.4822    0.5224    0.5531 
 15 nsw54f30      0.3744    0.3853    0.3958    0.4455    0.4778 
 16 nsw62f40      0.2401    0.3893    0.4204    0.4296    0.4409 
 17 nsw51f25      0.4532    0.5051    0.5182    0.5247    0.5253 
 18 nsw53f31      0.5531    0.5785    0.5881    0.5923    0.6081 
 19 nsw50m15      0.5131    0.5150    0.5241    0.5243    0.5350 
 20 nsw54m13      0.2645    0.3243    0.3937    0.5328    0.6040 
 21 nsw57m21      0.2070    0.2963    0.3044    0.3048    0.3821 
 22 nsw33f06      0.2136    0.2633    0.2777    0.3728    0.3737 
 23 nsw38f01      0.5052    0.5564    0.5576    0.6390    0.6477 
 24 nsw47f20      0.3333    0.3684    0.3930    0.4038    0.4362 
 25 nsw30f04      0.5081    0.5232    0.5475    0.5840    0.6113 
 26 psw24f04      0.0727    0.5146    0.5354    0.5501    0.5609 
 27 psw53m26      0.0049    0.2265    0.2369    0.2369    0.2400 
 28 psw23m01      0.0144    0.4615    0.4685    0.5151    0.5158 
 29 psw47f06      0.0067    0.2488    0.2502    0.3118    0.3226 
 30 psw49f23      0.0080    0.5105    0.5113    0.5166    0.5366 
 31 psw22f05      0.0028    0.2673    0.3811    0.3910    0.4253 
 32 psw36f01      0.0000    0.5756    0.5858    0.6215    0.6223 
 33 psw21f03      0.0818    0.3535    0.3535    0.3741    0.4141 
 34 psw32f07      0.0301    0.5997    0.6018    0.6254    0.6316 
 35 psw25f01      0.0153    0.1720    0.2068    0.2100    0.2260 
 36 psw46m03      0.1039    0.2474    0.2534    0.3048    0.3223 
 37 psw33f10      0.0195    0.4530    0.4600    0.5251    0.5998 
 
cum% expl.Var.        26        41        44        47        50 
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Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort 
 
                Loadings 
 
 QSORT             1         2 
  
  1 sw37f15      0.5536X  -0.2249  
  2 sw48f05      0.7354   -0.3262  
  3 sw54f12      0.3995X  -0.2097  
  4 sw45f09      0.6666X  -0.1633  
  5 sw59f15      0.4961   -0.3374  
  6 sw61f18      0.5919   -0.4295  
  7 sw55f33      0.6077   -0.2603  
  8 sw51f11      0.7282X  -0.2834  
  9 sw36m03      0.6256X  -0.0379  
 10 sw53m22      0.5749X  -0.1190  
 11 sw55f13      0.6166   -0.3503  
 12 sw59f38      0.4186X  -0.0376  
 13 sw55f03      0.5718X  -0.2788  
 14 sw27f01      0.6656X  -0.1399  
 15 nsw54f30     0.6119X  -0.1041  
 16 nsw62f40     0.4900   -0.3862  
 17 nsw51f25     0.6732X  -0.2279  
 18 nsw53f31     0.7437X  -0.1595  
 19 nsw50m15     0.7163X   0.0441  
 20 nsw54m13     0.5142   -0.2446  
 21 nsw57m21     0.4550X  -0.2989  
 22 nsw33f06     0.4622X  -0.2229  
 23 nsw38f01     0.7108X  -0.2262  
 24 nsw47f20     0.5773X  -0.1873  
 25 nsw30f04     0.7128X  -0.1233  
 26 psw24f04     0.2697    0.6647X 
 27 psw53m26     0.0703    0.4707X 
 28 psw23m01     0.1198    0.6687X 
 29 psw47f06     0.0820    0.4920X 
 30 psw49f23     0.0894    0.7088X 
 31 psw22f05     0.0531    0.5143  
 32 psw36f01    -0.0055    0.7587X 
 33 psw21f03     0.2860    0.5213X 
 34 psw32f07     0.1736    0.7547X 
 35 psw25f01     0.1235    0.3959X 
 36 psw46m03     0.3224    0.3787X 
 37 psw33f10     0.1396    0.6584X 
 
 % expl.Var.         26        15 
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Free Distribution Data Results 
 
 QSORT            MEAN     ST.DEV. 
  
  1 sw37f15       0.000     2.700 
  2 sw48f05       0.000     2.700 
  3 sw54f12       0.000     2.700 
  4 sw45f09       0.000     2.700 
  5 sw59f15       0.000     2.700 
  6 sw61f18       0.000     2.700 
  7 sw55f33       0.000     2.700 
  8 sw51f11       0.000     2.700 
  9 sw36m03       0.000     2.700 
 10 sw53m22       0.000     2.700 
 11 sw55f13       0.000     2.700 
 12 sw59f38       0.000     2.700 
 13 sw55f03       0.000     2.700 
 14 sw27f01       0.000     2.700 
 15 nsw54f30      0.000     2.700 
 16 nsw62f40      0.000     2.700 
 17 nsw51f25      0.000     2.700 
 18 nsw53f31      0.000     2.700 
 19 nsw50m15      0.000     2.700 
 20 nsw54m13      0.000     2.700 
 21 nsw57m21      0.000     2.700 
 22 nsw33f06      0.000     2.700 
 23 nsw38f01      0.000     2.700 
 24 nsw47f20      0.000     2.700 
 25 nsw30f04      0.000     2.700 
 26 psw24f04      0.000     2.700 
 27 psw53m26      0.000     2.700 
 28 psw23m01      0.000     2.700 
 29 psw47f06      0.000     2.700 
 30 psw49f23      0.000     2.700 
 31 psw22f05      0.000     2.700 
 32 psw36f01      0.000     2.700 
 33 psw21f03      0.000     2.700 
 34 psw32f07      0.000     2.700 
 35 psw25f01      0.000     2.700 
 36 psw46m03      0.000     2.700 
 37 psw33f10      0.000     2.700 
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Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks 
                                                                              
Factors 
No.  Statement                                                 No.          1        2 
  
  1  a\                                                        1      0.85  13   0.16  32 
  2  b                                                         2     -0.14  37  -0.89  45 
  3  c                                                         3      1.19   8   0.23  30 
  4  d                                                         4      0.91  11  -1.41  53 
  5  e                                                         5     -1.78  59  -1.32  51 
  6  f                                                         6      0.03  33  -0.69  43 
  7  g                                                         7     -0.30  40  -1.39  52 
  8  h                                                         8      1.33   5  -1.54  55 
  9  i                                                         9     -0.60  44  -1.08  47 
 10  j                                                        10      1.32   6  -1.72  59 
 11  k                                                        11     -0.81  47  -1.66  57 
 12  l                                                        12     -1.74  57   0.10  33 
 13  m                                                        13      0.18  28   0.75  16 
 14  n                                                        14      0.68  19  -0.20  39 
 15  o                                                        15     -0.40  42   0.46  24 
 16  p                                                        16     -1.65  55   0.22  31 
 17  q                                                        17     -0.95  48   1.11   8 
 18  r                                                        18     -1.26  51   1.80   1 
 19  s                                                        19      0.00  35   0.70  19 
 20  t                                                        20      0.19  27  -1.25  49 
 21  u                                                        21     -1.08  49  -0.40  41 
 22  v                                                        22      0.07  31  -1.72  60 
 23  w                                                        23      0.63  21   0.46  23 
 24  x                                                        24      0.74  16   0.79  14 
 25  y                                                        25      0.72  17   1.19   5 
 26  z                                                        26     -0.62  45   0.30  27 
 27  a\a\                                                     27     -1.49  52   0.05  35 
 28  bb                                                       28     -1.63  54  -1.06  46 
 29  cc                                                       29      0.04  32   0.10  34 
 30  dd                                                       30      0.58  22   1.50   2 
 31  ee                                                       31      0.78  14  -1.43  54 
 32  ff                                                       32      0.75  15  -1.68  58 
 33  gg                                                       33      0.14  30  -0.32  40 
 34  hh                                                       34     -0.16  39  -1.17  48 
 35  ii                                                       35      1.46   2   0.59  21 
 36  jj                                                       36     -0.43  43  -0.77  44 
 37  kk                                                       37      0.01  34   1.18   6 
 38  ll                                                       38      0.16  29   0.44  25 
 39  mm                                                       39     -1.76  58   0.74  17 
 40  nn                                                       40      1.27   7   0.57  22 
 41  oo                                                       41      0.36  26   1.05  10 
 42  pp                                                       42     -0.13  36   0.03  36 
 43  qq                                                       43      0.85  12   0.24  29 
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Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks 
                                                                              
Factors  
No.  Statement                                       .        No.          1          2 
  
 44  rr                                                       44      0.49  23   1.39   4 
 45  ss                                                       45      1.38   3   0.90  13 
 46  tt                                                       46     -1.98  60   1.13   7 
 47  uu                                                       47      1.78   1   0.28  28 
 48  vv                                                       48      1.01  10   0.70  18 
 49  ww                                                       49     -0.73  46  -0.68  42 
 50  xx                                                       50     -1.56  53   1.41   3 
 51  yy                                                       51      1.12   9   0.78  15 
 52  zz                                                       52      0.64  20  -1.59  56 
 53  a\a\a\                                                   53     -0.15  38  -1.30  50 
 54  bbb                                                      54      0.72  18   0.00  37 
 55  ccc                                                      55      1.33   4   1.08   9 
 56  ddd                                                      56      0.45  24   1.00  12 
 57  eee                                                      57     -1.69  56   0.41  26 
 58  fff                                                      58     -0.37  41   0.62  20 
 59  ggg                                                      59      0.44  25  -0.18  38 
 60  hhh                                                      60     -1.16  50   1.00  11 
 
 
 
     Correlations Between Factor Scores 
 
               1       2 
 
    1     1.0000 -0.0373 
 
    2    -0.0373  1.0000 
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Factor Scores -- For Factor    1 
 
 No.  Statement                                                    No.     Z-SCORES 
  
  47  uu                                                            47        1.776 
  35  ii                                                            35        1.456 
  45  ss                                                            45        1.383 
  55  ccc                                                           55        1.333 
   8  h                                                              8        1.330 
  10  j                                                             10        1.317 
  40  nn                                                            40        1.266 
   3  c                                                              3        1.191 
  51  yy                                                            51        1.121 
  48  vv                                                            48        1.014 
   4  d                                                              4        0.914 
  43  qq                                                            43        0.853 
   1  a\                                                             1        0.845 
  31  ee                                                            31        0.779 
  32  ff                                                            32        0.749 
  24  x                                                             24        0.737 
  25  y                                                             25        0.719 
  54  bbb                                                           54        0.717 
  14  n                                                             14        0.679 
  52  zz                                                            52        0.639 
  23  w                                                             23        0.625 
  30  dd                                                            30        0.580 
  44  rr                                                            44        0.494 
  56  ddd                                                           56        0.455 
  59  ggg                                                           59        0.438 
  41  oo                                                            41        0.355 
  20  t                                                             20        0.186 
  13  m                                                             13        0.183 
  38  ll                                                            38        0.158 
  33  gg                                                            33        0.137 
  22  v                                                             22        0.069 
  29  cc                                                            29        0.044 
   6  f                                                              6        0.025 
  37  kk                                                            37        0.011 
  19  s                                                             19       -0.002 
  42  pp                                                            42       -0.134 
   2  b                                                              2       -0.136 
  53  a\a\a\                                                        53       -0.148 
  34  hh                                                            34       -0.161 
   7  g                                                              7       -0.297 
  58  fff                                                           58       -0.370 
  15  o                                                             15       -0.401 
  36  jj                                                            36       -0.434 
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Factor Scores -- For Factor    1 
 
 No.  Statement                                                No.     Z-SCORES 
  
   9  i                                                         9       -0.604 
  26  z                                                        26       -0.617 
  49  ww                                                       49       -0.728 
  11  k                                                        11       -0.808 
  17  q                                                        17       -0.952 
  21  u                                                        21       -1.077 
  60  hhh                                                      60       -1.157 
  18  r                                                        18       -1.259 
  27  a\a\                                                     27       -1.491 
  50  xx                                                       50       -1.558 
  28  bb                                                       28       -1.633 
  16  p                                                        16       -1.655 
  57  eee                                                      57       -1.692 
  12  l                                                        12       -1.745 
  39  mm                                                       39       -1.757 
   5  e                                                         5       -1.785 
  46  tt                                                       46       -1.978 
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Factor Scores -- For Factor    2 
 
 No.  Statement                                                    No.     Z-SCORES 
  
  18  r                                                             18        1.805 
  30  dd                                                            30        1.504 
  50  xx                                                            50        1.414 
  44  rr                                                            44        1.386 
  25  y                                                             25        1.185 
  37  kk                                                            37        1.180 
  46  tt                                                            46        1.133 
  17  q                                                             17        1.107 
  55  ccc                                                           55        1.076 
  41  oo                                                            41        1.046 
  60  hhh                                                           60        1.002 
  56  ddd                                                           56        1.001 
  45  ss                                                            45        0.895 
  24  x                                                             24        0.795 
  51  yy                                                            51        0.780 
  13  m                                                             13        0.748 
  39  mm                                                            39        0.738 
  48  vv                                                            48        0.699 
  19  s                                                             19        0.696 
  58  fff                                                           58        0.619 
  35  ii                                                            35        0.593 
  40  nn                                                            40        0.566 
  23  w                                                             23        0.464 
  15  o                                                             15        0.459 
  38  ll                                                            38        0.442 
  57  eee                                                           57        0.410 
  26  z                                                             26        0.301 
  47  uu                                                            47        0.280 
  43  qq                                                            43        0.237 
   3  c                                                              3        0.229 
  16  p                                                             16        0.218 
   1  a\                                                             1        0.157 
  12  l                                                             12        0.104 
  29  cc                                                            29        0.095 
  27  a\a\                                                          27        0.047 
  42  pp                                                            42        0.033 
  54  bbb                                                           54        0.000 
  59  ggg                                                           59       -0.180 
  14  n                                                             14       -0.200 
  33  gg                                                            33       -0.316 
  21  u                                                             21       -0.402 
  49  ww                                                            49       -0.677 
   6  f                                                              6       -0.689 
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Factor Scores -- For Factor    2 
 
 No.  Statement                                                    No.     Z-SCORES 
  
  36  jj                                                            36       -0.768 
   2  b                                                              2       -0.893 
  28  bb                                                            28       -1.064 
   9  i                                                              9       -1.081 
  34  hh                                                            34       -1.166 
  20  t                                                             20       -1.250 
  53  a\a\a\                                                        53       -1.301 
   5  e                                                              5       -1.324 
   7  g                                                              7       -1.386 
   4  d                                                              4       -1.412 
  31  ee                                                            31       -1.426 
   8  h                                                              8       -1.538 
  52  zz                                                            52       -1.592 
  11  k                                                             11       -1.660 
  32  ff                                                            32       -1.681 
  10  j                                                             10       -1.716 
  22  v                                                             22       -1.722 
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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 2 
 
No.  Statement                                          No.     Type 1      Type 2  Difference 
  
  10  j                                                 10        1.317    -1.716       3.033 
   8  h                                                  8        1.330    -1.538       2.867 
  32  ff                                                32        0.749    -1.681       2.430 
   4  d                                                  4        0.914    -1.412       2.326 
  52  zz                                                52        0.639    -1.592       2.231 
  31  ee                                                31        0.779    -1.426       2.205 
  22  v                                                 22        0.069    -1.722       1.791 
  47  uu                                                47        1.776     0.280       1.496 
  20  t                                                 20        0.186    -1.250       1.436 
  53  a\a\a\                                            53       -0.148    -1.301       1.152 
   7  g                                                  7       -0.297    -1.386       1.089 
  34  hh                                                34       -0.161    -1.166       1.005 
   3  c                                                  3        1.191     0.229       0.962 
  14  n                                                 14        0.679    -0.200       0.879 
  35  ii                                                35        1.456     0.593       0.863 
  11  k                                                 11       -0.808    -1.660       0.852 
   2  b                                                  2       -0.136    -0.893       0.757 
  54  bbb                                               54        0.717     0.000       0.717 
   6  f                                                  6        0.025    -0.689       0.715 
  40  nn                                                40        1.266     0.566       0.700 
   1  a\                                                 1        0.845     0.157       0.688 
  59  ggg                                               59        0.438    -0.180       0.618 
  43  qq                                                43        0.853     0.237       0.616 
  45  ss                                                45        1.383     0.895       0.488 
   9  i                                                  9       -0.604    -1.081       0.477 
  33  gg                                                33        0.137    -0.316       0.453 
  51  yy                                                51        1.121     0.780       0.341 
  36  jj                                                36       -0.434    -0.768       0.334 
  48  vv                                                48        1.014     0.699       0.315 
  55  ccc                                               55        1.333     1.076       0.257 
  23  w                                                 23        0.625     0.464       0.161 
  49  ww                                                49       -0.728    -0.677      -0.051 
  29  cc                                                29        0.044     0.095      -0.051 
  24  x                                                 24        0.737     0.795      -0.057 
  42  pp                                                42       -0.134     0.033      -0.167 
  38  ll                                                38        0.158     0.442      -0.284 
   5  e                                                  5       -1.785    -1.324      -0.461 
  25  y                                                 25        0.719     1.185      -0.466 
  56  ddd                                               56        0.455     1.001      -0.547 
  13  m                                                 13        0.183     0.748      -0.566 
  28  bb                                                28       -1.633    -1.064      -0.569 
  21  u                                                 21       -1.077    -0.402      -0.675 
  41  oo                                                41        0.355     1.046      -0.690 
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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors   1 and   2 
 
No.  Statement                                       No.     Type   1    Type 2  Difference 
  
  19  s                                              19       -0.002     0.696      -0.698 
  15  o                                              15       -0.401     0.459      -0.860 
  44  rr                                             44        0.494     1.386      -0.893 
  26  z                                              26       -0.617     0.301      -0.918 
  30  dd                                             30        0.580     1.504      -0.924 
  58  fff                                            58       -0.370     0.619      -0.989 
  37  kk                                             37        0.011     1.180      -1.168 
  27  a\a\                                           27       -1.491     0.047      -1.537 
  12  l                                              12       -1.745     0.104      -1.848 
  16  p                                              16       -1.655     0.218      -1.873 
  17  q                                              17       -0.952     1.107      -2.059 
  57  eee                                            57       -1.692     0.410      -2.102 
  60  hhh                                            60       -1.157     1.002      -2.158 
  39  mm                                             39       -1.757     0.738      -2.495 
  50  xx                                             50       -1.558     1.414      -2.972 
  18  r                                              18       -1.259     1.805      -3.064 
  46  tt                                             46       -1.978     1.133      -3.111 
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Exact Factor Scores (ß la SPSS) in Z-Score and T-Score units 
                                                                              
Factors 
No.  Statement                                               No.          1          2 
  
  1  a\                                                        1      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  2  b                                                         2      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  3  c                                                         3      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  4  d                                                         4      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  5  e                                                         5      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  6  f                                                         6      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  7  g                                                         7      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  8  h                                                         8      0.00  50   0.00  50 
  9  i                                                         9      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 10  j                                                        10      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 11  k                                                        11      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 12  l                                                        12      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 13  m                                                        13      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 14  n                                                        14      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 15  o                                                        15      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 16  p                                                        16      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 17  q                                                        17      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 18  r                                                        18      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 19  s                                                        19      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 20  t                                                        20      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 21  u                                                        21      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 22  v                                                        22      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 23  w                                                        23      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 24  x                                                        24      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 25  y                                                        25      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 26  z                                                        26      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 27  a\a\                                                     27      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 28  bb                                                       28      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 29  cc                                                       29      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 30  dd                                                       30      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 31  ee                                                       31      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 32  ff                                                       32      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 33  gg                                                       33      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 34  hh                                                       34      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 35  ii                                                       35      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 36  jj                                                       36      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 37  kk                                                       37      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 38  ll                                                       38      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 39  mm                                                       39      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 40  nn                                                       40      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 41  oo                                                       41      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 42  pp                                                       42      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 43  qq                                                       43      0.00  50   0.00  50 
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Exact Factor Scores (ß la SPSS) in Z-Score and T-Score units 
                                                                              
Factors 
No.  Statement                                               No.          1          2 
  
 44  rr                                                       44      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 45  ss                                                       45      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 46  tt                                                       46      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 47  uu                                                       47      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 48  vv                                                       48      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 49  ww                                                       49      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 50  xx                                                       50      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 51  yy                                                       51      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 52  zz                                                       52      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 53  a\a\a\                                                   53      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 54  bbb                                                      54      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 55  ccc                                                      55      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 56  ddd                                                      56      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 57  eee                                                      57      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 58  fff                                                      58      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 59  ggg                                                      59      0.00  50   0.00  50 
 60  hhh                                                      60      0.00  50   0.00  50 
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Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement 
 
                                                                             
Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2 
  
  1  a\                                                             1        2      0 
  2  b                                                              2       -1     -2 
  3  c                                                              3        3      0 
  4  d                                                              4        3     -3 
  5  e                                                              5       -5     -3 
  6  f                                                              6        0     -2 
  7  g                                                              7       -1     -3 
  8  h                                                              8        4     -4 
  9  i                                                              9       -2     -2 
 10  j                                                             10        4     -5 
 11  k                                                             11       -2     -4 
 12  l                                                             12       -4      0 
 13  m                                                             13        0      2 
 14  n                                                             14        1     -1 
 15  o                                                             15       -1      1 
 16  p                                                             16       -4      0 
 17  q                                                             17       -2      3 
 18  r                                                             18       -3      5 
 19  s                                                             19        0      1 
 20  t                                                             20        0     -3 
 21  u                                                             21       -3     -1 
 22  v                                                             22        0     -5 
 23  w                                                             23        1      1 
 24  x                                                             24        2      2 
 25  y                                                             25        2      4 
 26  z                                                             26       -2      0 
 27  a\a\                                                          27       -3      0 
 28  bb                                                            28       -4     -2 
 29  cc                                                            29        0      0 
 30  dd                                                            30        1      5 
 31  ee                                                            31        2     -4 
 32  ff                                                            32        2     -5 
 33  gg                                                            33        0     -1 
 34  hh                                                            34       -1     -2 
 35  ii                                                            35        5      1 
 36  jj                                                            36       -2     -2 
 37  kk                                                            37        0      4 
 38  ll                                                            38        0      1 
 39  mm                                                            39       -5      2 
 40  nn                                                            40        4      1 
 41  oo                                                            41        0      3 
 42  pp                                                            42       -1     -1 
 43  qq                                                            43        3      0 
 44  rr                                                            44        1      4 
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Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2 
  
 45  ss                                                            45        5      2 
 46  tt                                                            46       -5      4 
 47  uu                                                            47        5      0 
 48  vv                                                            48        3      2 
 49  ww                                                            49       -2     -1 
 50  xx                                                            50       -3      5 
 51  yy                                                            51        3      2 
 52  zz                                                            52        1     -4 
 53  a\a\a\                                                        53       -1     -3 
 54  bbb                                                           54        2     -1 
 55  ccc                                                           55        4      3 
 56  ddd                                                           56        1      3 
 57  eee                                                           57       -4      0 
 58  fff                                                           58       -1      1 
 59  ggg                                                           59        1     -1 
 60  hhh                                                           60       -3      3 
 
 
Variance =  7.167  St. Dev. =  2.677 
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Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. 
Disagreement (Variance across Factor Z-Scores) 
 
                                                                             
Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2 
  
 49  ww                                                            49       -2     -1 
 29  cc                                                            29        0      0 
 24  x                                                             24        2      2 
 23  w                                                             23        1      1 
 42  pp                                                            42       -1     -1 
 55  ccc                                                           55        4      3 
 38  ll                                                            38        0      1 
 48  vv                                                            48        3      2 
 36  jj                                                            36       -2     -2 
 51  yy                                                            51        3      2 
 33  gg                                                            33        0     -1 
  5  e                                                              5       -5     -3 
 25  y                                                             25        2      4 
  9  i                                                              9       -2     -2 
 45  ss                                                            45        5      2 
 56  ddd                                                           56        1      3 
 13  m                                                             13        0      2 
 28  bb                                                            28       -4     -2 
 43  qq                                                            43        3      0 
 59  ggg                                                           59        1     -1 
 21  u                                                             21       -3     -1 
  1  a\                                                             1        2      0 
 41  oo                                                            41        0      3 
 19  s                                                             19        0      1 
 40  nn                                                            40        4      1 
  6  f                                                              6        0     -2 
 54  bbb                                                           54        2     -1 
  2  b                                                              2       -1     -2 
 11  k                                                             11       -2     -4 
 15  o                                                             15       -1      1 
 35  ii                                                            35        5      1 
 14  n                                                             14        1     -1 
 44  rr                                                            44        1      4 
 26  z                                                             26       -2      0 
 30  dd                                                            30        1      5 
  3  c                                                              3        3      0 
 58  fff                                                           58       -1      1 
 34  hh                                                            34       -1     -2 
  7  g                                                              7       -1     -3 
 53  a\a\a\                                                        53       -1     -3 
 37  kk                                                            37        0      4 
 20  t                                                             20        0     -3 
 47  uu                                                            47        5      0 
 27  a\a\                                                          27       -3      
0 
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Factor Arrays 
 
No.  Statement                                                    No.        1      2 
  
 22  v                                                             22        0     -5 
 12  l                                                             12       -4      0 
 16  p                                                             16       -4      0 
 17  q                                                             17       -2      3 
 57  eee                                                           57       -4      0 
 60  hhh                                                           60       -3      3 
 31  ee                                                            31        2     -4 
 52  zz                                                            52        1     -4 
  4  d                                                              4        3     -3 
 32  ff                                                            32        2     -5 
 39  mm                                                            39       -5      2 
  8  h                                                              8        4     -4 
 50  xx                                                            50       -3      5 
 10  j                                                             10        4     -5 
 18  r                                                             18       -3      5 
 46  tt                                                            46       -5      4 
 
 
Factor Characteristics 
                                     Factors 
 
                                       1        2 
 
No. of Defining Variables             18       11 
 
Average Rel. Coef.                   0.800    0.800 
 
Composite Reliability                0.986    0.978 
 
S.E. of Factor Z-Scores              0.117    0.149 
 
 
 
Standard Errors for Differences in Factor Z-Scores 
 
(Diagonal Entries Are S.E. Within Factors) 
 
            Factors         1        2 
 
                1         0.166    0.190 
 
                2         0.190    0.211 
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Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1 
 
 (P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown. 
 
Factors 
                                                                              1           2 
 No. Statement                                                   No.   Q-SV Z-SCR  Q-SV Z-SCR   
 
  47 uu                                                           47      5  1.78*    0  0.28  
  35 ii                                                           35      5  1.46*    1  0.59  
  45 ss                                                           45      5  1.38     2  0.90  
   8 h                                                             8      4  1.33*   -4 -1.54  
  10 j                                                            10      4  1.32*   -5 -1.72  
  40 nn                                                           40      4  1.27*    1  0.57  
   3 c                                                             3      3  1.19*    0  0.23  
   4 d                                                             4      3  0.91*   -3 -1.41  
  43 qq                                                           43      3  0.85*    0  0.24  
   1 a\                                                            1      2  0.85*    0  0.16  
  31 ee                                                           31      2  0.78*   -4 -1.43  
  32 ff                                                           32      2  0.75*   -5 -1.68  
  25 y                                                            25      2  0.72     4  1.19  
  54 bbb                                                          54      2  0.72*   -1  0.00  
  14 n                                                            14      1  0.68*   -1 -0.20  
  52 zz                                                           52      1  0.64*   -4 -1.59  
  30 dd                                                           30      1  0.58*    5  1.50  
  44 rr                                                           44      1  0.49*    4  1.39  
  56 ddd                                                          56      1  0.45*    3  1.00  
  59 ggg                                                          59      1  0.44*   -1 -0.18  
  41 oo                                                           41      0  0.36*    3  1.05  
  20 t                                                            20      0  0.19*   -3 -1.25  
  13 m                                                            13      0  0.18*    2  0.75  
  33 gg                                                           33      0  0.14    -1 -0.32  
  22 v                                                            22      0  0.07*   -5 -1.72  
   6 f                                                             6      0  0.03*   -2 -0.69  
  37 kk                                                           37      0  0.01*    4  1.18  
  19 s                                                            19      0  0.00*    1  0.70  
   2 b                                                             2     -1 -0.14*   -2 -0.89  
  53 a\a\a\                                                       53     -1 -0.15*   -3 -1.30  
  34 hh                                                           34     -1 -0.16*   -2 -1.17  
   7 g                                                             7     -1 -0.30*   -3 -1.39  
  58 fff                                                          58     -1 -0.37*    1  0.62  
  15 o                                                            15     -1 -0.40*    1  0.46  
   9 i                                                             9     -2 -0.60    -2 -1.08  
  26 z                                                            26     -2 -0.62*    0  0.30  
  11 k                                                            11     -2 -0.81*   -4 -1.66  
  17 q                                                            17     -2 -0.95*    3  1.11  
  21 u                                                            21     -3 -1.08*   -1 -0.40  
  60 hhh                                                          60     -3 -1.16*    3  1.00  
  18 r                                                            18     -3 -1.26*    5  1.80  
  27 a\a\                                                         27     -3 -1.49*    0  0.05  
  50 xx                                                           50     -3 -1.56*    5  1.41  
  28 bb                                                           28     -4 -1.63*   -2 -1.06  
  16 p                                                            16     -4 -1.65*    0  0.22  
  57 eee                                                          57     -4 -1.69*    0  0.41  
  12 l                                                            12     -4 -1.74*    0  0.10  
  39 mm                                                           39     -5 -1.76*    2  0.74  
   5 e                                                             5     -5 -1.78    -3 -1.32  
  46 tt                                                           46     -5 -1.98*    4  1.13  
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Consensus Statements  --  Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY 
Pair of Factors. 
 
All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01, and Those Flagged 
With an * are also Non-Significant at P>.05. 
  
 
 
                                                                                       
Factors 
 
                                                                              1           2 
 No.  Statement                                               No.   Q-SV Z-SCR  Q-SV Z-SCR   
 
   5  e                                                        5     -5 -1.78    -3 -1.32   
   9  i                                                        9     -2 -0.60    -2 -1.08   
  23* w                                                       23      1  0.63     1  0.46   
  24* x                                                       24      2  0.74     2  0.79   
  25  y                                                       25      2  0.72     4  1.19   
  29* cc                                                      29      0  0.04     0  0.10   
  33  gg                                                      33      0  0.14    -1 -0.32   
  36* jj                                                      36     -2 -0.43    -2 -0.77   
  38* ll                                                      38      0  0.16     1  0.44   
  42* pp                                                      42     -1 -0.13    -1  0.03   
  45  ss                                                      45      5  1.38     2  0.90   
  48* vv                                                      48      3  1.01     2  0.70   
  49* ww                                                      49     -2 -0.73    -1 -0.68   
  51* yy                                                      51      3  1.12     2  0.78   
  55* ccc                                                     55      4  1.33     3  1.08   
 
 
QANALYZE was completed at 09:55:46 
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Appendix 12a List of Invited Conference Presentations Based on Thesis 
Material 
June 2015: Social Work Education in Europe – Towards 2025: European 
Association of Schools of Social Work, Milan, Italy: Exploring Human Subjectivity 
Using Q-Methodology. 
April 2015: 5th European Conference for Social Work Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia: 
Exploring Human Subjectivity Using Q-Methodology. 
May 2014: Athens Institute for Education and Research, Athens, Greece: 
Knowledge Production and Public Accountability: Q-Methodology, Pragmatism, 
Knowledge Forms and Professional Practice. 
April 2014: 4th European Conference for Social Work Research, Bolzano, Italy: Q-
Methodology, Pragmatism, Knowledge Forms and Social Work Practice 
March 2014: Fachhochschule, Soziale Arbeit, FH Campus, Vienna, Austria: 
Pragmatism and Welfare Systems: An Example from the UK.  
October 2012: Hochschule, Merseburg, Germany: Knowledge for Practice in Work 
with Children and their Families. Invited Conference Presentation and Paper.  
June 2012: Fachhochschule, Soziale Arbeit, FH Campus, Vienna, Austria: 
European Perspectives on Systemic Practice – Pragmatic Lessons from the UK?  
Invited Conference Presentation & Paper.  
May 2012: The University of Helsinki, Finland: 'Systemic thinking, welfare policy and 
pragmatic philosophy - a meeting of ideas'. Invited Conference Presentation and 
Paper.  
March 2012: The Robert Gordon University: Systemic Social Work Throughout 
Europe: Pragmatic Perspectives. Hosted in conjunction with ASYS [Arbeitskreis für 
Systemische Sozialarbeit, Beratung und Supervision], Vienna, Austria; the 
University of Helsinki, Finland; Fachholschule Campus, Vienna, Austria; 
Hochschule, Merseburg, Germany; Hochschule, Lucerne, Switzerland and the 
London Borough of Hackney. Conference Organiser, Chair and Presenter. The 
Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. 
